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SUMMARY
This thesis offers an account of the processes through which feminist 
subjectivities are constructed. Subjectivity is a central theoretical concept of the 
work and is conceptualised throughout from a poststructuralist perspective. 
Implicit in this perspective is the understanding that subjectivity is social, 
dynamic and multiple. Drawing in particular on feminist poststructuralist and 
psychodynamic thought, the theoretical objective of the work is to advance 
theories of adult politicisation, human agency and critical adult education.
Based on original fieldwork with self-defined feminist women, feminist 
subjectivity is characterised as a three-way production involving a) different 
feminist discourses, b) relations in present situations and c) emotional 
responses.
Taking into account the complex picture of feminist subjectivity which the 
research provides, the thesis also asks if politicised subjectivities can be 
produced within the context of women’s personal development education. This 
is a timely question, given the enormous popularity of women’s personal 
development education in Ireland. Such education is predominantly practised 
within a human relations psychology framework which in turn draws on liberal 
humanist assumptions about the person, power and the nature of social change. 
Such practice is shown in this work to have depoliticising effects.
It is argued that personal development education can be practised in politically 
radical ways, if it draws on theoretical resources outside liberal humanism. The 
thesis builds on its own picture of feminist subjectivities to make proposals for 
a practice of personal development education which meets the stated needs of 
many women for attention to the personal, but without sliding into a 
depoliticised individualism. The proposals are living, practical and specifically 
designed for an educational context.
The thesis concludes by arguing that the training of personal development 
facilitators needs to be informed by a wide range of feminist discourses, 
especially including feminist poststructuralist theories. It also rec ommends 
that critical adult education provide the theoretical resources for politically 
radical personal development education, by addressing questions of subjectivity 
and human agency, and by treating gender differences as produced and open to 
change, rather than as given.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS
1.0 Introduction
This chapter introduces the thesis, the key assumptions of its epistemological 
stance, the social context in which the study takes place and the research 
questions. The thesis is a study of the construction of subjectivity and it puts 
forward a theoretical account of the processes through which adult feminist 
subjectivities are constituted. In taking subjectivity as a primary focus, there is 
a pedagogical concern to generate sources and themes for a politicised practice 
of women’s personal development education. I posit that the study of feminist 
subjectivities helps to understand how individual women are both governed by 
and, more importantly for a theory of change, resist the different forms of 
power which structure gender relations. The research seeks pedagogical 
conditions that enable people (women in particular) to engage in ideology 
critique and personal and social change (cf Lather, 1986: 266). The theoretical 
objective of the thesis is to advance theories of adult development and thereby 
to add to theories of adult politicisation and to elaborate on sources and 
themes for radical pedagogies. Thus, the theory which emerges must be living, 
as well as specifically educational, that is, distinct from psychological or 
sociological theory applied to education (cf Lomax, 1994). A focus on 
subjectivity is appropriate for such a study, because subjectivity is treated as 
something that is produced and developed throughout adult life.
The first five chapters of the thesis, which comprise Part One, are devoted to 
investigating the human subject, and especially the female subject, as it is 
construed by western academic, liberation movement and pedagogical 
discourses. The implications of this deconstruction for methodological issues 
are also discussed. In Part One I set out the conceptual and theoretical tools
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which I consider necessary for my subsequent accounts of subjectivity, by 
drawing on recent advances in feminist poststructuralist and psychodynamic 
theory. This chapter, Chapter One, introduces my epistemological stance and 
the research questions which have grown out of it. Chapter Two is a discussion 
of the general poststructuralist opposition to the modem, unitary human 
subject and the ‘principles’ of a feminist poststructuralist epistemological 
approach to subjectivity and change. Chapter Three examines views of 
subjectivity found in the paradigms of liberal humanism, cultural feminism and 
structuralism. It also examines feminist poststructuralist uses of psychoanalytic 
theories. Chapter Four reviews the conditions of production of some different 
approaches to pedagogy, learning, knowledge and pedagogical assumptions 
about the human subject. Chapter Five discusses the methodological 
implications of a feminist poststructural stance.
Part Two, which also comprises five chapters, begins with a study of the 
construction of feminist subjectivities in 1990s Ireland, through an analysis of 
case material from twenty self-defined feminist women. This is undertaken 
because of my conviction that if we want to produce feminist subjectivities or 
other kinds of politicised subjectivities in adult education, we need to have 
some kind of theory of how they are constructed and what they look like. 
Chapter Six examines the discourses of women and of feminism which form 
the content of feminist consciousness for the research participants. Chapter 
Seven examines feminist subjectivity as a process of relations in the present. 
Chapter Eight examines how psychodynamic concepts can be used for the 
development of feminist poststructuralist discourses. Chapter Nine ‘tests’ the 
usefulness of the theory developed so far in the thesis for my practice of 
women’s personal development education in a feminist poststructuralist 
framework. Chapter Nine is the crux of this work. In it, I attempt to go beyond 
mapping women’s oppression or alternatively calling for separate systems of 
education for women. I attempt to develop feminist praxis which transcends 
the gap between theory and practical strategies in the classroom. In Chapter
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Nine, my attempts to create and produce useful feminist knowledge in the 
course of pedagogical relations with other women are exposed for scrutiny. 
The final chapter, Chapter Ten, is a summary of the research findings and a 
discussion of the usefulness of feminist poststructuralism as a tool for 
pedagogy.
1.1 Subjectivity
Concerns with history, meaning and subjectivity are characteristic of 
appproaches in the social sciences which have emerged since the 1970s, under 
varying labels such as feminism, post-Marxism, poststructuralism and 
postmodernism. The work of Michel Foucault, in particular, has stimulated 
interest in history. Semiotics and similar traditions in theories of language 
stress that meanings are produced within social and material relations rather 
than in relation to objects. The third concern, subjectivity, approaches the 
traditional object of psychology, the individual, from a perspective which 
stresses power relations, language and meaning and the part played by 
unconscious forces (Hollway, 1991a: 185).
The treatment of the subject and the social as separate and different things is 
seen by poststructuralist theorists as characteristic of modernity. This 
treatment has led to theoretical situations where there is a division of labour 
between psychology and sociology. Briefly put, psychology deals with the 
individual and its dominant version of the the individual is one which is unitary, 
rational and asocial at its core (the real or true self). It tends to 
unproblematically view the social as made up of a collection of such individuals 
(Broughton, 1987b). Sociology centralises the social and structural aspects of 
life, but without an adequate theory of individual action and agency in relation 
to these structures. Sub-disciplines like social psychology and interactionism 
try to overcome this division, but unsatisfactorily, as I show. Psychologists
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have not satisfactorily resolved problems with the epistemological status of 
concepts like the individual, the self and personality, yet sociologists tend to 
use them unproblematically. Poststructuralists have attempted to overcome this 
dualism through the concept of subjectivity.
Subjectivity is conceptualised throughout this work, but for introductory 
purposes it is worth stating that I use the concept instead of the psychological 
terms ‘identity’ and ‘self, to indicate my attempt to overcome the dualistic 
notion that the psychological and social parts of the human person are 
essentially separate territories: one internal and one external to the person. 
Instead, I regard both the social and the psychological as being in ‘a recursive 
relationship of mutually advancing production and change’ (Mama, 1995 : 1). I 
follow the use of the term developed by Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and 
Walkerdine (1984), in their leading and ground-breaking text on 
post-structuralist psychology and its implications for political struggles. The 
authors refer to subjectivity as ‘individuality and self-awareness — the 
condition of being a subject’ (ibid: 3). Weedon also writes (1987: 32, 33):
The terms subject and subjectivity are central to post-structuralist 
theory and they mark a crucial break with humanist conceptions of the 
individual which are still central to western philosophy and political and 
social organisation. ‘Subjectivity’ is used to refer to the conscious and 
unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, her sense of 
herself and her ways of understanding her relation to the world. ... 
poststructuralism proposes a subjectivity which is precarious, 
contradictory and in process, constantly being constituted in discourse 
each time we think or speak.
In this work, I initially investigate the production of subjectivity through a 
study of how twenty self-defined feminist women experience feminism in the 
particular social context of late twentieth century Ireland. I examine the 
historical and social material they draw on and how they creatively relate to 
some of the discourses of feminism, sometimes transforming them, sometimes 
producing new discourses and sometimes experiencing personal
4
transformation.
I work with a theorisation of subjectivity that does not assume a unitary, static 
subject at its core but instead conceptualises subjectivity as multiple, dynamic 
and continuously produced in the course of social relations that are themselves 
changing and often contradictory. I demonstrate the effects of this theorisation 
on my practice as facilitator of women’s personal development education. All 
of this is undertaken with recent developments in feminist poststructuralist 
theories (for example, Hollway, 1989, 1994, 1995; Mama, 1995) in mind. 
However, the theorising is not meant to be a universal theory of human psychic 
or social development. As Mama (ibid) emphasises, it a local and specific 
analysis of adult human subjectivity.
1.2 Pedagogy
A commitment to feminism means for me, among other things, a desire to 
share feminist discourse, in particular, to share feminist poststructuralist 
discourse. How do feminists do this successfully? In other words, how do we 
get people to move into existing feminist ways of interpreting the social world, 
or to produce new feminist ways of interpreting it? And along with 
interpretation, how do we facilitate action and human agency based on new 
ways of knowing? One of the ways we try to do it is in educational settings, 
through pedagogical relationships with other people. One of the issues that we 
face in finding useful ways of doing pedagogy in different contexts is that we 
are dealing with real people. Just as a lived everyday politics does not come 
straight out of an epistemological position or commitment, a successful radical 
pedagogy does not emerge straight out of epistemology either. Real people 
argue, question, change the subject and shift the debate. Answers are at best 
partial (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 90). We need to find ways of moving easily 
between analysis and synthesis, between theory and practice. We also need to
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be able to find paths within a diversity of ways of knowing, which includes 
contradiction, partiality, contingency, revisability and questioning which opens 
up the nature of the problems which we face in seeking emancipatory 
knowledges. In spite of all the conflict and uncertainty that these descriptors 
imply, our pedagogical approaches need to be grounded enough to allow for 
action. Yet, in asserting the importance of action, we cannot afford to ignore 
theory for the sake of practice, for to do so is to run the risk of disconnection 
(Freire and Macedo, 1995: 382). In recognition of these concerns, subjectivity, 
as it is theorised by feminist poststrucutralists, needs to be a central theme in 
pedagogy.
Adult education wants to produce critically reflexive people who are capable of 
shifting social balances towards social justice. How does it try do this? 
Theoretically stated, how does adult education pedagogy envisage the 
production of politicised and agentic human subjects? For me, a feminist, with 
a specific interest in personal development education, the central organising 
question becomes: under what conditions is critical self-reflection a radical and 
empowering act for women, from a feminist poststructuralist point of view?
I assert throughout this work that, in taking a feminist poststructural approach 
to adult development, there exists the potential for us to know things about the 
human person, the human subject, or, to use my preferred term, subjectivity. 
Taking account of poststructural developments can help us know more fully 
who we are and how we and others around us are constructed (cf 
Cherryholmes, 1988: 149). I think it can be a useful approach to take to 
theorising radical pedagogies also. What is particularly useful about the 
language of subjectivity for thinking about pedagogy is that it offers ways of 
talking and thinking about complexities and contradictions that people 
experience in their engagement with new discourses, with critical theories and 
with practices of pedagogy in specific historical contexts. This emphasis on 
history and context minimises the chances of falling into a universalism 
unacceptable within a feminist poststructuralist framework. The approach
6
taken to subjectivity also points to the necessity to make conscious the 
subjectivities of teachers as well as students in settings of emancipatory 
pedagogy. Emancipatory pedagogical practices are not aimed only at students, 
but interrogate the teacher and teaching institutions also.
1.3 Poststructuralism and feminism
Feminism, poststructuralism and feminist poststructuralism are terms used and 
conceptualised throughout this thesis. They require qualifiers, in order to avoid 
universalising very particular concepts. Feminism, as I address it,
is resistance to invisibility and silencing. It is the recognition that 
resistance to gendered power relations is both integral to and distinct 
from all other resistances to global injustice. Feminism is a willingness 
to reckon with gender disparities as a universal but ‘unnatural’ power 
reality, a structural process affecting both male and female, which can 
be deconstructed through consciousness-raising and social change. 
Feminist resistance is articulated through women’s movements and 
through individual actions, including refusals and separations’. (Faith, 
1994:37)
Feminism is far from being a unified body of thought, as the thesis as a whole 
makes clear. Feminist poststructuralists recognise identity difference and power 
differentials, in common with other ‘branches’ of feminism, but avoid speaking 
with authority for ‘women’ or for ‘feminists’. This is not to say that one can 
never generalise within a given context, but that generalisation is done with 
caution and always subject to revisability (ibid). ‘Patriarchy’ is another term 
which causes difficulty (Cocks, 1989: 209). The term suggests both centralised 
and localised male power, unchallenged, and a clearly defined private / public 
split. The patriarchy as such does not exist (Faith, 1994: 63). Nevertheless, we 
can speak in various ways of patriarchal relations which structure power, 
authority and hierarchy and which regulate women’s lives.
The term ‘poststructuralism’ is often used interchangeably with
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‘postmodernism’. I do not use it in this way, as I do not believe we are in a 
postmodern era, distinct from a modern one (cf Giddens, 1994a, b). Modernity 
is based on Enlightenment ideas and postmodernism is seen as involving the 
realisation that all knowledge is produced, that there are no fundamental 
‘truths’ (Craib, 1992: 101). We do not live in an age when most people reject 
the idea of fundamental truths. Nevertheless, I accept the idea that we live in 
an age with a ‘postmodern turn’ (Hassan, 1987, cited in Lather, 1991: 4) and 
that the term can be used to mean the shift in material conditions of advanced 
monopoly capitalism, where diagnoses of the human condition often hinge on 
the concept of consumption as ‘the key to the intelligibility of our present ... 
[having] replaced class, region, religion, generation and gender as sources of 
interests and identifications’ (Miller and Rose, 1997: 1). This ‘turn’ is ‘brought 
on by the micro-electronic revolution in information technology, the growth of 
multinational capitalism and the global uprising of the marginalised’ (Lather, 
1991: 4). Following Lather, I use the term ‘poststructural’ to mean the 
working out of cultural theory taking the postmodern turn into account. 
Feminist poststructuralism is not an understanding of the world in all its 
complexity. I have adopted it as a contingent epistemological stance because it 
offers me a way of engaging with a complex world in ways that disrupt the 
gender status quo.
In particular, poststructuralism offers me a useful and productive way to 
approach the debates about social change which manifest themselves in the 
standoff between those who believe that the individual is the source of social 
change or, on the other hand, those who believe that only changes in social 
structures will bring about change. I return to these issues throughout the 
work. Hollway (1989: 27) sums up the importance of this debate in a 'parable':
Supposing in one way or another all humanistic psychological 
intervention was based on the assumption that change was desirable 
and that the individual is the source of change; that is that change in 
feelings, perceptions and attitudes resulted in changed action, and that 
social change consisted of the sum of individual changes. Suppose that 
this assumption were wrong. Its effect would be to preserve the illusion
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of commitment to change while reproducing the status quo. This would 
be particularly convincing since those committed to it would be sincere. 
(Some of you may recognise the critique of liberalism - see Grimshaw, 
1986.) To continue the parable, let us suppose these well-intentioned 
humanist psychologists were criticised by Marxists whose agenda for 
social change depended on changing basic economic, political and 
social structures and rejected the notion of personal change. Suppose 
the humanistic psychologists were understandably disgusted by the 
crudeness of this position which failed entirely to address their own 
experience, and that they were strengthened in their own beliefs.
Post-structuralism is about trying to transcend this hopeless dualism, by 
rejecting both voluntarism and determinism. To do so it requires a 
theory of the subject which is not caught up in the parallel dualism of 
individual and society. (Hollway, 1989: 27)
1.4 Political and epistemological commitments
As indicated, I take political and epistemological positions which are feminist, 
and deeply influenced by poststructural theories. These positions are also 
conceptualised throughout this study, but for introductory purposes, I 
summarise them here. Feminism is a politics directed at changing existing 
power relations between women and men in society. Feminist poststructuralism 
sees the categories of female and male as socially constructed and rejects the 
idea that human beings have essential natures, including essential gendered 
natures. For example, the idea that men and women are identified as such on 
the basis of ‘transhistorical, eternal, immutable essences’ (Fuss, 1990: xi) is 
rejected, because it cannot account for some people’s discomfort with existing 
arrangements and their desire for change. An essentialist formulation of 
womanhood, even when made by feminists, binds the individual to her identity 
as a woman and thus cannot represent a solution to sexism (Alcofif, 1988: 
415). This objection to essentialism leads to a rejection of reductionist, 
monocausal or foundationalist explanations. History and genealogy are seen as 
crucial in the development of ideas, since ‘truth’ does not exist outside the
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social formation.
The body of theory pertaining to feminist poststructuralism is capable of 
analysing the workings of patriarchy in all its manifestations — ideological, 
institutional, organisational, subjective — accounting not only for continuities 
but also for how changes take place. It enables us to think about gender 
without either simply reversing old hierarchies or confirming them (Scott, 
1988). It sees women as oppressed by virtue of their sex, but also along other 
axes of social difference, like age, race, ethnicity, sexual practice, religion, 
ability, etc. Its anti-essentialism requires that we look on a broad scale at 
gender identity and at the gendered positions which are available. It recognises 
the workings of difference, and that women are not a unitary category. It can 
embrace a variety of feminist, socialist and green politics. It emphasises the 
constructed, historical and contextual nature of conclusions and knowledge, 
yet recognises the importance of making choices and taking action for change, 
however flawed.
In adopting a feminist poststructuralist framework, I take the epistemological 
position that all knowledge is socially constructed and socially and historically 
situated. Therefore there is no value-free or universal social theory. I believe 
that the goal of intellectual rigour can best be served not by claiming 
objectivity and ignoring the values underpinning one’s intellectual work, but 
rather by acknowledging the commitments, motivations and conditions that 
have played a part in its production. Feminist poststructuralism is not the only 
body of theory that can support political and epistemological positions such as 
these, but it is through reading and engaging with poststructuralism that I, as a 
feminist woman, have found the clarifications and insights which seemed most 
useful to me and the most enabling of my feminist practice. Along with 
subjectivity, among the key concepts which feminist poststructuralists have 
utilised from poststructuralist theory are language, discourse, difference, 
deconstruction. Although feminist poststructuralism is not a unified body of 
theory, there are however, certain basic assumptions which feminist
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poststructuralists make and which are evident in their ‘contingent and 
révisable’ conclusions (Alcoff, 1988: 431) relating to these key concepts. One 
of these assumptions is that politics is central to everyday life.
1.5 Politics
Fuss (1990) is of the opinion that if there is any essentialism in feminist 
poststructuralism, it is the centrality of politics. Politics for feminist 
poststructuralism refers to opposing and subverting power relations, by 
revealing the vested interests and social construction process that lie behind 
them (cf Frosh, 1987: 12). Generating new theoretical perspectives from which 
the dominant can be criticised and new possibilities envisaged is especially 
important. Radical feminism in particular has contributed much to the 
development of concepts which include the personal in the political. The 
original consciousness raising approach to politics was deconstructive, in that 
the personal / political binary was exposed and attempts made to subvert it. 
Yet, the nature of the personal and of personal experience is problematised for 
feminist poststructuralism in ways which undermine the humanist assumptions 
implicit in liberal and radical feminisms. This valuing of women’s difference 
from men is based on a belief that timeless and true differences exist. While it 
can be strategically useful to emphasise and celebrate these differences from 
time to time (Kristeva, 1986), the valuing of such essential difference, if 
misused or misinterpreted, can be used to support the re-introduction of 
stereotyping (Middleton, 1993: 129). Negotiating diversity, multiplicity and 
differences is a different but necessary political project (Hall, 1997).
Much feminist hostility to poststructuralist theories of subjectivity focuses on 
their anti-humanist tendency. Anti-humanism as a theoretical position is often 
confused with being anti-women, especially by feminists whose primary 
concern is to value and celebrate the experience and culture of women
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(Weedon, 1987: 74). However, feminist poststructuralism’s concern with the 
ways subjectivity is constructed in discourse is motivated by a primary concern 
with understanding how individual women in society are both governed by and 
resist the different forms of power which govern social relations, seeing this as 
necessary for providing the context for a radical politics (Kerfoot and Knights, 
1994). Feminist poststructuralism emphasises the importance of making 
choices and taking action, however flawed or imperfect they may be. Strategy 
becomes important, and this may mean using humanist and essentialist 
concepts from time to time, drawing on them selectively (Spivak, 1990: 100). 
Feminist poststructuralism also realises that, although some concepts may be 
rejected as inadequate for a radical politics today, they were politically 
progressive in their time. It is important to examine them with regard to their 
historical context (Hollway, 1982: 17).
I want to avoid any kind of ideological implications when I say that feminist 
poststructuralist theories are the best so far, or the ‘one best way’ (cf Lather, 
1991). Feminist poststructuralism has a principled objection to ideas of 
progressivism. To accept such a position would imply that the field of critical 
theory can make repeated incremental advances as a function of specific 
discoveries, methodological innovations and clarifications of terminology, in a 
progressive process of construction independent of political motive or aim 
(Broughton, 1987b: 2). Yet, feminist poststructuralist theories embrace the 
kinds of knowledge which I have so far found most useful in producing 
‘successful’ (Faith, 1994: 58) feminist ways of being, and in facilitating 
subjective transformation.
One difficulty of working within a feminist poststructuralist framework has 
been mentioned: that many people see its anti-humanism as anti-women. 
Another difficulty is that it is perceived as currently fashionable in academia. 
Poststructuralism and feminist appropriations of it have been criticised for 
removing feminism and feminist theory from the lives of most feminists and 
from ‘ordinary’ women, into a closed academic realm (see, for example,
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discussions in Gill, 1996; MacNeil, 1993; Ramanazoglu, 1993b; Ransom, 
1993). In this realm, it is claimed, feminist poststructuralists use feminism as a 
means to advance their professional careers. They also offer it only as negative 
critique, with no practical value for political action. While this particular use of 
feminist poststructuralism may be happening, it does not diminish what I see as 
its practical value. Authors such as Lather (1991); Kenway, Willis, Blackmore 
and Rennie (1994); Lewis (1993) and Middleton (1993) have shown in their 
work how they have used it in practical ways to construct feminist change. It is 
one of the aims of this thesis to show its practical value.
1.6 Feminist poststructuralism, structures and the gender regime
I think it is important to be able to include a structural analysis in the feminist 
poststructuralist framework, since there is no doubt that structures have a 
material existence (Connell 1990, 1995; Hollway 1994). How can a concept 
like structure be used without succumbing to either dualism or determinism, 
both of which are inconsistent with a feminist poststructuralist epistemological 
stance? Connell (1990: 523) defines the term ‘gender regime’ as ‘the 
historically produced state of play in gender relations within an institution 
which can be analysed by taking a structural inventory’. He suggests three 
structures as a preliminary taxonomy of gender relations: a gendered division 
of labour, a structure of power and a structure of cathexis (Connell, 1987: 96 - 
7; 1990: 523 - 6; 1995: 74 - 5).
1.6.1 A gendered division of labour, or production. This includes: 
organisation of housework and childcare; division between paid and unpaid 
work; segregation in labour markets (women’s and men’s jobs); discrimination 
in training and promotion; unequal wages and unequal exchange.
1.6.2 A structure of power. This includes: hierarchies of state and business; 
institutional and interpersonal violence; sexual regulation and surveillance;
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domestic authority and its contestation;
1.6.3 A structure of cathexis, ‘or the construction of emotionally charged 
social relationships’ (Connell, 1987: 112). This includes: the patterning of 
object choice; desire and desirability; the production of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality and the relationship between them; the socially structured 
antagonisms of gender, trust and distrust; jealousy and solidarity in marriages 
and other relationships; the emotional relationships involved in child-rearing.
According to Connell, the first structure is based on the principle of separation 
and the second on the principle of unequal integration. He does not suggest a 
principle for the third structure, but Hollway (1994) does. She suggests that it 
is emotional investments in gender difference. Her suggestion is based on 
gender analyses that have confronted the question of how subjectivity is 
fundamentally gendered and how structures and practices are reproduced or 
modified through subjectivity. The emotional investment in gendered 
subjectivity reproduces gender-differentiated power relations and this is 
important for the analysis of cathexis.
According to Connell, structures constrain practice through providing a 
given form of social organization (1987: 920). However, practice 
provides the dynamic of change; ‘practice, while presupposing 
structure ... is always responding to a situation. Practice is the 
transformation of that situation in a particular direction. To describe 
structure is to specify what it is in the situation that constrains the 
play of practice’ (1987: 95). My previous analyses have tended to use 
a Foucauldian framework of the relations among power, knowledge 
and practice; an analysis which might be assumed to be inconsistent 
with a ‘structuralist’ approach. However, by identifying multiple 
structures and substructures, rather than one monolithic structure of 
patriarchal dominance, and by Connell’s emphasis on the dynamics of 
practice in the context of multiplicity and contradiction, the two 
approaches are consistent’. (Hollway, 1994: 248, first emphasis 
original, second emphasis added)
In my investigation and analysis of the gender regime and of feminist efforts to 
subvert it, using the concept of subjectivity, I acknowledge the multiplicity and
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potentially contradictory nature of structures. I assert that even small changes 
in practice at local sites can have structural effects, and these are some of the 
things I am seeking in people’s accounts. This is consistent with a view of what 
constitutes radical political action in our time (Abrahams, 1992; Giddens, 
1994a; Landry and Maclean, 1993).
1.7 Power, resistance and agency
Power, resistance and agency are issues central to this work as a whole. 
Resistance is the antithesis of the victim identity often associated with the 
position of women (Faith, 1994: 56). But it needs to be accompanied by 
‘success’ (cf Walzer, 1986, cited in ibid: 58). ‘Success’ is what I conceptualise 
as agency throughout this work. The concern with agency has been identified 
as one of the most important areas of work for feminist sociologists (Roseneil, 
1995: 200, 201) and, I assert, for psychologists and educators also, in coming 
years. As yet, it remains undertheorised (ibid).
In the traditional or agonistic definition of agency in sociological theory, to act 
is necessarily to be the agent who carries out various acts (Davies, 1990a). 
Agency is an individual matter in which any individual conceives of a line of 
action, knows how to achieve it and has the power, authority and right to 
execute it. In this model, which coincides with what has largely become the 
common-sense view of the person in the social world, there is an agonistic 
relationship between self and other and self and society. The individual, along 
with other individuals, does not collaboratively construct the social world. 
Rather, the individual is conceived as being in relation to ‘society’, which acts 
forcefully upon the individual and against which any individual can pit 
themselves.
Davies (ibid) develops a model of the person and of agency which stands in
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sharp contrast to the agonistic one. Following a poststructural model of 
language and discourse (which will be elaborated in the following chapters), 
she asserts that persons are persons, by virtue of the fact that they use the 
discursive practices of the collectives of which they are members. Such 
collectives might include children, girls, boys, a group of friends, a study 
group, a classroom, one’s family. Each person can speak only from the 
positions made available within those collectives. A child, for example, may 
know how to speak as an adult, but is not allowed to and may not want to. A 
feminist may choose not to speak as such in certain situations, or if s/he does 
speak as such, may not be understood. One’s desires are formulated in the 
terms that make sense in each of the discourses, or frames of reference 
available. Embedded in the discursive practices of one’s collective is an 
understanding that each person is one who has an obligation to take themselves 
up as a knowable, recognisable identity, part of the collective, but recognisably 
separate from it. In this separateness from the collective, one can be said to 
have agency.
There are discursive practices which make it not thinkable or do-able for 
certain persons or categories of persons to take themselves up as agents, that 
is, for their actions to influence the way the ‘ball-game’ (Smith, 1987: 32) 
develops. This is frequently women’s experience. Davies uses as an illustration 
of this point Busfield’s (1989) example of the way problematic female 
behaviour is often viewed as illness, and male as active wrong-doing. Agency 
can be denied to women and others, depending on the particular discursive 
practices in use and the positioning of the person in those practices. It becomes 
clear, then, that it is not a necessary element of human existence to be agentic, 
but a contingent element. This is in marked contrast to the agonistic model, 
where simply acting confers agency.
The discursive approach to agency has important political implications relating 
to the possibility for change. As Henriques et al (1984: 223, 224) demonstrate, 
roles and stereotypes are social impositions on a pre-existent subject. One
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implication of such a ‘role’ approach is that change is possible through the 
production and reinforcement of positive images for women (cf Coward, 1984: 
introduction). This is one of the things that liberal, radical and socialist 
feminisms believe is possible, but this liberation tradition prompts an 
oversimplified and voluntaristic notion of the relation between social 
‘oppression’ and individual ‘repression’. The attraction of liberation 
movements is that they promise a better, freer, unrepressed psyche, loosed 
from the bonds of capitalism and / or patriarchy. But if, as I argue throughout 
this work, there is no pre-existing, unitary subject there to be repressed, then a 
‘repressed psyche’ is not a simple product of capitalism or patriarchy. If 
psychic states are produced in relation to social practices there is no simple 
source of repression which, through its removal, would reveal the true, 
liberated individual. Structures of labour, power and cathexis are thus seen to 
be overlapping and interconnected. All need to be taken into account in the 
pursuit of agency.
‘The system’ is revealed to be not one but multiple, overlapping, 
intersecting systems or relations that are historically constructed and 
recreated through everyday practices and interactions, and that 
implicate the individual in contradictory ways. All of that without 
denying the operations of actual power differences, overdetermined 
though they may be. Reconceptualizing power without giving up the 
possibility of conceiving power. (Martin and Mohanty, 1988: 209)
1.8 Personal development education examined in the context of the 
position of women in Ireland
In the last three decades in Ireland, there have been significant changes in 
family structures, lifestyles, work and leisure patterns. Legislation has also been 
introduced such as the removal of the marriage ban in the civil service in 1972, 
the Equal Employment Act, 1977, the changed definition of dependency in 
1986 and the introduction of divorce in 1996. Such changes have affected 
women’s lives. Equality, contraception, divorce / separation and domestic
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violence have become issues of public debate. The contemporary Irish feminist 
movement experienced a resurgence in 1970 and has made an impact in 
challenging the status of women in Irish society. Nevertheless, economic 
inequalities persist. Low paid, part-time and temporary jobs and lack of 
childcare facilities act as barriers to the economic equality of women. The Irish 
Constitution portrays a narrow role for women, equating them with 
motherhood and work in the home, perpetuating beliefs that women should be 
the main carers in society.
In parliamentary political life, since the most recent general election in June 
1997, women make up twenty of one hundred and sixty six TDs in Dail 
Eireann and eight women senators out of sixty. There is no woman secretary of 
any government department and women in top jobs in the judiciary and other 
areas are still in a minority. Daly (1989a: 17) asserts that three main factors 
account for women’s lack of formal power within government and state 
agencies: women’s limited role in the economy; attitudes towards women and 
the roles they should play and access to resources. She argues that ‘women 
must actively develop an understanding of power itself, of the institutions of 
power and how power is exercised’ (ibid). This call is echoed by Mulvey 
(1995).
During the late 1980s and 1990s the women’s movement in Ireland has been 
most evident in the ‘mushrooming’ of community based women’s groups, the 
consolidation of Women’s Studies in Irish universities and growth in women’s 
publishing (L. Connolly, 1996: 68). In the community women’s groups, new 
forms of structure and organisation are emerging, emphasising non-hierarchical 
relations, participation and autonomy. Collins (1992) considers that these 
groups resemble the small-group, consciousness raising radical women’s sector 
of the 1970s, although this view is disputed by O’Donovan and Ward (1996). 
Some of these groups are autonomous, some are highly interconnected and 
networked with the generic community groups movement and others are 
connected to the state through its various handing programmes (L. Connolly,
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1996: 68) and through the Home- School- Community Links Scheme. This 
growth co-exists with the growth in the last decade of widespread interest in 
personal power, spirituality, counselling, psychotherapy and the life of the 
emotions, which form part of what Giddens (1991) describes as projects of 
personal reflexivity.
A strong anti-feminist climate also exists. Inglis (1994) highlights the role of 
the Roman Catholic church in the backlash, as does Byrne (1995: 13). Wilcox 
(1991, cited in O’Donovan and Ward, 1996: 16) concludes that Catholicism is 
a determining factor in people’s attitudes to greater gender equality in family 
roles. O’Dovonan and Ward (ibid) point out that Galligan (1993) has 
developed this by arguing that while there is a great demand for equality in all 
aspects of what she terms public life in Ireland, social attitudes and values 
indicate that there is considerable public pressure on women to achieve 
equality, while retaining their traditional family roles. O’Donovan and Ward 
(1996: 17) conclude that ‘to argue that women’s groups per se are inherently 
part of the feminist movement is akin to arguing that woman, by definition, is 
feminist’. The writings of some male journalists (for example, Myers, 1997; 
Waters, 1997; see also Spray, 1997) are evidence that an anti-feminist men’s 
movement has also has begun to manifest itself recently in Ireland.
For the most part the women’s groups have concentrated their activities on 
personal development courses (Daly, 1989b). The criticism has been made that 
the energy invested in these courses has not gone on to tackle structural 
changes (Daly, 1989a; Mulvey, 1991, 1995). Inglis (1994) on the other hand, 
while acknowledging these criticisms and also having a central concern with 
power, concludes that the groups’ concentration on personal development 
courses is based on felt needs and interests. The next section (Section 9) 
examines the content of such courses, but for the moment I wish to 
concentrate on some of the debates which surround personal development 
education in Ireland.
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In the analyses and commentaries on these issues and on personal 
development, and in the assertions that women need to ‘move beyond’ 
personal development, there is an assumption that structures are the ‘root 
causes’ of oppression. This is emphasised especially in Mulvey’s (1995) report 
on women’s power, which arises out of a conference of women’s networks in 
Ireland, entitled Women’s Power fo r  a Change. This document provides an 
overview of current dominant feminist attitudes to women’s power and 
personal development education in Ireland, as the conference was attended by 
influential activists, policy makers, academics and community leaders. The 
report documents frustration at the lack of structural change and lack of 
participation and representation by women in community, regional and state 
development. It exhibits a belief that a concentration on personal development 
is preventing women from engaging in structural analysis. The reluctance of 
women to accept the label feminist is noted, as is the view that the priorities of 
funders mean that women’s work is acceptable only if it is ‘poverty work’ 
(ibid: 17). The role of the Roman Catholic church and religious personnel in 
facilitating personal development courses is also noted and identified with the 
failure to address feminist issues in personal development.
Clancy (1995) in a large-scale survey, found that the majority of personal 
development courses in Ireland are run either by religious personnel or by 
people with a primary interest in counselling and / or psychology. While several 
writers and commentators have already identified religion with the maintenance 
of the gender status quo, there is little published work on the Irish context 
which makes links between the maintenance of the gender status quo and the 
predominance of a psychological view of women as essentially different from 
men. Gardiner (1997: 42) points to the existence of a ‘dual culture’ or a 
‘female culture’ mentality in Irish political life as evidence of the continued 
existence of patriarchal social relations. Feminist writing from Britain and the 
USA (which I explore in Chapters Two, Three and Four) has demonstrated the 
role of psychology (both mainstream and feminist ‘difference’) and beliefs in a
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female nature and culture in maintaining the gender status quo. Psychological 
approaches to women’s personal development and education are usually seen 
as a secular challenge to religious perspectives on women’s nature. This is 
particularly so in Ireland, where traditional, old-style Roman Catholicism is 
widely seen as having contributed to women’s oppression. Both religion and 
psychology, however, share a view of ‘woman’ which does nothing to 
challenge existing power arrangements. Mednick (1989: 1122) describes the 
problem as follows:
It is my view that the different voice / maximalist view, even though 
professed by feminists who are not in agreement with the rightwing 
agenda, nevertheless attained its popularity because it meshed so easily 
with the pro-family women’s nature ideology that has become the 
dominant public rhetoric ... arguments for women’s intrinsic difference, 
whether innate or deeply socialised, support conservative policies that, 
in fact, could do little else but maintain the status quo vis a vis gender 
politics.
Given the dominance of religious and counselling based facilitators, it is my 
view that there is little feminist personal development being carried out in 
Ireland. It is a mistake, therefore, for Irish feminists concerned with power to 
call for women to ‘move beyond’ personal development, as the conference 
organisers did (Mulvey, 1995: 19). The personal should not be regarded as 
constituting merely a ‘first step' which is less important than structures. This is 
dualistic and reductionist thinking which recent feminist theorising has shown 
to be inadequate for transformative politics. However, there is little evidence of 
critique, either of dualism and essential differences feminism, or of the 
psychologisation of feminism in published Irish feminist work.
Personal development courses are answering a felt need for women who are 
taking first steps outside their homes. The personal is implicated in structures. 
Personal development education deals with family relationships and cathectic 
structures which keep the gender regime in place. Such courses, if facilitated 
by feminists, can take a feminist perspective on change within the family. These 
facts, as well as the fact that the family and heterosexual couple relationships
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are the prime site for the reproduction of gender difference (Hollway, 1982; 
1984), mean that feminist personal development courses should not be 
dismissed. Far from being dismissed, they should be encouraged and developed 
in tandem with structural endeavours. By themselves, structural and collective 
change and agitation will not take the place of necessary personal work on 
emotional investments (which are held by both women and men) in the gender 
status quo. Structural oppressions are felt at the level of the individual and they 
construct emotional responses (Lewis, 1993). Work needs to be done at this 
level always. The greatest danger is that personal change will not be 
accompanied by political change. But on the other hand, political change in 
outlook, if not accompanied by emotional politicisation, is of limited effect.
Change is not a simple escape from constraint to liberation. There is no 
reaching a final realm of freedom, at the end of some linear progression which 
does not exist (Martin and Mohanty, 1988: 201). There is no final analysis, 
‘because change has to do with the transgression of boundaries which are 
carefully and tenaciously drawn around identity. Connections have to be made 
at levels other than the abstract political one’ (ibid). Seeing how the personal is 
political is crucial but it is not enough. The highly intimate and particular 
nature of the political has to be acknowledged and explored also. This is where 
earlier consciousness raising practices often left women without support. 
Having identified the connections between personal and political, women often 
felt guilty if they did not immediately throw off the aspects of their lives which 
they had identified as oppressive. Very often, people’s feelings remained in 
some way unaddressed by becoming critically and politically literate: ‘they are 
the parts which feminism has failed to reach — yet’ (Gill and Walker, 1993: 
69). Coward (1993) gives the title ‘our treacherous hearts’ to the result of 
feminism’s failure to deal with feelings and personal needs.
Feminism has provided discourses and language for recognising women’s 
oppression, and a desire to see feminism in action, but it has not displaced 
other, more dominant, discourses, within which desires are also constructed,
22
and which probably go further back in time for most people, feminism being 
largely an adult politicisation process. This has produced many areas of 
contradiction for women, including women who do not label themselves 
feminist but who are all nevertheless affected by feminism’s discourses in 
recent decades. If liberal humanist and religious discourses are not challenged 
within personal development, these contradictions will be interpreted as 
evidence that essential femininity and maternity exist after all and that women 
should give into them (cf ibid). Personal development courses are places where 
people explore feelings and desires. They need to be actively colonised by 
feminists acting outside of liberal humanist and religious discourses, because 
otherwise they will have anti-feminist effects.
The report (Mulvey, 1995) which forms the basis for this discussion, does, 
indeed, draw attention to the strengths which women can bring from personal 
development into other areas of political activity. But what both the report and 
the conference fail to do is to distinguish different types of personal 
development. Courses in personal development in this country are facilitated 
from a feminist perspective in only a tiny minority of cases. This is borne out 
by Clancy (1995: 117) who, in a large scale survey, found that counselling is 
the main training undertaken for facilitators. Clancy argues, correctly in my 
view, that counselling training is capable of treating the symptoms, but not the 
causes of women’s oppression and diverts attention away from inequalities to 
focus on individuals. This is not a fault of personal development per se. It is a 
result of the dominance of mainstream psychology practices, an issue to which 
I return in more detail in Chapters Two and Four.
Mulvey (1995: 19) reports that the conference on power concluded with a 
number of questions for the participants, one of which was ‘What is needed for 
women to move beyond personal development?’ This question would have 
addressed the issue much better, if it had asked what is needed to politicise 
personal development education for women and prevent it becoming an
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exercise focused solely on personal symptoms, spirituality and individual 
healing? My immediate answer to this question, shared by Clancy (1995) in 
her research conclusions, is that we need feminist / politicised facilitators who 
are able to incorporate social analysis, radical politics and feminism into course 
content which is also capable of meeting the felt and expressed needs of 
many women for a focus on their personal lives.
Martin and Mohanty (1988) ask, ‘What has home got to do with it?’ The 
answer must be that patriarchy and patriarchal relations are at their most 
naturalised and normalised in family life and in heterosexual relations. In the 
particular point in history where we live now in Ireland, and given the strong 
climate of anti-feminism which co-exists with religious and liberal humanist 
ideological views of women, home has an awful lot to do with it. We live in a 
formally egalitarian liberal democracy, where it is acceptable for women to 
take on roles outside their homes, in paid work, sport, party politics and many 
other arenas. But through discourses which position them as essentially 
domestic and maternal they are still widely considered to be the only sex 
properly suited to primary childcare. Issues of domesticity and maternity 
surface time and again in the personal development courses of my experience 
(cf Clancy, 1995). Dealing with them is a major challenge to contemporary 
feminism (Coward, 1993; Hochschild, 1990a). ‘Moving beyond’ personal 
development is not the solution. Politicising personal development by taking 
feminist, poststructuralism into account is one of the necessary responses to this 
many-faceted challenge.
1.9 What does a personal development course look like?
There is no set content for personal development courses. However a typical 
Stage One course runs for eight to ten weeks for two to two and a half hours 
one morning a week, for the number of weeks decided on by the facilitator.
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Topics covered include: reasons for coming to the course and hopes and 
concerns about it; ground rules; life stories, human rights; feelings; 
relationships; guided relaxation and visualisation; managing stress; 
assertiveness; communication skills; setting goals; social analysis; women’s 
health and nutrition; sexuality; education; envisioning ‘my ideal world’; 
affirmation of self and acceptance of praise (Aontas Women’s Education 
Group, 1991; Clancy, 1995; Clarke and Prendiville, 1992; Hayes, 1990).
There is usually a check-in with each woman at the beginning of a session, to 
see how she has been feeling and what has been going on in her life since the 
last session. Games, icebreakers and energizers are used. ‘Homework’ is 
usually set, in the form of giving oneself a treat during the week between 
sessions. Self-help is emphasised. The methodology is highly participative and 
women are encouraged to share only as much information about themselves as 
they feel comfortable with. A typical group starts off with twelve to fourteen 
women. Invariably, a few drop out after a week or two. Clancy (1995) also 
found that some groups are run on an ‘open’ basis, with different members 
attending each week. This was found to be a problem for the development of a 
sense of collectivity in a group (ibid). When I refer to personal development 
education from here on in this work, especially in Chapter Nine, I assume 
closed groups, running for eight to ten weeks, with the same facilitator or 
co-facilitators throughout.
Women come to personal development courses because they feel a need to 
make some changes in their lives, usually starting with family life and with a 
desire to ‘get out o f the house more’. This was Clancy’s (ibid) finding and is 
my experience. Courtney (1992) interprets the act of participation in most 
adult education courses as evidence of a desire for change and West’s (1996: 
25, 26) findings bear out this interpretation. Fagan (1991: 67) describes the 
community women who attended her social analysis classes as ‘searching for 
an unspecified development’. Personal development courses are part of the
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distinct process that is adult learning. Adult learning is seen as voluntary, 
self-directed, practical, participatory, with sharing of experiences and 
resources, related to individual’s self-concept or self-esteem, and possibly 
anxiety-provoking for the learners. It also attempts to take cognisance of 
different learning styles (Cranton, 1992: 5 - 7). Of themselves, these qualities 
do not necessarily make for politicisation of the participants. However, the 
processes which they involve are widely seen as essential for radical 
pedagogies which are also providing new or radical content (McDonald, 1989)
1.10 Why I am undertaking this study
This study is situated deep in the tensions, contradictions and flawed 
resolutions of Irish feminist life and social relations, in my everyday working 
life and in my home life (cf Middleton, 1993: 65). The conditions of my work 
as a teacher of young people from 1979 to 1991 were often in conflict with the 
feminism I had been constructing for myself from the mid 1970s, when I 
finished second-level schooling. Sexist and other regulatory discourses filter 
experience in schools and the difficulty of sharing and promoting muted 
discourses, such as feminism and other discourses of egalitarianism, in a 
schooling context often led me into conflict with authorities and peers. The 
power of hegemonic practices frustrated and depressed me. 1 was also aware 
of my cultural and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and my privileged status, 
conferred on me by the institutions of the schools where I worked, and of the 
power related to that status. As time went on, I also became aware that 
schooling is not always successful in socialising pupils into hegemonic 
discourses (see also Connell, 1995: 37). There is room in schooling for 
contestation and resistance, although the forms of contestation taken appeared 
to me to almost always reproduce dominant discourses of sexuality and gender 
relations.
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My later work as a home-school-community liaison teacher (1991 - 1995) 
centred on parents, which, in practice, meant mothers. This sort of work 
bolstered certain dominant assumptions about families and the functions of 
mothers, which I considered ideological, and which I wanted to resist. 
Westwood (1988: 80) comments.
Ultimately, adult education worked with a notion of the incompetent 
woman in need of upgrading through adult education. For all its 
contradictions, feminism was in direct opposition to this. The woman of 
feminist discourse was competent, active and struggling in and against 
the state, and the discourses that defined her personal and public world. 
Those struggles are ongoing.
Westwood is writing about the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. But 
this is how I felt the Home-School-Community (HSL) scheme constructed 
women, as well as assuming that the function of these ‘upgraded’ women 
would be to socialise their children and to produce them as the kind of 
self-regulating subjects on which the existence of the bourgeois state relies. 
The tensions with my feminism were great.
Yet, the existence of an ideological scheme such as HSL allowed me to have 
contact with women which, as a classroom teacher, I woud not otherwise have 
had. In my contacts with the women, I attempted to play a subversive role 
whenever I saw a space to do this. I participated in and later facilitated 
personal development courses with many of the women in the area where I 
worked and saw evidence of consciousness raising and of some radical 
personal changes. However, my subversive desires were not obvious within the 
school where I was employed. There, it was generally assumed that I shared 
dominant assumptions. So whenever I tried to operate in a different discourse 
and persuade the institution as a whole that it needed to examine assumptions 
about class, gender and ability, these discourses were alien to many (although 
by no means all) of my colleagues, and led to my marginalisation.
While I was marginal to mainstream schooling discourses, this was not obvious
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to most of the parents I met. (Those who were aware that I felt marginalised 
were the women with whom I took part in the personal development courses. 
They know me well and this colours our ongoing relations.) For most of the 
parents, I embodied the power of the school as institution, as well as the power 
and privilege of the middle classes. Even though I have engaged in a critique of 
my class positioning, I am aware that privilege, once bestowed, cannot be 
undone (Mantel, 1994: 44). Yet the existence of my critique and my awareness 
of the regulatory nature o f many schooling practices marginalised me within 
the school as institution. So I was positioned within and outside dominant 
discourses of education. This is not unusual for educators who want to 
challenge the status quo:
I tried to distance myself from my institution, both ideologically and
physically. Nevertheless, I had to acknowledge and live with the
authority they bestowed on me and the resources it provided me with.
(Johnston, 1993: 81)
In personal and social relations, I am positioned and I position myself as both 
feminist and feminine, with all the different relations attached to those 
discourses. In all my relations, I perceive myself as partly on the margins. I do 
not recognise myself in dominant texts, even within feminism. It is from the 
margins that political resistances are often formed (Faith, 1994: 39), although 
we should not romanticise the idea of marginality (cf Fuss, 1991: 5). 
Moreover, along with my marginality, I possess cultural capital which positions 
me powerfully (cf Greene, 1993).
Poststructuralist social theories and theories of the person focus on such 
contradictions, experienced as a result of multiple positionings, claiming that 
they are productive of emancipatory subjectivity. Hollway claims that women 
are more likely to incorporate greater multiple positioning than men, because 
of what ‘woman’ means in a relation of otherness to humankind (Hollway, 
1989: 129). Mama (1995) claims that black people are similarly multiply
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positioned and that this enables recognition of certain discourses and enhances 
the quality of certain types of research. Such experience of contradiction and 
multiplicity provides a productive starting point for exploring different ways of 
creating knowledge, because in the contradictions and marginal positionings 
can be found some of the things that the dominant discourses ignore or 
suppress. In attending to the gaps in the dominant discourses, their ideological 
functioning can be laid bare (cf Belsey, 1980).
For a long time, the experience of marginality was a source of disablement for 
me. However, the productive personal work which I have done on my 
experience of contradiction and the attendant loss of certainty has had the 
outcome of enabling me to construct feminist knowledge useful to me. It is the 
product of interweaving my own life-history with theoretical knowledge and it 
leads me to the postmodern challenge of revealing the personal history of one’s 
work (Greene, 1993). I have written an unpublished paper (Ryan, 1995) about 
this self-theorising, which I have used as the basis of discussion with some of 
the research participants (see Chapter Eight). I discuss some of this story here 
because it shows my personal affinities in what could seem otherwise to be 
abstract theory. It is my belief that there are always personal, biographical 
affinities in theory. Another reason for including aspects of my own story is 
that a life-history approach offers ways of making knowledge that are 
grounded in one’s native imagery (cf Middleton, 1993: 47). Having done this 
for myself, the process informs my methodology and my approach to the other 
women in the research.
Having called myself a feminist, and influenced by socialist feminism and 
radical feminist theory since I finished school in 1975,1 entered 1993 in a state 
of crisis. I felt irrevocably ‘stuck’ in my political agency. I had just completed a 
thesis (A. Ryan, 1992) which mapped the oppression of young women. I had 
adopted a feminist poststructuralist theoretical framework for the thesis and 
had spent three years engaging intensely with the theory. The theory refined 
my feminist identity and ideas and I felt passionate about its value for ‘making
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hope practical’ (Kenway, Willis, Blackmore and Rennie, 1994), but I had not 
managed to map successful acts of resistance and change in the thesis, nor was 
I able to use the theory to get myself over the crisis of ‘stuckness’ I was 
experiencing. Strong feelings dominated my life: o f anger, rage, depression, 
paralysis and fear. Added to this was a dreadful bitterness that I, who had 
identified my politics as feminist for so long, was ineffective. Eventually, I was 
persuaded to seek counselling. This was something I had always scorned, 
because of my belief that it bolsters the status quo. But I liked the counsellor 
and decided to give it a try, as we concentrated on the strong feelings I was 
experiencing. What I had not anticipated was the way that my work on my 
emotional life would interact with the feminist poststructuralist theory I had 
been reading and engaging with intellectually, to produce transformation and 
feminist agency.
It was an enormous challenge for me to work on my feelings and emotional 
investments. I arrived at a great deal of the ‘really useful knowledge’ 
(Thompson, 1996) alone, between sessions with my counsellor. I think that 
taking the space and time to acknowledge the feelings allowed me to do the 
other work in between sessions. I came to acknowledge the construction of my 
subjectivity in discourses which were not feminist and I found this difficult, 
because being a feminist had been so important to me for so long. But while it 
was painful, it was also productive of new feminist ways of being for me. It 
also made it possible for me to undertake this present work in the way I do. In 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, where I analyse case material from other 
feminist women, I draw attention at several points to my own role in producing 
their accounts and to where my self-knowledge illuminates similarities and 
differences between us.
Hollway (1989: 39) points out that psychic defences operate against 
formulating different accounts of oneself, because of the self-threatening 
implications. For some women, feminism is a threat. For me, femininity 
operated in the same way. I felt threatened by the possibility of recognising that
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my subjectivity had been produced in discourses of femininity. But by ceasing 
to suppress their productive forces in creating meaning in my subjectivity and 
in my heterosexual couple relationship, I came to an understanding of parts of 
my power in that relationship and in other relationships also. One of the ways 
structural gender difference is reproduced recursively is in the minutiae of 
heterosexual couple relationships (Hollway, 1982; 1984a), and in relationships 
between women and men in work organisations also (Hollway, 1994). This, 
then, was of major importance in helping me to have agency in creating 
structural changes, as well as, and distinct from, having the potential to 
improve interpersonal relations.
I no longer felt fraudulent as an individual in my intimate relationships and this 
seemed to free me to make progress on work relationships also. That is, I no 
longer felt that the political convictions which I held and expressed were 
‘invisible’ in my actions. I was able to centralise rather than marginalise 
feminism in my moment-to-moment actions, with a sense of agency. The 
structures of many organisations and job settings, while often formally based 
on equality policies, reproduce sexist and classist discourses similar to those 
operating in heterosexual relations (Hollway, ibid). Strategies developed in my 
domestic life became inspirations for strategies taken at work. While not 
always successful in the ways that f envisaged, they disrupted patterns of work 
relationships with often interesting effects. Working out these and similar 
issues for myself, using a combination of my intellectual theoretical 
background and the counselling process, was immensely satisfying. None of 
the issues I have mentioned here was the subject of counselling sessions, yet 
the attention to emotionality within those sessions facilitated the broader 
process which I describe here.
Attention to the emotions carries with it the danger of being dominated by 
liberal humanist discourses, with their individualisng effects. Intellectually, I 
had been aware of this from my engagement with feminist poststructuralist 
theory. As Kenway and Willis (1990) remind us, any process which attends to
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personal growth is on tricky ideological ground. Avoiding emotional issues is 
not the way to go about change, but the dominant discourses or intellectual 
repertoires (whether consciously articulated or not) which provide resources 
for reflecting on the emotions are dominated by either religion or by human 
relations psychologies. For reasons which I explore in Chapters Two and Three 
of this work, these theories of the self are not sufficient to sustain a disruption 
of the gender status quo. Attending to my emotional life was the crucial 
missing piece for me in developing a practical theory of myself, within a 
feminist poststructuralist framework. Most importantly, I had a discourse 
outside the dominant ones within which to reflect on myself and filter my 
experiences. This is one of the reasons why I place an emphasis in Chapters 
Two and Three on reviewing theories of the person which refute liberal 
humanist accounts. I also assert in those chapters that recent radical feminist 
theory, while it is critical of liberal humanism, falls into an account of the 
human subject which is highly deterministic, in such a way that it cannot 
provide a theory of agency.
Before I developed a theory of myself, I related to feminist poststructuralist 
theory in an analytic and rationalising manner. This is not to say that I was not 
passionate about what I believed. But because I perceived myself as ineffective, 
the passion was not allowed to express itself in productive ways. It showed 
itself most often in anger, self-pity or frustration. My inability to act was in 
conflict with my political analysis and a contradiction of feminism’s insistence 
on action. Conventionally, I could have been labelled ‘burnt out’. Through the 
politicised personal development and self-reflection process, I was able to 
‘reclaim conflict and contradiction as knowledge’ (Walicki, cited in Selby, 
1984: 348). Thus, I have overcome a paralysis of analysis and found that the 
most radical thing I can do is act (Martin Luther King, cited in Lather, 1991:
106), even if my actions are flawed.
Following my individual work with the counsellor, I changed my attitude to 
personal development education, in my work as home-school-community
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liaison teacher. I organised and participated in two personal development 
courses with another facilitator and began to theorise about the possibilities for 
them to be facilitated from a specifically feminist perspective. Under 
supervision, I facilitated several courses and I became convinced of their 
potential for politicisation, if facilitated by a politicised facilitator. The other 
factor that convinced me I should become involved in personal development 
course facilitation was that women were and are attending them in very large 
numbers in Ireland. They provide a forum where feminism can reach women 
who are looking for names for their experiences of power and resistance. If 
feminists distance themselves from personal development education, it is open 
to colonisation by right wing forces, without even a struggle.
My own personal development work has been valuable to me. It has helped me 
to formulate a personal radical feminist politics, taking into account the 
poststructuralist knowledge which I like so much. It has also helped me to feel 
more agentic in this political sense, in the adult education arena, which I see as 
one forum for feminist activism. What gives this thesis its focus on pedagogy is 
my desire to share something of feminist poststructuralist discourses and, using 
them, to engage in the production of knowledge. Feminism is, among other 
things, a pedagogical project. The concept of pedagogy draws attention to the 
process through which knowledge is produced. The teacher and the learner 
together produce knowledge in a cycle of production, exchange and 
transformation of consciousness. In looking at this cycle, we can open up for 
questioning ‘areas of enquiry generally repressed by conventional practices, 
about theory production and about the nature of knowledge and learning’ 
(Lusted, 1986: 3). However, I am also acutely aware of the regulatory 
potential of personal development courses, when the areas of enquiry which 
are generally repressed are left that way. This leads me to the research 
questions, which I set out in the next section.
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1.11 The research questions
• What forms do feminist subjectivities take? How are they constructed?
• Under what conditions can women do personal development and 
self-reflection work in ways that construct politicised and agentic feminist 
subjectivities?
Related to these central questions are the following:
• The personal change which people often experience as a result of personal 
development work can just as easily ally itself with the status quo as with a 
desire to challenge the status quo. What makes the difference?
• How, in practical terms, does a feminist politics help women to make 
powerful changes in their adult social relations, to take up successfully 
subject positions which are agentic, in the sense that they can create 
changes which disrupt the gender status quo in favour of justice?
Following Haggis (1990), I consider the questions important for the following 
reasons:
• Feminist women’s subjective experiences in Irish society have not yet been 
identified, described and included in research.
The reasons for this omission are probably significant and may have to do 
with an unfashionable public perception of a feminist orthodoxy and with a 
confusion of the terms women and feminist, or, in other words, a confusion 
of women’s increased visibility in public life with the achievement of 
feminist aims (see Landry and McLean, 1993xi).
• The task at hand is not only a matter of their inclusion, but also of the 
re-appraisal of methodology, as well as the creation of new emancipatory
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knowledge /^generation of theory.
• While description of women’s lives is important, because we cannot 
understand history, politics and culture until we recognise how influential 
the structures of gender and sexual difference have been, it is not sufficient 
for a feminist or emancipatory research project (cf Lather, 1986). Men 
have been accorded more social power and thus have decided whose 
realities are represented and taught, and which will not. In doing so, men 
have relegated women, as women, to the margins of culture. But the story 
of this alone is not sufficient. We must also act, politically and culturally, to 
change history.
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CHAPTER TWO
FEMINIST POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE MODERN SUBJECT
2.0 Introduction
This chapter is a discussion of the general poststructuralist opposition to the 
modern, unitary human subject and of the ‘principles’ of a feminist 
poststructuralist approach. Working with the concepts outlined in Chapter 
One, it shows how they are central to any assessment of subjectivity and 
change from a feminist poststructuralist perspective.
‘The “subject” of feminism is, ostensibly, women and its aim to improve the 
lives of women’ (Ramanazoglu, 1993b. 24). In debates about human nature, 
feminism, femininity, masculinity and gendered experience, there are implicit 
models of the human subject which are not usually addressed. Discussions of 
what individuals do when they act, however ‘natural’ it may seem, presuppose 
a whole theoretical discourse about language and about the relationships 
between meaning and the world, meaning and people, and about people 
themselves and their place in the world (Belsey, 1980). Concerns about 
meaning, about subjectivity and history are characteristic of approaches in the 
social sciences which have emerged since the 1970s, under varying labels such 
as feminism, post-Marxism, poststructuralism and postmodernism. The work of 
Michel Foucault, in particular, has stimulated interest in history. The concern 
with subjectivity addresses the traditional object of psychology, the individual, 
from a perspective which stresses power relations, language and meaning and 
the part played by unconscious forces (Hollway, 1991a: 185). As such, the 
concept of subjectivity is unremittingly social, in contrast to the theorisation of 
the self implicit in mainstream psychology, human relations and self-help 
psychology. In the concept of subjectivity, also, the general sociological 
acceptance of psychology’s theorisation (or lack of it) of the self is addressed
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and, to a certain extent, overcome (ibid). Adult education pedagogy tends to 
share dominant sociological and psychological assumptions about the self and 
thus shares their inability to analyse and understand forms of subjectivity, their 
manifestations and their costs, found in what Giddens (1991, 1994 a, b) terms 
‘high modernity’. They fail to come to terms with the role played in particular 
by mainstream psychology in the production of the self-regulating bourgeois 
subject (Blackmann, 1996; Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller, 1992; Walkerdine, 
1988).
Theorists concerned with subjectivity seek to subvert the paradigmatic 
distinction between psychology and sociology, between biology and the social, 
between agency and structure, individual and society, which is currently 
dominant (Layder, 1994; Oakley, 1992; Hollway, 1989), This dominance 
extends to education, including critical pedagogies (Davies, 1990c; Lather, 
1991; Cherryholmes, 1988; see also Chapter Four o f this work). Such dualisms 
have led to the dominance of binary thinking (Sherwin, 1989), with one side of 
the binary being in a hierarchical relationship to the other. Thus, what is seen to 
be unchanging, for example, the biological or the natural elements of human 
existence, are considered more real than that which is seen to change, that is, 
the social and the political. The real, in turn, is seen as superior to the unreal 
(Hollway, 1989).
One of the assertions of this chapter and the work as a whole is that 
psychology, sociology and biology tend to rely on such post-Enlightenment 
dualistic assumptions, including the assumption that the human subject is 
unitary and rational and that such assumptions are responsible for narrow 
perceptions of human potential and inadequate for any liberatory attempts. My 
concern is to work with and add to theories of the human individual in ways 
that avoid the reductionist and essentialist pitfalls of the biological, the 
sociological and the psychological disciplines. This concern leads me to review 
subjectivity in its own right, via poststructural theorists (cf Lengermann and 
Niebrugge-Brantly, 1992). It also leads away from a search for origins and puts
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the focus on gendered subjectivity and gender relations in the present, rather 
than having a focus on history only, or on a desire to produce universally 
applicable theory. A focus on the present highlights how one moment can be 
different from another in people’s practices and the meanings they ascribe to 
their practices.
I am not asking what theory of the person and of meaning is right or correct. I 
am asking what one is most useful to me, what one helps me around the 
inadequacies I experience with some theories and the issues they leave 
unaddressed. If we want a radical politics and a radical education, we need 
theory in order to get a grip on complexity and access to ways of making 
changes from within situations (Giddens, 1993; Schratz and Walker, 1995:
107). For example, Foucault’s work has demonstrated the complexity of power 
and at the same time, his theorisation of the complexity of its operations and its 
connections to knowledge in the modern age has helped radicals come to terms 
with power and see it as something to be used, not always as a monolithic 
presence ‘ out there’.
Theory is implicit in all human action. Everybody is a social theorist ‘based on 
what they have found out so far’ (Hollingsworth, 1994: 58) People interested 
in radical politics and social change need to develop theories of the person and 
of meaning and behaviour which take into account the complexities of the late 
modern age in which we live. It is an underscoring belief of critical adult 
education that change is possible (B. Connolly, 1996). Thus, as adult 
educators, we need theories that help people to move and act in ways that 
challenge dominant discourses and construct more liberating ones. This accords 
with Hollway’s (1982) observations on theory, that its concepts are ultimately 
only heuristic devices for understanding themes in a person’s actions, whether 
that person is oneself or a participant in research.
Many theorists assert that a re-appraisal of subjectivity is one of the necessary 
conditions for providing the context for a radical politics (Henriques et al,
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1984; Broughton, 1987a; Kerfoot and Knights, 1994; Hollway, 1982, 1989, 
1994; Mama, 1995). Harris (1988: 206, 207)) has identified subjectivity (and 
consequently structural issues) as essential to considerations of education 
which want to escape, on the one hand, reduction to issues of management, or, 
on the other, the dominance of mainstream psychology.
Why insist on using the terms subject and subjectivity in theoretical discussion, 
when ‘the person’, ‘the self and ‘the individual’ have been in use for many 
years? These are terms which have been at the centre of much psychological, 
political and philosophical theoretical discussions. Much of the literature of 
these disciplines fails to overcome the individual / society dualism which 
poststructuralism identifies as problematic. As well as this problem, everyday 
taken-for-granted usage of these terms is difficult to employ without the 
implication that they consist solely of what we experience directly and that such 
experiences are dualistically opposed to the social (Hollway, 1989: 25). Why 
not use the term ‘consciousness’, especially in view of its positive history in 
feminist consciousness raising, in Marxist theorising, in radical social theory 
and in African social philosophy (Mama, 1995: 86)? Mama points out that her 
colleagues in psychology convinced her that the use of the term consciousness 
would be taken too much as the opposite to ‘unconscious’ forces, as used in 
Freudian theory (ibid).
2.1 The modern subject
Disparate as the ‘grand theorists’ of poststructuralism are, their ‘common 
theme is that the self-contained, authentic subject conceived by humanism to be 
discoverable below a veneer of cultural and ideological overlay is in reality a 
construct of that very humanist discourse’ (Alcoff, 1988: 415). I now describe 
the nature and origin of this modern subject.
The ‘subject' is the generic term used in philosophy for what in lay terms would
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be called ‘the person’, ‘individual’ or ‘human being’ (Henriques et al, 1984: 2). 
The modern subject combines two identities. On the one hand, there is the 
subject of reason, which was born with modem science and the new social 
order that replaced feudalism (Easlea, 1980). On the other hand, there is the 
abstract legal subject, the subject of general ‘rights of man’: The first is 
represented in Descartes’ dictum, ‘I think, therefore I am’. The second refers 
to a new conception of the individual which in theory equalises the subject with 
regard to law, to contractual obligations and to property (Venn, 1984). 
However, for a long time, women, children, non-white people and the 
propertyless were excluded from this definition on the grounds of lesser 
rational ability, for the most part. This demonstrates relationship between the 
two notions of the individual subject (ibid).
Following the Copemican revolution, which decentered the earth in the 
cosmos, the work of Galileo is a symbolic turning point in the development of 
western thought, because it makes dependence on rationality a necessity 
(Clavelin, 1974, cited in Venn, 1984: 134; cf Bhaskar, 1979: 145). Another 
principle of this rational framework is one of order founded in mathematics 
(Foucault, 1966, Walkerdine, 1989a). Together, they are in opposition to the 
previously dominant Aristotelian - Thomist doctrines and to the teachings of 
the Church (Easlea, 1980). Gradually, rationality and logic came to be regarded 
as primary, even if ultimately underwritten by a divine creation. This shift in 
thought ensures the development of a new explanatory structure for the world. 
It replaces the previous structures based on the idea of a ‘signus dei’ imprinted 
on the world, knowledge of which was also knowledge of God (Aquinas). With 
the beginning of doubt in the ability of God’s representatives to reveal the 
secret order of things, there begins with Decartes in Meditation (1641) and 
Discourse (1637) the search for a new certainty and a new reason (Venn, 
1984).
Many analyses of ideas about reason and reasoning cannot be understood 
historically outside considerations of gender (Walkerdine, 1989a: 27). The
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modem certainties which emerged about the. ..development of reasoning and 
reason included ‘truths’ about girls and women. Fisher and Todd (1988: 227) 
point out how the construction of subjectivity (that is, the condition of being a 
subject) in the sexes leads to separate, well defined gender identities. These 
gender identities are very much taken for granted in western thought. To 
investigate these ‘truths’ about women, we need to understand something of 
the history of modem ideas about the female body and mind, in the context of a 
‘history of the present’. This is Foucault’s term for an examination of 
taken-for-granted practices which have come to seem obvious and 
unchallengeable facts (Walkerdine, 1989a: 20).
In the development of modern ideas, reason alone becomes the source of 
knowledge and of truth, viewed in the western philosophical tradition as what 
is universal, transcending the idiosyncrasies of partial, individual perspectives 
(Benhabib and Cornell, 1987: 7). Young (1987) characterises this concept of 
reason as deontological and locates its pitfalls in the inability to deal with 
difference and particularity, without reducing them to irrationality. The 
cognitive and affective domains are split. Knowledge is seen as produced by 
individuals through the application of thought or reason, and its social and 
developmental nature is denied (Layder, 1994: 117) Layder cites Elias (1978: 
122), who points out that the self-perception of individuals as self-contained 
entities separate from the rest of society first developed between the 14th and 
15th centuries in Europe (that is, from the late Middle Ages to the early 
Renaissance). Modem sociology and psychology reinforce this idea. For 
example, role theory simply endorses it, providing a bridge between the 
individual and society, when the idea of a bridge is false, because no distinction 
exists between ‘inner self and ‘outside world’ (Layder, 1994: 115). History 
and social anthropology have both complemented sociology’s perspective and 
have remained descriptive (ibid).
Venn (1984) points out that the emergence of the dominant concept of reason 
did not go uncontested. The writings of Porta (1650), Paracelsus (in Koyre,
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1933) and others portray a struggle for a different conception of the world, 
which asserts a fundamental symbiotic relationship between all things, including 
humans, and which does not split the cognitive and affective domains (cf 
Capra, 1983). This conception privileges the community and the whole over 
the individual and does not regard nature as something to be conquered and 
put to use (Venn, 1984: 136).
2.2 Social change and humanist models of the subject
By the 1960s, the unitary rational model of the human subject which dominated 
the positivist social sciences was being challenged by human relations or 
humanistic models, which emphasised feelings as part of an approach to the 
whole individual (Hollway, 1989: 26). Nevertheless, whether the approach to 
change is liberal-humanist or Marxist-structuralist, this hopeless dualism 
between individual and society remains. On the one (liberal-humanist) hand, the 
individual enters freely into relations with the social world, and can just as 
easily change these relations, through individual agency. On the other hand, in 
the structuralist way of seeing things, the individual is determined by social 
forces, which must change before individual change is possible. Once the 
individual and the social are assumed to be different things, the central problem 
becomes the manner in which they are related (the bridge referred to in Elias, 
1978, above). Social psychology, for example, has depended on the idea of 
‘interaction’ (Broughton, 1987b; Riley, 1978) and has developed theories of 
socialisation, social cognition, sex-roles and stereotyping. In each case, the idea 
of the subject involved is an individual with an asocial core, with the social 
parts contained in the other half of the dualism (Hollway, 1989).
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The idea of role as a technical concept for bridging the gap between individual 
and society in the social sciences and as a serious way of explaining social 
behaviour generally, dates only from the 1930s, although the metaphor of 
human life as a drama is an old one (Connell, 1995: 22). It provides a way of 
linking the idea of a place in social structure with the idea of cultural norms. 
The most common way of applying the concept of role to gender is that in 
which being a women or a man entails enacting a general set of expectations 
which are attached to one’s sex — the sex role. Masculinity and femininity are 
interpreted as internalised sex roles, the products of social learning or 
socialisation. Most often, sex roles are seen as the cultural elaboration of 
biological sex differences, to the extent that research findings of sex differences 
(which are usually slight) are simply called ‘sex roles’ (ibid). The sociologist 
Talcott Parsons, however, treats the distinction between male and female sex 
roles as a distinction between ‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’ roles in the 
family. The family is considered as a small group and thus gender is deduced 
from a general sociological law of the differentiation of functions in social 
groups (ibid: 23).
The idea that masculinity or femininity are internalised sex roles allows for 
social change, and that was seen by earlier feminists and others interested in 
social change as role theory’s advantage over psychoanalysis (for example, 
Friedan, 1965) Since the role norms are social facts, they can be changed by 
social processes. This will happen whenever the agencies of socialisation such 
as family, school, mass media and church transmit new expectations. However, 
for the most part, the first generation of sex role theorists assumed that the 
roles were well defined, that socialisation went ahead harmoniously and that 
sex role learning was a good thing, contributing to social stability, mental 
health and the performance of necessary social functions.
1970s feminism contested the political complacency of this framework, rather
2.2.1 Roles and a real self
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than the concept of sex roles. Sex role research bloomed with the growth of 
academic feminism (Connell, 1995). It was generally assumed that the female 
sex role was oppressive and that role internalisation was a means of fixing girls 
and women in a subordinate position. Research became a political tool, 
defining problems and suggesting strategies for reform, which included 
changing expectations in classrooms and setting up new role models
Stimulated by feminism, by the mid 1970s, many authors were also painting a 
picture of the traditional male sex role as placing pressures on the self. The 
American psychologist Joseph Pleck contrasted a traditional with a ‘modem’ 
male role. A great deal of writing of the time encouraged men towards the 
modern version, using therapy, consciousness raising, political discussion, 
role-sharing in marriage and self help (Connell, 1995: 24). Connell points out 
that many of the writers remained sympathetic to feminism and tried to include 
connections with hierarchies of power in their work (for example, Pleck, 1977 
and Snodgrass, 1977). Others, however, equated the oppression of men with 
the oppression of women and denied that there was any hierarchy of 
oppressions (for example, Goldberg, 1976).
Inherent in sex role theory is the idea that the two roles are complementary and 
reciprocal, therefore polarisation is a necessary part of the concept (Davies, 
1990c). There is nothing that requires an analysis of power, because roles are 
defined by expectations and norms that are attached to biological status. To the 
extent that oppression appears in a role system, then, it appears as the 
constricting pressure placed on the self by the role. This can happen in the male 
role as readily as in the female. It precludes an analysis of issues of power in 
social relations. It does not have a way of understanding change as a dialectic 
within dynamic gender relations (Connell, 1995: 27).
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2.2.2 Human relations psychology
The idea of an autonomous, real, asocial self hidden behind social roles or 
masks has also been facilitated by the growth of counselling and therapy, much 
of which is inspired by the work of the major theorists of humanistic 
psychology, Carl Rogers and, especially, Abraham Maslow. Friedan (1965) and 
Daly (1973) both used Maslow’s conception of self-realisation and 
self-actualisation as the basis of what they wanted to see as a realisable goal for 
women. A great deal of feminist psychology since then has used their work as 
inspiration, with consequences which many commentators consider to 
ultimately defeat feminist aims (see Grimshaw, 1986). The focus shifts away 
from the social domain and its importance in the construction of the self in a 
way which complements role theory and which shares its difficulty with a 
power analysis. It is important to point out that I am distinguishing here 
between Maslow’s and Roger’s theories and their therapeutic practices.
While humanistic or human relations psychology has many different 
manifestations and is far from being a unified body of thought, it does have a 
consistent theoretical view of the self. This view is drawn largely from the 
work of Rogers and, especially, Maslow. The major concept in Maslow’s 
theories is that of ‘self-actualisation’. He sees human needs as existing in a 
hierarchy, starting at the bottom with needs for food and shelter and 
progressing through security and self-esteem. Once these are gratified 
adequately, the ‘higher’ needs like self-actualisation can come into play. Two 
of the central characteristics that he identifies are those of autonomy and of not 
needing others. Those who have not yet reached the ‘highest’ level of human 
motivation still need others. But, ‘far from needing other people, 
growth-motivated people may actually be hampered by them’ (Maslow, 1970: 
34). They like solitude and privacy and can remain detached from other people. 
Maslow constantly contrasts such people with ‘ordinary’ people. Ordinary 
people need others, self-actualising people do not (ibid: 161).
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There are also people who are autonomous or self-determined and those who 
are not. Self-actualising people are autonomous, and their actions and decisions 
come from within:
My subjects make up their own minds, come to their own decisions, are 
responsible for themselves and their own destinies. ... They taught me 
to see as profoundly sick, abnormal or weak what I had always taken 
for granted as humanly normal: namely, that many people do not make 
up their own minds, but have their minds made up for them, by 
salesmen, advertisers, parents, propagandists, TV, newspapers and so 
on. They are pawns to be moved by others, rather than self-moving, 
self-determining individuals. Therefore they are apt to feel helpless, 
weak and totally determined: they are prey for predators, flabby 
whiners rather than self-determining persons, (ibid)
Rogers shares some presuppositions with Maslow (Grimshaw, 1986). What 
Maslow calls self-actualisation, Rogers calls ‘becoming a person’. He sees 
‘being a person’ as involving emotional self-sufficiency and the determination 
to pursue one’s own individually defined goals. Like Maslow, he draws a sharp 
distinction between those people whose focus of evaluation is external and 
those in whom it is internal, those who are, as he puts it, pawns rather than 
persons (Rogers, 1978).
The implications of these ideas is that a process of personal change or 
individual effort will lead by itself to individual liberation and fulfilment, and the 
ultimate abolition of things like poverty or racial and sexual oppression 
(Henriques et al, 1984). It is a notion endemic to humanist psychology that the 
only route to personal and social change is through working on one’s feelings, 
individually or in groups (see Hollway, 1982, 1994). Rogers, for example, 
posited that the problems of Northern Ireland might be solved if only sufficient 
trained humanistic counsellors were to go there and hold encounter groups on 
every street comer (cited in Grimshaw, 1986: 149).
As Grimshaw (ibid) demonstrates, despite the veneer of egalitarianism in 
Maslow’s work, with its emphasis on the self-actualisation of every human 
being, it is hierarchical, not egalitarian. In his studies of self-actualisation, he
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talks of ‘higher’ levels of motivation and of ‘superior’ human beings. He 
believed that an elite of self-actualisers should be legitimate leaders. One of 
their characteristics is ‘their relative independence of the physical and social
environment’ (1970: 162).
Could these self-actualising people be more human, more revealing of the 
original nature of the species, closer to the species type in the taxonomical 
sense? Ought a biological species to be judged by its crippled, warped, only 
partially developed specimems, or by examples that have been 
overdomesticated, caged, trained? (ibid: 159)
This is more than simply liberal humanist discourse. Consistently, Maslow 
identifies self-actualisation with superiority, with dominance, with success, with 
winning (Grimshaw, 1986: 151). He equates strength with dominance also 
(1939, 1942, cited in ibid). In addition, he posits that high-dominance women 
(that is, women with high self-esteem) need even more dominant men, to 
whom they would enjoy being forced to submit sexually. His elites are socially 
empowered, but nowhere does he acknowledge this (ibid).
Given the rejection of hierarchy, dominance and elitism that characterises so 
much feminist thinking and humanist psychology nowadays, it is surprising that 
Maslow’s work should be seen as inspirational. Grimshaw (ibid) argues that 
accepting a Maslovian theory of self implicitly accepts the anti-egalitarian 
aspects of his work. This is not to say that the techniques of humanistic 
psychology should all be disposed of. But it is far from neutral. If used in a 
supposedly asocial framework, without regard to social conditions and without 
a philosophy of egalitarianism, the techniques will result in the people with 
‘learning deficits’ being left out of the picture. They will become further 
marginalised, while those who experience the ‘superiority of the higher self 
will continue to justify such marginalisation as the consequence of personal 
deficiencies in the socially excluded.
The individual essence inherent in the notion of a real self inevitably reduces to 
biology and information-processing mechanisms (Henriques et al, 1984;
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Hollway, 1989). The dualism between the individual and society is apparent in 
approaches to social change adopted by liberal feminist, radical feminist and 
Marxist feminist theory (discussed in more detail in Chapter Three), where it is 
referred to as the agency - structure problem. In the realm of critical theory, the 
work of Habermas on the ‘ideal speech situation’ shows similar tendencies 
(Fraser, 1987; Meisenhelder, 1989; Merchant, 1980). All of these perspectives 
on change retain essentialist models of the human subject. The notion of the 
autonomy of the self and the autonomy of individual desires is a liberal 
individualist one. A theory of subjectivity goes a long way to an understanding 
of the self as dynamically constructed, not merely as a pre-existing and asocial 
core.
Human relations perspectives replaced the rational subject with the feeling 
subject as the essence of individuality. However, as Hollway points out, this 
apparent reversal was not as straightforward a challenge as it seemed.
Human relations appeared a relevant, personal caring psychology which 
valued change and liberation ... [but] its challenge was never on the 
content of psychological theory, rather on the dehumanising effects of 
scientific method. (Hollway, 1989: 95)
There still lingered ‘the therapeutic rationale that if feelings were spoken, the 
non-rational would be exorcised and action would be governed by rationality 
once again’ (ibid). In this case, rationality is not displaced at all.
In the human relations model, the idea remains of a core individual, a ‘natural’ 
essence that exists prior to socialisation (Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961). 
Feelings are seen as the indicators of this essence, although the feelings are 
often hidden under layers of culture and / or socialisation. Gradually, human 
relations groups interested in change moved towards the idea that radical 
change comes from within the individual and that social change follows 
individual change. Such an approach to social and personal change is 
voluntaristic and is evident in both radical and liberal feminist thought. Both of 
these strands of feminsm depend on the humanist premise that change is
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initiated by the individual agent and that it depends on the individual’s freely 
made choice. It is in direct contrast to the position that change (including 
individual change) is achieved by a change in structures (the orthodox Marxist 
position). These contrasting perspectives on social change reflect the issues of 
the humanism debate (Hollway, 1989: 27).
2.3 Feminist poststructuralism
Throughout this work, I assert the value of feminist poststructuralist theoretical 
developments to examine differences widely seen as true and real, to critically 
appraise the notion of an asocial, real self, to examine the notion of ‘truth’ and 
to produce a politically useful and consciously adopted epistemological stance 
which operates outside the terms of reference of liberal humanism. Feminist 
poststructuralism is not a unified, closed body of thought, which claims to have 
all the answers. There are, however, certain basic assumptions which feminist 
poststructuralists make and which are evident in their ‘contingent and 
revisable’ conclusions (Alcoff, 1988: 431). For that reason, I now outline those 
assumptions. As the chapter progresses, I examine in more detail how and why 
these principles have emerged and why I consider them the most useful way of 
bringing about change, while engaging with mainstream thought, and without 
resorting to separatism. The possibility and strategic usefulness of alliances 
between feminist poststructuralism and other progressive politics will also 
become evident. This is because feminist poststructuralism allows that there are 
axes of oppression and domination which can exist alongside that of sex. Each 
person simultaneously occupies a range of positions in discourses of sex, class, 
race, age, ability and other social variables (Kenway et al, 1994).
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2.3.1 Language
Following the work of structuralist linguistics, which built on the semiology of 
Saussure (1974), language has become a central focus of poststructuralist 
analysis. Saussure sees language as a system of signs. Each sign is made up of a 
signifier (the sound-image, or its graphic equivalent) and a signified (a concept 
of meaning). The relationship between the signified and the signifier is arbitrary 
— there is no necessary reason for one concept rather than another to be 
attached to a given signifier. Therefore, there is no defining property or essence 
which the concept or essence must retain in order to count as the proper 
signified of a particular signifier (Culler, 1976: 23). This arbitrary relation 
between signifier and signified means that there are no fixed universal concepts. 
Each sign in a system has meaning only by virtue of its difference from others, 
and in its relations with other signs. Only when articulated with other elements 
do individual elements acquire a positive or a negative value (Silverman, 1985: 
173). It is not assumed to be a representation of ideas or material relations 
which exist outside language itself and which language merely represents. The 
analysis of language provides a starting point for understanding how social 
relations are conceived, how institutions are organised, how relations of 
production are experienced, and how collective identity is established. (Scott, 
1988: 34). In particular, subjectivity can be seen as self-signification, without a 
fixed meaning or essence.
A further dimension to the issue of meaning is that of its extension in time. 
Derrida has coined a concept for this aspect of meaning — differance — which 
refers to the fact that meaning is always deferred. While structuralist linguistics 
grasped the capacity of meaning to extend infinitely in space (difference), at 
one instant, Derrida points to the extension of meaning in time (Hollway, 1989: 
40). Poststructuralists insist that words and texts have no fixed or intrinsic 
meanings and that there is no basic or ultimate correspondence between 
language and the world, between meaning and the world. Language, for 
feminist poststructuralists, is a means of finding out how meaning is acquired,
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how meanings change, how some meanings become normative and others 
muted and / or pathologised.
2.3.2 Discourse
The relationship between language and meaning is addressed in the concept of 
discourse, particularly as it has been developed by Foucault. A discourse is not 
a language or a text, but a historically, socially and institutionally specific 
structure of statements, categories and beliefs, habits and practices. Discourse 
is used to filter and interpret experience (Holland and Eisenhart, 1990: 95). It is 
responsible for reality, not just a reflection of it. Foucault suggests that the 
elaboration of meaning involves conflict and power and that the power to 
control meaning in a particular field resides in claims to (scientific) knowledge. 
Discourse is thus contained or expressed in organisations and institutions as 
well as in words. In this sense, for feminist poststructuralist theory, it includes 
the material nature of Althusser’s ‘ideology as common sense’. Discourse 
appeals to ‘truth’ for authority and legitimation and different discursive fields 
overlap, influence and compete with each other (Scott, 1988: 35).
The brilliance of so much of Foucault’s work has been to illuminate the 
shared assumptions of what seemed to be sharply different arguments, 
thus exposing the limits of radical criticism and the extent of the power 
of dominant ideologies or epistemologies. (ibid)
Blackman (1996: 366) points out that Foucault (1972a, b, 1973a, 1980) 
maintains a distinction between veridical and vernacular discourses. Veridical 
discourses are those knowledges such as psychology and psychiatry which 
‘function in truth’. They are organised around norms of truth and falsehood, 
maintaining the ability and status to divide the normal from the abnormal. They 
are embedded in and organise specific discursive practices, for example, 
schooling (see Walkerdine, 1988, 1990). They provide the techniques and 
understandings through which behaviours, conduct and thought are classified,
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administered and managed.
Vernacular discourse is a conception of the ways that power and the 
norm-producing effects of the veridical discourses (science, psychology, 
psychiatry) are implicated in the production of knowledge. Foucault uses the 
power / knowledge couplet to highlight this distinction (1980). This couplet 
refuses to reduce knowledge to an effect of power, as analytic concepts of 
ideology, social control and social interest tend to do. ‘These are the concepts 
utilised by many where history is viewed as a play of dominations and those 
resistances against them’ (Blackmann, 1996: 367). Foucault develops his idea 
of a ‘history of the present’ to re-pose questions concerning the relation 
between truth and power, asking under what conditions certain discourses and 
practices emerge (1972a). The specific sites which he identifies and terms 
‘surfaces of emergence’ (ibid) were the family, the streets and other 
institutions, such as the prison and the asylum. These ideas inspire one of the 
central questions of this work: under what conditions can a politicised and 
agentic practice of women’s personal development education emerge?
Where Derrida shows the structure and stability of knowledge and language to 
be a fiction, Foucault shows knowledge and discourse to be political, material 
products that represent a privileged way of seeing things, reflected in power, 
position and tradition (1972a, 1980). Meaning, situated in the power / 
knowledge nexus, cannot be separated from time and place, culture and 
history, politics and society. Foucault argues that underlying power relations 
shape a discursive practice. Its rules are rarely explicit or subject to criticism, 
but those who participate must speak in accordance with them. Discursive 
practice is
a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time 
and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, 
economic, geographical or linguistic area, the conditions of operation 
of the enunciative function (Foucault, 1972a: 117)
Discourse is thus institutional. Truth is politically produced. The effects of
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power and knowledge are interwoven in communicative interactions. 
Institutionalisation can occur at the level of a discipline, a politics, a culture, or 
a small group. Discourses can compete with each other, or they can create 
distinct and incompatible versions of reality (Davies and Harre, 1990). When 
we speak, we have less autonomy than we think or claim, because we always 
use the categories, argumentative strategies, metaphors, modes of composition 
and rules of evidence which precede us and which, in turn, have no single, 
identifiable author. Thus, discourse is anonymous (Foucault, 1980: 113 - 138).
Truth is a thing of this world. It is produced only by virtue of multiple 
forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each 
society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques 
and procedure accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of 
those who are charged with saying what counts as true, (ibid: 131)
For Foucault, the meaning of what is asserted, evaluated, instructed, noted or 
appraised cannot be separated from time and place, culture and history, politics 
and society. The situation of meaning in a power-knowledge nexus arises out 
of his focus on the political production of truth which is beyond our immediate 
control. Discourses represent political interests and, in consequence, are 
constantly vying for status and power. The site of this battle for power is the 
subjectivity of the individual (Weedon, 1987: 41).
The concept of the power / knowledge nexus allows Foucault to identify ‘three 
modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects’ (Siegel, 
1990). First, he identifies modes of enquiry, scientific or quasi-scientific 
discourses that identify humans as subjects who speak, produce or simply live 
(Foucault, 1970). Second, he identifies ‘dividing practices’, which divide the 
mad from the sane, the ill from the healthy, the lawful from the criminal. In 
these practices, the subject is seen as either divided inside him- or herself 
(contrasting with society’s idealised view of the individual as whole), or 
divided from others in society (Foucault, 1972b, 1973a, 1975). Third, he
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investigates the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject in a 
discourse. This is the question around which Foucault constructs his studies in 
the history of sexuality (1979). He describes the way in which power can be 
exercised through a concern with sexuality.
By using the concept of discourse, with regard to the construction of sexuality 
(as opposed to seeing it as an innate drive), Foucault is able to link into 
macro-conceptions of society and social change (Walby, 1990: 115 - 116). In 
his work on the history of sexuality (1979), he argues against the notion that 
the Victorian period was one in which sexuality was repressed. Rather, he 
argues that several discourses of sexuality emerged during that period, which 
constituted and shaped sexuality, even as they were ostensibly concerned with 
containing it. Sexuality has increasingly been controlled, but not repressed. 
Speaking about sexuality puts it into discourses: this happens when it is 
analysed in psychoanalysis, or confessed as in the Roman Catholic practice of 
confession. The identity of the subject is found within these discourses, which 
multiply the areas for sexual pleasure, only to control, classify and subject 
(Coward, 1984: 183; Walkerdine, 1990). J. Kitzinger (1993) has recently 
applied a similar analysis to some pop-psychology and self-help manuals for 
survivors of sexual abuse.
The overall theme of Foucault’s work on sexuality, as well as being a theme 
found in most of his other work, is that the growth of expert professionals of 
social life and their ‘scientific’ bodies of knowledge leads to greater control 
over people, not to liberalisation and greater freedom. In speaking of sexuality 
within these professional discourses, it is controlled as it is produced. Medical, 
psychiatric, psychotherapeutic and religious professions and discourses are all 
sites for the operation of regulation and control within the power / knowledge 
nexus. Foucault implies that the only way to speak of sexuality is within these 
discourses, so verbal exploration of sexual issues becomes not liberating, but 
restrictive (cf Ryan, 1997). He also argues that the need for everyone to have a 
clear-cut and unchangeable identity as a member of one sex is historically
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recent (Connell, 1985). However, there is a strong tendency in his work and in 
the work of Donzelot (1980) to take it for granted that the strategies 
succeeded in creating norms and in eliding the practices of the powerful. His 
view of recent historical change is thus one of profound pessimism (Walby, 
1990: 116). Nevertheless, many feminist poststructuralist theorists have used 
Foucault’s concept of discourse, without seeing this ‘discourse determinism’ as 
the necessary outcome. They have combined insights from various feminisms, 
from deconstruction and from psychoanalysis, with Foucault’s discourse 
analysis, to produce a network of promising ideas which I go on to discuss.
2.3.3 Power and Gender
Feminist poststructuralism has a central concern for power, which owes a great 
deal to Foucault’s theorisation. In opposition to Marxist theory, Foucault 
denies that capitalism and class are the means by which power is structured. 
Power is highly dispersed. Instead of a simple equation of power with blatant 
oppression and negativity, power is seen as productive, neither inherently 
positive nor negative. It is both an enabling and a constraining force (Foucault, 
1980). It produces certain knowledges, meanings, values and practices, as 
opposed to others (Hollway, 1984a: 237). Neither is it static: it is a process 
that is always in play. This differs from the view that power is always 
oppressive and negative and can be got rid of only by revolution. This is a 
valuable theorisation of power but there is a problem in Foucault’s failure to 
distinguish between different forms of power. In the words of Fraser (1989: 
32), he ‘calls too many things power and leaves it at that’. He writes ‘as though 
he were oblivious to the existence of the whole body of Weberian social theory 
with its careful distinctions between such notions as authority, force, violence, 
domination, and legitimation. Phenomena that are capable of being 
distinguished through such concepts are simply lumped together under his
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catchall concept of power’ (ibid).
Nevertheless, following Foucault’s deconstruction of the monolithic, unitary 
character of power and the social domain which is characteristic of Marxist and 
radical feminist theory, it is possible to ‘make links between a diverse and 
contradictory social domain and a contradictory subject’ (Henriques et al, 
1984: 92). As I discuss in Chapter Three (Section 8), such a project is 
complementary to Lacanian psychoanalysis in a feminist poststructuralist 
scheme, although Foucault himself is critical of psychoanalysis (Adams, 1990).
Foucault’s gender blindness is not to be underestimated, however (Connell, 
1985; Walby, 1990; Ramanazoglu, 1993a, b). Despite his concern with power, 
he fails to consider the implications of gender inequality for sexual discourses. 
He discusses whether the bourgeoisie is controlled by or controls the new 
discourses of sexuality, without considering that one gender within the 
bourgeoisie might be using sexuality to control the other. He analyses only the 
most powerful discourses (male, bourgeois) and omits discourses of resistance 
in the cases of both class and gender. (Walby, 1990: 117). The failure to 
consider discourses of resistance is one of the facets of Foucault which has led 
to the charge of ‘discourse determinism’ and a failure to theorise change 
(CCCS, 1982). But feminist poststructuralism selectively uses his work to 
advance feminist theory and politics. In Chapter One (Section 7), I have 
identified resistance as a central concern of this work. Faith (1994: 46, 47), for 
instance, points out that, while Foucault does not examine specific resistances,
... rather, again and again, stresses in passing the importance of 
resistance as a conjunct of power. In discussing Foucault’s view of 
resistance, Dreyfus and Rabinow summarize as follows:
‘Foucault holds that power needs resistance as one of its fundamental 
conditions of operation. It is through the articulation of points of 
resistance that power spreads through the social field. But it is also, of 
course, through resistance that power is disrupted. Resistance is both 
an element of the functioning of power and a source of its perpetual 
disorder (1982: 147)’.
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Because so much of Foucault’s work is concerned with the conditions that 
make discourses possible and the conditions o f their emergence and 
disappearance, one can see possibilities for change. For example, an active 
feminist politics could create conditions where some discourses were no longer 
possible (or at least not as widely determining of practices) and where other 
new discourses were possible and / or recognised. This has happened, 
particularly in the case of liberal feminism, although the phenomenon is not 
unproblematic, as the discussion of liberal feminist discourse in Chapter Three 
(Section 1) illustrates. The creation of new feminist discourses and their 
implication in the construction of subjectivity is one of the central areas for 
investigation of this thesis and the consideration of Foucault’s work and 
feminist engagements with it are pivotal to that investigation.
2.3.4 Essentialism
Essentialism, as a belief in the real, true essence of things, is rejected by 
feminist poststructuralism. For example, the idea that men and women are 
identified as such on the basis of ‘transhistorical, eternal, immutable essences’ 
(Fuss, 1990: xi) is rejected, because it cannot account for some people’s 
discomfort with existing arrangements and their desire for change. ‘An 
essentialist formulation of womanhood, even when made by feminists, binds the 
individual to her identity as a woman and thus cannot represent a solution to 
sexism’ (Alcoff, 1988: 415). This objection to essentialism leads to a rejection 
of reductionist, monocausal or foundationalist explanations. History and 
genealogy are seen as crucial in the development o f ideas, since ‘truth’ does 
not exist outside the social formation. Feminist poststructuralist ideas have 
allowed feminists to be attentive to every kind of difference, including 
differences within a person, and to escape the trap of ‘theory as the production 
of a quasi-metanarrative, capable of explaining everything, if the “one key 
factor” could be found to explain sexism cross-culturally and illuminate all of
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social life’ (Fraser and Nicholson, 1988: 384).
2.3.5 Difference and deconstruction: Derrida, Cixous and Kristeva
In western philosophical thought, the essentialism rejected by feminist 
poststructuralism is especially manifest in the notion that timeless and true 
differences exist, such as man / woman, or culture / nature. Feminist 
poststructuralist analysis of difference is based on Derrida's reworking of 
Saussure's linguistic insight that meaning is made through implicit or explicit 
opposition or contrast, that positive definition rests on the negation or 
repression of something represented as antithetical to it. Instead of framing 
analyses and strategies as if such binary pairs were 'real', deconstruction 
involves examining the ways meanings are based on oppositions which are 
constructed, not natural. Fixed oppostitions conceal the extent to which things 
presented as oppositional are, in fact, interdependent. Derrida has also shown 
that the interdependence is hierarchical, with one term dominant, for example, 
the first term in each of the binaries of light / darkness, presence / absence, 
reason / feeling. Although the term 'deconstruction' is principally associated 
with Derrida's treatment of binary oppositions, it has also come to mean more 
generally any exposure of a concept as ideological, or culturally constructed, 
rather than a natural or a simple reflection of reality (Alcoff, 1988: 415).
Derrida’s deconstruction of binaries, while impossible to freeze conceptually, 
can be broken down into three steps:
a) identify the binaries, the oppositions that structure an argument
b) reverse or displace the dependent term from its negative position to 
a place that locates it as the very condition of the positive term
c) create a more fluid and less coercive conceptual organisation of 
terms which transcends a binary logic by simultaneously being both and 
neither of the binary terms (Grosz, 1989, cited in Lather, 1991: 5)
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This process is used in Chapters Seven and Eight, where I take a 
deconstructive approach to the opposition of feminism and femininity in 
participants’ accounts.
According to Derrida, philosophy's notion of a mastery of ideas rests on a 
profound misunderstanding of the linguistic sign. The ‘meaning’ of a text is not 
definitively available, there can be no fixed signifieds. Signifiers, that is, sound 
or written images, have identity only in their difference from each other and are 
subject to an endless process of deferral. This means that the effect of a ‘true’ 
representation is only retrospective and temporary (Weedon, 1987: 25). What a 
particular signifier means at any given moment depends on the discursive 
relations within which it is located, and it is open to constant reinterpretation.
Dominant liberal-humanist discourse relies on the philosophical notion of ideas 
as something outside ourselves, of difference as self-evident and transcendent, 
to be discovered through experience. Yet, Derrida shows the structure, 
coherence and stability of meaning and of knowledge to be a fiction, always 
open to challenge. For liberal humanism, experience is what we think and feel 
in any particular situation and it is expressed in language. Experience is seen as 
authentic in this perspective, because it is guaranteed by the full weight of the 
individual's unitary subjectivity, a real self at the pre-social core of the person. 
It relies on what Derrida calls a metaphysics of presence, that is, the conviction 
that words are only signs of a real substance which is elsewhere (ibid: 85).
For Derrida, thought systems which depend on unassailable first principles or 
foundations are metaphysical and they try to build a hierarchy of meanings on 
these foundations. The foundational position of paradigms of knowledge can be 
shown to be beliefs, values or techniques of a given community (Goodsin, 
1990). These paradigms provide order, but their structured knowledge can be 
demonstrated to be less foundational than it appears. We are all contaminated 
by this impulse to build knowledge on certain unconstestable basic ideas, 
because it is so deeply embedded in our history. But Derrida places meaning in
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a radically different position to this metaphysical illusion of presence. 
Philosophy must give up the futile attempt to manipulate meaning which exists 
‘out there’ and must return to considering the never-ending play of signs (ibid).
Attempts by social theories outside a poststructuralist framework to deal with 
the problem of binaries and their associated hierarchies have largely inverted 
the binaries, rather than subverting them, as deconstruction tries to do. Cultural 
and separatist feminisms have tended to invert the man / woman hierarchy by 
extolling all that is female, but without challenging the symbolic order that sets 
male and female in opposition to each other in the first place (Kristeva, 1986, 
Davies, 1990b, Moi, 1985). In the case of individual / society, or agency / 
structure dualisms, structuralists have emphasised the social and the structural 
in the construction of the human subject, in a scenario where individual agents 
have little or no ability to bring about social change. Liberal-humanists have 
emphasised the idea of a core individual, a natural essence that exists prior to 
socialisation, with change initiated by the individual agent and depending on the 
individual's freely made choices. Poststructuralists try to create a more fluid 
and less coercive conceptual organisation of terms which transcends a binary 
logic by simultaneously being both and neither of the binary terms (Grosz, 
1989: xv, cited in Lather, 1991: 5).
The French feminist Cixous has drawn heavily on Derrida’s work and 
developed a discussion of ‘death dealing’ binary thought. She identifies the 
following oppositions:
activity / passivity 
sun / moon 
culture / nature 
father / mother 
head / emotions 
intelligible / sensitive
logos / pathos. (Cixous and Clement, 1975: 115)
These oppostions correspond in all cases to the underlying man / woman 
opposition and can be analysed in each case as a hierarchy, where the
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‘feminine’ side is seen as negative and powerless. Thus, nature and passion, 
associated with women, become opposed to culture, as represented in art, 
mind, history and action (ibid: 116). Cixous’ project then becomes one of 
proclaiming woman as the source of life, power and energy (Moi, 1985). To 
enclose maleness and femaleness in opposition to each other is to force them to 
enter a death-dealing power struggle. For Cixous, like Derrida, meaning is not 
achieved in the static closure of the binary opposition, but is achieved through 
the endless possibilities of the signifier. Following this logic, the feminist task 
becomes the deconstruction of patriarchal metaphysics (that is, the belief in an 
inherent, present meaning in the sign). If we are all contaminated by 
metapahysics, as Derrida has argued, then we should not attempt to propose a 
new definition of female identity, because we would necessarily fall back into 
the metaphysical trap. Woman’s identity should be that which escapes 
definition.
The linguist and psychoanalyst Kristeva refuses to define ‘femininity’ at all, 
preferring to see it as a position constructed by patriarchal thought and 
marginalised by the patriarchal symbolic order, as defined by Lacan (Moi, 
1985). This is a relational approach to the problem of what it is to be ‘feminine’ 
and allows Kristeva (1986) to argue that men can also be constructed as 
marginal to the symbolic order. Her emphasis enables feminists to counter 
biologistic definitions of femininity. Cixous shows that femininity is defined as 
lack, darkness, irrationality and chaos. Kristeva, while recognising the 
dichotomy between masculine and feminine as metaphysical, approaches the 
notion of women as positional marginality, rather than as essential definition. 
Where Cixous tries to develop a new feminine language which will subvert the 
binary schemes that silence women, Kristeva shows that what is perceived as 
marginal at any one time depends on the position one occupies. If patriarchy 
sees women as occupying a marginal position in the symbolic order, then it can 
construe them as the limit of that order, representing the frontier betweeen man 
and chaos, but also merging with the chaos outside. Women are neither
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completely inside or completely outside the symbolic order — they can thus be 
vilified or venerated. Patriarchal thought has vilified women as Lilith, or the 
Whore of Babylon, as well as elevating them to a position of Virgin and 
Mother of God, where they protect men from chaos (Moi, 1985).
Kristeva’s position is that one must reject the notion of identity. This is 
different from Cixous’ project of developing a positive feminine identity and an 
écriture feminine, emphasising the power and energy of women. Although 
Cixous emphasises the multiple identities and heterogenous differences among 
women, in opposition to any scheme of binary thought, her project eventually 
falls into a form of essentialism, where everything to do with women is 
glorified (Moi, 1985; Walby, 1990).
2.4 Politics and feminist poststructuralism
Kristeva (1986), in advocating a deconstructive appproach to sexual difference, 
wants to create a new theoretical and scientific space, a signifying space 
(Davies, 1990b: 502), where the very notion of identity is challenged. Her 
perception of women’s historical and political struggle is as follows:
1. In a liberal feminist framework, women demand equality and equal 
access to the symbolic order.
2. With radical feminism, women reject the male symbolic order in the 
name of difference and glorify femininity.
3. Women reject the dichotomy between masculine and feminine.
There is some debate about whether this scheme would represent a feminist 
version of Hegel’s philosophy of history, where position three would be 
exclusive of positions one and two, or whether they should be simultaneous 
and non-exclusive positions in contemporary feminism (Jardine, 1985; Moi,
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1985, 1990).
As Moi (ibid) sees it, the problem in adopting position three exclusively is that, 
in deconstructing patriarchal metaphysics, we also risk deconstructing the logic 
that sustains the first two forms of feminism. As long as patriarchy remains 
dominant, it remains politically essential for feminists to defend women as 
women, in order to counteract the patriarchal thought that despises them as 
women. But an unreconstructed form of stage two feminism runs the risk of 
becoming an inverted form of sexism, unaware as it is of the metaphysical 
nature of gender identities. It runs this risk by uncritically taking over 
metaphysical categories created by patriarchy, which have led to women’s 
oppression, in spite of feminists’ attempts to attach new worth to the old 
categories (cf Cocks, 1989).
An exclusive adoption of Kristeva’s third space of deconstructed identities, 
which is what she herself advocates, as does Jardine (1985), leaves everything 
as it was in one sense, because it rejects the notion of identity, while leaving the 
feminist political struggle no better off In another sense, however, the 
deconstruction of identity radically changes our perception of the political 
struggle. A feminist appropriation of a deconstruction like Kristeva’s, which 
can show the notion of a feminine identity to be incomplete or contradictory, is 
useful if it incorporates the first two of her stages also. Situating attempts at 
deconstruction in specific political contexts is important in avoiding 
ahistoricism and in recognising the significance of interests and investments in 
operative factors which structure relations between men and women.
Kristeva’s deconstruction, however has shown the contradictory nature of such 
a project. A commitment to equal rights for women must assert the value of 
women as they are, before equal rights have been won (that is, in their 
difference from men, in their femininity as it is currently and varyingly 
constructed). But a commitment to equal rights for this constructed femininity 
risks glorifying women in their essential difference, a difference from men
63
which is metaphysically and patriarchally constructed. Because we actually live 
in a system of patriarchal relations, however, feminists have to take positions 
that assert the value of women as women, in order to counter structural 
devaluation of them. In this context, equality and difference are not easily 
compatible. In isolation, a feminist theory of women’s difference comes 
disturbingly close to echoing patriarchy’s conception of them as different. Yet, 
the same is true of the isolated articulation of a feminism that values women as 
a unified category. Given this logic, the feminist influenced by poststructuralism 
cannot settle for either equality or difference. But even if we are aiming for 
Kristeva’s deconstructed world, it does not exist now, we cannot live in it. 
Patriarchy exists, its forms are constantly shifting and changing and one of the 
tasks of any kind of feminism must be to expose these forms (Cullen, 1987; 
Walby, 1990). Because we live in patriarchal, metaphysical space, we have to 
try to hold all three of Kristeva’s positions simultaneously (cf Moi, 1990). This 
is a far from easy task and Kristeva herself has retired from political 
engagement. As Fraser writes,
... you can’t get a politics straight out of epistemology, even when the 
epistemology is a radical antiepistemology, like historicism, 
pragmatism, or deconstruction. On the contrary, I argue repeatedly that 
politics requires a genre of critical theorising that blends normative 
argument and empirical sociocultural analysis in a ‘diagnosis of the 
times’. (Fraser, 1989: 6)
2.4.1 Identity politics
Alcoff (1988) articulates the same dilemma introduced by Moi (1990) in her 
consideration of Kristeva. Where Moi finishes her article with this articulation, 
Alcoff uses it as a starting point. Drawing on the work of Lauretis (1984, 
1988) and Riley (1983), she develops the idea of an identity politics, combined 
with the notion of the subject as positionality and construction. Subjectivity and 
identity must be recognised as always a construction, yet also a necessary point
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of departure. The concept of identity politics problematises the relationship 
between this constructed identity and political theory or analysis. In doing so, it 
departs from the mainstream methodology of western political theory.
According to the latter, the approach to political theory must be 
through a ‘veil of ignorance’ where the theorist’s personal interests and 
needs are hypothetically set aside. The goal is a theory of universal 
scope to which all ideally rational, disinterested agents would acquiesce 
if given sufficient information. Stripped of their particularities, these 
rational agents are considered to be potentially equally persuadable. 
Identity politics provides a materialist response to this and, in so doing, 
sides with Marxist class analysis. The best political theory will not be 
one ascertained through a veil of ignorance, a veil that is impossible to 
construct. Rather, political theoiy must base itself on the initial premise 
that all persons, including the theorist, have a fleshy, material identity 
that will influence and pass judgement on all political claims. Indeed, 
the best political theory for the theorist herself will be one that 
acknowledges this fact. (Alcoff, 1988: 432, 3)
The essentialist definition of woman makes her identity independent of her 
external situation and denies her ability to construct and take responsibility for 
our gendered identity, our politics and our choices. The positional definition, 
on the other hand, makes her identity relative to a constantly shifting context, 
to a situation that includes a network of elements involving other people and 
economic, social, cultural and political conditions. If  women can be identified 
by position in this network, then feminist arguments from women can claim the 
need for radical change, not because some innate essence is being stunted, but 
because women’s position within the network lacks power and mobility. Added 
to this must be the belief that women’s subjectivity is not solely determined by 
the external elements of this network, but by her engagement with it, her 
interpretation and reconstruction of her history, as mediated through the 
cultural discursive context to which she has access (Lauretis, 1988: 8,9). 
Feminist discourses must be circulated so that women have the opportunity to 
do this interpretation and reconstruction in ways that are different from the 
dominant discourses. As Alcoff (1988: 434), points out, when women become 
feminists, the crucial thing that has occurred is not that they have learned any
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new facts about the world but that they come to view those facts from a 
different position, from their own position as subjects. A political change in 
perspective means that the framework for assessment has changed, not that the 
facts have changed, although new facts may come into view.
In this analysis, one can make concrete demands on behalf of women, without 
entailing a commitment to essentialism. Recognition of the fact that, now, 
many women need childcare ‘in no way commits you to supposing that the care 
of children is fixed eternally as female’ (Riley, 1983: 194). However, as things 
stand now, invoking the needs of women with children also invokes the 
accompanying belief in our cultural conception of essentialised motherhood. 
We need to constantly problematise universalising concepts like ‘women’s 
needs’, while ensuring that political strategies are developed to ensure that no 
woman’s current needs go unmet. We can do this, for example, by meeting the 
needs of women with children, while rejecting and challenging ‘the idealised 
institution of motherhood as women’s privileged vocation or the embodiment 
of an authentic or natural female practice’ (Alcoff, 1988: 428).
These circumstances mean that we must make political choices. We cannot 
avoid them, simply because poststructuralist theory has uncovered chinks in the 
formulation of key concepts of earlier feminist thought. These choices are often 
difficult and unsatisfactory, since every choice closes off some other possibility. 
In making a choice and taking up a position, one runs the risk of being wrong, 
or making oneself vulnerable by revealing one’s hand. But we have to engage 
with the dominant thought structures of our day, while constantly being aware 
that our choices are limited by our specific material positions in society and 
history. People change from generation to generation and do not just reproduce 
oppression — the factors that make us desire change and the ways that we can 
produce change must be examined. It is not impossible, though not simple 
either, to simultaneously challenge and make use of the rules of Enlightenment 
rationality, which is where we get the notion of emancipation from, after all 
(Moi, 1990: 375). We must not forget that it is the humanist paradigm which
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gives critical force to a commitment to the modem ideals of autonomy, dignity 
and human rights (cf Fraser, 1989: 57). What we can do is to give up the quest 
for metaphysical truth, while not overlooking the truth o f women’s oppression 
(ibid). As Weedon (1987: 86) says, ‘just because we subscribe to a theory of 
the provisionality of meaning, does not mean that meaning does not have real 
effects’.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that feminist poststructuralism uses 
all the theoretical tools of poststructuralism, while remaining resolutely 
grounded in the politics of everyday life (Lauretis, 1988: 12). It has examined 
the emergence of the modern subject and approaches to subjectivity, along with 
feminist poststructuralist objections to humanism, human relations psychology 
and role theory. It has also examined how feminist poststructuralist theorists 
have developed ideas about language, discourse, power, deconstruction and 
politics, in a drive to theorise social change. All of the ideas discussed here are 
used in the analyses of feminist subjectivity in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight! 
The next chapter (Chapter Three) includes a discussion of how feminist 
poststructuralism relates to other approaches to gender equality, such as 
liberal, radical, psychoanalytic, Marxist and dual-systems feminisms. It also 
leads into a discussion of the relation of feminist poststructuralism to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and developments of psychodynamic theories of the person.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE RELATION SHIP OF FEMINIST POSTSTRUCTURALISM TO 
OTHER EMANCIPATORY THEORIES
3.0 Introduction
This chapter examines models of the subject which underpin the paradigms of 
liberal humanism, cultural feminism and structuralism. It also examines feminist 
poststructuralist uses of psychoanalytic theories and psychodynamic accounts. 
The objective of the chapter is to make clear what aspects of these paradigms 
and theories a feminist poststructuralist approach draws on and what aspects it 
refutes.
3.1 Liberal feminism
Liberal feminists (called ‘bourgeois feminists’ by Kaplan, 1987) have typically, 
although not exclusively, adopted socialisation theory in their approach to 
gendered subjectivity and change (Walby, 1990). Socialisation in one or other 
set of gender attributes is considered to start from birth, with different 
messages being given to boys and girls (Belotti, 1975). Toys, games and 
activities are gendered, as a preparation for adult roles (Weinreich, 1978). 
Television and other media continue the process of socialisation, through 
advertising and depiction of roles (Tuchman, Daniels and Benet, 1978). 
Education too is responsible, in terms of its formal and informal curricula and 
the dynamics of the organisation of its institutions (Deem, 1978, 1980; 
McQuillan, 1995; Sharpe, 1976; Stanworth, 1983).
Socialisation theory opposes the notion that gender differences are biological, 
documenting the process through which gender is acquired. However, few 
socialisation theorists take into account the variety that exists within the
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categories male and female, especially within different social classes, ethnic 
groups and societies (Connell, 1995; Davies, 1990c). As such, socialisation 
theory tends towards a universalism. It also tends to assume that people are 
passive in their acquisition of gender, indeed that women are socialised into a 
‘false consciousness’ (Walby, 1990: 93). It fails to account for people’s 
psychological investments in their roles and for their interests in maintaining 
structures and power relationships. This failure is illustrated in the liberal 
accounts of rape and violence towards women, which see them as the actions 
of disturbed individuals, who have not developed normally (Pizzey, 1974; 
West, Roy and Nichols, 1978). Rather than focusing on the social contexts and 
structural arrangements which result in a gendered violence, male violence 
towards women is explained as an abberation in a few individuals. In fact, many 
more women are the victims of male violence than is consistent with a theory 
that the perpetrators are deranged (Walby, 1990).
Neither does socialisation theory problematise the content of gender nor study 
its construction (Jones, 1993). It studies the process of gender acquisition 
through a perception of the individual as an ‘information processing system’ 
(Walkerdine, 1984), a perception owing much to the developmental 
psychology of Piaget. In this context, the categories available to the child play 
an important part in the process (Weinreich, 1978). This approach sees no path 
of ‘normal’ development and is thus avowedly anti-biologistic. But Henriques 
et al (1984: 21) argue that, ultimately, the opposite is the case, because the 
capacity of the individual to process information is reduced to the biological 
capacities of the human system. The socialisation model of interaction between 
society and the individual means that the focus is on the way that the individual 
assimilates available information. Overcoming issues like sexism and racism 
becomes a matter of providing education and information, of making more 
possibilities available, not a matter of politics and economics, bound up with 
power, exploitation and psychological investments (ibid). As with the issue of 
violence and change, the focus is on the individual, not the social context.
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Walby (1990) points out that liberal feminist analyses often start.by noting the 
relative absence of women from powerful positions in the state and in other 
decision-making arenas, like educational institutions, corporate management 
(Kanter, 1977) and trades unions. They also address sexist language (Lakoff, 
1975) and discriminatory practice. In doing so, liberal feminist researchers have 
made available a large body of empirical evidence for women’s subordinate 
position in society (Walby, 1990). Women’s dual roles as paid workers and as 
mothers have also been described. But the work is usually composed of 
detailed descriptions of how inequality is played out, not of the causes of 
inequality on a gendered basis. Nor does it supply accounts of what successful 
acts of resistance look like, which is one of the things this work is trying to 
achieve. Often, there is an assumption that if more women were in positions of 
power, it would be to the advantage of all women. Harding (1986, 1987) calls 
these ‘feminist approaches to equity issues’, where the strategy to be employed 
is ‘add women and stir’. Such approaches assume that if women get the same 
opportunities as men in education, work and in domestic relations, then social 
change will follow. New norms will emerge and new social roles will be 
defined, which women and men can take on. As well as being limited by the 
role theory which underpins it (see Chapter Two Section 2.1), this is an 
approach which focuses on individual gain and does not call for radical changes 
in the structures of society (Fisher and Todd, 1988: 4, 5).
Nevertheless, Eisenstein’s (1981) view is that, as women move towards 
equality in education, work and domestic relations, the barriers they encounter 
will be so firmly entrenched that the women will be radicalised and forced to 
ask the kinds o f questions posed by more radical feminisms, of which feminist 
poststructuralism is one. It could be argued, however, that incremental change 
is always in danger o f being wiped away. For example, in the Reagan era in the 
United States of America, there was rapid diminution of social gains and a 
widespread féminisation of poverty.
A theoretical reliance (whether implicit or explicit) on socialisation has further
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pitfalls. When attempts to socialise children in families and in schools, into 
‘gender equal’ ways of behaving fail to have the desired effects, people often 
have recourse to the notion of an essential human nature, to explain 
attachments to femininity and masculinity (Connell, 1995; Davies, 1990c). For 
lasting change to happen, the nature of power and its part in the construction 
of subjectivity needs to be understood better. If gender is acquired through 
social relations or interaction, or through family dynamics, if it is relational, 
rather than determined by nature, then we must try to understand the social 
relations themselves.
3.2 Radical feminism
In radical feminist analysis of gender inequality, men as a group are seen to 
dominate women as a group and to benefit from women’s subordination. The 
forms of radical feminism which emerged from the 1960s took feminism as a 
universal struggle of women against men’s power (Walby, 1990). This claim to 
universality has been widely criticised. The system of domination of women by 
men is called patriarchy and is independent of other systems of social inequality 
— for instance, it is not a by-product of capitalism. Radical feminism has 
broadened the scope of the social sciences, politics and the consideration of 
subjectivity by introducing issues not conventionally considered relevant to an 
analysis of social inequality. Firestone (1974) sees reproduction and hence the 
household as central to women’s oppression. She argues that women’s role in 
reproduction makes them vulnerable to men and that this creates two classes, 
based on sex. She considers reproduction to be the real material base of human 
society, more basic than production. Brownmiller (1976) sees the issue of male 
violence and rape as central and Rich (1980) argues that institutionalised 
heterosexuality is the basis, with sexual relations organising marital relations. 
Personal aspects of life are seen to be as important as the public domain. The 
question of who does the housework, or who interrupts whom in conversation, 
is seen as part of the system of male domination. Millett’s slogan, ‘the personal
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is political’, has become the best-known expression of this approach to social 
and political analysis. Here, the term ‘politics’ refers to power-structured 
relationships, where one group of persons is controlled by another. Hence, the 
relations between the sexes are political (Millett, 1971: 23).
This theme was a central component of early second-wave feminism, which 
introduced consciousness-raising groups in which, by sharing and discussing 
their experiences, women came to see their problems not as private 
misfortunes, but as public issues. Understanding links between the political and 
the personal was tremendously exciting for me during my early twenties. I was 
aware that this was the theoretical underpinning of my feminism and of any 
activism in which I was involved as a younger woman. In this approach, 
everything is political (Walby, 1990): sexuality (Millett, 1971), conversation 
(Spender, 1980), housework (Mainardi, 1970), motherhood (Luker, 1984, 
Rowland and Thomas, 1996), abortion (Petchevski, 1988). In its strongest 
form, this argument implies that nothing is not political. Subjective experience 
is thus socially formed (Richardson, 1996b).
In contrast to liberal feminists, radical feminists usually eschew electoral 
politics, although engaging with the state on practical issues such as access to 
contraception and abortion (Walby, 1990). There is also a strong emphasis on 
exposing and challenging patriarchy in practice, in every area of life. This 
radical feminist reworking of the term ‘politics’ is among the most 
revolutionary and useful ideas for challenging the mainstream of western 
political theory, and not just in the interests of women (Abrahams, 1992). 
Mainstream theory sets a political goal where personal interests and needs are 
hypothetically set aside, where a rational, disinterested agent will make 
objectively ‘correct’ decisions, given sufficient information (Alcofif, 1988: 433). 
The inclusion of the personal in politics provides the basis for the feminist 
poststructuralist development of identity politics discussed in Chapter Two 
(Section 4.1).
Millett’s development of the workings o f patriarchy has been criticised by
72
Barrett (1980), Giroux (1983) and Moi (1985), among others. Barrett (1980: 
110) considers that it is not satisfactory to always see women as innocent 
passive victims of patriarchal power, which is how Millett theorises the 
position of women. According to Millett, once women see through male 
ideology, they can cast it off and be free. She does not take into account the 
ways that the oppressed can come to identify with the dominant ideology 
(Giroux, 1983: Moi, 1985). Neither does she accept the difficulties in throwing 
off oppression, even after becoming conscious of its existence in one’s life. In 
this, Millett demonstrates a voluntaristic view of social change and a reliance 
on a model of a rational humanist subject, which can bring about radical change 
within the individual, once presented with sufficient information about its 
oppression.
Sexuality, and specifically the institution of heterosexual sexuality, is a central 
pillar of patriarchy for many radical feminists who reverse the traditional 
practice of setting up lesbianism and male homosexuality as unusual and in 
need of explanation (Brownmiller, 1976; Kitzinger, 1990; Millett, 1971; Rich, 
1980). Intimate relations between women are to be expected, given what 
women share under male oppression. If sexual partners are chosen on the basis 
of sharing, liking and loving, as is generally supposed, then the prevalence of 
heterosexuality (that is, intimate relations with an oppressor) is seen to be in 
need of explanation. The Leeds Revolutionary Feminist Group (1981) argues 
that heterosexuality has important political implications in the ways that it 
divides women from each other, uniting each one with her own special 
oppressor. To survive the situation, women adopt, at least partially, the 
viewpoint of men. This suggests that women suffer from a false consciousness 
in heterosexual relationships. The group suggests that women who are 
independent from men are more likely to combine politically to resist 
patriarchy. Lesbianism is an integral aspect of radical feminist practice and the 
degree to which heterosexually active women can be independent of patriarchy 
is a source of debate (Ferguson, Zita and Addelson, 1981; Kitzinger and 
Wilkinson, 1993; Richardson, 1996a). More recently, this has developed into
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discussion of the whether heterosex can be conducted in a framework of 
equality (for example, Hollway, 1995), or whether heterosexual desire is 
predicated on inequality and domination and the eroticisation of power 
differentials (see, for example, C. Kitzinger, 1994). This discussion is relevant 
to the analysis carried out on the heterosexual couple dynamic in Chapters 
Seven and Eight.
The problematisation of heterosexuality is connected with the perceived need 
to create a separate culture of women, in order to develop non-patriarchal 
thinking, as a prelude to rebuilding society (Daly, 1973. 1978, 1984). Daly’s 
work seeks to embrace, as essence, the devalued characteristics associated in 
western culture with women and to revalue them. In order to effect this 
revaluation, opposing patriarchal values are devalued. For Daly, feminists must 
assume and enjoy their essential female nature or continue as men’s pawns, 
victims and dupes of patriarchy (Bailey, 1993: 120). There are elements of 
deconstruction (see Chapter Two, Section 3.5) in this work, as Grimshaw 
(1986: 156) points out. In her 1973 work, Daly argues for a breaking down of 
an initial polarisation of values. Thus, she says ‘love cut off from power or 
justice is inauthentic power of dominance, and justice is a meaningless façade 
of legalism split off from love and real power of being’ (1973: 217, cited in 
Grimshaw, 1986: 156). However, Daly’s vision of a feminist future is devoid of 
any real discussion of the ways in which women actually spend their lives. She 
implicitly divides women into two camps: those who are liberated and those 
who spend their lives in servitude (ibid: 158, 9).
Radical feminists take the view that sexuality is not a private matter to be 
explained in terms of individual preferences or psychological processes fixed in 
infancy (in this respect, radical feminism is hostile to psychoanalytic theory). In 
this perspective, sexuality is socially organised and critically structured by 
gender inequality. Society is seen as preceding sexuality, giving structure and 
content to the individual experience of it (Barry, 1995). Walby (1990) draws 
attention to the fact that, while few radical feminist writers make reference to
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Foucault and his discourse analysis, in practice most of them have adopted a 
method similar to his, producing historically and socially sensitive analyses. 
Walby (ibid: 122) agrees that there are elements of essentialism in some of the 
accounts, notably Firestones's account of reproduction, but that these are often 
overstated as a eulogy to an essential feminine experience. Radical feminists 
have shown that sexuality is a discourse which is a social phenomenon that 
exists outside individuals, as well as being constituted by the actions of 
individuals (Walby, 1990: 122).
Critics (Barrett, 1980; Cocks, 1989; Segal, 1987; Rowbotham, 1981) accuse 
radical feminism of a tendency to essentialism, to implicit or explicit biological 
reductionism, which is necessarily universalistic and ahistoric. It is argued that, 
by setting all men up as exploiters of the female essence that all women 
possess, radical feminists create an account which, by definition, cannot 
change. At best, the solution to this problem is to set up feminist free-space and 
a woman-centred culture. But because differences between men and women 
are seen as innate, there is no point in feminist activists trying to change 
mainstream culture. Echols gives the name 'cultural feminism' to a trend for 
using radical feminist theory to equate 'women's liberation with the 
development and preservation of a female counter-culture' (Echols, 1983, cited 
in Alcoff, 1988: 412). Echols infers from the writings of Rich and Daly that 
their emphasis on separatism is based on the idea that there is an innate female 
essence.
Hollway (1995) argues that the social constructionist assumptions of later 
radical feminist work (for example, Kitzinger, 1987, 1994; Barry, 1995) are 
too deterministic and do not allow for a theory of social change. This view is 
not necessarily at odds with the view that radical feminist thinking tends to take 
an essentialist view of women. As I argue in Section 6 of this chapter, the 
structuralist premises on which social constructionist thinking is based 
ultimately assumes a unitary, essential human subject. Richardson (1996b: 193) 
notes the variety of radical feminist theorising about sexuality, and its critics'
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tendency to focus on a narrow range of earlier works in defence of their claims 
that it is essentialist.
The political effects o f cultural / radical feminism have been positive, in 
insisting on viewing traditional feminine characteristics from a different, 
affirmative point of view (Eisenstein, 1984; Alcoff, 1988). But it is difficult to 
see how it can provide a useful strategy for change in the long term, or a 
radical theorisation of the subject, or of the complexity of women's and 
feminists' lives. Moreover, its development has led to a constraining feminist 
ideology for some (Gallop, 1988), since not all women recognise themselves in 
the ideal of womanhood which cultural feminism posits. This kind of thinking 
reproduces dominant cultural assumptions about women, although giving them 
new, positive value. It fails to represent the variety of differences between 
women, as well as between women and men.
Some theorists who have developed the kind of 'cultural feminism' associated 
with radical feminism have used object-relations psychoanalysis and especially 
the work of Chodorow (1978), to develop a theory of lesbian sexuality (Rich, 
1980; Ryan, 1990). Chodorow herself does not address the issue of lesbianism, 
but her theories have lent themselves to an idea of the 'woman-related woman' 
(Rich, 1980). Segal (1987) and Wilson (1986) have argued that this 
development of Chodorovian theory is essentialist and, thus, restrictive. 
Although Chodorow (1980; 1994) herself cautions against the notion of fixed 
gender identities, the notion of the woman-related woman has been used to 
develop what Moi (1985: 191) calls a 'deep-seated essentialism' and what Segal 
(1987: 142) calls 'psychic essentialism'. This essentialism is evident in the 
theories of'difference feminism' of Bordo (1987), Keller (1985) and Gilligan 
(1982). The unproblematic use in these works of the terms 'male' and 'female' 
displays a belief in fundamental sexual differences in male and female 
personality structures.
The drift towards celebrating 'essential' or traditional female qualities has also 
been characterised as conservative (Stacey, 1983; Hare-Mustin, 1991). 'Caring,
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which is represented as a fundamental female quality, can be better understood 
in relational terms as a way of negotiating from a position of low power' (ibid: 
70). Gilligan's's most influential work (1982) describes ideology, while 
purporting to describe something that is essentially and universally female. This 
could be said of cultural feminism as a whole. The danger in this is that the 
universal unitary, rational and male subject is simply replaced with the opposite 
side of the binary, a unitary, universal, feeling female subject, even if it is open 
to debate whether this subject is pre-given or constructed. Such a theorisation 
is still incapable of addressing the complexities of subjectivity in what Giddens 
(1991, 1994a) calls late or high modernity, or the social conditions of the late 
twentieth century.
3.3 Object-relations theory and Chodorovian psychoanalysis
Within feminism, there are varied attitudes to psychoanalytic theory and 
practice. Although, as I discuss in Section 8 of this chapter, Freudian, Lacanian 
and Kleinian thought has given productive ideas to feminist poststructuralism, 
radical second-wave feminism (for example, Kitzinger, 1987) tends to be 
hostile towards Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud privileges the role of the father 
and gives little importance to the role of the mother in the formation of 
identity. This, and other 'felt difficulties' with the Freudian approach to female 
sexuality have provoked some feminists to 'detour' Freud (Lovell, 1990: 190). 
One psychoanalytic approach which has taken this detour and had enormous 
influence with radical and cultural feminists is the work of Nancy Chodorow.
Chodorow has been the principal theorist in what Balbus (1987: 110) calls the 
feminist psychoanalytic theory of Dinnerstein, Balbus, Rich and Flax. This 
branch of feminist psychoanalysis draws on the non-Kleinian object-relations 
theories o f these writers (Balbus, 1982; Dinnerstein, 1976; Flax, 1978) and has 
been the theoretical basis for the practice of 'feminist therapy' (Eichenbaum and 
Orbach, 1982, 1984). This work has attempted to situate psychoanalytic
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theories of the psychic construction of gender within an historically specific 
social environment. The approach requires a transformation of key Freudian 
categories and the anthropological assumptions on which they are based.
Chodorow shifts from Freud to later object-relations theory (Winnicott, 1956) 
to explain how women's childcaring role is perpetuated through the earliest 
relationship between a mother and her child. She develops a theory of gendered 
relations which centres on early childhood experiences (Chodorow, 1978). This 
leads her to a demand for a fundamental change in how childcare is organised 
between women and men in our culture. She examines the reproduction of 
mothering, rather than gender identity per see, arguing that women develop a 
greater desire to be mothers than men do to be fathers. For her, the cause of 
differences between the genders is that, while all girl children continue to 
identify with the mother, boy children have to make a serious break and 
identify with the more distant father, in order to become masculine. This is a 
wrench for boys and develops a different type of personality, which is less 
nurturing. The process is embedded in the unconscious and is not amenable to 
simple conscious resolution. Consequently, girls grow into nurturing adults, 
while boys do not (ibid: 43, 44) Relationships and issues of dependency are 
experienced differently by women and men. Masculinity is defined through 
separation. Masculinity is threatened by intimacy, while female gender identity 
is threatened by separation.
Instead of privileging the Oedipus and castration complexes, as Freud does, 
Chodorow focuses on the psychic effects of the pre-Oedipal mother-daughter 
relationship, over the mother-son and father-son relationships emphasised by 
Freud. The girl is seen as struggling with her likeness and unlikeness to the 
mother, before her entrance into and her inscription within the law of the father 
(Michie, 1989). The problematic bond between mother and daughter is what 
produces language, identity and a provisional notion of 'self in the little girl. 
Chodorow (1978: 208, 9) stresses 'the fact that women universally are largely 
responsible for early childcare and for (at least) later female socialisation'.
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Working in a North American context, Chodorow uses psychoanalysis to 
dispute biological and social theories of gender acquisition, which deny the 
significance of important mental processes. What in Freud and Lacan are 
abstract positions with which the child identifies, for example the position of 
the father, become real people in Chodorow's work. This has led Rose (1990) 
and Kurzweil (1989) to describe Chodorow's work as part of socialisation 
theory, rather than as a truly psychoanalytic approach. As Hochschild (1990a: 
155, 156) points out, 'all women come out pretty much alike' in Chodorow's 
theory, as do all men. The approach is descriptive, detailing the successful 
internalisation of patriarchal ideology, and reductionist (Segal, 1987: 140, 
141), suggesting that the ideology could be changed by changes in childcare 
arrangements. It does not address changes from generation to generation, or 
the contradictory nature of women's experiences and expectations, which have 
often been the impetus for feminism (Ryan, 1990: 253).
Chodorow’s historical and relational positioning of the production of feminine 
identity initially contrasts favourably with Freud’s theorisation of the 
construction of sexual difference around ‘the phallic economy’ (Harris, 1989: 
131). The identification of the girl is more informed by process and becomes 
problematic only when she realises that she identifies
with a negatively valued gender category, and an ambivalently
experienced maternal figure, ... accessible but devalued. Conflicts here
arise from questions of relative power and social and cultural value.
(Eisenstein and Jardine, 1985: 14)
Chodorow values mothering highly (Gilligan, 1982) and her analysis is 
woman-centred (H. Eisenstein, 1984). The problem is that mothering is not 
highly socially valued, apart from its role in socialisation and regulation, as 
propounded in the work of Winnicott (1956, 1957). Chodorow’s solution is for 
men to parent, as well as women. Her analysis recognises the strength of the 
social processes and suggests that the social changes could change the 
organisation of the psyche and the formation of subjectivity. But she does not 
analyse the social processes which give low rewards to motherhood and her
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solution to gender inequality, for men to parent, ignores wider social issues 
which devalue women in society (Walby, 1990).
In her attempt to make pre-Oedipal relations social-familial, rather than 
ahistorically psychosexual, Chodorow acknowledges that women’s social role 
as mother is always historically and culturally specific in its organisation and 
meanings. She thinks that changes in family structures can affect individual 
change and thus social change. But, on the other hand, in her privileging of 
mothering, she theorises it and its psychosexual and social implications as 
universal (Segal, 1987). In doing this, in common with all psychoanalysis, 
Chodorow reduces subjectivity to sexual identity and the constitution of this 
identity to the first five years of childhood (Weedon, 1987: 62). And, at the 
same time,
she loses sight of Freud’s radical deconstruction of the ego, replacing it 
with a stable gendered subjectivity, founded on gender roles learnt in 
the context of the unconscious structuring of femininity and masculinity 
which reinforces them, (ibid)
Chodorow argues that gender is reproduced through mothering and that no 
change is possible until one is part of a family where men mother. Change is 
located at a single point, the point of origin of gender. As Hollway (1982: 104, 
5) points out, we must use psychoanalytic concepts in a way which does not 
reduce gender to a single, unchangeable, originary moment. The incorporation 
of social content through language and the unconscious makes this possible, as 
does the incorporation of contradiction. Taking as a starting point the 
formation of a feminist subjectivity in the context of adult social relations, as 
this thesis does, implies that there are no origins, not even complex ones.
Rather, any starting point is relatively arbitrary and depends on tracing 
the recursive (Giddens, 1979) relations which have produced the 
subject at that time. It is through these that it is possible not to lose 
sight of the effect of social changes on the experience and identity o f an 
individual subject over time. Depending on the opportunities which 
construct women’s opportunities in the social world, the expression of 
these contradictory sites of identity may be limited. However, the 
recognition of their theoretical possibility is crucial for a dynamic
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theory of identity which takes into account the changing relationships 
of a person’s history and which can thus explain gender in the 
contemporary western world, (ibid: 105)
3.4 Marxist feminism
If identity and subjectivity cannot be understood without theorising the social 
domain, what is the relationship between them? It is in the Marxist tradition 
that sophisticated and sustained attempts were first made to go beyond the 
idealist humanist / rationalist theory of the person which constitutes traditional 
philosophical approaches to the subject (Henriques et al, 1984: 93if). Out of an 
epistemological and political commitment to materialism, criticisms of the 
transcendental subject have been derived via Althusser and his use of Lacanian 
psychoanalytic concepts. Before examining Althusserian approaches to the 
subject in Section 6, I first look at Marxist feminist and dual-systems theories 
of women’s oppression.
Marxist feminist analysis considers that gender identity and inequality in gender 
relations derives from capitalism where men’s domination of women is a 
by-product of the domination of capital over labour. Class relations and the 
economic exploitation of one class by another are the central features of social 
structure and these determine the nature of gender relations (Benhabib and 
Cornell, 1987; Hartmann, 1981; Jagger, 1983; Walby, 1990). Marxist-inspired 
feminist theorists offer an examination of the division of labour, where 
women’s work within the home has been devalued as part of the private, 
inconsequential sphere of life. Further, when women enter the paid workforce 
in addition to doing their domestic work, it is often in low-paid, low-status 
jobs. In this dual capacity of domestic and labour-force worker, women keep 
capitalism and male dominance in place — a system in which they are largely 
subordinate. However, there is no unified Marxist-feminist approach to 
household production. Approaches range from those which see gender and the 
family determined primarily at an ideological level, to those which view it
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principally at an economic one. Some see the family as neutral in the 
oppression of women which stems from capitalism and others see the family as 
the critical site of women’s oppression. A common thread, however, is that 
capitalism needs the conventional family form, so there is little prospect of 
major alterations in gender relations until there have been major changes in 
capitalism. The exploitative economic relations between classes are seen to be 
implicated in the oppression of women, to such an extent that women’s 
liberation from the family would not be achievable outside a socialist society.
The first Marxist theorist to address the question of women’s subordination 
was Engels (1940), whose description of women’s oppression contains the 
elements of a socialist analysis of the pre-conditions for change in women’s 
situation. He asserts women’s oppression as a problem of history, rather than 
biology, and posits therefore that revolutionary politics could solve it. Arguing 
from a base-superstructure model, he sees the material base as composed of 
production, including the making of tools, food, clothes and the processes of 
birth and caring for children, the ill and the elderly. This base determines the 
political and ideological superstructure. Although Engels’ account has been 
subject to criticism (Delmar, 1976; Stone, 1977), he importantly recognises the 
material nature of women’s work, providing the basis for a materialist analysis 
of women’s subordinate position (Walby, 1990: 71). Walby goes on to criticise 
Althusser (1971a) for losing this critical insight and for seeing the family purely 
as an ideological state apparatus, whose function is to socialise children for 
capitalism.
Taking up the materialist strand in Engels’ work, the domestic labour and 
wages for housework debate of the 1970s systematically examined the 
relationship between housework, or domestic labour, and capital (Dalla Costa 
and James, 1973; Hartmann, 1981). If the work of women could be shown to 
be central to capitalism, then feminism could be shown to be central to 
revolutionary politics. The argument centred around the concept of ‘value’, the 
Marxist unit of economic worth (Hartmann, 1981: 34). Hartmann’s critique of
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Dalla Costa and James is that they found a place in the revolution for women’s 
struggle by making women producers of surplus value and, as a consequence, 
part of the working class. They did not, however, examine the importance of 
housework in maintaining male supremacy, or the importance of men’s vested 
interests in the subordination of women. Women’s struggles, in this scenario, 
are seen as revolutionary, not because they are feminist, but because they are 
anti-capitalist.
Nicholson (1987: 17) argues that feminist theory has in Marx both a strong ally 
and a serious opponent. In common with Hartmann (1981: 10), she points out 
that Marxism enables us to understand many aspect of capitalist societies, such 
as structures of production, generation of occupational structures and the 
nature of dominant ideologies, but that its categories, like capital itself, are 
sex-blind. Nicholson goes on to argue that the concept of production (narrowly 
understood as the producing and formation of an object), which is central to 
orthodox Marxist approaches, is also inadequate for comprehending the 
complex, inter subjective nature o f traditional female activities like caring and 
nurturing and, therefore, inadequate as an analytic tool for feminists 
(Nicholson, 1987: 17). Walby (1990: 73) considers the strengths and 
weaknesses of Marxist feminism and radical feminism to mirror each other, in 
that the former overstates the household labour argument at the expense of 
gender relations, while radical feminism provides, in isolation from other 
systems, an important analysis of gender relations. Hartmann (1981: 11) 
considers Mitchell’s (1975) approach to women’s oppression via 
psychoanalysis to be a ‘more useful’ Marxist feminism, in common with Delphy 
(1984) and Brown (1981). However, Benhabib and Cornell (1987), Nicholson 
(1987) and Lovell (1990) believe that a more useful theory could come out of a 
fuller engagement between the two approaches. This could take place only in 
the context of a paradigm shift in orthodox Marxist thought, away from the 
paradigm of production.
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3.5 Dual systems theory
Dual-systems theory is an attempt to synthesise radical feminism and Marxist 
feminism. It was one of the first feminist efforts to avoid ‘single variable’ 
models, by theorising the intersection of gender with class (and, in some cases, 
with race). As such, it foreshadows the feminist poststructuralist project of 
theorising the intersection of different social variables as the ground for 
differential treatment. But, as Fraser (1989: 8) comments,
despite this laudable aim, it soon reached an impasse: having begun by 
supposing the fundamental distinctness of capitalism and patriarchy, class 
and gender, it was never clear how to put them together again.
Dual-systems theory argues that both capitalism and patriarchy are important 
systems to consider in the structuring of gender relations. Delphy (1984), for 
example, retains the material Marxist analysis and the focus on men’s 
oppression of women that comes from radical feminism, arguing that the 
exploitation of women’s labour in the home is the cornerstone of their 
oppression by men. Unlike the Marxist feminist analysis of housework in the 
domestic labour debate, she considers this to be patriarchal exploitation, since 
men, not capital, are seen to benefit. This system of exploitation is regarded as 
parallel to, but separate from, the exploitation of labour by capital, which takes 
place simultaneously.
Eisenstein (1979) sees capitalism and patriarchy as fused into one system of 
capitalist patriarchy. The two are seen as so closely interrelated and symbiotic 
that they have become one integrated system, with patriarchy providing a 
system of control and order, and capitalism providing the economic system. 
Their effect on each other and their need for each other are too great for them 
to be theorised as separate systems. They are fused at the level of the state, 
where patriarchal interests are represented via male capitalists (Z. Eisenstein, 
1984).
Both Hartmann (1979) and Mitchell (1975) keep the systems analytically
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distinct, while differing in their mode of separation of capitalism and patriarchy. 
Mitchell discusses gender in terms of a separation between the two systems, in 
which the economic level is ordered by capitalist relations and the level of the 
unconscious is ordered by the law of patriarchy. She re-evaluates the work of 
Freud in order to uncover the unconscious and its function in perpetuating 
patriarchal ideology. Hartmann’s (1979) analysis is different, in that she sees 
patriarchal relations operating at the level of the expropriation of women’s 
labour by men, not at the level of ideology and the unconscious, she argues that 
both housework and paid work are important sites of women’s exploitation by 
men. Further, both forms of exploitation reinforce each other, since women’s 
disadvantaged position in paid work makes them vulnerable within the family 
and their position within the family disadvantages them in paid work.
Young (1981) claims that it is impossible to sustain a dual-systems analysis of 
capitalism and patriarchy. Dual-systems theorists typically try to do this by 
allocating them to different levels of society but, in doing this, cannot account 
for patriarchal elements in the level allocated to capitalism, or for capitalist 
elements in the level allocated to patriarchy (Walby, 1990: 7). Walby considers 
a further limitation of existing dual-systems theory to be the fact that is does 
not address the full range of patriarchal structures, giving very little attention to 
sexuality and violence.
Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1990) disagree with Z. Eisenstein’s (1979) attempt 
to discover a feminist materialism in the social relations of reproduction, saying 
that it fails because it tries to superimpose a materialist project onto a different 
object and reproduce its terms of reference. Lovell (1990: 71) argues that in 
the dual-systems strategy of ceding to Marxism what it can best explain and 
turning to feminist theory for a complementary understanding of sex-gender 
systems, there lies the danger that the Marxist analysis of production goes 
uncriticised by feminist thinking. Although Marxist feminists can sometimes be 
accused of reducing sex oppression to class subordination, this very tendency 
towards reductionism necessitates a critical engagement with Marxism, the idea
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that modes of production and social classes might be systematically gendered, 
she says, is in some ways more challenging to Marxism than the notion of two 
parallel systems in interaction (ibid), similarly, Benhabib and Cornell, (1987: 1, 
2) are of the opinion that the confrontation between twentieth century Marxism 
and feminist thought requires nothing less than a paradigm shift of the former, 
which they describe as the ‘displacement of the paradigm of production’ of 
orthodox Marxism.
Feminist theory has been influential in challenging the Marxist emphasis on 
production but it is much less useful for explaining the oppression of women 
than the oppression of the working class. The concept of ideology offers a way 
forward through a link with the material position of women (Hollway, 1982: 
115). Ideology can ‘mediate contradictions’ between women’s actual 
productive and reproductive value and their subordination, according to the 
Marxist social anthropologist O’Laughlin (1974, cited in Hollway, ibid). She 
assumes that ideology works to reproduce conditions whose origins lie 
elsewhere. Hollway cites this as a product of O’Laughlin’s Marxist problematic 
of base and superstructure and asserts that Althusser’s theory of ideology takes 
this problematic as far as possible. Hollway (ibid) points out that Althusser 
(1971a: 153, 155) posits two theses on the nature of ideology:
1. Ideology represents the imaginary relations of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence.
2. Ideology has a material existence.
In the second thesis, Althusser describes ideology as a structure of social 
relations which can be further described through the ideological state 
apparatuses (ISAs) of church, state and school. The ISAs are one ‘instance’ of 
the social formation. He goes on to describe its relation to other ‘instances’, 
notably the economic, which is determinate of social relations, but not 
necessarily dominant, because the ‘lonely hour’ of the last instance never 
comes (Henriques et al, 1984: 96, 97). In Althusser’s stipulation of relations,
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he develops the notion of conjuncture to express the idea of the co-existence of 
necessarily uneven instances at any given moment. Thus, he attempts to break 
with the determinism of the original base-superstructure model by seeing the 
‘instances’ of the social formation at any given time as having a different 
capacity to determine other instances. This is what he means by their 
‘effectivity’ ( Hollway, 1982: 120). The notion of instances is echoed in the 
feminist poststructuralist emphasis on relations in the present. This concept is 
developed further in Chapter Seven, which examines feminist subjectivity as a 
process of relations in present situations.
3.6 Structuralism’s account of the relationship between ideology and the 
subject
Although the recent history of a specific, stated anti-humanist position is most 
closely associated with Althusser, it has its point of departure with writers like 
Merleau Ponty (1969), Sartre (1960), Gramsci (1971) and writers of the 
Frankfurt school, including Habermas (1971a, b). Nietzsche’s ‘death of man’ 
and Lévi-Strauss’ ‘death of the subject’ had given earlier indications of this 
departure, as well as Marx’ critique of Feuerbach’s foundation of the purpose 
of history in ‘man’, and Freud’s decentering of the rational cogito and his 
emphasis on the importance of the unconscious (Henriques et al, 1984).
Althusser’s re-working of Marxist theory has been taken as most representative 
of the structuralist outlook. In general, structuralism is an attempt to apply the 
linguistic theory of Saussure to activities other than language (Eagleton, 1983: 
106). This approach concentrates on isolating the underlying set of laws 
(structures), under which signs are combined into ‘meanings’. The 
structuralism of the anthropologist Lévi-Strauss, for example, meant that, in 
studying a body of myth, he was looking less at its narrative content than at the 
mental operations which structure it. As Eagleton puts it, ‘like Freud, he 
exposes the shocking truth that our most intimate experience is the effect of a
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structure’ (ibid: 107). The structuralist approach emphasises the
constructedness of human meaning.
Structuralism is anti-humanist in that, in establishing cultural elements and their 
rules of combination, it shows the inseparability of cognitive systems and social 
structures. The humanist position tends to see the individual as the agent of all 
social phenomena and productions, including knowledge. The specific notion 
of the individual contained in this outlook is one of a unitary, essentially 
not-contradictory and, above all, rational entity. It is the Cartesian subject in 
modern form. Thus, a society-individual dualism arises, with humanism on the 
side of the individual and structuralism on the social side. This has also been 
characterised as an agency-determinism dualism (Hollway, 1989). Althusser’s 
anti-humanism attacks the individual as an agent of social change. His early 
work sees class struggle, represented by the revolutionary party, as the agent of 
change. Later, following his development of ideology, he sees change arising 
out of changes in the ISAs (family, church and school). He privileges the 
structure of the social formation and any attribution of agency to the individual 
is labelled bourgeois (Giroux, 1983; Henriques et al, 1984).
However, a problem arises in that, in claiming to isolate laws of the mind, 
structuralism is ‘hair-raisingly unhistorical’ (Eagleton, 1983: 109) and is as 
guilty as humanism of conceptualising the human subject in universal terms. In 
taking an anti-humanist stance, structuralism privileges a system of rules and a 
universal mind. But it does not give an account of human subjects and their 
intentions, probably out of a desire to avoid re-introducing the Cartesian 
subject ‘through the back door’ (Henriques et al, 1984: 95). The elimination of 
the human subject and subjectivity from analysis means that the structures 
themselves form the framework of a new metanarrative, replacing the ‘god’ of 
religion and the ‘man’ of humanism.
Althusser, like Gramsci, links common sense with ideology. This differs from 
the widespread classical perception of ideology as a set of doctrines or a 
coherent system of beliefs deliberately adopted by self-conscious individuals.
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Althusser considers that ideology is the very condition of our experience of the 
world, unconscious precisely in the fact that it is unquestioned and 
taken-for-granted. As already outlined, in Althusser’s use of the term, ideology 
works in conjunction with political and economic practice, to constitute what 
he calls the ‘social formation’. He sees as ideological things which are widely 
considered natural or obvious. In this way, he develops the notion of ideology 
as common sense. Theorists influenced by Althusser and Lacan, on whom he 
draws, such as Black and Coward (1981), Coward and Ellis (1977) and Belsey 
(1980), have taken up this idea, to show how common-sense ideology is 
inscribed in the language we speak, and how language and discourse influence 
thought and consciousness. Ideology is not seen as a separate package of ideas, 
or an ‘optional extra’ (ibid: 5). It is seen as a way of thinking, speaking and 
experiencing and, as such, it is inscribed in discourses. A discourse is a domain 
of language use, a particular way of talking, writing and thinking (ibid). 
Ideology is inscribed in discourse in the sense that it is expressed in it, in 
writing and in speech. It is a particular form of the use of knowledge (Craib, 
1992: 113).
Giddens (1979) also addresses ideology. He rejects the idea that ideology is a 
particular type of symbolic order (this idea corresponds to Althusser’s first 
thesis, that ideology represents the imaginary relations of individuals to their 
real conditions of existence). This is the view that usually juxtaposes ideology 
to science, falsehood to truth, as orthodox Marxist theory does. Borrowing 
from Habermas, Giddens posits the view that discursive knowledge is partly 
constitutive of social life, so it cannot systematically be mistaken, as in the 
Marxist view. He prefers to confine the term ideology to the mobilisation of 
structures of signification to serve the sectional interests of hegemonic groups. 
Investigating ‘sectional interests’ further, he recognises the usefulness of a 
conception of interests and wants to develop one which does not depend on the 
actor recognising his or her interests or wants (Craib, 1992: 53).
In Althusser’s early work, the agent of change was class struggle, represented
89
in the revolutionary party. Henriques et al (1984: 96) point out that his later 
work responds to the events of 1968 in Paris, when the party failed to deliver 
the revolution, by developing this different understanding of the relation 
between ideology and the subject which is what forms his second thesis on 
ideology, namely that it has a material nature. In addition, he was working in a 
climate in which many activists were questioning the effectiveness of the 
voluntarism of the liberation movements of the time. Ideology, and the ISAs of 
church, family and school were seen to produce individuals as subjects, in such 
a way that they participated in reproducing capitalism (ibid). Althusser 
concluded that the fundamental task of ideological practice, over and above the 
reproduction of particular ideologies, is the ‘interpellation’ of individual human 
beings as subjects, within the place assigned them in the social order. It is thus 
that individuals acquire and assent to their social identity.
Althusser draws on the work of Lacan (1977, 1981) for his account of the 
process of an infant’s simultaneous entry into language and social life. This 
view of subjectivity has been criticised as ‘mechanistic’ (Giroux, 1983; 
Silverman, 1985):
Human subjects simply act as role-bearers, constrained by the
mediations of structures like schools and responding primarily to an
ideology that functions without the benefits of reflexivity or change.
(Giroux, 1983: 136)
Ideology is seen to have a material existence in the ISAs and subjectivity 
becomes just ‘a reflex of the needs of capital and its institutions’ (ibid).
Both humanism and structuralism share a conception of the human subject that 
is essentialist: characterised ‘as a condition of its creative activity in the one 
case, and of its subjection to its position in the structure, in the other’ 
(Hindness, 1986: 120). Both perspectives are also reductionist, because they
propose to reduce diverse social conditions to other conditions which are
considered more basic: either to structures or to the creative actions of
individuals (Hirst, 1979). What is needed is a dialectical treatment of
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subjectivity and structure, in order to overcome the individual-society dualism 
(Barrett, 1980; Giroux, 1983; Hollway, 1989).
The strengths of structuralism are many, and they provide resources for the 
feminist poststructuralist project of theorising a dynamic and multiple 
subjectivity. A particular strength is the recognition that meaning never resides 
in a single term, that everything depends on how the constituent elements are 
articulated. There is an implicit questioning of the possibility of a unique 
‘correct’ set of ideas about the subject, which acquire privileged status. 
Structuralism has pointed out the value-laden nature of common sense and has 
shown how whole social ideologies may be present in an apparently ‘neutral’ 
approach. This is important for feminists in their task of exposing patriarchy 
(Cullen, 1987; Walby, 1990; Wilkinson, 1990). It has also partly enabled the 
critique of liberalism (Grimshaw, 1986; Kitzinger, 1987). To see society as 
primarily determined by structures is an advance on the perspective that sees 
society as the expression of the individual mind, even if structuralism does not 
take human subjects and their intentions into full account. However, 
structuralist premises emphasise what is static and universal, not accounting for 
history and change. Poststructuralism is not opposed to structuralism, in the 
way it is fundamentally opposed to humanism. Feminism poststructuralism 
attempts the dialectical treatment of structure and subject, by combining the 
insights of structuralism with psychoanalytic theory about the nature of desire 
and intention, and with Foucauldian discourse theory.
3.7 Marxism and feminist poststructuralism
Feminist poststructuralism, where it draws on Marxism, draws largely on 
Althusserian Marxism. The anti-essentialism of feminist poststructuralism does 
also find a forerunner in the anti-essentialism of existentialist Marxism, 
particularly that of Beauvoir (Schor, 1989). However, Althusserian Marxism 
defined itself in opposition to both existentialist and humanist Marxisms and
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Beauvoir’s importance tends to be overlooked, particularly in Britain, because 
of the widespread adoption of Althusser’s theories there in the 1970s (Lovell, 
1990: 187, 188). While Morrow (1994: 130) asserts that Althusser’s 
structuralism has been decisively rejected by critical social theorists, he neglects 
productive feminist engagements with it.
Althusser stresses the material nature of ideology which, in poststructural 
terms, is discourse (Weedon, 1987: 97). He also stresses the class structure of 
society and the integral relationship between theory and practice. However, he 
assumes that social relations, discourses and the social power legitimised by 
discourses are reducible to economic, that is, capital-labour relations, in the last 
instance (Althusser, 1971a). Feminist poststructuralist theorists Urwin (1985) 
Walkerdine (1985a) and Weedon (1987) have, however, pointed out that in 
any one historically specific example, relations may ultimately be reducible to 
the economic, but that this should not be treated as a universal principle. Other 
forms of power relations, for example those manifest around gender, race, 
ethnicity, age and ability, must be allowed and must not be subordinated to the 
economic in considerations of subjectivity and power (Lewis, 1993; Middleton, 
1993). The interrelation of different forms of power and different axes of 
oppression is often crucial to poststructuralist analyses.
Althusserian Marxism also assumes that meaning and consciousness do not 
exist independently of language, that language and our inscription in discourse 
through language, are what construct meaning. This is a primary assumption of 
feminist poststructuralism also, although the notion of language as ‘text’ 
extends to habit and practice (Alcoff, 1988: 43). Language, in the form of what 
Althusser calls ‘ideology in general’, is the means by which individuals are 
governed by the IS As, in the interests of dominant groups (Weedon, 1987: 30). 
However, poststructuralist linguistic theory does not see signifier and signified 
as ultimately linked together in the way Saussure theorised them. Foucault is 
concerned with many of the same problems as Althusser, although he does not 
begin with the same epistemological perspectives. His historical approach to
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discourses emphasises their multiplicity and potential contradictions at any time 
(Hollway, 1989: 53). Derrida asserts that signifiers achieve meaning in a 
specific discursive context and the fixing of meaning is achieved only 
temporarily as a result of this.
Like Althusserian Marxism, feminist poststructuralism makes the 
primary assumption that it is language which enables us to think, speak 
and give meaning to the world around us. Meaning and consciousness 
do not exist outside language. Stated in this way, poststructuralist 
theory may seem to resemble a range of humanist discourses which 
take consciousness and language as the fundamental human attributes.
Yet in all poststructuralist discourses, subjectivity and rational 
consciousness are themselves put into question. We are neither the 
authors of the ways in which we understand our lives, nor are we 
unified rational beings. For feminist poststructuralism, it is language in 
the form of conflicting discourses which constitutes us as conscious 
thinking subjects and enables us to give meaning to the world and to 
act to transform it. (Weedon, 1987: 32)
Marx was one of the early theorists who broke with the humanist notion of 
society as formed by individuals, and showed how individual experience was 
formed by social structures. This is an important link with poststructuralism. 
However, there is an assumption in Marxism and in Marxist-feminism that, by 
changing the system and ideology, all women would benefit equally. Women 
are lumped together as a universal group with a specified nature (Fisher and 
Todd, 1988: 5). Missing from this critique is an analysis of differential 
treatment based on other axes of oppression. Althusser, ultimately following 
orthodox Marxism, reduces difference to economic relations and therefore to 
class.
Useful as Marxist traditions are to the development of a feminist 
poststructuralist framework, a problem arises with this economism of Marxist 
theory, because it allows the use of the terms ‘real’ and ‘false’. Marxism has a 
concept of historical-materialist ‘science’, which can offer a true explanation of 
capitalism, guaranteed by the ultimate determining power of the relations of 
production (Henriques et al, 1984: 98, 99). As such, it can offer the notions of 
‘false consciousness’ and of alienation from a true, unrepressed self, as
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expressed in the Freudo-Marxism of Reich, Marcuse and Fromm (Mitchell, 
1975, Part Two). An application of Marxist scientific analysis can lift the ‘veil 
of ideology’ which blinds people to the true nature of things (Foster, 1984). 
While there may have been some ambivalence about the status and meaning of 
the word ‘science’ at the time when Marx was writing (in Grundrisse, for 
example, he uses the word to mean both a method and a real consciousness or 
truth) (Westwood, 1988). Althusser was writing at a different point in history, 
where the meaning of the word science was unambiguous (ibid).
Thus, Marxism falls back into the individual-society dualism which feminist 
poststructuralism is concerned to avoid. The Althusserian notion of ideology 
problematically places the source o f ‘ideas’ in subjects, such as the ruling class, 
and does not challenge existing ideas of the role of the individual subject as 
agent. For Foucault, somewhat differently, discourses are already powers and 
do not need to find their material force elsewhere. He shifts the focus from the 
ideas of an intellectual elite onto mundane discourses of disciplinary institutions 
that more directly affect the everyday life of the masses. From this viewpoint, 
‘ideology can be seen as the prosaic encounter of criminal and criminologist, 
neurotic and therapist, child and parent, unemployed worker and welfare 
agency’ (Foster, 1984: 87).
In rejecting the claim that scientific theories can give access to ‘truth’, feminist 
poststructuralism has also drawn on the work of early radical feminist writers 
such as Daly (1978) and Rich (1980), who have demonstrated the false claims 
to objectivity made by the social sciences. Feminist poststructuralism sees 
ideology as having a material existence, in discourse, not as representative of 
something else (Lees, 1986). This differs from the Marxist view of ideology as 
‘false’ and Marxist science as ‘true’, a view demonstrated in Althusser’s first 
thesis on ideology, that it represents the imaginary relations of individuals to 
their real conditions of existence (Hollway, 1982: 118). So while Althusser’s 
other thesis on ideology, that it has a material existence, is useful for the 
feminist poststructuralist project, its usefulness is lessened by the existence of
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the first thesis, with its implicit reductionism of a search for origins (the ‘real’ 
conditions of existence) (ibid). As Norris (1982: 84) puts it, ‘Althusserian 
Marxism is a form of deconstruction but one that seeks to halt the process at a 
point where science can extract the hidden message of ideology’.
3.8 Psychoanalysis and feminist poststructuralism
The widespread engagement with Althusserian theories of ideology among 
Marxist feminists in Britain in the 1970s paved the way for a reassessment of 
Freud and psychoanalysis, through attention to Lacan’s reworking of Freudian 
theory. Classical Marxism could not supply an equivalent to the sociological 
concept of socialisation, but an Althusserian approach did (Mitchell, 1971). 
Althusser used the Lacanian concept of ‘interpellation’ to examine how human 
subjects submit themselves to the dominant ideologies of their societies. Early 
applications of psychoanalysis were connected with ‘conservative sociology’ — 
Parsons uses it as the framework for his personality system, which he 
subordinates to his social system (Kurzweil, 1989: 82). Second-wave radical 
feminism had traditionally maintained considerable hostility towards Freudian 
psychoanalysis also.
Psychoanalysis has frequently been dismissed as bourgeois, as highly culturally 
specific while purporting to be universal, and as anti-feminist. Some of the 
accusations against it are indisputable. For example, Freud privileges the 
position of the father in the family and his explanation of characteristics of 
female psychology rests heavily on the concepts o f ‘penis envy’. Psychological 
differences between women and men are thus too easily reduced to biological 
differences, with the implication that women’s subordination is natural and 
inevitable.
Moreover, the poststructuralists Foucault and Donzelot have cited 
psychoanalysis in the production of particular sites for intervention and 
social regulation; for instance, in the prescription of sexual norms 
(Foucault, 1979) and in the management of child-care and what
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constitutes the role and responsibilities o f parents within the family 
(Donzelot, 1980). (Henriques et al, 1984: 206).
However, Adams (1990) critiques Donzelot for assuming that individuals are 
free to stand outside the norms and to reject them. His stance on this makes 
nonsense of the claimed effectivity of the normalising apparatuses in the first 
place. Donzelot’s voluntaristic viewpoint is reminiscent of Millett’s (1971) and 
of much of the traditional left’s and feminism’s liberation politics of the 1960s 
and 1970s, where consciousness-raising was seen as the key to casting off 
oppression. However, within feminism, a simple rational embracing of 
liberation came to be seen as far from straightforward and 
consciousness-raising was seen to have limitations, particularly where sexuality 
and desire were concerned (Adams, 1990).
The discursive approach and the accompanying decentering of the individual, 
as based on the work of Foucault, has many advantages over preceding 
theories of the subject. It succeeds in conceptualising subjectivity and the 
human subject as multiple, dynamic and as historically and socially 
(discursively) produced (cf Mama, 1995: 124). Nevertheless, it leaves certain 
areas untheorised:
... we are left with a number of unresolved problems. First, in this view 
the subject is composed of, or exists, as a set of multiple and 
contradictory positionings or subjectivities. But how are such 
fragments held together? Are we to assume, as some applications of 
post-structuralism have implied, that the individual subject is simply the 
sum total of all positions in discourses since birth? If this is the case, 
what accounts for the predictability of people’s actions, as they 
repeatedly position themselves within particular discourses? Can 
people’s wishes and desires be encompassed in an account of discursive 
relations? (Henriques et al, 1984: 204)
Given the theoretical lack in both traditional left liberation theory and in 
Foucauldian theory, it is productive to make a critical and selective use of 
psychoanalysis and its account of subjective processes which resist change, as 
well as accounts of failure of identity, which make change and resistance 
possible. It is important to take into account that contemporary psychoanalysis,
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like contemporary feminism, is not a single entity (Rose, 1990; Ryan, 1990). 
The aspects of psychoanalysis on which feminist poststructuralism draws in its 
theorisation of subjectivity are principally the theories of Freud and Lacan and, 
more recently, Klein (Hollway, 1989; Mama, 1995) and Benjamin (Hollway, 
1995).
Furthermore, psychoanalysis is not purely theory — there exists a large and 
diverse body of practice, some of which has had normative applications. 
Walkerdine (1996: 151), for instance, points out how, from the 1930s onwards 
in Britain, psychoanalytic practices joined forces with, and were shaped by and 
in turn shaped, concerns about the presence of the mother in the production of 
the bourgeois democratic citizen. ‘Deprivation’ came to be something that 
could result not just from maternal absence, but also from inappropriate and 
inadequate mothering (Bowlby, 1971). Anti-social behaviour and delinquency 
were also laid at the door of the mother by Winnicott (1957).
I have referred in Chapter One (Section 10) to my own discomfort at being 
involved in the F1SL scheme which targets mothers, with a view to ‘improving’ 
them and ultimately ‘improving’ their children. I have found a widespread 
acceptance of the theories of Bowlby and Winnicott among those who work 
with families. Even if these theories are not always explicit, they have entered 
into popular thinking as common sense, with all the attendant ideological 
implications. The normative applications of psychoanalysis, however, should 
not be allowed to mask the potential radicalism of the concept of the 
unconscious in Freudian theory (cf Rose, 1990).
Henriques et al describe well the aspects of psychoanalysis which need to be 
addressed:
First, if the attempt to appropriate psychoanalysis is to have politically 
progressive implications it must obviously utilise the potentially 
subversive aspects of the theory. There is a marked tendency for these 
to be suppressed in favour of therapeutic techniques which in effect 
focus on fostering the individual’s adjustment to his or her 
environment. ... Second, such an approach must also recognise
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explicitly the historical specificity of the psychic phenomena and 
reading of unconscious life which psychoanalysis produces. This is 
recognised in most feminist appropriations of psychoanalysis. ... Unless 
its appropriation enables us to envisage the possibility that things can 
be otherwise, and to move towards a theorisation of the possibilities of 
change, psychoanalysis will lock us into a closed circle. (Henriques et 
al, 1984: 207, 8)
For Freud, normal adults achieve femininity or masculinity through 
psycho-sexual development. But feminist poststructuralism cannot accept the 
privileging of sexual relations above other forms of social relations, as 
constitutive of identity. Sexual relations may well be central in any one 
historically specific analysis, but there is no reason why this should be 
universally so. Furthermore,
... feminist poststructuralism suggests that it is not good enough to 
assume that psychoanalysis accurately describes the structures of 
femininity and masculinity under patriarchy, since discourse constitutes 
rather than reflects meaning. (Weedon, 1987: 61, 62)
If we accept a descriptive function for psychoanalysis, we assume that basic 
patriarchal structures exist prior to their discursive realisation. Effective 
description of structures that are thought to pre-exist could lead to a view that 
sees no possibility for change and a subsequent prescriptive role for 
psychoanalysis in forcing people into conformity. This charge has been made 
against psychoanalysis by Wilson (1981) and Sayers (1982), legitimately, in so 
far as the bourgeois practice of psychoanalysis is concerned (Belsey, 1980: 
131). However, a feminist poststructuralist outlook emphasises the necessity to 
provide an historically specific context for the development of psychoanalytic 
theory and practice and the need to conceptualise psychoanalysis as an integral 
part of the processes that make up the social domain. This view comes from 
the proposition that all forms of knowledge are productive, in the specific sense 
that they have definite effects on the objects they seek to know. There is an 
important sense in which, far from discovering the ‘truth’ about an object of 
study, practices often produce the truth they believe they are discovering 
(Henriques et al, 1984: 92; Walkerdine, 1989a). By keeping these points in
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mind, feminist poststructuralism can draw on the radical insights and lessons of 
psychoanalysis, while remaining aware of the discursive practices it produces, 
as well as those which produce it.
From this perspective, in addressing the criticisms of Wilson and Sayers, one 
can point to the fact that they see only half the story, in stressing the normative 
applications of psychoanalysis and ignoring the importance of the unconscious 
in Freudian theory (Rose, 1990). Similarly, in Marxist approaches to 
psychoanalysis, attention is focused on the ideological determinants of our 
social being, to the detriment of the role of the unconscious. This approach is 
illustrated in the work of Barrett (1980). The radical feminist theory of Millett 
(1971) takes a similar approach but although Barrett does not acknowledge the 
importance of the unconscious, she is aware that it is not satisfactory to always 
see women as innocent passive victims of patriarchal power (1980: 110). On 
the other hand, throughout Millett1 s work, ‘woman’ is the victim of a 
conscious plot. Millett’s denunciation of psychoanalysis does not account for 
the aspects of psychoanalytic theory which provide the concept of 
‘investments’ (Hollway, 1984a, 1994) or emotional commitments involved in 
taking up certain positions within discourses, which confirm identity as 
masculine and feminine and support a sense of identity (cf Gavey, 1993). To 
accept these theories would be to accept that liberation is far more complicated 
than a rational casting off of false and oppressive beliefs.
Millett’s denunciation of psychoanalysis has retained its popularity with many 
feminists, especially those of the radical school, for example, Kitzinger (1987), 
Jeffreys (1990) and Kitzinger and Perkins, (1993), although there are today 
widely varied feminist psychoanalytic approaches (Brennan, 1989; Segal, 
1987). Moi (1985: 29) considers that the continuing effectiveness of Millett’s 
views with some feminists may be linked to the fact that her theory of sexual 
oppression as a conscious monolithic plot against women leads to a 
‘seductively optimistic view of the possibilities for full liberation’. 
Undoubtedly, the practice of psychoanalysis has been oppressive to women and
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in particular to lesbians (Hollway, 1995: 95). Feminist poststructuralism, 
however, cannot accept the reductionism of a complete dismissal of 
psychoanalytic theory. Nor can it accept patriarchal ideology as a total closure. 
There are always weak points, ideological and material contradictions. These 
are often made manifest through things which are unconsciously said or done, 
that is through things which insist on being heard, as opposed to the things 
which are considered acceptable to be seen or heard (Moi, 1985: 124; Rose, 
1990: 229; Weedon, 1987: 136). Psychoanalysis attends to these through its 
focus on the unconscious, to symptoms, slips of the tongue and dreams. There 
is no currently available substitute for psychoanalysis, or more broadly, 
psychodynamic accounts (Hollway, 1995: 95) of these symptoms which 
indicate the existence of the unconscious.
The concept of the unconscious can help conceive of ideology as a 
contradictory construct, full of inconsistencies. It can also, as Moi (1985: 26) 
points out, explain how, throughout history, some women have resisted 
patriarchal ideology, because of a failure of the dominant feminine identities (cf 
Rose, 1990). In this, it is a challenge to the self-evidence and common-sense 
ideological character of everyday life (cf Anderson 1968). These have also been 
the targets of different feminist approaches which have challenged the ‘natural’ 
and pre-given qualities ascribed to women’s social position. Freud’s radical 
deconstruction of the ego has been used to develop the idea of a non-unitary 
subject, which is at odds with the unitary, norm-related subject of mainstream 
psychology (Venn, 1984; Hollway, 1989). This unitary subject of psychology is 
also similar to the subject of liberal humanism and they bolster each other 
recursively (Hollway, 1991b).
The Freudian subject, then, is non-rational and multiple, subject to forces that 
are not always under the control of the conscious mind (Mama, 1995: 128). 
Furthermore, Freud’s ideas on the development of human sexuality are 
subversive, in that his theory takes neither masculinity nor femininity for 
granted. ‘Instead, the Freudian infant starts out as sexually undifferentiated
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(polymorphously perverse) with the potential to develop in any number of 
different directions, and only later develops masculinity or femininity after a 
complex struggle between contradictory forces’ (ibid). Mama points out that 
psychoanalytic theory is also a truly relational and social account of the history 
of the individual, because in it, the person is constructed in the course of 
relationships with other people. In Freud’s culture, this is the nuclear family 
(ibid).
3.8.1 Lacan
Many of the challenges to Freud, from analysts with whom he engaged in 
debate, ended by producing an account of femininity which had more 
normative effects than his own (Rose, 1990: 234; Henriques et al, 1984: 212). 
From the 1930s, Lacan challenged all of these therapeutic practices, 
particularly that of ego-psychology in the USA. He saw ego-psychology as a 
misuse of psychoanalysis for purposes of social adaptation and control and 
singled out for particular criticism its notion of a strong ego as the rational 
monitor of consciousness. He also argues that the notion of rational 
self-determination is an illusion produced through the social conditions of 
bourgeois society. He seizes on the deconstruction of the ego and the unitary 
subject, developing an account of a subjectivity fundamentally decentered from 
consciousness. ‘The ego is necessarily not coherent’ (Wilson, 1982, cited in 
Rose, 1990: 234, original emphasis), but always and persistently divided 
against itself. An ideological world conceals this division, this splitting of the 
subject, and the conscious part of the subject is
... supposed to feel whole and certain of a sexual identity. 
Psychoanalysis should aim at a deconstruction of this concealment and 
a reconstruction of the subject’s construction in all its aspects. 
(Mitchell and Rose, 1982: 26)
For Lacan, not only is the subject split, but its very production depends on the 
use of language. The entry into language is the pre-condition for becoming
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aware of oneself as a distinct entity (distinct from the mother), within the 
conditions laid down by already-existing social relations and cultural laws. In 
addition, the process of entry into language founds the unconscious. This 
brings us to Lacan’s theory of the imaginary and symbolic orders.
The imaginary corresponds to the pre-Oedipal period when the child believes 
itself to be part of the mother and perceives no separation between itself and 
the world. At this stage, the child is neither feminine nor masculine and has yet 
to acquire language (Lacan, 1949). Between the ages of six and eight months, 
the child enters the ‘mirror stage’ (still part of the imaginary). This stage allows 
for dual relationships, where the child identifies with the Other (usually a 
parental figure) and misrecognises itself as the source of meaning and power 
over this Other. Lacan uses Buhler’s (1930) account o f children’s behaviour in 
front of a mirror, where they will perform to their images which capture their 
every movement, in developing the idea of the mirror stage. This development 
is inserted by Lacan into Freud’s account of narcissism, which asserts that a 
period of self-love precedes object-love and the resolution of the Oedipus 
complex (Freud, 1914). Urwin (1982) shows that the mirror stage does not 
depend on the ability to see, drawing on her work with blind children.
In the Oedipal crisis, the father splits up the dyadic unity of mother and child 
and forbids the child further access to the mother’s body. The phallus, 
representing the Law of the Father (or the threat of castration), thus comes to 
signify separation and loss to the child. The loss is that of the maternal body 
and, from now on, desire for unity with this body must be repressed. With this 
repression, the child enters what Lacan calls the symbolic order, which is the 
social and cultural order in which we live our lives as conscious, gendered 
subjects. To speak as one of these conscious subjects is to represent the 
existence of repressed desire for the imaginary order, where there is no loss or 
lack. This is how Lacan can claim that the speaking subject is lack. When the 
child takes up its place in the symbolic order and learns to say ‘I am’, to 
identify ‘me’, distinguished from other people, this is the equivalent of the
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subject saying ‘I am s/he who has lost something’, the loss being the 
identification with the mother and the world which existed in the imaginary.
The entry into language and repression of the imaginary simultaneously form 
the unconscious. Since language is a social system, Lacan is able to assert that 
the social enters into the formation of the unconscious. The primary repression 
involved in entering the symbolic is what opens up the unconscious, which is 
always connected with lack. In the imaginary, there is no unconscious, since 
there is no lack. The speaking subject comes into being through the repression 
of desire for the mother, and Lacan asserts that ‘the unconscious is structured 
like a language’.
Contrary to popular appropriations of psychoanalysis, for Freud and Lacan, the 
unconscious is not the seat of drives or instincts, but o f traces of repressed 
ideas, signs or memories. These can become linked to works and find psychic 
expression. Thus, language is doubly attached to the expression of the 
unconscious. Freud (1900) addressed the relation beteen symbolic processes 
and the working of the unconscious, in his work on the interpretation of 
dreams. In ths work, he also deals with the difference between needs and 
desires. The distinction is also important in Lacan.
3.8.2 Desire
For Freud, needs can be fulfilled, since they arise from a state of internal 
tensions. For example, hunger can be satisfied by food. Wishes and desires, on 
the other hand, are based on ‘needs’ that have once known satisfaction. 
Through memory traces, this satisfaction is remembered and sought again 
(Freud, 1973). In so far as desires are fulfillable, it is through the reproduction 
in fantasy of perceptions and / or states which have become signs of this 
satisfaction. In trying to fulfill desire, we try to reproduce states which signify 
satisfaction for ourselves.
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Lacan looks to Saussure’s linguistic theory, in his own theorising of the sign. 
He stresses processes of selection and combination as fundamental to the 
organisation of meaning in language, but modifies the Saussurean account of 
the relationship between signifier and signified. Saussure’s account privileges 
denotative meaning (Culler, 1976), that is, something real in the world which is 
referred to, so the signifier and signified can be ‘harmoniously united’ 
(Eagleton, 1983: 166) when real meaning is grasped. In Saussure’s account, 
fixed a priori signifiers exist. For Lacan, the speaking subject is produced 
through the entry into the symbolic, which is itself made up of signifiers. But in 
Lacan’s departure from Saussurean theory, these signifiers are not linked to 
fixed a priori signifieds or concepts. Language is seen as ‘a constant stream of 
signifiers which achieve temporary meaning for a speaking subject 
retrospectively through their difference from one another’ (Weedon, 1987: 52). 
The unconscious consists of chains of signifiers, or the relationships between 
them. One term finds its meaning only by excluding the other.
Possession of the object of desire, the Other, means the satisfaction of desire. 
The child learns that language stands in for objects, becoming a substitute for 
some direct, wordless possession of the object itself (Eagleton, 1983: 166). But 
as it is learning these lessons of language, the child is also learning them in the 
world o f sexuality. The father, symbolised by the phallus, breaks up the dyadic 
unity of mother and child, teaching the child that it takes up a place in the 
family which is ‘defined by sexual difference, by exclusion (it cannot be its 
parent’s lover) and by absence (it must relinquish its earlier bonds to the 
mother’s body) (ibid: 167). In accepting this, the child is negotiating the 
Oedipus complex, to use Freud’s term. In Lacan’s terms, it is moving from the 
unity of the imaginary, where there is no desire because there is no lack, to the 
symbolic order of pre-given social and sexual roles. The lack, or loss, present 
in the symbolic order presents itself as ‘the unbridgeable gap between signifier 
and signified’ (Cornell and Thurschwell, 1987: 146).
Lacan’s theory of language resembles Derrida’s critique of rationalist theories
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of language and the metaphysics of presence, which presuppose that the 
meaning of concepts is fixed before their expression through language. Derrida 
also transforms the relationship between signifier and signified For both 
Derrida and Lacan, meaning can occur only in a specific context and in a 
relation of difference from other contexts. For Derrida, the principle of 
differance (see Chapter Two, Section 4.5) prevents a final fixing of meaning. 
For Lacan, it is the mechanisms of desire which prevent it.
However, for Lacan, there is one a priori signifier. This is the signifier of 
sexual difference, which he calls the phallus. The control of satisfaction of 
desire is the primary source of power within psychoanalytic theory and the 
phallus signifies power, in the symbolic order. Desire, for Lacan, is the 
motivating principle of human life. The desire for control of objects through 
possession becomes the primary motivating force of the psyche and control is 
identified with the position of the father, which is symbolically represented by 
the phallus. Thus, Lacan’s appropriation of the symbolic order is ultimately 
structural (Walkerdine, 1985a: 227). Although he privileges the sign of 
difference (the phallus) and not biological difference, the phallus still stands for 
ultimate difference, which fixes meaning in language. Language in turn is 
regulated through the power systems of society.
In developing the idea of a transcendental signifier, Lacan follows 
Lévi-Strauss’ structural analysis of the incest taboo and laws of kinship and 
exchange which he sees as underlying all societies. The successful resolution of 
the Oedipus complex means that the child solves problems of desire for the 
mother or the father, by identifying with the parent whose sex is the same as its 
own. At this point, the child becomes a subject according to the cultural laws 
which pre-ordain it. The ‘law of the phallic taskmaster’ (Wilson, 1981) is 
universal for Lévi-Strauss and Lacan, so gender difference enters into the 
formation of subjectivity in Lacan’s account. This production of subjectivity is 
dependent on the mastery of the use of language — the lack of control which 
the individual experiences as the gap between desire and satisfaction is, as in
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Freud, the motive for language. The inevitability of desire in a Freudian or 
Lacanian framework is a main factor in producing the determinism of these 
accounts (Hollway, 1982: 500).
3.8.3 Some problems with Lacan’s account
A feminist poststructural point of view rejects transcendental, a priori 
explanations. The phallus as the ‘signifier of signifiers’ is unacceptable, because 
it produces a simple, deterministic reductionism. The inbuilt phallocentrism and 
universalism of the signifier is incompatible with theorising the production of 
subjectivity in a way which accounts not only for how the processes may occur 
under patriarchy, but also how things could be otherwise (Urwin, 1984: 278). 
Furthermore, even though control of desire is impossible for Lacan, the fact 
remains that it is symbolically represented by the phallus and that anatomical 
difference determines who can aspire to the phallus (Cornell and Thurschwell, 
1987: 146). Mitchell and Rose also highlight this problem:
Sexual difference is then assigned according to whether individual 
subjects do or do not possess the phallus, which means not that 
anatomical difference is sexual difference (the one as strictly deducible 
from the other), but that anatomical difference comes to figure sexual 
difference, that is, it becomes the sole representative of what that 
difference is allowed to be. It thus covers over the complexity of the 
child’s early sexual life with a crude opposition in which that very 
complexity is refused or repressed. The phallus thus indicates the 
reduction of difference to an instance of visible perception, a seeming 
value. (Mitchell and Rose, 1982: 42, original emphases)
Men, by virtue of their possession of a penis, can aspire to a position of power 
and control within the symbolic order, whereas women have no access to it in 
their own right and cannot be represented in it. ‘There is no woman, but 
excluded from the value of words’ (Lacan, cited in Irigaray, 1985a: 87). This 
aspect of Lacan can be seen to openly disclose the reality of male power 
instead of hiding it under a guise of ‘neutrality’ or ‘impartiality’ (Gallop, 1982: 
36 - 38). The theme of women’s exclusion from the symbolic order has been
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the starting point for the work of the French feminist psychoanalysts and 
deconstructionists Cixous and Kristeva (see Chapter Two, Section 4.5)
A second problem with Lacan’s work is that desire, in his account, is inevitably 
unfulfillable, to be governed by or subordinated to fantasy (Henriques et al, 
1984: 216). For Lacan, desire works in the same way as language, moving 
from object to object or from signifier to signifier and ‘it will never find full and 
present satisfaction, just as meaning can never be seized as lull presence’ (Moi, 
1985: 101). Urwin (1984) points to Lacan’s emphasis of narcissism in his 
reading of Freud and his insistence on the unfulfillability of desire. (Both Urwin 
(ibid: 279) and Moi (1985: 98) note the influence of existentialism on Lacan -- 
existentialism emphasises a fundamental lack of being in the subject.) Urwin 
(1984: 279) points out that some desires can be fulfilled and this is why people 
cling to practices which give a feeling of control and consequent fulfilment, 
however fleeting. She recommends an investigation of how desires are fulfilled 
and how people are capable of satisfaction — a necessary consideration if we 
are to accept the possibility of change. Her theorisation of desire echoes 
Deleuze and Guattari (1982), who see the theorisation of unfulfillable desire as 
self-fulfilling prophecy.
A third problem in Lacan’s account is the precise sense in which the 
unconscious is structured like a language. This poses two problems for feminist 
poststructuralism. First, as we have seen, Lacan draws heavily on structural 
linguistics, with its acceptance of a priori signifiers. Second, Thom (1981), 
Urwin (1984, 1985) and others have questioned the implication that the 
unconscious is therefore to be comprehended entirely through the rules of 
language, particularly if these rules are provided by structural linguistics.
As in all structuralist accounts, there is an inbuilt tendency for the 
specificity o f content and process to be subordinated to a universalist 
mode of explanation, a problem which applies equally to the work of 
Lévi-Strauss. As Hall (1980) has argued, one of the implications of 
using a structuralist paradigm is that Lacan’s theory tends to collapse 
into an account of a universal, albeit contradictory, subject who is not 
situated historically, who is tied and bound by pre-existing language,
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and is incapable of change because of this. This, o f course, is precisely 
the position which we wish to avoid. (Henriques et al, 1984: 217)
Despite these problems, it is Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis which has 
provided a theory of the dynamic unconscious, radically challenging the unitary 
rational subject. ‘This is one of the sources of the subversive impact of 
psychoanalysis: it overturns the western view that the distinguishing mark of 
humanity is reason and rationality’ (Frosh, 1987: 25). It is not that rationality 
does not exist, rather that it is always being contested by forces of the 
unconscious, where repressed ideas, feelings, desires and fantasies lie. ‘The 
forces governing subjectivity and action are therefore not derived from a single 
source’ (Hollway, 1989: 29).
3.8.4 Using Kleinian concepts
A further problem with psychoanalysis, applicable to any work that examines 
the production of adult subjectivities, as this work does, is that most 
psychoanalytic accounts of human psychic development focus on processes 
occurring in early infancy. Feminist poststructuralist theorists take the view that 
subjectivity is not only dynamically formed, but also continually changing and 
being constituted from one instant to another, as well as over long periods of 
time (Mama, 1995: 129). This means that subjectivity can be studied at any 
point in the life cycle. This present work studies the subjectivities of adult 
feminist, women. Subjectivity is treated as located in history, with specific 
content, and not as an abstract idea which can be treated as if it were devoid of 
that content. Even if similar psychodynamic processes occur in all people, the 
cultural and discursive content will be group specific and historically located 
(ibid). Treating entry to the symbolic as a moment in childhood which is the 
effect of a structure, as Lacan does, means that the theory is static (Hollway, 
1989: 84). This static point of entry of the subject into the symbolic order also 
denies the ‘continuous, everyday defensive negotiation of intersubjective
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relationships within the.field of effects of power / knowledge relations’ (ibid).
Hollway’s (1982, 1984a, b, 1989, 1994, 1995) work has used psychoanalytic 
and Foucauldian theory to address a crucial question for feminism: if we accept 
that subjectivity is constructed, how do we explain why people take up subject 
positions in one discourse rather than another? If the process is not a 
mechanical one, why, for example, do some men position themselves as subject 
in the discourse of aggressive male sexuality (1984a: 231)? What do they gain 
from it and why don’t all men position themselves in this way (cf Wetherell, 
1986: 136)?
According to Hollway, we must pay attention to the histories of individuals and 
also to the question of a subject’s investment in a particular position in 
discourse. By claiming that people have investments in taking up certain 
positions in discourses, and consequently in relation to each other, she means 
that there is some satisfaction involved for people through these actions. The 
feeling of satisfaction may not be conscious or rational and may also be in 
contradiction with other resultant feelings (1984a: 238). Her concept of 
investment is a re-theorisation of the concept of desire and is connected to 
power and the way it is historically inserted into the subjectivity of individuals. 
Desire comes from a lack of a feeling of control over and oneness with the 
other, as experienced in Lacan’s imaginary. If people’s individual histories have 
taught them that a certain subject position in a particular discourse can, even 
fleetingly, reproduce a feeling of fulfilment of desire, then they may make an 
investment in that position.
Power is thus more than material or economic. If discourses alone are 
examined in relation to power, then the examination is confined to material 
structures and practices. Material inequalities between men and women need to 
be addressed, but Hollway’s (1989) work also points to the importance of the 
construction of subjectivity in power relations which are not a direct or 
immediate effect of material structures. Power is always ‘dynamic and two-way 
and tied to the extra-rational forces’ (ibid: 85, 86) of the unconscious, which
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she conceptualises through the notion of anxiety and inter subjective defence 
mechanisms.
Hollway argues (1995: 98) that the interconnection between power and desire 
is overemphasised ip Lacanian accounts, resulting in a psychic determinism 
which is not useful for theorising change. She emphasises therefore the 
connections between power and aaxiety, based on an understanding of 
pre-Oedipal relations, derived from Kleinian object-relations psychoanalysis. 
Although this work was developed on the basis of work with young infants, 
Kleinian theory has it that primal processes pave the way for processes that 
continue throughout adult psychic life (ibid; Mama, 1995: 130). Klein 
privileges the defence mechanisms which work between people rather than 
within a person, so that inter subjective relations become the location for the 
negotiation of meaning and its effects, through power, on subjectivity.
These relationships are always the product o f two or more people’s 
unique histories, the contradictions between meanings (suppressed and 
expressed), differentiated positions in available discourses, the flux of 
their continuously renegotiated power relations and the effect of their 
defence mechanisms. Thus, they are never simply determined, either by 
the intentions of those involved, or by language / discourse. (Hollway, 
1989: 84, 85)
Although the relationships and their effects on subjectivity are not determined, 
neither are they arbitrary. Hollway (ibid) posits that the principle motivating the 
taking-up of positions and the mobilising of defences is the vulnerability of 
what psychoanalysis calls the ego. According to Klein, vulnerability is an 
unavoidable effect of human nature; anxiety is the original state of human 
nature. Hollway accepts the importance of vulnerability, but without resorting 
to human nature as its cause, through an examination of the ways that the 
infant is positioned by adults. Adults, as a result of their anxieties, defence 
mechanisms and power relations, as well as their access to differentiated 
positions in discourses, create a situation of cultural anxiety for human infants, 
rather than a naturally occurring state of anxiety. The continuous attempt to 
manage anxiety and to protect oneself is never finally accomplished, although
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in mature adulthood, people can achieve relative stability and a state of 
apparent peace with anxiety. Anxiety thus provides a continuous, more or less 
driven motive for the negotiation of power in relations (ibid).
The subject’s main defence against anxiety is the process of splitting, a 
projective process which involves separating an object into good and bad. 
According to Klein, the primordial experience of good and bad occurs at the 
breast which is either experienced as benevolent and nurturing, or as rejecting 
and frustrating. When splitting occurs, the good object is incorporated into the 
ego — that is to say, it is introjected. The bad object on the other hand is 
projected — directed outward and away from the ego, on to other people or 
objects (Mama, 1995: 131). For Klein, these projective processes are intimately 
bound up with idealisation and denial:
Idealisation is bound up with the splitting of the object, for the good 
aspects of the breast are exaggerated as a safeguard against the fear of 
the persecuting breast. While the idealisation is thus the corollary of 
persecutory fear, it also springs from the power of the instinctual 
desires which aim at unlimited gratification and therefore create the 
picture of an inexhaustible and always bountiful breast — an ideal 
breast. (Klein, 1986: 182, cited in Mama, 1995: 131)
The idealisation of the breast and the corollary fear of it produce ambivalence. 
The baby in its state of dependency is both gratified and enraged. In its rage, it 
has fantasies of striking back at the breast and hence at the mother (Coward, 
1993: 114). These hostile fantasies are followed by fear of retaliation by the 
mother. These feelings and destructive thoughts are a source of guilt, which, 
theoretically at least, is experienced no differently by boy and girl children. 
Human beings of either sex experience rage and grief against the mother for 
loss of oneness. Yet, some clinical experience has shown women to be far more 
susceptible to guilt than men (ibid: 116).
Coward (ibid) posits that the different responses of the sexes have to do with 
their different abilities to tolerate ambivalence and the expression of 
destructive, aggressive feelings. In particular, guilt has much to do with the
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ability to tolerate ambivalence. In Klein’s — and in most psychoanalytic 
accounts — the ‘healthy’ individual is the individual who can most easily 
tolerate ambivalence, who can integrate hostility and aggression with love and 
reparation. Dealing with ambivalence is a possibly universal process which is 
culturally exacerbated for women by the fact that women have made and 
continue to make themselves responsible for their families’ well-being, at 
considerable personal cost and sacrifice (ibid). It means that, for women, the 
unconscious fantasies of having possibly destroyed the mother are overlaid 
with more immediate and real fears. In a culture where women are always at 
risk of being devalued or rendered invisible or insignificant, as opposed to the 
importance of men, a daughter’s destructive fantasies can appear to have a 
basis in fact (ibid).
Mama and Hollway both take up the experience of contradiction as indicative 
of anxiety and this can be joined to Coward’s identification of the importance 
of feelings of ambivalence and associated guilt, which are experienced by 
women when they make changes in their lives. Feminists have long identified 
the experience of contradiction as indicative of the need for change and for the 
possibility of change, in ‘traditional’ women. Feminist women too experience 
contradiction and ambivalence when they make changes in the gender status 
quo, despite a rational conviction of and commitment to feminist change (cf 
Davies, 1990b). In seeking to address the anxiety which arises from 
contradiction and / or ambivalence, feminist poststructuralism uses and needs 
theories of the unconscious.
For the feminist poststructuralist theorists cited, then, the experiences of 
contradiction, anxiety, ambivalence and guilt are major forces in the dynamics 
of subjectivity. Discursive changes which accompany politicisation are, at the 
same time, psychodynamic movements which involve splitting (cf Mama, 1995: 
133). Individual women frequently separate off certain qualities which they find 
unacceptable in their own sex, such as ambition, ruthlessness and aggression, 
and project them onto men (Coward, 1993: 132). Essentialist feminist
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discourses do this on a collective basis with men as a group, in the process 
idealising the feminine.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that all social movements for change rely on 
theories of the human subject, whether these are explicit or otherwise. The 
theories of such movements, such as feminism, need sophisticated theories of 
the human agent (Giddens, 1993: 5), or the subject. Social constructionism has 
emphasised, often using discourse theory, how people’s social positions 
construct how they are and has been criticised for being too deterministic 
(Hollway, 1995: 100; Giddens, 1991). The theorisation of subjectivity arrived 
at by feminist poststructuralist theorists implies that discursive movements are 
accompanied by psychodynamic processes within the individual and vice versa: 
psychodynamic processes have discursive (social, historical and cultural) 
content.
In other words, there is a constant resonance between psychodynamics 
and social experience in the construction and reproduction of the 
individual’s subjectivity. This means that both discourses (theorised as 
conveyors of history, culture and social meaning) and individual 
subjects are produced in a continuous dialectic, out of reverberations 
between historical-cultural and psychological conditions. Here we have 
a theory which transcends dualism because it conceptualises the 
individual and the social as being produced simultaneously. This is not 
to say that every individual change generates new discourses but that 
when individual changes are provoked by conditions that are widely 
experienced — such as those of race and gender — then these are more 
likely to become widespread, to gain social power and become 
discourses that convey culture and social meaning, or collective 
knowledge. (Mama, 1995: 133).
When the possibility of social change arises, therefore, it demands the tackling 
of feelings and needs and of the contradictions and difficulties of the situations 
which arise in tandem with discursive movements. At least some answers lie in 
looking at the social conditions which produce these feelings (cf Coward, 
1993: 198). Desire and the concept of the unconscious are given a social basis 
through theorising their historical development in relation to meaning and
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discourse (Hollway, 1995: 94), not simply as something universal and 
inevitable which will pull us back into essential ways of being. We have to take 
into account the power relations that construct systems of desire (Frosh, 1987).
In taking an approach like this, we can hold on to the importance of the 
unconscious, but also see a route past what has been identified as Lacan’s 
failure to deal with the material conditions of people’s lives (Henriques et al, 
1984). Such reworkings can produce a more historically specific reading of 
desire and the unconscious which will, by implication, be less universalistic and 
less pessimistic (with regard to the unfulfillability of desire) than Lacan’s. 
Foucauldian discourse theory is also drawn on in accomplishing this reading, 
but at the same time, the discourse determinism of Foucault has been 
addressed, by acknowledging that individual history plays an important part in 
the reproduction or change of social relations. All of these issues are relevant 
for the analysis of femininst subjectivities undertaken in Chapters Six, Seven 
and Eight.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PEDAGOGICAL VIEWS OF THE HUMAN SUBJECT AND OF 
KNOWLEDGE
4.0 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to trace a path through some of the conditions 
which have produced some of the orthodoxies of Irish education to-day. This is 
attempted because of my conviction that knowledge production is a political 
activity. The chapter attempts to show how both science and structural 
approaches to knowledge were envisaged as tools for both regulation and 
liberation and for the wellbeing of nations. A rejection of science brought a 
turn to psychology, especially human relations psychology. The chapter shows 
how approaches to pedagogy are social, that is, they are embedded in the 
dominant discourses and theoretical perspectives of their time.
The chapter takes the form of a genealogy. While it acknowledges a historical 
perspective, it is not a usual kind of history, which examines the progress of 
ideas through the influential figures in the subject and the improvements in 
practice which are the result of application (cf Hollway, 1991a: Introduction). I 
am not attempting an overarching synthesis (cf Rose, 1979), nor a search for 
origins of the various orthodoxies, but a review of models of the subject and of 
knowledge which have shaped different educational practices. The emphasis 
which I place on production allows me to raise further questions about the 
conditions of production, about the situations in which problems are defined, 
by whom, and with whose interests they are incorporated (cf Hollway, 1991a).
In tracing the genealogy, the chapter examines the following:
• the emergence of the subject of pedagogical practices
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the structure-of-the-disciplines movement
• the psychologisation of education
• liberatory education: a unitary, rational and male subject
• women’s ways of knowing: a unitary female subject
• challenges for adult education pedagogy posed by feminist poststructuralist 
theories.
Education is viewed by many as the means by which individuals and societies 
are shaped and changed. This assertion applies to popular discourse about 
education and to formal discourse in pedagogical situations. The chapter is also 
an attempt to examine some of the conditions under which critical adult 
education has been constructed, specifically its opposition to schooling. I 
believe that much critical adult education practice in Ireland, while it defines 
itself in opposition to religion and schooling, is dominated by liberal humanist 
and by essential difference feminist models of the subject. These models are not 
sufficient to produce radical pedagogies. In fact, I assert, they have many of the 
same end results that schooling and religion have, namely, the creation of 
self-regulating subjects. While I acknowledge that there are always 
contradictions and cracks in the explanatory adequacy of any model of the 
subject, I nevertheless assert also that critical adult education needs to be 
aware of the dominant conditions of its own production, if it is to be a truly 
critical practice.
How did the aspects of pedagogy which I single out for examination come to 
be what they are? In posing this question, I start with the premise that all 
pedagogical and curricular approaches are bodies of knowledge which have 
been produced, rather than coherent disciplines which have been discovered. 
For example, critical adult education has been produced partly in opposition to 
schooling and its overt purpose of producing a workforce and the less overt 
purpose of regulating people and maintaining the social status quo. It has also
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been produced in conditions where a human relations psychological perspective 
has emerged (since the 1960s) as the dominant discourse through which people 
in the western world interpret themselves and their behaviour. This human 
relations discourse is dominant in adult education even though it does not go 
uncontested. It is also emerging strongly in schooling in the last decade. It is 
important to bear in mind the historical place of human relations discourse and 
the progressive political positions it has often been associated with. 
Nevertheless, I will go on to argue that its theorisations of the person are not 
adequate for the kinds of feminist change that feminist poststructuralism calls 
for.
4.1 The emergence of the subject of pedagogy
Walkerdine (1984) asserts that, as a consequence of classification, norms and 
dominant discourses of knowledge have been produced. Human subjects are 
produced within these discourses. In the case of schooling, many of its 
practices have been concerned with the search for a pedagogy which could 
provide the desired forms of individuality of the authorities of the day (or of the 
revolutionaries). These could range from the overt desire to produce people 
capable of working in the factories of the English industrial revolution, to the 
formation of correct moral attitudes in Sweden (Gee, 1988), to the desire of 
the Owenite movement to develop a rational means for working-class children 
to be freed from the pre-conceptions of existing society (Stewart, 1972), to the 
desire of the British administration to regulate education in Ireland and thus 
prevent nationalists or insurgents from fomenting revolution (Coolahan, 1981), 
to the less overt concern with producing the self-regulating individual which is 
characteristic of the modern bourgeois state (Walkerdine, 1988, 1989a, b; 
Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989).
Certain tendencies in educational practices have been introduced into public 
education and administration by individuals and groups from outside public
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education (cf Hollway, 1991a). These introductions and ideas were originally 
linked with a belief in science and the supremacy of the rational which began 
with the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The idea of scientific 
legitimacy was adopted by forward and progressive thinkers — it was seen as 
modernism and is still largely seen as such. In some cases, science was adopted 
to replace religion (for example, Marxism) and in other cases (for example, 
public educational systems in Sweden, Ireland and England), scientific 
rationality was adopted, but continued to be underwritten by the idea of a god.
The claims for a science of the rational were from the start intimately bound up 
with the possibilities of a scientifically validated and rational pedagogy 
(Walkerdine, 1984). Foucault (1977: 195 ff) documents the emergence of 
techniques of administration which were founded in the sciences. He traces 
how this body of techniques was made possible by conditions such as growing 
urbanisation, which came about with the rise of capitalist manufacture. 
Theorists such as Adam Smith were urging that the state should promote 
literacy and numeracy at elementaiy level as an essential factor for industrial 
progress.
At this time and given these conditions, forms of power emerged which 
allowed certain techniques of producing knowledge and knowing about human 
beings to be used. These techniques had regulatory effects. But it is not the 
case that they were produced by a monolithic capitalist class for the domination 
of the emerging working class. On the contrary, while the effect might well 
have been to produce what Foucault calls ‘docile bodies’, it was often liberals 
and radicals who proposed the new forms of scientific administration and 
pushed for them as preferable to the forces of religion. This tendency 
characterised the work of Marx. His belief in the science of history and the 
scientific basis of historical materialism has to be understood as part of the rise 
of the scientific and rational movements (Walkerdine, 1984: 165). As 
Walkerdine (ibid) points out, if so subversive a figure as Marx opted for the 
legitimation of science this points to how scientific forms of knowledge and
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administration were privileged. Foucault’s work has gone a long way to show 
how science, by its naturalisation, became a tool for normalisation and 
regulation, even when used by those who envisaged it as a tool for liberation.
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw significant initiatives in 
state involvement in education in many European countries such as 
Switzerland, Holland, Prussia, France, Spain, Greece, Italy, Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway (Coolahan, 1981; Gee, 1988). England was influenced by a 
prevailing political philosophy of laissez-faire and state involvement in 
education came much later, with an Education Act in 1870 and compulsory 
education established about 1880. The Act of Union of 1800, which brought 
Ireland under the direct control of the government and parliament and 
Westminster, sought to bind Ireland more closely to Britain by a policy of 
cultural assimilation. But as Coolahan (1981: 3,4) points out, Ireland was 
frequently used to try out various policy initiatives before introducing them in 
England, such as an organised police force, improved health services, a Board 
of Works. Thus, Ireland got a state-supported primary school system, under 
the control of a state board of commissioners, in 1831.
State legislation on education in Ireland was also in response to various 
commissions which recommended that school systems be supervised for 
purposes of politicising and socialising goals, for cultivation of attitudes of 
political loyalty and cultural assimilation. In addition, after Catholic 
emancipation in 1829, Catholic demands for fair treatment could not be 
suppressed any longer and the national school system under state control 
seemed to the government the best way of directing educational provision 
(ibid: 4, 5).
These were among the arguments used for the provision of schooling in Ireland 
at that time. Jones and Williamson (1979, cited in Walkerdine, 1984) point out 
that all popular texts of the time of the introduction of (at first popular and 
later compulsory) schooling in England show that the goals of education were 
to provide a solution to crime and pauperism. The principles and habits of the
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population were to be changed through schooling. Popular eduation thus came 
to be seen as a possible solution to the nation’s ills, by the inculcation of good 
habits, notably of reading, especially reading the Bible. Gee (1988) points to 
similar developments in Sweden, where the popular literacy movement was 
directed towards Bible reading and consequent moral development. Gee (ibid: 
202), citing Graff (1987a, b), also points out that the Catholic countries of 
Europe had very low rates of literacy, due to the way the Bible was interpreted 
by Catholic church authorities, who then tried to standardise interpretation 
through illustrations. Ireland, though predominantly Catholic, was also a 
colony and so received the literacy teaching of the coloniser.
Policy on elementary education in Ireland from the 1870s to the end of the 
century was focused on teaching the ‘3Rs’, in a system whereby teachers were 
paid by results. The century saw the virtual elimination of illiteracy in the 
English language (Coolahan, 1981: 7). In addition, up until 1922 and 
independence, the national Board of Education maintained control over the 
textbooks used in the schools and retained a right of sanction over books which 
it did not publish. The books tended to be heavily utilitarian in the sort of 
information they imparted to pupils. They also endorsed the prevailing political 
and social orthodoxy and value system and avoided for the most part specific 
references to Irish contexts, ‘thus helping to promote the cultural assimilation 
process which had been signalled by the Act of Union’ (ibid).
The emphasis on utilitarianism and literacy and numeracy had their hidden 
agendas. The cultural context of the National Board textbooks could be said to 
be more overt in the omission of references to Ireland. The Irish language 
declined. After 1922, there was a radical change with the introduction of a 
programme inspired by the ideology of cultural nationalism. Schools were used 
as agents of change in an attempt at cultural revolution. After independence, 
the cultural revolution and the attempts to revive the Irish language were overt 
messages in elementary schooling.
The forms of pedagogy used for the masses in elementary schooling, both
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before and (mingled with other forms) after independence here in Ireland, and 
widely in Europe and in parts of Asia (ibid: 11) was the monitorial school. This 
was based, like Bentham’s dream of a panopticon (described by Foucault, 
1977), on a model of constant surveillance. As well as instructing pupils in 
utilitarian work habits, moral regulation of the habits of the population would 
be produced by constant monitoring and ceaseless activity. However, in 
England, at any rate, conditions for a move away from monitorialism came 
when some teachers were ‘unutterably shocked by the cynical readiness of 
certain children to recite the Lord’s Prayer for a half-penny’ (Jones and 
Williamson, 1979: 88, cited in Walkerdine, 1984). Monitorialism as a practical 
solution to the civilising goals of elementary education was seen not to be 
working. The coercion and constant monitoring of pupils was not solving the 
social problems.
‘Rational powers of mind’ were put forward by some as the solution to the 
social problem of the ‘dangerous classes’ in several European countries 
(Walkerdine, 1984: 166; Gee, 1988: 202). This was the first time (mid- to late 
nineteenth century) that the term ‘class’ emerged in the demographic sense, in 
discourse (Hamilton, 1981, cited in Walkerdine, 1984). Scientific rationalism 
began to be seen as a way to regulate the individual, not through coercion and 
monitoring and the inculcation of habits, but through understanding. Through 
understanding, it was assumed that individuals would come to rationally choose 
correct and natural ways to behave (ibid: 2).
The form of pedagogy advocated to achieve such understanding was to be 
carried out through class instruction and a curriculum based on the study of 
natural phenomena. Such methods had been pioneered as early as 1813 by the 
Scottish philanthropist Robert Owen, following the philosophy of Rousseau 
and others (Harrison, 1969). Owen had at first admired monitorialism, but later 
denounced the system which could render a child ‘irrational for life’ (Owen, 
1813, cited in Walkerdine, 1984: 167).
Owen had introduced his methods with an emancipatory intent. He provided
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schools for the children of workers in his mills. His ideas on pedagogy were 
seen as left-wing and progressive. He was a radical who supported the French 
Revolution.
No longer were children, in Owen’s mind, to be treated as the 
recipients of those values that the middle and upper classes thought 
were necessary for them if they were to know their place in society. It 
was a decisive break with the old philanthropic attitude to the 
education of the poor, the tradition in which Bell and Lancaster (the 
monitorialists) were firmly rooted and its importance in the history of 
British education cannot be overestimated ... Owen’s educational 
principles could almost be summed up as Rousseauism applied to 
working class children. He was the first to demonstrate that what was 
later called elementary education could be based upon affection, 
imagination and the full realisation of the potentialities of the child 
(Stewart, 1972: 35, cited in Walkerdine, 1984).
Owen too made the assumption that, given the right conditions, achieving 
understanding would mean that children would make the correct, rational 
choices which would ensure their liberation. He moved away from the constant 
surveillance of monitorialism to love as a basis for education. This love, 
however, was to be rational and hygienic, without passion. Passion was not 
scientific and therefore not a basis for progress.
Those with an interest in the regulation and containment and civilisation of the 
working-class child were also basing their pedagogy on the assumption that if 
people made rational choices based on understanding, they would ‘do the right 
thing’. Walkerdine (1984: 168 ft) points out that it was not a smooth transition 
from monitorialism to class teaching. Both approaches were defended and 
contested. Eventually, though, class teaching, based on groups of children of 
the same age, became widespread. This was the first time it was assumed that 
children of the same age should be grouped together for instruction. 
Walkerdine also points out that this understanding of class in a school context 
came about at the same historical moment that class as a social concept 
emerged. She places both developments in a context of increasing classification 
and measurement aimed at the working class. She also asserts that all these 
practices in education which depended on reason and science were first
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developed with working-class children and only later came to be used with all 
children, as statements of scientific fact (ibid: 198).
The idea that those who possessed understanding would choose to behave 
correctly and be good citizens was possible because of developments in ideas 
of normal development which were emerging around the same time. The 
techniques which Owen developed claimed to be based on an amplification of 
the natural and, therefore, of the normal (Stewart, 1972: 47). Owen insisted 
that knowledge of the natural world was a means by which the mind could be 
freed from the pre-conceptions of society. The utilitarians called for 
understanding to be taught and encouraged, so that the children of the 
labouring classes, recognising the ‘order of things’, would be capable of being 
gainfully employed (see Hamilton, 1981; Harrison, 1969).
By the beginning of the twentieth century there were two parallel developments 
going on, both of which related to the scientific classification of children: child 
study and mental measurement (Walkerdine, 1984: 169). At this time, the work 
of Darwin and other developments in evolutionary biology were inspiring 
surveys of populations which included histories o f family ‘pathologies’. 
Characteristics, including those of children, were recorded with a view to 
establishing what environmental conditions might produce physical illness, 
immoral and criminal behaviour. Children came to be singled out as a class, to 
be classified in their own right (Rose, 1979). It was seen as important to give 
heredity the best chance. This is an important shift in emphasis from the 
degeneracy of the population being a moral problem to one amenable to 
scientific solutions. Again, it is symptomatic of the shift away from religion 
towards science.
The individual (and in the case of schooling, the individual child) became a 
legitimate focus of concern and study, an object of the scientific gaze. As 
Henriques et al (1984: 119 - 152) point out, certain forms of social problems 
were located as an object of science. Therefore science could provide 
techniques of detection by establishing population statistics and providing tools
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for establishing the scientific basis of the normal, that is, in respect to a normal 
curve of characteristics in the population (Hacking, 1981; Gardner, 1983). 
Normal individuals could be produced and the abnormal cured through some 
form of institutional provision (Walkerdine, 1984: 170). The new science of 
child-development psychology was involved in all of these happenings from the 
start (ibid).
All of these social events provided the conditions for the emergence of a 
scientific pedagogy based on the model o f naturally occurring development 
which could be observed, measured, normalised and regulated. Thus, 
degeneracy in the population could be avoided by ensuring that children 
developed properly and became socially fit adults. The scientific approach to 
the human subject of education came to be contested strongly in the 1970s. 
Before examining the ways it was contested, I examine a movement in the 
1950s and 1960s, originating in the USA, which examined the structure of 
knowledge itself and which was influential in Ireland.
4.2 The structure-of-the-disciplines approach to knowledge and the 
human subject
The structure of the disciplines approach identifies categories and binary 
distinctions relating to knowledge and to the human subject in education. 
Cherryholmes (1988: 134) points out the examples of binary distinctions that 
structure curriculum : achievement / failure, theory / practice, concept / fact, 
learner-centred / subject centred, accountability / lack of accountability, 
terminal objective /  intermediate objective, literate, /  illiterate, cognitive / 
affective, organisation / disorganisation, synthesis / knowledge of specifics, and 
sociocentric / egocentric. Several approaches to knowledge and curriculum 
value the first over the second term in many of the preceding pairs, and which 
term is valued depends upon which transcendental signified is dominant for a 
while. Some versions of humanistic education, opposing structural versions,
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might be: learner-centred / subject centred, practice / theory, lack of 
accountability / accountability, and affective / cognitive. ‘Approaches to 
curriculum could be topsy-turvy because these and other distinctions could be 
reversed and reversed again, depending upon the reigning transcendental 
signified.’ (ibid).
Cherryholmes’ argument is that people identify what could be termed 
transcendental signifieds which, they think, will produce knowledgeable 
subjects. In Britain at the moment, these transcendental signifieds are ‘back to 
basics’ (reading, writing, arithmetic), understanding the difference between 
right and wrong, and academic excellence, which will save the nation. This 
happened in the fifties in the United States of America.
This move was superceeded at the end of the 1950s by the work of a group of 
scientists, scholars and educators who met to consider how science education 
in United States schools could be improved. Their deliberations were reported 
in the influential book The Process o f Education (Bruner, 1960). A central 
theme of that book was that students should be given ‘an understanding of the 
fundamental structure of whatever subjects we choose to teach’ (ibid: 11). It 
was hypothesised that four outcomes would follow (Cherryholmes, 1988: 134):
1. Understanding fundamentals makes a subject more comprehensible. 
(Bruner, 1960: 23)
2. Learning general or fundamental principles ensures that memory loss 
will not mean total loss, that what remains will permit us to reconstruct 
the details when needed, (ibid: 25)
3. To understand something as a specific instance of a more general 
case — which is what understanding a more fundamental principle or 
structure means — is to have learned not only a specific thing but also a 
model for understanding other things like it that one may encounter. 
(ibid:25)
4. By constantly reexamining material taught in elementary and 
secondary schools for its fundamental character, one is able to narrow 
the gap between ‘advanced’ knowledge and ‘elementary’ knowledge. 
(ibid:26)
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As Cherryholmes (1988: 136) asserts, this was a persuasive argument about 
knowledge and about learning. Teaching the structure of a subject, tapping the 
centre of disciplinary knowledge, was economical, since it taught core ideas 
only. It was also long lasting, since there would be increased retention of what 
was learned and what was learned would become dated more slowly because of 
its fundamental character (ibid).
The movement inspired by Bruner’s work became known as the 
structure-of-the-disciplines movement. It was supported by the explicit 
structural influence on education of Taxonomy o f Educational Objectives 
(Bloom, 1965). This influential text clearly stated that concepts were superior 
to facts; comprehension superior to knowledge of specifics; analysis superior to 
application; synthesis superior to analysis; and evaluation superior to synthesis. 
Valued and non-valued categories were clearly set out. This structure of 
educational objectives was to be added to the structure of the disciplines. 
Conversely, the taxonomy assumed that subject matter and knowledge had an 
integral structure conducive to such an arrangement (Cherryholmes, 1988: 
137).
A third contributing discourse was Tyler’s (1949) rationale (ibid). Tyler applied 
principles of scientific management to education that showed educators how to 
think systematically: decide upon objectives, list learning experiences, organise 
learning experiences and evaluate outcomes. Tyler’s argument is a classic 
application of structuralism to education. Learning objectives by themselves 
mean little; but in a structure of organised learning experiences and evaluation, 
learning objectives contribute to systematic instruction. Likewise, by itself, a 
measurement instrument used for evaluation has little significance; but in a 
structure of objectives and learning experiences, it can be given an 
interpretation. ‘By itself, each stage of the Tyler rationale means little; the 
meaning of each stage depends upon differences from and relations to other 
parts of the process’ (Cherryholmes, 1988: 137).
At this point, the Foulcauldian analyst would point out that it could have hardly
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turned out differently (ibid). It was important for the United States to stay 
ahead of and compete technologically with the Soviet Union during the late 
1950s and the 1960s (on October, 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first 
artificial earth satellite and this was widely seen as a threat to the national 
security of the United States). To this end, public education had to be 
upgraded. Politically, it was important to provide education in the certainty that 
scientific progress would be made and that patriotism would thus be 
strengthened. Powerful discourses were operating which also reinforced each 
other. Bruner drew on positivist and logical-empiricist epistemology; Bloom et 
al drew on educational psychology (also influenced by logical empiricism); and 
Tyler drew on scientific principles (and therefore efficient management). 
Teaching the structure of the disciplines had the effect of fixing meanings. 
Everything could be figured out, from objectives to evaluation. These 
discourses were in a continual relation with history (the international political 
scene with the Soviet Union, especially). Dominant discursive practice in 
politics dictated who could talk with authority about knowledge. As 
Cherryholmes ((1988: 139) puts it, ‘The configuration of power from several 
discourses, practices and situations conferred upon the arguments of Bruner, 
Bloom et al and Tyler the effects of truth’ (cf Hollway, 1991a: 6, 11).
However, the idea of disciplinary structure was largely based on a positivist 
view of knowledge which presumed the following:
1. The structure of disciplinary knowledge was logically coherent and 
complete.
2. Disciplinary knowledge was logically valid and truth preserving, from first 
principles to testable hypotheses.
3. Disciplinary knowledge was factual and explanatory, not evaluative.
4. Scientific language was value neutral and passive in describing and 
explaining phenomena (Cherryholmes, 1988: 138).
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Points one and two assume a distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements. Point three assumes a distinction between facts and values and 
point four views language as passive and descriptive, not active or evaluative. 
Points three and four also assume that knowledge and science are somehow 
separate from the world being described and explained (Cherryholmes, 1988: 
139). There is no recognition that knowledge is produced within historical 
conditions, in this case the conditions facing the United States, as it saw itself 
competing with the Soviet Union. However, at the same time, developments in 
modern logic by Quine (1953) and in the philosophy of language by Austin 
(1968) and Wittgenstein (1953) began to undermine these assumptions 
(Giddens, 1993). Quine argued that it was not possible to account for 
truth-preserving natural-language arguments and therefore that it could not be 
shown that disciplinary knowledge was logically complete or truth-preserving. 
Austin and Wittgenstein, in different ways, showed that speech is action, not 
just description, and that value and institutional commitments infiltrate 
language and what is said. Disciplinary knowledge did not consist of passive, 
true arguments that were above evaluation. However, their arguments did not 
affect the structure-of-the-disciplines movement, illustrating the argument that 
power makes truth possible (Cherryholmes, 1988: 139).
Nevertheless, politics does not create curriculum in a seamless way. Power 
transforms discourses such that a category such as disciplinary structure is 
given more currency and importance that others. As Cherryholmes puts it, 
‘international tensions did not create the notion of structure, but they did, 
however, assign an educational value it did not have before to disciplinary 
structure’ (1988: 145). Power assigns value and is implicated in what 
constitutes curriculum that is, what students have an opportunity to learn. 
Pedagogical theories are theoretically, culturally and historically specific 
(Kenway and Willis, 1990). Nevertheless, feminist poststructuralists, among 
others, insist that the curriculum includes what Cocks, (1989: 4), although 
writing in a different context, calls
evasions of that control that subsist not apart from and against but in
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the interstices of the ordinary and everyday, and that are often tacit 
rather than overt, understated rather than overscored, and subversions 
that have attained a more definitive counter-existence, but that are still 
unmarked or are actively secretive.
By the 1970s, domestic politics in the United states was dominated by the 
civil-rights movement, the war on poverty and rising controversy over United 
States involvement in Vietnam (Cherryholmes, 1988: 140). These provided a 
context for the ‘progressive’ educational movements of the decade, which are 
connected in turn with the subject of the next section, the psychologisation of 
pedagogy.
4.3 The psychologisation of pedagogy
Early in the twentieth century, straddling the colonial and independent 
administrations, and later, in the 1960s and 1970s, Irish elementary education 
was affected by all of the new practices which were emerging, although Ireland 
was not industrialised and did not have the kind of working class population 
with which many of the earlier practices were developed in the first place. In 
the late 1960s the introduction of what was popularly known as the ‘New 
Curriculum’ for primary schools was influenced by the structure of the 
disciplines approach (An Roinn Oideachas, 1971). Developments in human 
relations psychologies in the 1970s were also influential in terms of their 
approach to the individual (for example, Holland, 1979). The most striking 
changes in the conditions for pedagogy in Ireland in the second half of this 
century were the growth in social sciences and psychology and the emergence 
of a social psychology. In the context of this growth, there emerged the 
development of the school, the family and the individual as a site of 
intervention, with the aims of changing human behaviour.
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4.3.1 The growth of social sciences, psychology and the development of 
the family and individual as sites for intervention.
Acker (1988: 315) traces the development of three ideologies in this context:
1. ideologies about child-centred learning
2. ideologies about the determining role of factors outside school on 
educational achievement
3. ideologies about the political neutrality of the school.
It was assumed that if children (or people in general) are truly treated as 
individuals, it is impossible to discriminate against a social group. This stance, 
in practice, rules out positive action as well as negative discrimination. To be 
individual, personal or child-centred can have important feminist effects (ibid; 
see also Middleton, 1993). However, in practice, such beliefs can also obscure 
sex-differentiated pratice (Clark, 1989). Comments like ‘he’s naturally 
boisterous’ or ‘she’s naturally quiet’ can support and promote gendered 
practices in relation to work and behaviour. As Gill (1987: 6) suggests, 
‘treating them as individuals can lead teachers unconsciously to a perception of 
individual male and individual female appropriate beheviour and attitudes’. 
Even a comment like ‘it’s his family background’ about a troublesome and 
boisterous boy can be seen as appealing to a socially produced effect on 
behaviour, which conforms to appropriate male behaviour in the face of home 
difficulties.
Individualistic discourses which situate themselves in an ideology of neutrality 
preclude the identification of what happens in the social relations of the 
classroom as gendered or sexist practice. Without access to alternative 
discourses, teachers cannot see patterns of differential treatment or of sexist 
abuse and power relations. Once they get access to alternative discourses, they 
gain the language and ideas to analyse things differently (Clark, 1989).
130
The focus on the individual led to increased psychometric testing and the 
development of IQ scales. Where children did not meet the standard set by the 
psychologists, deficit models were employed and remediation programmes set 
in motion to remedy the deficits. Mainstream psychology has been severely 
criticised for this approach (Drudy and Lynch, 1993; Gardner, 1983), both for 
its inaccuracy and for its inhumanity. Intelligence has been shown by Gardner 
and others to be multiple and culturally based. The inhumanity of mainstream 
psychology has been attacked by the human relations school of psychology, 
especially influenced by Rogers. Human relations approaches have 
concentrated typically on raising self-esteem and confidence as a pre-requisite 
for learning. But as Kenway and Willis (1990: 16, 17) point out, seeking to 
raise self-esteem within the terms of the educational status quo may well have 
the effect of underscoring the dominant sex, class and ethnic groups in society.
In Irish schooling, then, if there is any debate, it is between the psychometric 
testing field and the human relations field. But both of these, as Chapters Two 
and Three of this work show, are set within a framework which assumes the 
existence of a unitary rational subject. And while the human relations field may 
feel that humanisation of relations is the road to liberation, Walkerdine’s work 
(1987, 1988, 1989a) and the work inspired by it has deconstructed its content 
and shown its implication in the construction of self-regulating subjects through 
rationalisation and rational argument.
Rational argument has operated in ways that set up as its opposite an irrational 
other, which has been understood historically as the province of women and of 
exotic others (cf Mama, 1995). In schools where a liberal pedagogy of 
individualism prevails, rational deliberation, reflection and consideration of all 
view points has become a vehicle for regulating conflict. The power to speak is 
used for transforming conflict into rational argument by means of universalised 
capacities for language and reason. Ellsworth (1989: 302) claims that it is 
inappropriate to respond to certain kinds of ‘irrational’ writing or talk by 
subjecting them to rationalist debates about their validity.
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That the effects of power in a social system become less visible, the more 
integrated the social system is, is a theme central to the work of Foucault. In 
the context of the liberal practices of pedagogy (and of motherhood) which 
emphasise individuality, this is particularly evident. There is less an overt 
controlling, than an underlying conviction that is possible to educate the 
individual in a way that makes her / him ‘want’ to make the ‘correct’ choices. 
To preserve the ‘wholeness’ of the discourse of femininity, it is more important 
that girls rationalise away conflict, that where they might percieve gaps and 
inconsistencies, the power of reason can legitimately and recognisably be called 
on to displace the conflict. In this view, attempts within pedagogy to construct 
a rationally ordered and controllable child are deeply bound up with the 
modem form of bourgeois government and the emergence of the modem state 
(Walkerdine, 1987, 1988; Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989).
Thus pedagogy inspired by human relations is implicated in the production of 
compliant forms of individuality, by means of natural development rather than 
compulsion or coercion. These regulatory pedagogies produce and have 
produced knowledges about human beings which are often presented as 
‘discoveries’ (cf Henriques et al, 1984). Human relations psychology, once 
envisaged as a tool of liberation, is, by the fact of its naturalisation in schools 
through self-esteem programmes, becoming the very basis of the production of 
normalisation. The same danger exists in adult education through personal 
development, if not firmly enmeshed in a political and stmctural framework (cf 
Kenway and Willis, 1990). Even the combination of a human relations 
perspective with social analysis is not sufficient for a transformation of social 
relations towards social justice. The reliance on the unitary rational subject 
persists and the attention to contradiction which feminist poststructuralism 
considers necessary is absent.
Psychology has constructed for itself a power base in the places where 
pedagogies are created: in preschools, schools, universities, colleges and 
communities. While mainstream psychology is being challenged by human
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relations perspectives, these both rely on a preconception of the human subject 
as unitary and rational. The adoption of human relations perspectives has 
allowed feelings and intuitive knowledge to be accepted as valid ways of 
knowing, but only insofar as they allow access to the core individual, 
untrammelled by social forces. A feminist poststructuralist perspective wants to 
see feelings as social, while allowing for individual agency. Also in human 
relations approaches, a great deal of emphasis has been laid on democratising 
the relations and processes of pedagogy. But the poststructuralist insight that 
all knowledge is a production is rarely addressed.
The appeal of the human relations self-esteem discourse to policy makers and 
teachers has been theorised by, for example, Renshaw (1990), Kenway, Willis 
and Nevard (1990) and Gilbert (1989, 1990). They show that the ‘self 
literature, as it arose out of social psychology, emerged in various guises in 
many fields in, and associated with, education. It has informed a wide range of 
‘progressive’attempts to both humanise the curriculum and to engineer some 
sort of educational change which might militate against educational and social 
‘disadvantage’. In a sense, the ‘progressive’ educational movements of the 
1970s, in their various manifestations, provided a complementary body of 
thought which was to help facilitate the acceptance of the schooling and 
self-esteem literature. Both pinned their hopes for educational and social 
progress on micro-politics and individual change. In so doing they paint an 
educational and social reform scenario in which the teacher is central. 
Enlightened and humane teachers are to be the driving force of a movement in 
which all individuals develop their full potential together, in an atmosphere of 
unconditional positive regard. Social change is made possible by change at the 
‘chalk face’.
This liberal humanist or human relations based approach to education sits 
comfortably with the individualist approach of meritocracy, which is a defining 
characteristic of the Irish educational system and a reason for its unequal 
outcomes (Drudy and Lynch, 1993: 33). The individualising of educational
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problems and their solutions is currently a strong influence in Irish education. 
The techniques associated with it, such as targetting self-esteem, have found 
their way into many of the approaches to educational disadvantage, including 
efforts at improving the educational experiences of girls. In foregrounding the 
individual, both the self-esteem discourse and the education system generally 
repress matters of culture, ideology and power (Kenway and Willis, 1990).
In its emphasis on working towards empowerment, even emancipation1, critical 
adult education practice in Ireland places emphasis on interpersonal skills and 
personal development. It doing so, it defines itself in opposition to behavioural 
psychology and psychometric testing and emphasises the need to deal with the 
whole person. Where it differs from the schooling use of interpersonal skills is 
that it attempts to help people understand how the transfer of these skills into 
the social world, for its transformation, is possible. In its focus on the person, 
with this objective, it draws on liberal-humanist and human relations 
discourses, which cannot be divorced from the content of their assumptions 
about the human subject. It attempts to combine these assumptions with social 
analysis. However, these models do not have the radical content necesssary for 
social change in social relations in general, because of their reliance on a core, 
rational and unitary subject, nor in gender relations, because of their reliance on 
the notion of male / female essential differences and dual cultures (cf Gardiner, 
1997). Despite their good intentions, they maintain the gender status quo.
4.3.2 Interactionism
An implicit or explicit theory of interactionism underlies much educational 
practice which takes the individual as its object. Interactionism claims to 
address dualism with its creed of 'the individual affects the environment and
1 Inglis (1992, cited in Connolly, 1997: 44) distinguishes between empowerment and 
emancipation. Empowerment is the enabling of people to work within existing power 
structures; emancipation is the enabling of people to struggle against the structures.
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the environment affects the individual' (Broughton, 1987b: 13). Broughton 
situates this statement within a liberal ideology which homogenises the social, 
cultural, historical, political and technological into an external environment. 
Out of this arises a formula in which ‘cybernetics displaces Newtonian causality 
with circular causality’ (ibid).
Despite appearances, however, the traditional psychological dualism of 
individual and society is hardened. There is here a cunning sleight of 
hand that actually preserves the traditional positivist vision of 
development rather than challenging it. The old world view appears to 
be replaced, but it is actually reduplicated, emphasising again the 
catchword of orthodox western democracies: reciprocity (cf Gouldner, 
1973). In the process, the relation between inside and outside is 
rendered even more mechanical, as human life and growth are reduced 
to bidirectional exhanges of subsystems with the superordinate systems 
that govern them. The abstract geometry of this reversibility, lauded in 
Piaget's theory of operational intelligence, serves the ideological 
function of concealing subordination, control and privilege (Harris, 
1975). (Broughton, 1987b: 13, 14)
Kenway and Willis consider interactionism to be unlike traditional 
psychologies, which see society as the aggregate of all its individual members. 
Interactionism sees
... the individual as the product of the interpersonal, inter subjective 
negotiation of meaning, and society as the aggregate of these 
interpersonal relations and meanings, ie, its focus is always on the small 
scale. This has consequences for analysis and sexual education politics. 
What it does not permit is sufficient recognition that certain social 
conditions also pre-exist individuals and their negotiations and, as such, 
individuals are, to a certain extent but by no means entirely or forever, 
the social relation into which they are born. Second, to focus on an 
individual's narrow range of interpersonal situations and to see her / 
him as a product of these, is to minimise the force of wider social 
process, such as class. Interpersonal relations are clearly not a 'closed 
field'. (Kenway and Willis, 1990: 205)
‘Invisible’ liberalism is the hallmark of much contemporary pedagogy. This is 
true also of contemporary feminism and of the social sciences generally, 
including developmental psychology (Walkerdine, 1984, Broughton, 1987b), 
occupational psychology (Hollway, 1984c, 1991a), cognitive psychology
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(Sampson, 1981, cited in Kitzinger, 1987) and the psychological testing of 
intelligence (Emler and Heather, 1980, cited in Kitzinger, 1987). For those who 
oppose existing oppressions and who want to work to contribute to their 
alleviation, the deconstruction of liberal humanism is an urgent and challenging 
task which sadly is not being undertaken in anything like a mainstream way.
Challenges to all these approaches were made by Freire and by feminist 
theorists, in many ways. In the next section, I consider Freire’s work and his 
influence, along with that o f Habermas, on Mezirow. I also look, in Section 5, 
at dominant feminist approaches to knowledge and the knowing subject 
(particularly Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule, 1986). In spite of 
challenges to it, however, the continuing power of psychological discourse in 
education is profound and critical sociological discourse seems to have little 
influence on it. The situation is not helped either by continued reliance on the 
‘forms of knowledge’ language in educational theory (Harris, 1988: 207), 
which reflects the structure-of-the-disciplines approach to curriculum.
4.4 Liberatory pedagogies
Education, knowledge and pedagogy were for a long time typically 
conceptualised as institutional practices associated with schools. This began to 
change when new agendas concerned with social justice began with the 
publication of Freire’s work in 1969 (first published in English in 1970). These 
agendas sought, in the words of Weiler (1988: 50) to discover ‘how the human 
ability to create meaning and resist an imposed ideology can be turned to praxis 
and social transformation’. Freire sought to do this with his notion of 
conscientization. He questioned the role and authority of the teacher, 
recognised personal experience as a source of knowledge and took into 
account the perspectives of people of different races, classes and cultures. 
Underlying Freire’s theories is a vision of social justice which was influential in 
the critical and liberatory movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.
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However, as Weiler (1991) points out, Freire’s claims to universal truths and 
his assumptions of a collective experience of oppression do not adequately 
address the specific realities and complexities of students’ lives.
Freire’s still most widely read and classic text, is his first book to be published 
in English, Pedagogy o f the Oppressed (1970). In this work, Freire organises 
his approach to liberatory pedagogy in terms of a dualism between the 
oppressed and the oppressors and between humanisation and dehumanisation. 
This organisation of thought in terms of opposing forces reflects Freire’s own 
experiences of literacy work with the poor in Brazil, a situation in which the 
lines between oppressor and oppressed were clear (Weiler, 1991: 452). Freire’s 
thought is, like all other thought, historically and socially situated. For Freire, 
humanisation is the goal of liberation. Simply reversing the relations between 
oppressor and oppressed will not create liberation. Liberation and humanisation 
are possible only if new relationships between human beings are created. This is 
to be achieved by naming and analysing existing structures of oppression 
(denunciation) and by the creation of new relationships and ways of being as a 
result of mutual struggle against oppression (annunciation).
Apart from the use of the male referent throughout Pedagogy o f the 
Oppressed, a usage universal during the 1960s, when the book was written, the 
main problem for feminists in Freire's thought is the ideal of humanisation and 
the assumption that all forms of oppression are uniform (Weiler, 1991: 453). 
The assumption of the work is that in struggling against oppression, the 
oppressed will move toward true humanity. But this leaves unaddressed the 
form of true humanity and implicitly accepts the existence of a real, true self 
which poststructuralist thought has shown to be both a fiction and a central 
tenet of liberal humanism.
In his usage of the concept of oppression, what is not addressed is the 
possibility of simultaneous contradictory positions of oppression and 
dominance: the man oppressed by his boss could at the same time 
oppress his wife, for example, or the White woman oppressed by 
sexism could exploit the Black woman. By framing his discussion in 
such abstract terms, Freire slides over the contradictions and tensions
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within social settings in which overlapping forms of oppression exist, 
(ibid)
There is too much universalism in Freirean thought to satisfy feminist 
poststructuralist needs for situated teaching, learning and generation of 
knowledge. This is not to say that Freirean pedagogy should be rejected, but it 
is to say that we need to add to it what we know about subjectivity and the 
nature of oppression (ibid).
Freire also works with a concept of false consciousness and ties its 
transformation to the idea of praxis (Freire, 1970: 47). Transformation of 
perspectives is not a purely intellectual action. It must involve action for 
change, only then can it be termed praxis. ‘Knowledge is praxis, a constant 
interplay between theory, ideas and the actions that derive from them and in 
turn influence their development’ (Maher, 1987: 94). This idea of praxis has 
been taken up by many feminist theorists and is crucial to any politicised 
poststructuralist viewpoint. However, Cocks (1989: 15) shows Freire’s 
magical consciousness to be equated with medieval superstition. This implies a 
reliance on rationality in Freirean concepts of the knowing subject and 
conscientization.
The core goal of adult education practice which strives for change in this 
decade has been to produce critical thinkers. This is how adult education 
envisages the mobilisation of adult resistance to oppression (Tennant and 
Pogson, 1995: 199) In this, adult education shares with all other pedagogies 
the production of particular types of subjects. However, it fails to provide a 
theory of the person which is capable of underpinning this task. A key thinker 
in the field of critical thinking is Mezirow (1978, 1981, 1991), whose concept 
of transformative learning is implicit in the idea of critical thinking. Mezirow 
has been influenced by the work of Freire and Habermas and has in turn 
influenced many other thinkers in adult education and critical pedagogy.
Mezirow’s (1991, 1996) theory of transformative learning has developed over 
nearly two decades into a comprehensive and complex description of how
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learners construe, validate and reformulate the meaning of their experiences. 
Mezirow sees Freire’s (1970) work as parallel to perspective transformation. 
Perspective transformation is intended for emancipatory purposes: ‘The intent 
of education for emancipatory action — or ... perspective transformation — 
would be seen by Habermas as the providing of the learner with an accurate 
in-depth understanding of his or her historical situation’ (Mezirow, 1981: 6, 
cited in Cranton, 1992: 24). The core of transformative learning in Mezirow’s 
(1991) view is the uncovering of distorted assumptions — errors in learning — 
in each of the three domains of meaning perspectives, that is, psychological, 
sociolinguistic and epistemic perspectives. A learner can be advanced in the 
development of reflective judgement or the intellect and still hold distorted 
assumptions. Mezirow (1991) lists things like scope of awareness and learning 
style as important in shaping the epistemic meaning perspective (1991: 43).
The main problems with Mezirow’s work, from a feminist poststructuralist 
point of view, are first, that of distortion and, second, the assumption that 
accurate information exists. Distortions are similar to false consciousness, 
whose problems have been discussed already in relation to Marxism (Chapter 
Three, Section 7) and to Freirean thought. Distortions, in a feminist 
poststructuralist framework, are as real as the ‘accurate information’. They do 
not represent a false consciousness, since no such false consciousness exists.
A reliance on this notion of distortion betrays an assumption that accurate 
information and rational understanding alone can lead to transformation. The 
assumption that accurate information exists and that consensus can be reached 
on the basis of access to such information is a legacy from Habermas. The 
danger with consensus and trying to achieve it through what Habermas calls 
the ‘ideal speech situation’ (1983b) is twofold. First, it does not allow for the 
investments that people make in certain positions or in certain kinds of 
knowledge, based on how these investments give access to power or positions 
of power. Second, the idea of consensus is based on rational talk (Young, 
1987: 67 - 73) and too often such talk reflects dominant discourses, because of
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the power associated with such discourses and the fact that muted discourses 
have little currency and therefore cannot be made sense of, even by people with 
the best will in the world. Rational talk and the idea of rationality again betray 
assumptions that the human subject is unitary and rational, all other things 
being equal (ibid).
In this approach to critical pedagogy, there is a trend towards ensuring that 
students are given the chance to arrive logically at a consensus that it is 
universally valid that all people have a right to freedom from oppression 
(Alcoff, 1988). Habermas (1983a: 19) insists that impartial reason will emerge 
from dialogue, as long as the dialogue takes place under conditions of 
co-operatively seeking the truth, where all motives are neutralised. As long as 
all perspectives are heard and taken into account, there is a possibility of 
consensus. Having deconstructed the assumptions of accepted consensus, he 
reconstructs a presumption of impartiality in his ideal of rational consensus 
(Young, 1987: 69).
In Mezirow’s theory, the concept of perspective transformation has as its 
foundation this concept of the unified self and a belief in the decisive power of 
human agency (Mezirow, 1990: 14). The self, for Mezirow, exists apart from 
structure, it is essentially disengaged, disembodied, dehistoricised. ‘Mezirow 
may in fact have reified the masculinist ideal of the “unencumbered subject’” 
(Welton, 1990, cited in Clark and Wilson, 1991).
Mezirow’s work takes a constructivist stance (Cranton, 1992: 25) and is thus 
useful to feminist poststructuralists. Mezirow also emphasises the importance 
of content, process and premise reflection. However, they are used by Mezirow 
to serve primarily a critical function of revealing theoretical obfuscations and 
injustice. A feminist poststructuralist perspective adds a crucial investigation of 
psychodynamic process and investments which exist in a dynamic and recursive 
relation with social and historical content (discourse), interpersonal relations 
and premise reflection. The recognition that we are multiple, contradictory, 
desiring and embodied subjects which cannot be reduced to rationality is
140
missing from Mezirow’s work. This recognition is a theoretical resource which 
feminist poststructuralism posits as a necessary prerequisite of the search for 
social change, and especially change in gender relations (Kenway et al, 1994). 
Emancipatory education needs a theory of the person which does not assume, 
by default, that the person is what liberal humanist discourses assume.
4.4.1 Social movements and pedagogy
While the goal of schooling pedagogy was and is to provide public, unified 
subjects of a particular kind, left pedagogy and separatist feminist pedagogies 
and other liberatory or emancipatory pedagogies also had similar aims, even if 
these were not always explicit. They wanted to produce politicised subjects of 
various kinds (Lusted, 1986) Thus, the notion of false consciousness was used 
by Marxists and by early radical feminists like Millett. The implication was that 
once the veil of ignorance was lifted from the eyes of the working class, or of 
women, or whoever was the subject of the pedagogy, then they would change 
their behaviour. This kind of voluntarism has already been critiqued in Chapters 
Two and Three.
Liberals tended to see subjects as individuals socialised into their appropriate 
roles. But poststructuralist insights show that people are not passively shaped 
by active others, including ‘social structures’. Rather, they ‘actively take up as 
their own the discourses through which they are shaped’ (Davies and Banks, 
1992: 3, cited in Jones, 1993: 159). Thus, girls and women can be read now as 
positioning themselves. Patriarchy is not ‘a monolithic force which imposes 
socialisation on girls ... it produces positions for subjects to enter’ (Walkerdine, 
1989a: 205). And the discourses which provide the available positions or ‘ways 
to be’ (subjectivities) shift in contradictory ways. There is no one way in which 
women or girls, as a group, or as individuals, can be fixed in our understanding 
(Jones, 1993: 159).
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In spite of these insights, which for many feminists produce useful feminist 
knowledge, a major influence in feminism is the idea that women have special 
‘female’ ways of knowing which coincide with essentially female ways of 
being. This is also perhaps the most visible and influential face of feminism in 
the mainstream of everyday life and the media. I agree with Brookes (1992) 
that it is important to connect being and knowing through a model of education 
which draws on the everyday experiences of women, but that it will not 
challenge the gender status quo if it bases itself on a difference mode. The 
Harvard Project on Women’s Psychology and Girls’ Development, from which 
a great deal of this difference work emanates, is a project which represents one 
of the most influential strands of feminist social psychology today (Wilkinson, 
1996: 13). Such educational work has been influenced by the work of 
Chodorow (1978), Gilligan (1982), Brown and Gilligan (1992, 1993) and 
Taylor, Gilligan and Sullivan (1995). Its most popular manifestation with 
reference to education is in Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule’s (1986) 
book, Women’s Ways o f Knowing. In the next section, I address some of the 
assumptions of this book and its implications for practice (cf Brookes, 1992).
4.5.1 A universal female subject
Drawing on the work of Perry (1970) and positioning themselves against it, 
Belenky et al use the findings of a study of one hundred and thirty-five women 
learners to reformulate five stages of women’s knowing, from silence, through 
received knowledge, subjective knowledge, procedural knowledge to, finally, 
constructed knowledge. Perry’s work is a study of developmental theory 
derived from his analysis of male students attending Harvard University and the 
ideas in it are still influential. Perry assumes that it is not problematic to use his 
research to indiscriminately chart the epistemological development of both 
female and male students, despite the fact that his work originates in male 
experience. He assumes that students move in a linear way, from a basic 
dualism where the world is viewed in terms of black / white, right / wrong,
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through to increasingly advanced stages. In the last stage, one is presumed to 
know that all knowledge is relative and socially constructed. Perry assumes 
that ‘dualists are rare at Harvard’ (1970: 63, cited in Brookes, 1992: 41).
Belenky et al are critical of Perry’s assumptions that people learn in a linear 
manner. They argue that ‘women’s thinking did not fit so neatly into his 
categories’ (1986: 14), particularly women’s experiences of male authority 
(ibid: 23, 24). However, they build on Perry’s scheme when they argue that 
women’s learning can be grouped into ‘five major epistemological categories’ 
(ibid: 150). Also problematic is their assumption that women learn differently 
from men and therefore require a woman-centred education (ibid: 214 - 229).
As Brookes (1992: 41) points out, any pedagogy which suggests that women 
should be isolated in a woman-centred environment is problematic. 
Theoretically, it is unacceptable, because it is based on difference. Strategically, 
it is unacceptable, because it would isolate women in an academic context 
which is already highly stratified. Politically, it is unacceptable, because it 
maintains a sex-differences approach and thus maintains male / female dualism. 
Women can benefit from a safe and supportive learning environment, but to 
suggest that they need special, separate environments to meet their essentially 
different needs does not address the need for safety as a political problem. It 
implies that the problem is located in naturally occurring differences between 
women and men (ibid). As Lewis (1989: 122) puts it:
The language in which Belenky and her colleagues locate women’s 
experiences in the academy — ‘newborn’, ‘child’, encouraged to ‘think 
more’, turning her into a ‘real knower’ — suggests that education for 
women needs to be focused at some primary level in order to bring us 
up to par with the already ‘grown up’ male thinkers who are posed as 
the norm to which we must aspire. It is easy to see how such an 
approach might enhance the already prevalent ideology that education 
for women is a prescription for lowering standards. The terms of the 
discourse on standards, which the language in Women’s Ways o f 
Knowing implies, only makes sense within the frames of a phallocentric 
system where being a man is not only considered to be different from 
being a woman but also considered to be better.
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This categorisation of levels of knowing amounts to a hierarchy of ways of 
knowing on which the authors ultimately base a model of education that might 
draw women out of a state of silence. This state o f silence is described as a 
state devoid of ‘awareness of mental acts, consciousness, or introspection’ 
(Belenky et al, 1986: 25). The aim is to draw women into a state of 
constructed knowledge, described as a condition of ‘becoming and staying 
aware of the working of their minds’ (ibid: 141). In this state, women can 
create their ‘own’ epistemological understandings.
On the face of it, these stages represent an exciting model and the idea of 
constructed knowledge appears to address the dynamics of the challenge 
brought to patriarchy by women’s education (Lewis, 1989: 120). However, the 
authors propose to establish the frames of their educational model by 
connecting teaching with midwifery. They propose, following Ruddick (1980, 
1984), to name the discourse through which women’s education is to be 
articulated as ‘maternal thinking ’ (Belenky et al, 1986: 218, emphasis added). 
This proposed political strategy will draw a woman’s knowledge out into the 
world.
As a proposed pedagogical strategy, Ruddick’s concept of maternal thinking 
maintains the idea of immutable and natural sex differences and does not 
address at all the political climate (that is, patriarchal social relations and sexist 
discourses) in which learners’ subjectivities are constructed. This is not to 
dispute the goodwill of the authors or their genuine concern about ‘why so 
many women students speak so frequently of problems and gaps in their 
learning and so often doubt their intellectual competence’ (ibid: 4). But, 
because of the lack of a clearly articulated political agenda, the authors 
inadvertently slip into the language of women’s deficiency and thereby fail to 
address the deeply complex ways in which women’s constraints and 
possibilities are constructed (Lewis, 1989: 121).
Belenky et al fail to analyse the structural inequalities in educational 
environments, most particularly the sexual harassment, abuse and incest that
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form a pervasive background to the lives of the women surveyed for the book. 
While the authors conclude that sexual abuse and harassment may affect 
women’s ways of knowing and learning, they do not analyse how this happens. 
They do not address women’s knowledge as socially and politically organised 
(cf Grimshaw, 1986), but as something intrinsic to women. What they describe 
is ideology about women, but they take this as evidence of natural differences 
between women and men. In doing this, they promote a discourse of male / 
female dualism. As Brookes (1992: 58) points out, they do not address how an 
explicit theoretical validation of difference -- an assumption implicit in 
mainstream curriculum and academic programming — might further 
disempower women in an educational system which already is failing to meet 
their needs, insofar as it is organised to reflect male experience and hence to 
entrench male power and authority.
Belenky et al use a language of difference to discuss women’s educational 
needs and to propose educational strategies for women. Theoretically, this is a 
model based on gender difference and which draws in turn on recent directions 
in the works of Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan (1982). Common to these 
theorists is the idea that women learn and know differently from men. And in 
this assumption, which implies that women are naturally different, not that 
women learn differently because of their experiences of male power and abuse 
of male power, there is an inherent lack of politicisation. It locates women’s 
problems within the individual, without considering the social conditions which 
gave rise to these ways of knowing in the first place. Such a model tends to 
minimise the facts and nature of women’s oppression itself as a major 
contributory factor to women’s lives and experiences (Grimshaw, 1986; 
Maher, 1987; Pollitt, 1995). As Maher (1987: 98) points out, while such 
models can attend to political experience, they overlook the importance of 
politically conscious resistance experiences and, I would add, the important 
ways that subjectivities are produced in discourses of resistance.
Although they initially reject Perry, Belenky et al (1986) build on his work later
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when they organise women’s learning perspectives into the five categories of 
silence, received knowledge, subjective knowledge, procedural knowledge, and 
constructed knowledge. While the authors clearly state that these are not 
universal categories, that they are abstract and hence cannot capture the 
complexity of individual women’s thought, and that men show evidence of 
similar categories (ibid: 15), implied in their work, nonetheless, is the 
assumption that one stage builds upon the other in a linear and hierarchical 
manner. Brookes points out that this is problematic from a methodological 
perspective because it lends itself, as does Perry’s research, to an analysis 
which depends upon fitting experience into defined categories rather than 
attempting to make sense of that which does not fit, in this case, how women’s 
learning is affected by male abuse of power. ‘Instead, Belenky et al assert the 
relationship of abuse to women’s learning and conclude that a new model of 
education must be devised for women. Lost is an analysis of how men abuse or 
of how women know this abuse in an educational context’ (Brookes, 1992: 56, 
original emphasis).
Knowledge production is political activity. Although they do not acknowledge 
this, Belenky et al have produced knowledge about women which proposes a 
universal, unitary female subject, existing in a dualistic and therefore 
hierarchical relation to a unitary male subject. They preclude the possibility of 
moving out of or of deconstructing or subverting dualism, by their reliance on 
maternal practices as the vehicle for their pedagogy and by their use of 
restrictive educational categorical ways of knowing, which implicitly deny the 
possibility of generating new knowledge, given different social circumstances.
The theoretical divisions set up in the work of Belenky et al support a dualistic 
approach to knowledge and the human subject which, far from challenging the 
status quo, functions to reinforce it. Instead of looking at supposedly naturally 
occurring differences, pedagogy, if it is to rise to the challenges posed by 
poststructural feminist insights, needs to investigate how gender difference is 
produced, how difference can be celebrated without resorting to essentialism
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and how human subjects are organised to know. There is no knowledge which 
is indigenous to women, or to men. The questions which a feminist 
poststructuralist pedagogy could ask are centered on the key question of what 
social conditions organise women and men to learn differently.
4.6 The challenges for a feminist poststructuralist emancipatory pedagogy
Like Hollway (1991b: 31), I am constantly struck by how dominant is the idea 
among feminist educational practitioners and theorists that there exist natural 
differences between the genders and that there are naturally different women’s 
and men’s ways of knowing. In common with both Hollway (ibid) and Segal 
(1987), I am disturbed at these easy polarities and what I see as the negative 
effects on feminism which follow from them. In published work on pedagogy in 
Ireland (for example, A. Byrne, 1995; Byrne, Byrne and Lyons, 1996), there is 
no attention to this idea, although Gardiner, (1997) and Mannix (1996) refer to 
it in the contexts of politics and psychology in Ireland, respectively.
Hollway’s and Segal’s work gives a convincing account of the extent to which 
polarised thinking about femininity and masculinity dominates white Western 
feminism. This kind of thought depends to a considerable extent on 
psychological concepts:
The most accessible feminist writing today is one in which we are likely 
to read of the separate and special knowledge, emotion, sexuality, 
thought and morality of women, indeed of a type of separate ‘female 
world’ which exists in fundamental opposition to ‘male culture’, ‘male 
authority’, male-stream thought’, in opposition to the world of men 
(Segal, 1987: ix).
Hollway (1991b) asks why white Western feminist thought in the 1980s and 
1990s has been so psychologised, unlike the socialist feminism of the 1970s. 
The same questions need to be asked about recent trends in school education 
and particularly about large sectors of critical adult education’s approach in 
Ireland. Although it defines itself in opposition to regulatory schooling, is still
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deeply affected by human relations psychology. I believe that what is significant 
in accounting for the psychologisation of adult education is
the closeness o f a psychological vision of the world to the dominant 
popular assumptions of Western culture, since what the two have in 
common is an outlook which understands the world in terms of the 
individual. (Hollway 1991b: 30)
This is especially the case in the way that adult education approaches gender 
issues. Psychology plays a part in reproducing and legitimating popular 
assumptions about individuals and their femininity or masculinity. It places a 
particular model of the individual at the centre of its explanatory world, and 
while it does so it cannot reconceptualise gender issues in terms of the 
constraints and forces which shape a person and how these may be changed 
(ibid). While adult education continues to rely on unitary models of the subject, 
whether these are unitary and male, or unitary and female, it will not escape the 
limitations of popular assumptions, legitimated by psychology.
Many practitioners of adult education seek a radical political agenda in all 
areas, including gender issues. But in gender issues feminism is frequently 
reduced to psychology. If adult education remains within psychology’s terms of 
reference in the use of the categories ‘femininity’ and masculinity’, it cannot 
avoid reducing them to natural differences or to cultural differences, even while 
applying a social analysis. Hollway (1989: 98ff) makes the same point about 
social psychology, which many feminists claim has set out to combine a social 
analysis with psychological questions. While some of the evidence in 
Wilkinson’s (1996) collection on feminist social psychology shows that some 
feminists are beginning to overcome these difficulties, it also clear that this is 
not a widespread theoretical concern.
The solution for adult education is not necessarlily to abandon psychology. One 
of the reasons that the socialist feminisms of the 1970s became concerned with 
psychological questions was that feminists operating in consciousness raising 
groups realised that the personal is political and that change is not simply a
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matter of economic resources, equal opportunity, correct political intentions 
and voluntarism. Adult education has taken these lessons on board also. But as 
long as the reliance on femininity and masculinity remains, the personal will be 
reduced to the psychological and the individual, losing in the process a vision 
of the politicised personal and the personal nature of the political. The only 
difference between such use of femininity and masculinity and the old 
patriarchal psychology of sex differences is that adult education, relying on 
feminist psychology, has re-evaluated femininity as superior. This is not enough 
to make a political difference in a world of complex social relations 
characterised by ‘shades of grey’ rather than clear-cut essential differences (cf 
Cocks, 1989). As Segal (1987: 5) points out, some renowned misogynists are 
not averse to claiming that women are superior to men. It excuses all sorts of 
bad behaviour, legitimates double standards and does not disturb the 
expectations that women will take primary responsibility for caring, feeling and 
nurturing.
Adult education needs a theory of how gender differences are produced, 
reproduced and subverted. The theoretical focus needs to be on new forms of 
femininity and masculinity, on politicised subjectivities formed in the struggle 
to challenge the gender status quo. It is not enough to focus on women and 
men as they are, because gender is produced through difference, in relations. 
Hollway’s work (1982, 1984a, 1989) has shown how gender difference is 
produced in adult social relations. Her focus on relations makes it possible to 
define the question in terms of the production of differences between genders, 
rather than in terms of a psychology of women or of men. Focusing on sex 
differences in adult education leads to comparison, but does not fundamentally 
challenge the categories male and female. A production-of-differences 
approach is not about comparison. ‘It is explanatory rather than descriptive, 
relational rather than comparative, emancipatory rather than normative and 
dynamic rather than static’ (Hollway, 1991b: 32).
Including a psychology of women in adult education has historically been seen
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as radical in the face of a mainstream psychology which tended to take the male 
as the norm against which women were to be measured and most often seen as 
deficient. This explains the enormous popularity of the work of Gilligan (1982), 
Brown and Gilligan (1992) and Belenky et al (1986). These ideas need to be 
seen in the historical context in which they first became popular. But the 
insights produced by feminist poststructuralism mean that these approaches are 
no longer satisfactory. These insights have shown that people are not 
seamlessly socialised into masculinity or femininity. Femininity and masculinity 
are social constructions to which women and men relate in differing and 
problematic ways throughout life. A feminist psychology of the production of 
gender difference looks at how women and men relate to these categories and 
can theorise change and resistance to change in terms of power and in terms of 
conscious or unconscious investments or interests in gender differentiated 
positions in discourses (see, for example, Hollway, 1984a, b, 1994; Connell, 
1995).
The challenge for a feminist poststructuralist adult educator is to counter the 
dominance of feminist essential difference psychology in order to create a 
changed conceptual framework for practices concerning gender. Producing 
knowledge about women’s and men’s psychologies is based on many diverse 
interests. A feminist poststructuralist interest militates against the production of 
dominant, monopolising knowledge such as has been characteristic, until 
recently, of psychological knowledge about women or black people or working 
class children (Mama, 1995; Hollway, 1991b; Walkerdine, 1989a).
I quote Hollway on a final point about an approach in terms of the production 
of gender differences:
It recognises that there are systematic, though not invariable nor 
determined, differences between women and men at the psychological 
level which despite access to material equality are not going to 
disappear overnight. Ignoring these differences would not be in the 
interests of feminism any more than it is to reduce them to women’s 
biology. The challenge is to be able to explain them, both in terms of 
their tenacious hold over a person’s psyche and in terms of the
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undoubted scope which is available to everyone to exceed and 
transgress the limits of their psyche and actions imposed by gender 
difference. (Hollway, 1991b: 33)
4.7 Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter has relevance in terms of this research, because 
knowledge production is a political activity. I want to research the production 
of knowledges and subjectivities formed in feminist discourses of resistance, 
rather than to seek fundamental truths about women. Orthodoxies which have 
emerged about women’s education have their ‘regimes of truth’, as well as 
their marginalises and contestations. The marginalities and contestations in 
turn have their own orthodoxies and regimes of truth. I have chosen to 
research feminist subjectivities as they have been produced in trying to disrupt 
the gender status quo and to see what this can add to a truly radical feminist 
practice of adult education, which escapes the pitfalls of dominant feminist 
psychologies. I want to see how the knowledge generated out of the 
exploration and explanations of feminist subjectivities can be used to radicalise 
the content of women’s personal development courses, while still meeting 
women’s felt needs.
If feminist psychology has been influential in adult education in general, it has 
been particularly influential in personal development education. As such, it has 
tended to reproduce mainstream western philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of maleness and femaleness, while asserting the superiority of female 
ways of being and knowing. Gore (1993) has pointed out that critical and 
feminist pedagogies need to have their regimes of truth investigated and 
deconstructed, along with the regimes of truth of more dominant pedagogies. I 
want to see where the interstices are for challenging these orthodoxies and 
dominance in ways that still meet women’s needs for safety, validation and 
affirmation of their experiences. Such a challenge would enable people to see 
where gender difference is produced and thereby give them the resources to
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produce new forms of being male or female, which would be emancipatory 
rather than normative and dynamic rather than static.
I have attempted to show how science was envisaged both as a tool for 
liberation and for regulation and how, in struggling to be liberatory, many 
pedagogies have rejected science and scientific measurement and techniques of 
normalisation and have turned to psychology, especially human relations 
psychology. Foucault’s work has gone a long way to show how science, by its 
naturalisation, became a tool for normalisation and regulation, even when used 
by those who envisaged it as a tool for liberation. Feminist poststructuralist 
work has provided a similar critique of psychology.
The conclusions I have reached in thinking through the genealogy I have 
attempted, are that practices, discourses and orthodoxies of education emerge 
out of dynamic relationships between social and historical events and human 
actors, who have personal affinities and individual biographical details which 
must be taken into account. My own affinities are for a commitment to 
knowledge informed by feminist poststructuralist critiques of both mainstream 
sexist discourses and discourses of difference feminism.
It is important, however, to move beyond critique towards discourses of 
agency, by suggesting ways of shifting and adjusting the meaning of the human 
relations, self-esteem and personal development projects within feminist 
educational politics. Along with accounts o f contradictions and the 
acknowledgement of the complexity of subjectivity, what is further required are 
accounts of how transformation and movement in subjectivities can come about 
or can be achieved and lived. These questions are addressed in Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight, where I examine feminist subjectivities. In Chapter Nine, I 
discuss how I draw on them to inform my own practice of personal 
development education. What especially interests me is how theory and 
practice become one, how the production of knowledges and their 
communication as part of everyday life may be experienced as part of a whole,
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and how radical critiques can connect with people’s lives in practical ways.
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CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGY
5.0 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the methodology of this research is 
based on the theoretical considerations set out in Chapters One, Two, Three 
and Four. Placed at the end of Part One of the work, the chapter is a link 
between those considerations and the ways that I derive and analyse the case 
material of the research participants, in Part Two. The chapter specifies:
• the information required to answer the questions posed in Chapter One
• how the information was obtained
• problems of experience and description in obtaining and analysing 
information
• how the information was analysed.
One way to demonstrate the importance and usefulness of theory is by showing 
its practical applications for social analysis. Much of the discussion in Chapters 
One to Four has been quite abstract, but I do not want to avoid using the new 
concepts simply because they are difficult to understand. There is a distinction 
between what is unnecessarily abstruse and what is essential for thinking about 
people in new ways. New concepts become more understandable and easier to 
work with and their usefulness is more easily illustrated through continued use 
and exemplification (Hollway, 1989: 24) and through their application to the 
analysis of real-life events. Chapters Six to Eight put the theory to work in 
order to develop a picture of feminist subjectivities and this present chapter 
explores the ways that they do so. Chapter Nine then goes on to apply themes
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emerging from that picture to my own practice as a facilitator of women’s 
personal development education.
5.1 The research questions revisited and the information required to 
answer them
The preceding chapters have discussed the feminist poststructuralist concepts 
on which this research is based. From among these concepts, I have chosen to 
highlight for investigation the development of politicised subjectivities in a 
context of feminism. I want to explore the subjective worlds and experiences of 
feminist women, to see what discourses are recognised in the collectives of 
which they are part and what discursive postionings and resources are available 
to them at a particular period. I further want to ask how the themes and 
insights which this exploration throws up can be used to politicise the practice 
of women’s personal development courses and to construct women as agentic 
and politicised subjects. These questions determine that I require information 
about the following:
how discourses relating to feminism are implicated in the ways that 
self-defined feminist women experience themselves, other women, men 
and gender relations
the role of discourses and discursive practices in producing 
significations of feminism
• investments made in the positions in discourse which people take up
• how new discursive practices are produced
• how agency is attributed and produced for feminists
• what models of subjectivity and the human subject are evident in
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people’s accounts
• relations in the present
• the operation of power.
The aim is to produce a ‘snapshot in time’ (Farran, 1990; Holland and 
Eisenhart, 1990) which can help theorise about feminism and the production of 
feminist change, about women and about the production of gender difference, 
in ways that allow for carefully specified generalisations for the practice of 
personal development pedagogy, but without slipping into universal claims (cf, 
Hollway, 1989: 106).
The kind of research I want to do judges its usefulnesss on the kind of analysis 
of the present it can come up with. It takes its point of departure from current 
problems. A current problem for feminism is emotional investment in 
gender-differentiated positions in discourse and how these can result in a 
retreat from feminism (cf Coward, 1993). A current problem for adult 
education is the way that a lot of the practice of personal development courses 
is depoliticised. In obtaining information about a current discourse or practice, 
we reconstruct a ‘history’ which shows the conditions for the emergence o f the 
discourse. In order to identify discourses, we need to use approaches to 
research that help us see gaps, inconsistencies and contradictions in accounts of 
experience (Henriques et al, 1984: 104). Since my theoretical perspective is 
also based on a critique of dualism, I also require information about how we 
can take apart dualistic relationships commonly viewed as natural and normal, 
such as the relationship between feminism and femininity, and show them to be 
social constructions.
I have used a framework that takes as central an assumption that all individuals 
experience contradictions in motives, aspirations and self-understanding which 
indicate multiple subjectivities (cf Hollway, 1982, 1989; Mama, 1995). 
Investigation of these phenomena calls for lengthy interviews or periods of
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observation. This framework or perspective on subjectivity also implies that 
neither psychological nor sociological information alone is sufficient. One of 
the ways of dealing with individual / society dualism is to focus on present 
circumstances and signification in the present, thereby opening up a theoretical 
and methodological space to produce information about individual 
subjectivities in relation to social context. I consider emotional relations and 
dynamics which may have happened in the past in the context of present 
circumstances.
The information obtained has to allow for the theoretical goal of understanding 
the conditions which produce certain accounts or narratives and how meaning 
and signification are produced from them (Hollway, 1989: 42, 43). A theory of 
meaning incorporating personal history, culture, unconscious processes and 
social differences is required to make sense of people’s accounts. Seeking 
information about psychodynamic processes is therefore relevant. 
Self-reflection is culturally shaped and delimited (Chodorow, 1996: 39). The 
kinds of self reflection which I require from the interviews and discussions with 
the research participants could not have been produced thirty years ago (cf 
West, 1996: 24). This kind of information is part of an emerging movement. It 
depends for its effectivity on a discourse which has arisen only recently and on 
what theories and discourses we are attuned to (cf ibid: 41).
5.1.1 Concern with meaning
I see one of the central concerns of this research as trying to understand and 
portray the meanings of the phenomena which I describe, as well as the means 
by which these phenomena are produced. I also want to examine how the 
meanings are achieved within discourses, through language and other 
discursive practices. In this sense, I am less concerned with portraying the 
research subjects as ‘representative’ of certain sectors of society, than with 
identifying the different discourses which they recognise. This is consistent with
157
grounded theory’s emphasis on identifying concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 
112), as well as the relationships between the discourses. From this point of 
view, it is immaterial whether or not respondents in an interview are actually 
‘telling the truth’. Potter and Wetherell (1987: 178) argue:
The researcher should bracket off the whole issue of the quality of 
accounts as accurate or inaccurate descriptions or mental states ... Our 
focus is exclusively on discourse itself: how it is constructed, its 
functions and the consequences which arise from different discursive 
organisation.
It is information obtained about systems of meaning-making which is 
important. This emphasis is a legacy of feminist poststructural literary criticism 
in the development of feminist poststructural theory (Weedon, 1987; Wetherell, 
1986; Moi, 1985). My theoretical perspective affects the kind of research I do. 
For example, I do not believe that the text of an interview or discussion reflects 
unmediated experience or that the more ‘authentic’ the material I get, the more 
valuable the interview. Influenced by literary criticism in this (see Moi 1985:4), 
I want to explore gaps and silences, how language is used and the subject 
positions that people take up have taken up in the past.
I am seeking ‘insiders’ accounts’ (Smith, 1989) and think it is important to use 
them as literal material, as text. In making sense of the text, I move between 
theory, my own experiences and interpretations and the text or material as data 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Mama, 1995; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The 
concern with meaning rejects the traditional linguistic notion of intention-to 
mean as directly homing in on its object, but instead recognises that the 
pathway of meaning in language is by no means simple and assured (cf 
McDermott and Tylbor, 1987: 167). As I have already pointed out, the concern 
with meaning, with signification, with gaps and silences also requires that a 
methodology based on a search for ‘facts’ must be rejected.
The resulting interpretation is a pragmatically guided reading of the 
coherence of the practices of society. It does not claim to correspond 
either to the everyday meanings shared by the actors or, in any simple 
sense, to reveal the intrinsic meaning of the practices. (Dreyfus and
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Rabinow, 1983, cited in Cherryholmes, 1988: 195)
My approach to the gathering and analysis of information is shaped by my 
epistemological stance, which has developed, in part, as a result of my own 
ontological status (cf Stanley and Wise, 1990). It is also shaped by my desire to 
engage in emancipatory research and use it for developing emancipatory 
pedagogy. To this end, I develop theory out of my own experience and include 
this in the thesis, as well as generating theory out of the accounts of the other 
research participants. For these reasons, a grounded theory methodology is 
suitable. However, there are reservations about grounded theory’s treatment of 
research subjects and its asssertion that it is a scientific method (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). As West (1996: 31) points out, there 
are positivist assumptions in grounded theory: ‘that valid, reliable and definitive 
answers were to be found in specific data, provided one searched exhaustively 
and diligently enough’. The assertion of feminist poststructuralism that meaning 
and knowledge are generated in relations in the present means that all answers 
and conclusions must be regarded as provisional and revisable.
Another place where I and emancipatory research depart from grounded theory 
is in the relationship with the research participants (cf Lather, 1986: 262). 
Grounded theory takes a ‘scientific’ approach to the research ‘subjects’. For 
me, doing research on people involves an important educational commitment. 
We are looking for a research theory and methodology adequate to the task of 
changing the world, just as we are looking for a pedagogy adequate to the 
same task. To this end, ‘empirical evidence must be viewed as a mediator in a 
contstant mutual interrogation between self and theory’ (ibid).
Empiricism is the belief that knowledge and social analysis generally is based 
on direct observation and experience, whereas I believe that knowledge and 
social analysis can be based on the ways that any one person constructs 
knowledge and makes sense of her / his social world. Since meaning in the 
present is so important and since I am not concerned with prediction in the way 
that a great deal of positivist / empiricist social enquiry is (Bhaskar, 1978, cited
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in Hollway, 1989: 13), sample sizes and distributions become less significant 
than in other types of research. The theoretical sampling used in grounded 
theory is therefore appropriate.
5.2 Gathering the information
The study employs grounded theory techniques for information gathering. 
While there are epistemological differences between some of the premises of 
grounded theory and feminist poststructuralism, the approach serves well as a 
research method or technique, even though I do not take on board all of its 
assumptions. I use it more as a technique than as a methodology grounded in a 
scientific epistemological stance, which is what it claims to be (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The techniques are used with a more 
diverse epistemological stance as their framework, which takes into account 
structural aspects of subjectivity. This distinguishes my stance from the 
symbolic interactionism within which grounded theory is situated (Layder, 
1994: 72). The initial interviews and discussions were with people who 
self-defined as feminist, concentrating on feminist changes and how they were 
defined and achieved. The sequencing of the analysis in Chapters Six, Seven 
and Eight reflects the ways that I moved in my interviews with participants 
from fairly broad discussion, to detailed accounts of private and emotional 
changes, drawing on only a few cases. This is consistent with grounded theory 
techniques, including theoretical sampling, the delineation of broad categories 
and their development through subsequent fieldwork and analysis.
5.2.1 Collecting data: theoretical sampling
The comparative method of obtaining information is based on the comparison 
of cases, in order to discover their different relationships to a theory whose 
explanatory limits must be established according to social differences (Hollway,
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1982: 199). It is on this principle that theoretical sampling is based. Theoretical 
sampling is carried out to discover categories and their properties and to 
suggest how the interrelationships between categories can form a theory. It 
provides constant direction to the research by comparing differences and 
similarities between categories, in order to generate properties. It comprises an 
active theoretical search for categories that work and fit together (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967: 47 - 76).
Family life and heterosexual couple relationships under patriarchy are important 
sites for the construction of femininity and masculinity. This is argued strongly 
by many of the contributers to Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1993). The face of 
patriarchy needs to be directly confronted in cathectic structures (emotionally 
charged relationships) in families and in friendships (cf O’Connor, 1992), as 
well as in wider political and social arenas. Cathectic structures have also been 
identified as key sites where feminists retreat psychologically from feminism 
(Coward, 1993). It was therefore very important for my project of investigating 
how feminist change works to direct my search for information towards 
feminists who had, to their own way of thinking, successfully engaged with 
aspects of feminism such as these, and produced agency in domestic 
relationships, but who had not at the same time reduced feminism to ‘lifestyle’ 
and issues of personal psychology and interpersonal relationships (cf Kitzinger, 
1987).
As with the work of Hollway (1982) and Mama (1995) in Britain, the problems 
raised in this work are a product of theoretical questions being posed and also 
of the politics o f the women’s movement in Ireland at this time, where the 
slogan ‘the personal is political’ is under scrutiny. The difficulties of making 
changes and the confusion and pain associated with change are crucial aspects 
in formulating the research questions and the kind of information required to 
answer them. Following Hollway (1982), I assert that it is the experience of 
those contradictions which provides the possibility to understand subjectivity, 
personal change and identity. Craib (1992: 172) also points out that both a lack
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of conceptual clarity and contradictions are necessary and productive.
The theoretical sampling process of this study began when I asked six women 
who had defined themselves as feminists through public speech, work or 
writing, to take part in research on feminist identity and how they put their 
feminism into practice in their everyday lives. Two of these women knew me 
already. All of the women were aware of the current personal / structural 
debates (see Chapter One, Section 8). All had significant experience of 
self-reflection and politicisation. The subjective experiences of this group of 
women (around my age and older) is a rich source of information about the 
identity of feminists, in relation to personal change embraced for political 
reasons. The intial six women all came from a similar age group, class 
background / present class status, educational and professional positions and 
cultural history, similar to my own. All six contacted responded positively to 
my letters and before conducting interviews, I discussed in more detail with 
them, over the phone or in person, the sort of research I was hoping to do.
I conducted interviews between January and August, 1996. At each interview 
conducted between January and May, I asked the women for the names of one 
or two other feminist women who might be interested in participating in the 
research. This means of contacting participants is referred to as ‘snowball 
sampling’ by Greed (1990) and L. Connolly (1996) and is capable of facilitating 
the theoretical sampling procedures. In January 1996, I began a series of 
individual interviews with eight women (the original six contacted and two 
others whose names had been given to me by the first group), conducted over 
four weeks. Most women did one interview, three did two. I taped and 
transcribed all interviews. I did some preliminary analysis on these, drawing up 
categories and concept lists. I then conducted a group interview with four 
women. Another single interview and a pair interview followed. At this point, I 
felt that the categories of discourses and relations analysed in Chapters Seven 
and Eight were saturated, at least insofar as the discursive analysis went.
162
Many of the interviewees thus far had referred to the importance of ‘emotional 
work’ or to doing personal therapeutic work, but the interviews / discussions 
had not developed in such a way that produced material pertaining to the 
details of this work. I knew from my theoretical sensitivity (a combination of 
cultural and personal experience and theoretical reading), that a lot of this kind 
of work could happen in the context of a crisis or the perception of a ‘leap 
forward’, or a major advance in the thinking and practice of feminist women. 
At this point, I had a collection of sixteen other names given to me by people 
who had already done interviews. Like Connell, (1995: 90), ‘rather than spread 
the research thin, I decided to concentrate on a few situations where the 
theoretical yield should be high’. In June 1996, I drafted a letter telling 
potential new participants about the work so far and describing the kind of 
intimate discussion I was looking for, focusing particularly on overcoming 
crises of identity or feelings of being blocked or stuck in feminist effectiveness. 
I also asked those who expressed interest if would they like to read my paper 
which I refer to in Chapter One (Section 10), called A Voyage Round M y 
Feminism (Ryan, 1995), as well as a summary of the analyses I had made so 
far. Five people agreed to take part in this exercise. I met them in a pair and a 
three, during August 1996, spending about six hours with each group.
By the time I conducted these discussions, I had written Chapters Six and 
Seven in draft form and I had decided that I wanted to focus on producing an 
account or accounts which would take as their theme psychodynamic 
processes, as well as relations and discourses. I could also give them sections 
of transcripts from some of the interviews. I brought along the rest of the 
transcripts (edited for anonymity). This was in case they wanted to see more of 
a person’s account (as it happened, they didn’t).
Theoretical sampling is based on the saturation of categories (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967: 62) and while I could have conducted more interviews or 
discussions on certain categories, I considered it unnecessary from the point of
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view of generating theory. Clearly this procedure affects what aspects of the 
world I claim to illuminate. Following Marshall (1986: 196), I hope to achieve 
depth, ‘rather than make widely applicable but conceptually simplified 
statements’ (cf Connell, 1995: 90). The textual material on which I base my 
interpretations is part of the written report and this also means that my 
interpretive processes are laid bare and are open to differing interpretations by 
the reader. I regard the textual material as a case study in feminism. The case 
study method does not limit in advance what may be relevant to the 
investigation.
5.2.2 The research participants: an overview
The data for the study were drawn from the following sources:
1. For the study of feminist subjectivities of self-defined feminist women, 
twenty women in the age group thirty-five to fifty provided data through
interviews, discussions and conversations.
2. For Chapter Nine, eight women from a Dublin community education project 
took part in a personal development course which I facilitated, having 
consulted them in advance about using the course as part of my research. Five 
of the women also participated in group discussion after the course had ended.
3. I am also present in the research, as a feminist woman and a personal 
development facilitator: ‘All social research constitutes an autobiography of thé 
researcher’ (Miller, 1993: 88). This acknowledgement lays bare the resources 
available to me in interpreting experience (cf McCracken, 1988 18, 19). It is 
from my own story, combined with my reading of theory, that I have derived 
my theoretical sensitivity, that is, a combination of experience, reading the 
literature and emerging data (Glaser, 1978; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). I use 
this theoretical sensitivity to develop concepts for analysing material.
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The twenty self-defined feminist women were randomly assigned participant 
codes PI to P20. The course participants were assigned codes PD1 to PD8.
5.2.3 Collecting data: feminists’ interviews, conversations and discussions
In my research interactions with the twenty self-defined feminist women who 
provide the data for Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, I was developing rather 
than testing ideas about subjectivity. It was only when I ran the course on 
which I draw for some of the material for Chapter Nine that I was ‘testing’ 
theory which I had developed. In the developing stage, I needed a method that 
would generate material and themes, rather than one that would impose a 
formalised set of questions on the research participants (cf Mama, 1995: 70). 
The interviews and conversations with which I began the collection of data 
were, therefore, open ended. I conducted in-depth individual, pair and small 
group interviews and discussions lasting from between one and three hours. In 
the final two group discussions, I narrowed the focus to investments in 
cathectic relationships. These last two discussions lasted about six hours each.
My approach in all o f the interviewing and discussion was based on exploring 
contradictions and keeping the focus on relations, rather than on individuals. 
To do this, I made use of concepts I had already developed from my theoretical 
sensitivity. I regarded both participants (myself and the interviewee) as equals, 
I voiced my own opinions and encouraged the interviewees to ask questions of 
me, although I was careful not to dominate the discussions or conversations. I 
was trying to record and document slices of information about ongoing social 
practices in which all the research participants were involved and to use this as 
a basis for theorising.
We met at locations like workplaces, our homes, often over tea or a drink. I 
usually initiated the conversations by explaining some of my interest in doing a 
study of feminist identity. I checked with the participants if they were willing to
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Participant Age group at
date of studv
PI 35 -
P2 35-
P3 40-
P4 40 -
P5 35 -
P6 35 -
P7 45-
P8 40-
P9 40-
PIO 40-
P II 35 -
P12 35-
40
40
45
45
40
40
50
45
45
45
40
40
TABLE 1 
Overview of participants
Data gathering Chapter and section
context___________________________________________ where cited________
Discussion with P3 8.4
Two individual interviews 6.4.1; 6.7.2; 7.1
Discussion with PI 8.2; 8.2.1; 8.6
Individual interview 6.3.1; 7.1; 7.2; 7.6
Individual interview 6.5.1
Individual interview 7.6
Group discussion with P9. P10, P12, P14
Individual interview
Group discussion with P7, P10. P12, P14 6.7.1
Individual interview 7.1
j.
Individual interview 8.1
Group discussion with P7, P9, P10, P14 6.7.1
Participant Age group at
date of study
P13 40-
P14 40-
P15 35-
P16 35-
P17 35 -
P18 40-
P19 35 -
P20 40-
PD1 45-
PD2 50-
PD3 40-
PD4 35 -
PD5 60-
45
45
40
40
40
45
40
45
50
55
45
40
65
TABLE 1, continued
Data gathering Chapter and section
context___________________________________________ where cited________
Two individual interviews 7.1
Group discussion with P7, P9, P10, P12 
Group discusssion with P I8, P I9
Pair discusssion with P17 7.2.1; 7.5; 7.6
Pair discusssion with P16 7.2.1
Group discusssion with P15 , P19 
Group discussion with P15, P18
Individual interview 7.1; 7.4
Personal development course 9.4.1
Personal development course 9.5.1
Personal development course 9.5.3
Personal development course 9.5.4
Personal development course 9.5.1
Participant Age group at
date of study
PD6 35 - 40
PD7 30 -35
PD8 35 - 40
TABLE 1, continued
Chapter and section
where cited_______
Personal development course 
Personal development course 
Personal development course
Data gathering
context ____
have the sessions recorded on tape and all were. Most of the participants had 
experience of group work or facilitation and were able to be both active 
listeners as well as able to voice their own thoughts, or to develop thoughts in 
discussion with others (cf ibid). There was never a problem getting discussion 
started. As soon as possible after each interview, each participant was provided 
with a transcript of the conversation or discussion in which she had taken part 
and, where requested, with a copy of the tape recording.
I stopped holding recorded sessions when I had material from twenty women, 
amounting in all to thirty-seven ninety-minute cassettes, most of which I had 
transcribed. In the course of analysis, I played back and listened to the tapes, as 
well as reading and re-reading transcripts. A great deal of the material recorded 
is not quoted in the thesis, clearly. Nevertheless, every interview gave me 
something to think about and add to my mindmaps. Transcription was an 
enormous amount of work, which I did as soon as possible after each interview 
/ conversation or discussion, in order to keep on top of the work. I gave myself 
a huge amount of work in transcribing and could probably just as well have 
listened to the tapes for the kinds of analysis I did. However, several women 
thanked me for supplying a transcript promptly and expressed appreciation at 
having the opportunity to read their words.
I later supplied each participant whose material I used with drafts of the 
chapters where their accounts were analysed. Some women contacted me to 
discuss these. One woman decided at that point that she would prefer to 
withdraw from the research. She concurred with the analysis, but did not want 
it produced in print. 1 had used her material in Chapter Eight, which left me 
with the accounts of only two participants for that chapter’s analysis. 
Nevertheless, the discussion with the woman who dropped out reaffirmed my 
conviction that the analysis was valid and worth including. The theoretical 
sampling principles also convinced me that the analysis could stand using only 
two participants’ accounts.
As well as the formal data gathering sessions, I held many informal
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conversations and discussions with friends about the research. Some of these 
have also shaped my theorising. I think of these participants as secondary 
participants (cf Mama, 1995: 74). While I have not quoted directly from them, 
they have also played an important part in the research.
Having reached the level of theorising about subjectivity which is evident from 
chapters Six, Seven and Eight, I organised and facilitated a Stage One personal 
development course in a community education setting in a North Dublin 
suburb, using the structures and topics outlined in Chapter One (Section 9) of 
this work. I met a group of ten women who had enrolled for a personal 
development course and spent a session discussing with them whether they 
would be willing to allow me to write about the course as part of this research. 
I explained that I would be doing the course as part of research, but that there 
would be no tape-recording or "assessment’. A parallel course was running in a 
nearby venue for those who preferred not to be involved in research. They 
were asked to think about it for a few days and to let me know.
Eight of the ten women contacted me to say that they would like to go ahead 
with my course. We started the course on a wet Tuesday morning in October 
and continued with ten two-and-a-half-hour sessions for nine weeks, until 
December 1996. I kept a personal diary and fieldnotes of the course which I 
wrote up after every session and often in between sessions. After the course 
finished, five of the women returned a few weeks later (January 1997) for a 
group discussion about the course, which was recorded, but not transcribed. I 
write about personal development education in Chapter Nine, but I do not 
confine my analysis to this one course, I draw also on my experiences of other 
courses, both as facilitator and as participant. Chapter Nine is, then, more 
research on me and my practices as a feminist poststructuralist personal 
development facilitator, than it is research on a particular group of women. 
Any quoted material in that chapter is from the recorded discussion with the 
research course participants and is quoted with permission.
The ways that I developed my information gathering and my subsequent
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analysis of the material gathered came directly out of my own feminist interests 
and reflect many of my feminist concerns. In this respect, this work has partly 
been research on myself, as a movement intellectual. I have access to cultural 
and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986) through my class, occupation and 
education, but find myself positioned without power in the social network, by 
virtue of my sex. Yet, as a woman, I also experience myself as not without 
power, due to my positioning in discourses of femininity. Thus, I focused on 
relational and strategic ways of having feminist agency, in the information 
gathering. In addition, my feminism of recent years has been stuck most often 
in the arena of the production of gender in my heterosexual couple and work 
relationships and I consider that radical personal development work has helped 
me get past this ‘crux’. Feminist literature on this topic, which backs up my 
analysis of my experience, opened the way for me to incorporate it into 
academic research. Hence my sensitivity to similar experiences in other 
feminists’ accounts and my desire to give them a theoretical treatment.
This approach is consistent with theoretical sampling and with the feminist 
poststructuralist assertion that any individual’s experience is valid and requires 
understanding theoretically (Hollway, 1995: 101). It is at odds with the more 
usual radical feminist assertion that only widespread experiences are valid and 
worth theorising and that individual experiences are ‘exceptions’ (Thompson, 
1994, cited in Hollway, 1995). It is a crucial move if we are to get beyond the 
restrictions placed on doing emancipatory research by the uncritical adoption of 
unitary models of the human subject. The next section, in problematising the 
treatment of experience, reveals how unitary models of the subject underpin 
some feminist research aproaches to both information gathering and analysis.
5.3 Issues of experience and description in feminist research
In a great deal of feminist theory and research, especially in research based on 
cultural feminist epistemologies, experience has been made the most reliable
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guide to reality. Feminist researchers have shown the importance of 
recognising and describing women’s experiences and in thus giving them a 
valid voice. They have shown how many sociological issues of major interest to 
women, such as hierarchical power relations within the family, have been either 
ignored or interpreted as ‘natural’ by leading sociologists (Delphy and 
Leonard, 1992, cited in Clancy, Drudy, Lynch and O’Dowd, 1995: 13). In 
addition, they have demonstrated how women have often not been counted in 
sociological studies (such as Goldthorpe et al, 1980 and Whelan and Whelan, 
1984, both cited in Clancy et al, 1995: 13) and in psychological studies 
(Gilligan, 1982). In this way, feminist researchers have demonstrated the 
importance of recognising that the personal aspects of one’s life are related to 
the social and political spheres. This was a major factor in feminist 
consciousness-raising and continues to be so. But there are all sorts of 
theoretical questions behind the concept of experience and they have political 
effects. The models of the subject implicit in many feminist approaches to 
research have tended to be humanist and / or essentialist, where the very use of 
the term ‘raised’ implies that feminists know best (Condor, 1986: 112; Pollitt, 
1995). In these approaches, experience, approached through description, tends 
to be reified as the most valid and most stable ground for knowing and for 
building an epistemology.
The poststructural objection to this use of experience is not a repudiation of 
grounds of knowing per se (Fuss, 1990: 27), nor of experience as one of those 
grounds. It is based on a belief that experience is socially constructed and that 
it is a sign mediated by other signs. As Hollway argues (1989: 42), the use of 
women’s experience as a basis for research is subject to the same kind of 
theoretical problelms which surround models of the human subject. Humanistic 
psychology and Verstehen-ba.sed sociology assume that accounts given in 
answer to sympathetic questioning will be an expression of the ‘real’ person. 
Much feminist theory has actually had the effect of reinforcing orthodox social 
theory, in assuming that the meaning of accounts is unproblematic. Mama 
(1995: 81) takes up this point, by discussing how open-ended techniques can
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evade the epistemological and theoretical dilemmas raised by the critique of 
science, instead of addressing them. The social conditions which gave rise to 
this approach by feminists are also alluded to by Mama (ibid), who places them 
in a framework of anti-imperialist critique.
Both Mama (1995: 81) and Hollway (1989: 41) point out, as did Wilkinson 
(1986: 20) before them, that there were considerable similarities of 
methodology and method between feminist social psychology and ethogenics 
and personal construct theory. The common element is to take seriously 
people’s accounts, rather than directly trying to measure performance or 
attitude. In ethogenics, this is manifest in Harre and Secord’s ‘open souls 
doctrine’ and in personal construct theory in Kelly’s ‘first principle’ (ibid). 
Both share the idealist assumption, which at a deeper level is shared with 
orthodox psychology, that an account will produce facts whose truth-value is 
not problematic for the research. It is believed that an account can reflect 
directly that individual’s experience (Hollway, 1989: 41). But these similarities 
are based on humanist assumptions about the individual which rely on the 
metaphysics of presence, that is, on the belief that one can be fully present to 
oneself and to other people. Poststructuralist developments in theories of 
subjectivity, on the other hand, can draw on the value of experience and of 
accounts which were once ignored, but are able to see subjective accounts as 
produced within discourses, history and relations. This is my starting point for 
examining and interpreting experience. To strengthen its achievements in 
asserting the importance of personal experience, feminist method needs to draw 
on poststructuralist theories and to interpret experience, not just describe it, in 
the mistaken belief that there is no theory behind ‘plain description’. We need 
to combine the value of experience with Foucault’s idea that truth is a historical 
product and therefore not absolute (Walkerdine, 1989a: 40).
For feminist poststructuralism, each claim to experience must be examined in 
the context in which it is made, and must be seen as filtered through discourse. 
‘Sociological description cannot conclude by reproducing participants’
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categories’ (Silverman, 1985: xi). The common-sense idea of experience as 
‘truth’ and of untheorised description as allowing access to that truth is an 
ideological position, underwritten by the metaphysics of presence and a belief 
that one can be fully present to oneself and to other people. This is exemplified 
in Gilligan (1982), where the different moral nature of women’s 
decision-making is hailed as natural and better, but is actually describing 
ideology about women.
Many women identify with Gilligan’s descriptions and theory because they 
have only the dominant interpretive resources available to them when thinking 
about themselves. Believing in truth and recognising themselves in Gilligan’s 
descriptions, they conclude that she is describing women’s essence. However, 
in that 1982 work, Gilligan does not look at the social conditions, such as being 
oppressed, in which women developed their interconnectedness and 
decision-making techniques which supposedly come naturally to them 
(Grimshaw, 1986). Although Gilligan’s assumptions about women’s nature 
have altered a little in recent years, to take social condidions into account (for 
example, Brown and Gilligan, 1992), it is notable that her most quoted work is 
the 1982 work, where the epistemological base is that which most closely 
resembles the dominant humanist assumptions about the subject. I believe that 
the popularity of Gilligan’s work as a model for much feminist research is due 
to the closeness of its vision of women to the dominant popular assumptions of 
western culture, ‘since what the two have in common is an outlook which 
understands the world in terms of the individual’ (Hollway 1991b: 30).
Rather than completely dismiss or accept the special validity of experience, 
feminist poststructuralism contends that each experience is as valid as the next, 
but is socially constructed and must not be taken as an indicator of an essence 
of, or an essential truth about, a person. Rigid categories of ‘female experience’ 
or ‘male experience’ are of limited epistemological usefulness (Connell, 1995: 
71; Fuss, 1990). An additional related point is made by Wise (1990: 129), 
when she says that feminist research should not focus exclusively on women’s
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lives and experiences. Hollway also deplores the current trend in feminist 
psychology and social psychology to focus exclusively on women:
I believe that this is unfortunate for two reasons. First, there is a danger 
of taking women as a catetgory and leaving men outside the account, 
because gender is produced through difference, in relations, and so if 
the other side of the relation is out of view, a social psychology of 
women’s experiences cannot produce a theory of how women are 
produced. Secondly, description without theory is not possible and 
accounts of women’s experience cannot operate in a theoretical 
vacuum. (Hollway, 1989: 106)
An exclusive feminist concentration on the special validity of women’s 
experiences also suggests that if one has not had a woman’s experiences, one 
cannot be a feminist, one is outside the ‘circle’ (cf Said, 1986). It puts the 
responsibility for ‘progress’ on women alone, since ‘men can’t understand’. In 
addition, it reduces women to their experiences as women and does not allow 
for overlapping experiences of class, race, ability, age, ethnicity and other 
social variables. As Weedon (1987: 8) puts it:
It is not enough to refer unproblematically to experience ... we need a 
theory of the relationship between experience, social power and 
resistance. ... Theory must be able to address women’s experience by 
showing where it comes from and how it relates to material social 
practices and the power relations which structure them.
In this present study the issue of experience is particularly important. It raises 
theoretical questions about the concept of women’s experiences, of power, 
resistance and agency. However, I do not treat experience as revelatory of 
some female or feminist essence. First, I try to uncover the constructed nature 
of experience. Although I have no male participants, I put a special focus on 
the construction of feminism and feminist subjectivity in relations, including 
heterosexual couple and work relations. Second, because of the type of 
discourse analysis which I attempt, readers may make connections with their 
own everyday experiences, the ways in which they are constructed in discourse 
and the different positions available within the discourses. Women’s 
experiences, I argue, need to be included in research and education, but as a
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starting point for developing less rigid gender hierarchies, not for showing the 
true nature of women. Research needs to take approaches which theorise 
experience and this theory needs to be drawn on in a politicised practice of 
education, including personal development courses. The use of the category or 
concept of women’s experience needs to be done in a context which does not 
treat the category as unproblematic, or neutral.
5.3.1 Descriptive research
Many earlier feminist approaches rightly saw that power was being exercised in 
the process of analysis and theorising about people who participated in 
research but who did not have a chance to participate in the analysis or, often, 
did not have a chance to even read the research publications. A common 
response to this was to democratise the relations of research and also to refrain 
from theorising and theory building and to view research as a means of giving 
voice to previously silenced views on the world (ibid). The method most 
commonly adopted in this response is one in which women are directly asked 
for accounts of their experience, referred to as descriptive interviewing. 
Hollway (1989: 40, 41) notes:
The method of descriptive interviewing represents a consistent 
application of the political principle that women’s experience can 
provide a direct route to women’s consciousness or identity. That 
principle provides the answer for feminist method: ask women directly 
for an account of their experience. It is also consistent with the 
humanist criticism of traditional psychology that people’s experience 
was neither sought nor valued. Again, the assumption is the idealist one 
that the knowledge is there, based on experience, and can be 
represented in an account.
Hollway (ibid:42) asserts that unless researchers have developed a theory of 
experience and subjectivity, old assumptions will govern research methods and 
interpretation. Weedon (1987: 85) also notes that ‘it is possible to transform 
the meaning of experience by bringing a different set of assumptions to bear on
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it’. The descriptive interviewing method typically presents extracts from 
interviews, which ‘speak for themselves’, to represent the speaker’s 
experience. Methodologically, the meaning of a person’s account is assumed to 
be a transparent reflection of experience (ibid: 95). The researcher does not 
question the validity of the account and her role is to organise the material so 
that it conforms to an essentially descriptive theory.
Once an account is given, it assumes the status of the expression of the 
person’s experience in relation to a particular topic. What is not 
considered is the status of the account in relation to the infinite number 
of things that were not said. From my perspective, what this approach 
achieves is a reasonably faithful reproduction of whatever assumptions 
people use to interpret their own experience in the research 
relationship. Put another way, it reproduces (and legitimates through 
science) whatever discourses research participants use to position 
themselves at the time. (Hollway, 1989: 40, original emphasis)
Descriptive research can tell us a lot about women’s lives but it cannot theorise 
about or explain women or men, or gender. It is typical of ‘new paradigm’ 
research which is based on humanistic principles (Hollway, 1989, 1991b). I 
take the view that truth and experience are produced in social relations and that 
experience is similarly produced. An emphasis on production guards against the 
assumption of pre-existing entitities, whether these are individual human 
nature, or social institutions like heterosexuality or the family. Descriptive 
research forgoes that possibility. In its unproblematic reliance on experience, it 
has retained a focus on the individual, rather than relations, power and 
difference. The theoretical lack inherent in this approach is undermining the 
potential of research to be emancipatory. The dualism and the models of the 
person inherent in work on ‘women’s needs’ and ‘women’s ways of knowing’ 
operate to leave gender without a social component. I do not believe that this 
kind of research can be effective when it comes to trying to change the gender 
status quo.
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5.4 How the information was analysed
In approaching analysis, I use a methodology which is loosely called 
‘interpretive discourse analysis’ (Gavey, 1989; Hollway, 1989; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987), or ‘interpretive analytics’ (Cherryholmes, 1988). This has 
been descrbed as moving on from the more static genealogical / archaelogical 
approach of Foucault (ibid: 195; Gavey, 1993). It is also deconstructive, in so 
far as it tries to take apart dualistic relationships commonly viewed as natural 
and normal, such as the relationship between feminism and femininity, and to 
show them to be social constructions. The ways that I go about the analysis can 
be discussed under three headings:
• Focusing on accounts rather than individuals
• Identifying and analysing discourses
• Subject positions and positioning within discourse.
5.4.1 Focusing on accounts
Feminists have long noted the problems with researchers trying to represent 
members of groups to which the researcher does not belong. And because 
groups are not homogeneous, there is also a difficulty in trying to do ‘insiders 
accounts’ of them (see, for example, Kitzinger, Bola, Campos, Carabine, 
Doherty, Frith, McNulty, Reilly and Winn, 1996). Although I am a feminist 
researching feminists, I cannot asssume that I can accurately ‘represent’ them, 
or that feminism will mean the same tiling to them and to me.
The problem is partly overcome by focusing in the analysis on accounts of 
identity and signification, not on individual feminists, nor on searching for a 
real, true feminist identity, but on the accounts of feminist ‘success’ and agency 
provided. ‘Feminist identity’ is intended to characterise the meanings ascribed 
by a woman to whatever social, emotional, sexual, political or personal
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configuration she intends when she describes herself as a feminist. A feminist 
identity is a woman’s subjective experience or intrasubjective account of her 
own feminism. The accounts are not assumed to give access to that subjective 
experience, but must rely on what the participants are able and willing to say 
about it (cfKitzinger, 1987: 90).
I treat the accounts as located in sociocultural and political contexts, as well as 
having features unique to each individual, but no less social for that. In 
common with Kitzinger (ibid), I try to avoid conceptualising them as derived 
solely from the psychology of individual women. As Kitzinger points out, for 
researchers for whom the individual is the primary unit of study, the account is 
treated as the exclusive property of the individuals who provide it. However, 
when the account is treated as the primary unit of study, even though 
account-gathering depends initially upon individual account-providers, the 
analysis cannot be reduced to these people’s individual psychologies. Because 
the account is not forever tied to the individual who provided it, the researcher 
can pursue her study of the account per se, while still acknowledging features 
unique to each individual. In this I take a more dynamic approach to the 
analysis of accounts than Kitzinger’s social constructionist perspective. The 
researcher can look for evidence of the discourses with which the accounts are 
associated, drawing attention to the political and personal features of feminist 
accounts of identity.
The critique of naturalism mounted by feminist poststructuralists emphasises 
the importance of significations and recognises that they are always multiple. 
Accounts never exhaust significations. ‘By starting with significations, it is 
necessary to recognise that the choice of certain combinations prohibits that of 
others and this choice is never arbitrary. Thus, one looks not just for presences 
in a text, but also for absences’ (Hollway, 1982: 188; cfHenriques et al, 1984). 
An analysis in terms of the pre-existence of discourses into which people are 
inserted means that assumptions are made in accounts, meanings are taken for 
granted. The analysis of significations therefore must contain interpretation.
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Similarly, in accepting the existence of an unconscious in my theoretical 
framework, I will look for it in the texts of accounts. Thus, Poster describes 
Lacan’s method as follows:
The analyst was to make a ‘symptomatic reading’ of the words or text 
of a patient, looking for absences, words not there, and analysing them 
as repressed metaphors ( Poster, 1978: 88, cited in Hollway, 1982: 
188).
From Freudian and Kleinian analysis of the unconscious I also use the notion of 
defense mechanisms which protect a person against the intrusion of repressed 
material. These mechanisms are relational. That is, they operate not simply by 
pushing down in the individual^ but, for example, by projection. This 
perspective also emphasises the importance of relations rather than individuals 
(Hollway, 1982: 189). Nevertheless, even though psychoanalysis has given us 
valuable insights, my project is not to interpret people’s unconscious. I am 
trying to describe feminist subjectivity at the level of consciousness, because 
the world of culture and politics is a consciously experienced world (Cocks, 
1989: 14). However, this is not the same as reifying experience. It is more like 
Cain’s (1993) reference to deep analysis but on a more social scale. A similar 
aim is found in the memory work techniques developed by Haug (1987), 
Schratz and Walker (1995) and Stephenson, Kippax and Crawford (1996).
I see texts and conversations as essentially the same kind of product, that is, as 
accounts o f ‘identities’ in specific situations, as does Hollway (1982: 252). On 
this basis, statements of opinion, shaped as they are in language, cannot be 
regarded as a ‘pure’ reflection of an underlying belief or reality, but must be 
considered as aspects of rhetoric which cannot be fully understood apart from 
the context and the social relations in which they are articulated (cf Condor, 
1986; Lees, 1986). Social relations are inserted in discourses through which 
they have access to significations. The relations of the research activity itself 
are also social relations which are Subject to the same principles of insertion in 
discourse or discourses. Following Hollway (1982, 1989), I choose 
signification as an entry point for analysing participants’ accounts, because it
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does not privilege either side of the individual / society dualism.
5.4.2 Identifying and analysing discourses
In the feminist poststructuralist approach, discourse is responsible for reality 
and not simply a reflection of the real. Much of my analysis centres on the 
concept of discourse. In this section 1 try to make clear how I decided what a 
discourse was. Foucault makes the following methodological points about 
discourse:
1. Seek in the discourse not its laws of construction, as do the 
structural methods, but its conditions of existence.
2. Refer the discourse not to the thought, to the mind or to the subject 
which might have given rise to it, but to the practical field in which it is 
deployed. (Foucault, 1973b, cited in Cherryholmes, 1988: 161)
The readings that someone has of herself or of another person are a product of 
that person’s history of significations and their present position in discourses. 
This product (or point of meeting between discourses and signification) is 
specified in a particular relation, to which I get access in the text or transcript 
(cf Hollway, 1982). Deconstruction is a methodological technique to do this. It 
is different from searching out the ‘weaknesses’ in an argument. ‘Instead, the 
focus is on how we might be suspicious of the text itself, its own conditions of 
construction’ (Lather, 1991: 5)
I use large chunks of material, because I want to emphasise relations and the 
production of meaning in accounts. Relations are best illuminated by the way a 
group or a person explore a particular theme. It would thus be inappropriate to 
‘chop up’ the material, in a manner which would be more characteristic of 
naturalism (cf West, 1996: 31). During the process of data gathering and 
analysis, I used a codified system based on mindmaps organised around ‘basic 
organising ideas’ (Buzan, 1995). I equated the basic organising ideas with 
grounded theory’s concept of phenomena (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
181
However, I do not use them for writing up the analysis, as I think that any 
codified system would be incapable of demonstrating the complexity of the 
systems of meaning-making which produce the accounts (cf Hollway, 1982).
Analysing a large piece of material, a text or transcript, and keeping the 
analysis specific to that text, but nevertheless consistent with a theoretical 
framework, is a method used with literary texts. Following Hollway’s (1982 / 
1989) method, under a piece of text, I write my comments; for example, I raise 
questions and contradictions posed by an account. I use the concept of 
discourse to do this, specifiying the discourses within which an account is 
produced. I try to show how the account cannot be understood without a 
theory of multiple significations (cf ibid).
The comments are followed by a commentary which locates them in relation to 
a broader theoretical analysis and makes more complex links. I follow this 
method with all extracts long enough or dense enough to make several points. 
If an extract illustrates a simple point, it is contained in the text without a 
commentary (cf ibid). The data is analysed over three chapters (Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight) and it is only by the end of these chapters that an overview of 
feminist subjectivities emerges.
The comments indicate the following kinds of phenomena (cf Hollway, 1982: 
290ff):
• implications
• stresses
• equations
• discourses
• discursive shifts
182
effects of discourse on practice
• use of different discourses to read other people’s actions
• contradictions
• recognition that practices (eg, heterosexual sex) can be about other things 
(for example, about the operation of power)
• motivations
• implications of operation at an unconscious level
• indicators of multiple significations
• indicators of different positionings
• splits between different situations in being able to act as subject of feminist 
or other discourses
• recognitions (conscious or unconscious) of power in everyday relations
• projections
• awarenesses
• experiences of agency or lack of it
• knowledge assumed, acquired or produced.
5.4.3 Subject positions and positioning within discourses
I make use of the concept of positioning within discourse as an analytic tool 
(Davies, 1990a; Davies and Harre, 1990, Hollway, 1984 a and b, 1989, 1994; 
Mama, 1995; Walkerdine, 1989a). I outline it briefly here and its details
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become evident as the analysis proceeds.
The poststructuralist research paradigm recognises the constitutive force of 
discourse and discursive practices and, at the same time, recognises that people 
are capable of exercising choice in relation to those practices (Davies and 
Harre, 1990). The constitutive force of discursive practices lies in their 
provision of subject positions. A subject position incorporates both a 
conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights 
for those that use that repertoire. Once having taken up a particular position as 
one’s own, a person sees the world from the vantage point of that position and 
uses the images, metaphors and concepts which are made relevant within the 
particular discursive practice in which they are positioned. At least a possibility 
of notional choice is involved, since there are many and contradictory 
discursive practices that each person could engage in (ibid: 46).
Positioning is the discursive process whereby subjects are located in 
conversations and other discursive practices, as recognisable participants in a 
narrative or repertoire. Whenever we speak, we are positioning and being 
positioned, and we move from one discursive practice to another, one audience 
to another, one conceptual repertoire to another. As a feminist, if I invoke 
feminist discourse of some kind, I may, depending on who the hearers are, be 
positioned as one who should be listened to, or one who is marginal (Davies, 
1990a). There can be interactive positioning in which one person positions 
another, and there can be reflexive positioning, where one positions oneself. 
Positioning is not necessarily intentional, although it can be. Different positions 
in discourse are available to people on the basis of categories of social 
discourse, which are historically generated out of collective experience (Mama, 
1995: 82). People’s accounts reproduce whatever discourses they are using to 
position themselves or others at a particular time. A central idea in all of this is 
the differential power associated with different positions (Hollway, 1989).
The concept of positioning allows me as researcher to examine the tensions 
produced between different subject positions taken up by or imposed upon a
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participant and evident in her account. I want to theorise how people’s 
subjectivity is reproduced by positioning in discourses through relations and 
how this subjectivity can change the positioning. This leads me into a focus on 
relations and therefore to the use of psychodynamic concepts as a methodology 
of interpretation. The approach is thus self-consciously disruptive of the 
coherence produced by speaking in the first person (see Stephenson et al, 
1996: 189). As Stephenson et al (ibid) point out, it thus differs from the kind of 
analysis undertaken by Gilligan (1982, 1986), which stresses the importance of 
isolating distinct voices by trying to look for coherent first-person voice 
statements. Although I do not use the memory-work technique based on the 
work of Haug (1987), for gathering data, which is the technique used by 
Stephenson and her colleagues, the concept of positioning provides me with a 
means to discuss the process of subjectivity as it is constructed in relations. I 
take the view that the number of possible accounts which a person can produce 
is potentially limitless (cf Hollway, 1989: 41) and that, although research 
participants often try to produce a coherent account, more can be learned by 
way of explanation, if the interviewer and the interview process encourage the 
expression of contradictions and multiplicity which people experience as a 
result of differential positionings within different discourses.
Many of the women in this study acknowledge their multiplicity. ‘The more 
multiple the acknowledged parts of a person are, the more capable they will be 
of identifying with many different positions’ (Hollway, 1989: 129).
Acknowledging one’s multiplicity, that is, that one is not always rational and is 
often contradictory, is more likely to be something that women do, ‘because of 
what woman means in a relation of otherness to human kind ... White middle 
class men are the ones who, historically, have produced the systems of social 
difference which have created various Others’... (ibid: 129, 130). Mama (1995) 
demonstrates that black people living in Britain and in the United States are 
also likely to acknowledge multiplicity, because of the positions of otherness 
which they often occupy. I argue that feminist women are also likely to be 
positioned as Other and that many of us develop the capacity to comfortably
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occupy many different social positions which we consider feminist. For a 
researcher to recognise this, it helps to be multiply positioned oneself, as I 
claim to be.
If the number of accounts that a person can produce is potentially limitless, 
then the number of explanations and analyses that the researcher can generate 
from a single account is also potentially limitless (Hollway, 1989: 129). 
Although feminist discourses in general have emphasised contradiction as a 
common experience for both feminist and non feminist women, nevertheless, a 
principle of unitariness still underpins the way that Gilligan and those 
influenced by her work approach analysis of women’s accounts. Gilligan (in 
Kitzinger and Gilligan, 1994: 415, cited in Stephenson et al, 1996: 189) 
stresses the importance of isolating distinct voices by ‘pull[ing] those 
first-person voice statements out of women’s interview texts, and really 
try[ing] to listen for how a woman speaks for herself.
5.5 Interpretation of data and creation of shared knowledge
An intention of the research methodology of this study was to create dialogue 
and a shared reflexivity between me and all of the participants (cf Schratz and 
Walker, 1995: 105; West, 1996: 212). It was intended to encourage 
interpretation and exploration by the participants, as well as by me. However, I 
think that in the final resort, the conclusions are more mine than they are shared 
with the participants, with the exceptions of the accounts analysed in Chapter 
Eight. I was the one who spent hours pouring over the data and trying to 
connect themes. I would like to think that this was a truly participative research 
process but as it is, many research projects cannot be said to be truly 
participative (Mama, 1995: 79, 80) and in the long run, I reserve the right to 
make interpretations, although I offered the participants the power of veto and 
the opportunity to comment on my analyses of their accounts.
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5.6 Conclusion
Poststructuralist views of language have implications for methodology because 
they imply that, since meaning is achieved through relations between units of 
meaning and since relations are never static or fixed, meaning is never achieved 
within the boundaries of a word, sentence, or even an extract. Rather it is 
established in an infinite network of relations (Hollway, 1989: 39). This has 
methodological implications, because in this infinite network, content and 
context cannot be distinguished, there is no distinction between text and the 
rest. In particular, a feminist poststructuralist approach emphasises the 
production of gender difference, rather than the investigation of gender 
differences per se (cf Hollway, 1991b). It is here that I see, in common with 
Hollway (1989), the greatest promise or potential of feminist research: that it 
can theorise about how women and men are produced in social relations and 
that out of this it can generate theory about how new ways of being female or 
male can also be produced. As such it is dynamic rather than static, explanatory 
and exploratory rather than descriptive, relational rather than comparative, 
emancipatory rather than normative (ibid: 32).
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CHAPTER SIX
THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF FEMINIST SUBJECTIVITY
6.0 Introduction
In the first part o f the thesis, I have conducted a review from the literature of 
how interplays of knowledge, power and practice have affected the 
construction of the human subject in feminist theory and in pedagogy. In that 
part, the concept of discourse emerged as a method of producing truth and 
knowledge and as a method of filtering experience, as well as a tool for 
critiquing what social and pedagogical theory has to say about women. From 
this point on in the thesis, I continue to use the concept of discourse (including 
poststructuralist insights on language and meaning), but as a tool to analyse 
subjectivity itself and as a way of developing an understanding of feminist 
subjectivity as dynamic and multiple, and as collectively and relationally 
produced. In doing this, I am influenced by and draw on recent feminist 
poststructuralist work on subjectivity and discourse, especially as developed by 
Hollway (1982, 1984a, b, 1989, 1994) and Mama (1995).
In this chapter, I illustrate how three major discourses of feminism manifest 
themselves in the research participants’ accounts. A fourth discourse of ‘real 
feminism’ is also evident, which I interpret as anti-feminist. Central to my use 
of the term discourse is the understanding that there are different meanings 
about feminism held by the research participants and that people are positioned 
in relation to these meanings (cf Hollway, 1989: 38; Mama, 1995: 100 - 109); 
The signifier feminist achieves its meaning for feminist women in this discursive 
context (Hollway, 1989: 66).
This approach requires that I specify the ways that people make sense of 
feminism and the effects their interpretation of feminism has on their thoughts 
and actions. I begin to look at the ways in which the different discourses are
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taken up, how they overlap in feminist women’s accounts, how people are 
positioned within discourses and how they position themselves within 
discourses. In the following chapters of this work (Chapters Seven and Eight), 
I examine in more detail how discourses are modified and new discourses are 
created, in the construction of individual subjects (cf Mama, 1995: Chapter 
Six). In all my discussion of discourses, I keep in mind their conditions of 
existence and their practical fields of deployment.
6.1 Discourses analysed as the content of subjectivity
Within the framework of analysis for this chapter, discourses carry the content 
of subjectivity. Mama (1995: 98) points out that subjectivity can be approached 
only through the particular histories and cultures of those people being studied. 
There is no universal subject but only particular subjectivities and subject 
positions that are located in discourses — and thus in the social sphere of 
history and culture. Subjectivity is a process of constitution and movement 
through already constituted positions (ibid).
Discourses here are defined as historically constructed regimes of knowledge. 
These include the common-sense assumptions and taken-for-granted ideas, 
belief systems and myths that groups of people share and through which they 
understand each other. Discourses articulate and convey formal and informal 
knowledge and ideologies. They are constantly being reproduced and 
constituted, and can change and evolve in the process of communication. A 
discourse is a shared grid of knowledge that one or more people can ‘enter’ 
and through which explicit and implicit meanings are shared (ibid).
Discourses produce certain assumptions (about, for example, sex, see Hollway, 
1982: 283) and they provide subject positions from which people speak. 
Following Hollway (1984a: 230), I shift the emphasis from Foucault’s 
explicitly historical use of the concept and its part in the evolution of social 
institutions and the production of regimes of truth (for example, Foucault,
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1979), towards an approach which is located around the meaning derived from 
language (written or spoken). Discourses, as used in this chapter, then, position 
individuals in relation to one another socially, politically and culturally, as 
similar to or different from; as ‘one of us’ or as ‘Other’ (Mama, 1995: 98). In 
this way, different positions and powers are made available to people. This 
approach also involves identifying discursive practices.
6.2 Identifying discourses of feminism
Four main themes emerged from the participants’ data, to qualify as discourses 
in the way I have defined the concept for this chapter and for this section in 
particular, which looks at the content of subjectivity. They are:
Discourse One: feminism as an expression of a naturally occurring femininity 
which is oppressed under patriarchy
Discourse Two: feminism as a rejection of women’s and men’s socialisation 
into different roles
Discourse Three: feminism as a move away from male / female dualism 
Discourse Four: a ‘real feminist’ discourse
The first three discourses reflect Kristeva’s three stages of feminism (see 
Chapter Two, Section 3.5), although they are not identical to them. Discourses 
One and Two especially have long histories in feminist theory and practice and 
have entered popular collective awareness as the face of feminism, although not 
without modification. Discourse Three is more recent and more complex and 
fewer people take up positions in it. These discourses do not refer to actual 
entities. They are heuristic devices, that is, they are devices which help to 
organise the accounts of participants. ‘Discourse is a theoretical concept whose 
validity consists in its explanatory power, rather than in evidence of its material
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existence. It is therefore according to the same criteria that the validity of my 
delineation of a specific discourse must be evaluated’ (Hollway, 1982: 288).
6.3 Discourse One: feminism as an expression of a naturally occurring 
femininity which is oppressed under patriarchy.
I refer to this discourse from here on as as Discourse One, or the oppressed 
feminine discourse. At times, it is expressed in accounts as the repression of a 
universal and essential feminine and at other times as the repression of a female 
culture, not necessarily based on a pre-existing femininity, but on a way of 
being derived from women’s positions as primary care-givers in social 
relations.
The central proposition of this discourse is that there is either an essential 
feminine identity, or a female culture, or both, which have been not been valued 
under patriarchy. The desire of feminism under this discourse is to see this 
essential nature, or this culture, reinstated as at least equal to, if not superior 
to, the masculine. The masculine is also seen in this discourse in terms of 
essential nature and / or culture.
The discourse relies on binary thinking, as one participant put it, on ‘either / 
or’. It tends to vest all that is good in the female, all that is bad in the male. In 
general, in this discourse, men are not highly valued unless they acknowledge 
their own ‘femininity’, or adopt ways of doing things which draw on female 
culture.
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6.3.1 Female culture
P4. I have much stronger views now on feminism and women’s issues than 
I did twenty years ago. I also think that living with men, which I did for 
fifteen years, was terribly anti —1 stuff — I don’t think that men 
understand these issues, especially men who are radical, socialist, have 
a liberal agenda. Whatever about the others.
Can you dismiss them?
Well, you can, I suppose. I just feel that even people like that just don’t 
have a sense of what it is like for women to make it in the world. Mind 
you, 1 think that women have a different way of operating. You know, 
the argument can be levelled at you, ‘Well, why don’t you — join in?’. 
But I actually have problems with that, because I think that they join in, 
or people like me do, but in a different kind of way — different ways of 
communicating things, we have different ways of operating [1], which 
often don’t fit very well with — you know, hierarchical, very male 
structures and political parties [2], I think that’s a problem.
I  sometimes fee l that there are two spheres that never meet. There are 
these non-hierarchical attempts at being egalitarian and then there 
are male-centred, hierarchical, party-political structures [3], even 
though there are women involved in that too. And I  often feel they 
don’t meet at all. How would you see that?
It’s true. Well, I would say there are two different classes. But I think 
it’s difficult. On the one hand, you could say, well, the only way to 
change things is to get in there and re-organise the structure. But I 
don’t actually agree with that argument any more. I think that what you 
need to develop is a completely different sort of structure. I think it’s 
the same argument that people use about women priests. They say, oh, 
the church will change if there are women priests [4], But it won’t. 
What will happen is you get a lot of women buying into a very 
male-oriented structure which doesn’t allow them any equality in a real 
sense and where they will probably get treated just as second-hand as 
people get treated in other spheres. But it won’t change the thinking. 
Whereas if they allowed priests to marry, that might change their 
thinking, because they would have to think about a few other things,
1 In this account and all the accounts which follow in the thesis, I use the following devices:
-  indicates hesitation in speech 
italic text indicates my speech
... indicates that a section of text has been left out of a particular account by me 
[ ] is used for explanatory notes or to avoid using names as part of an account
[ ] also contains numbers which refer to tire comments I make after each account (see Chapter 5, Section 
4.1).
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apart from themselves [5],
And it’s almost like that with political structures as well. For example, 
our own experience in working with women’s groups, you very quickly 
realise that women operate in a different way. They’ll operate in a way 
where they network, they’re concerned with what other people’s needs 
are, and they operate I think in a more caring way. And I think that’s a 
huge disadvantage when you come to joining in the rest of the world 
[6], — things like organisation of structures that are very much the old 
male-oriented county council, VEC [Vocational Education Committee] 
structures. Where they put up their hands to speak and stuff like this. 
And when women come on, I think actually there’s an argument for 
learning to operate like that, because I don’t think you can survive 
without it. But on the other hand, there is an argument for the structure 
changing to accommodate that. But women need a lot of time and they 
need a lot of support to do that, because they are not used to operating 
like that, especially women who are not involved in work outside the 
home [7], And even women who are involved in work outside the 
home, for example, if you are operating at quite a different level. In 
which case, you will be isolated, you know.
But in a way, this is very funny, because we are all women members of 
staff, which is sort of weird. But that didn’t happen deliberately. It 
happened because women work for money in an organisation like this 
that is sort of pathetic. But the advantage of that is that you have a very 
different sort of team operation or managerial operation than you 
would if you had a mixed population, I think [8], I don’t know, I mean, 
I haven’t had really time to sit down and look at it in much detail [9],
— Statistically, that’s not happening much outside. But yes, it’s a sort 
of organic growth and then, actually, if that happens and if it’s managed 
carefully [10], then people can develop skills that they wouldn’t 
develop in other kinds of hierarchical structures. For example, here 
somebody starting off as a clerical assistant would now be working in 
some kind of other area, where they can — develop more skills, you just 
have to allow that to happen. And I think that in a lot of work 
structures, that doesn’t happen. If you look for example at the Civil 
Service, you find a lot of good women stuck at HEO [Higher Executive 
Officer] level. You're not out around town with the boys, so it’s not 
possible to make all those promotional moves [11].
193
Comments
1. Statement that women have ways of doing things: part of Discourse One’s 
central proposition.
2. Distinguishes women’s ways from male ways of doing things and 
characterises these male ways as hierarchical: Establishment of dualism.
3. I am drawn into the discourse. I know how to operate in it, even though I 
don’t completely accept its central proposition, as readers know already. Yet, I 
am not ‘faking’, because I can read feminism through this discourse and I can 
act in this discourse when I need to do so, in order to make contact with 
another woman about issues of feminism. I also imply by my remark that power 
continues to reside in the ‘male’ space, that a power imbalance will continue to 
be constituted through any discourse which holds intact a male-female dualism.
4. P4 explicitly distinguishes the discourse in which she is operating from a 
liberal feminist, access discourse.
5. 6. Recognition that the existence and separate nature of a women’s culture 
won’t change gender relations. The main discourse of essential differences 
begins to break down here, or at least to reach its explanatory limits. Thus the 
account is produced not just within the essentialist discourse, but also 
recognises that gender is relational, which contradicts the main discourse 
through which the account is constructed.
7. Recognition that women’s way of operation is cultural and based on the 
prevailing conditions of their existence. This is a recognition of the 
constructedness of experience.
8. A reassertion of the existence of a separate female culture
9. Acceptance of a female culture is a ‘gut’ reaction. A recognition that looking 
at it in detail would reveal more of the contradictions and explanatory limits
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referred to in comments 5 and 6. Even while drawing on a particular discourse, 
the account recognises that the discourse might not be capable of explaining 
things completely.
10. It is a culture that can be fostered and encouraged. This is a further 
recognition of its constructed nature.
11. A male culture prohibits women’s development. Acceptance of the 
existence of separate cultures of male and female. This interpretation of her 
experience reinforces P4’s belief in the discourse’s central proposition, that 
women operate in a different, specifically female, culture.
Commentary
Discourse One can exist in conditions where women are downgraded, or in 
contexts where women are considered equal but different, as in Jungian 
psychology or religion (cf Connell, 1995). On coming into contact with this 
discourse, which was very often their first contact with feminism, many 
participants experienced it as both liberating and enabling. They spoke of 
‘women’s power’, ‘getting in touch with my femininity’, ‘feeling a female 
energy’. It enabled them to reject the negative and inferior definitions of 
women afforded to them by sexist and anti-women discourses. Culture needs 
major symbols, so if we talk about a women’s culture, it is most likely that an 
essential femininity will become one of the major symbols, because it meshes so 
easily with patriarchal culture that people can understand it readily.
This discourse (which is admittedly varied in its manifestations) seems to me to 
be the dominant discourse for thinking about women in most women’s groups, 
including community women’s groups. L. Connolly’s (1996) research suggests 
that it is in the community groups that feminism is experiencing a revival in 
Ireland. I tentatively suggest that in this feminist revival, the themes of a
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specific female culture and / or an essential femininity are the main feminist 
tools. Because of its tendency towards separatism it doesn’t reach its 
explanatory limits as often as Discourse Two does (see Section 4.1).
It is a discourse taken up at both collective and personal levels. At the 
collective level, it provides an explanatory framework for women’s networks, 
women’s art and women’s cultural expressions. At a personal level, it provides 
a regime of truth which offers women a way of seeing themselves as superior 
to men. It tends to invert hierarchies, rather than subvert them. Yet it is a 
necessary discourse, given the division of the world into female and male, 
under patriarchy, with a devaluation of traditionally female ways of doing 
things.
In comment number 9 above, I interpret P4’s acceptance of female culture as a 
gut reaction, taken as indicative of some essential truth precisely because it is a 
gut reaction. I nevertheless contend that such reactions, while important and 
revealing, are not revelatory of essential knowledge, but of constructed 
knowledge and that in this case, they reflect dominant discourses of essential 
femininity.
6.4 Discourse Two: feminism as a rejection of women’s and men’s 
socialisation into roles
The central proposition of Discourse Two is that gender is purely social. It 
relies on the concept of the conditioning or socialisation of a neutral person 
into differentiated sex roles. Justice and equality are ideals which can be 
achieved through rational action and legislation, although the complexity of this 
is not underestimated. It reflects the liberal feminist idea that access to areas 
previously denied them is important for women, in ‘desocialising’ or ‘de-roling’ 
them, and that the same applies to getting access for boys and men to roles 
traditionally associated with women.
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Many of the women in the study found this discourse reflected in the attitudes 
of their mothers, who encouraged them to gain good education, good 
employment, financial independence. Some people found it in their schools, 
although schools were also recognised as prime sites for socialisation into 
roles. Those who have daughters of their own are passing it on to them.
6.4.1 Socialisation
P2. I think that my interest in the whole role definition [1] and because of 
my consciousness of it given my subject area [home economics], in 
some ways, that strengthened — I became more aware of the anomalies 
that existed, whereas maybe if I had stuck with hotel management [her 
original choice of career training], I would probably have become 
aware of it in terms of hotel work, maids, housekeepers and so on. But 
I mightn’t have been challenged as much — I wouldn’t have come 
across all the inequalities in the school system, for example [2], That 
wouldn’t have met me like a slap in the face, in terms of the attitude to 
certain subjects and I might have been more like the women who say 
‘well, if you really want to do it, you should do it’ [3], I might actually 
have gone that way, because there are a lot of women who have made 
it in management And they think, ‘I ’ve done it, why can’t everybody 
else do it?’ and it’s more for them that we don’t have the neck or we 
don’t have the academic ability or whatever [4], rather than looking at 
the things that have happened throughout our life or what are the things 
that have been dished out to us to make us take different paths or that 
have forced us in some way into different positions [5], And if I had 
done the hotel management, I wouldn’t have gone to do social studies 
probably [6], probably wouldn’t have got into union activities as much, 
because in the hotel business at management level, you would have a 
different approach to all those things, so in one respect, my career 
choice was probably a very good one for me, in terms of 
complementing what I had already thought of about equality and in 
keeping the impetus there for change. But with other people I can 
understand that the contradictions are too much and they don’t become 
active [7],
I think there are probably different social levels regarding what your 
interests are [8], I would recognise that we as teachers at one level are 
paid equally and so on, a lot of teachers wouldn’t see the inequalities in 
promotions etc because a lot of women don’t go for promotion. They 
would more say that women don’t want it, where I say that women are
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conditioned into things [9]. They say that women are more suited to the 
classroom or it doesn’t suit them now because they have young kids. It 
could suit their husband, but he might have young kids as well [10]. 
They wouldn’t be as aware of all the inequities that exist in the wider 
society in terms of women’s roles, because they wouldn’t be touched 
by it [11], I have always had a wider interest in the role of women, 
beyond my own career. I think that a lot of women I have met who are 
into equality for themselves are not so much interested in equality for 
everybody — they want equality for women, but once they see it in then- 
own set context, they don’t think about it beyond — in all layers of 
society [12],
Even in terms of class, they wouldn’t see that some upper class women 
are very traditional in terms of their relationship with men. Or in terms 
of working class women who might be suffering violence, they would 
say, ‘Well, why don’t they just leave?’ But they don’t take time to think 
about all the other issues that are stopping them from getting out — 
like their own conditioning in their families [13], or that women aren’t 
as important in the economy [14], So a lot of the stuff I would be 
conscious of wouldn’t have come from picking up books on feminism 
[15], or socialism even [16], it would more come from trying to analyse 
what was happening around me [17] and listening to discussions and so 
on. And probably I will do some more reading on research done. But I 
have actually been pleased over the last while when I have actually 
done some reading to see that a lot of the research matches what I 
would have thought anyway [18] and that it is a matter of putting the 
academic language on it.
Comments
1. Statement of central proposition of the discourse: socialisation into roles.
2. Schooling as a site of socialisation and a place where role differentiation can 
be clearly seen.
3. 4. Rejection of individualism and meritocracy as explanation of inequalities
5. Almost a structural interpretation of the socialisation model is developed in 
the account, in contrast to a meritocratic model.
6. Recognition that a social studies course has shaped her thinking. (Social
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studies theory, or any body of theory, represents certain discourses.)
7. Recognises the effects of power and gender structures in everyday life, in 
constraining or enabling actions.
8. Recognition that things signify differently for different people.
9. Again, rejects individualistic interpretation and asserts socialisation 
discourse.
10. Uses role differentiation to explain or interpret different attitudes and 
behaviours in men and women.
11. 12. Reads other women as positioned in a discourse of individualism, which 
precludes them caring about equality as a social or collective aspiration.
13. Recognition of the family as another site of socialisation.
14. 16. Recognition of the limits of a socialisation theory (economics is also 
important).
15. Associates feminist awareness with knowledge of socialisation and role 
theory.
17. Recognition of the effects of everyday life on the development of a 
discursive position and on politics.
18. Belief in the central proposition of the socialisation discourse is confirmed. 
Commentary
Drawing on Discourse Two is not simple for P2 in this account. Its explanatory 
limitations are frequently exposed. She expresses awareness of this when she 
refers to ‘all the other issues’. She sees the limitations of the discourse in
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schools where equal opportunities initiatives are in place, but where ‘de-roling’ 
people has not worked. The discourse fails to problematise the investments that 
people make in taking up gendered positions, and fails to examine the content 
of those positions. It therefore is constantly coming up against challenges to its 
central proposition that roles can be changed.
The comments which I make on the extract above are testimony to the 
awareness of P2 of the complexities of gender identities. Yet her explanatoiy 
framework leads her to constantly refer to feminism as awareness of and 
challenge to roles and conditioning. The account recognises how things signify 
differently for different people [8] and how women can be positioned against 
their will in powerful gender structures [7, 11, 12], Yet the discourse’s regime 
of truth brings her back all the time to socialisation as her explanatory 
framework. This discourse has not the explanatory power of Discourse One, 
which draws on patriarchal and deeply ingrained notions of what men and 
women are really like, to assert the value of women, as women. Neither does it 
have the radical and productive uncertainty which is evident in Discourse Three 
(see Section 5). Yet this is the discourse most frequently encountered in 
schooling, along with the related theme of access to non-traditional roles for 
girls and boys, women and men (Ryan, 1997).
As a content of subjectivity, it is not as satisfactory for a feminist as Discourse 
One. Yet many women in the study who accepted Discourse Two saw 
Discourse One as regressive, in its acceptance of a special women’s way of 
being. Some people had drawn on Discourse Two earlier in their feminist lives 
and had been radicalised into Discourse Three, which I discuss below. This is 
reminiscent of Eisenstein’s (1981, 1984) claim that the limitations of liberal 
feminism will eventually radicalise liberal feminists.
Many women of my acquaintance have given up on the socialisation discourse 
as a basis for feminism, although retaining a basic assumption of the discourse 
that the human subject is androgynous. Most frequently, they have taken a path 
of immersion in humanistic or human relations psychology. They assume the
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existence of a core self, untainted by gender or sex roles, as does the 
socialisation discourse. But they have given up the feminist component and 
became depoliticised. When I talked to one such woman at a social gathering 
about the subject of my thesis, she said words to the effect that: ‘I know that a 
lot of those people in [an adult education organisation] consider themselves 
feminists. I used to be like that, but I ’ve gone beyond all that now’.
Since this is a study of feminist subjectivity and politicisation, I didn’t interview 
any of these women in a formal way for the study, but they formed a topic of 
conversation between me and many of the research participants, as we 
pondered what it was that made us hold onto a feminist identity. One 
conclusion which I have reached in relation to this, and to which I return in 
Chapter Eight (Section 4), is that, within liberal humanism, politicisation 
represents immaturity, or a phase that has to be ‘gone through’ before maturity 
(cfKitzinger, 1987).
6.5 Discourse Three: feminism as a move away from dualism
The central proposition of this discourse is that feminism moves us towards a 
possibility of wholeness, where woman is not constituted in terms of the male / 
female dualism. Such a move involves confronting one’s own identity as it 
relates to ‘masculinity’ or ‘femininity’. Maleness and femaleness are revealed as 
multiple and fragmented and any sense of opposition or hierarchy, or essential 
difference is removed. However, it is not a move towards sameness, but 
towards multiple ways of being (Kristeva, 1986, Davies, 1990b). Its effects are 
complex and include an awareness of the other two discourses and 
acknowledgement of their strategic value and necessity in different contexts. It 
relies on an awareness of oneself and one’s desires and investments (insofar as 
these can be made present to oneself or others). In some ways, though, this is 
not a discourse in the sense that Foucault described discourse as appealing to 
‘truth’ for authority and legitimation. It is a more critical discourse, in the sense
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that critical means scrutinising what is taken for ganted in the account, more so 
than the other two discourses do.
6.5.1 Rejecting dualism
P5. And it's only now I'm working out the personal side of it. And that can 
be very confusing then, because there were times when I would ask 
myself, 'am I still a feminist?’[1] I'm beginning to see things very 
differently [laughter].
You're talking about the story o f my life, nearly — it sounds so familiar 
[more laughter].
Yes. Yes, and now coming to the place that: 'yes, I am feminist'. And I 
don't feel as black and white or as straightforwardly as I used to, you 
know [2].
Yeah, I  used to have this thing that there was a proper, a real feminist 
way to be. And i f  you're not that way, you can't call yourself that. And  
like you say, I  used the political to work out the personal side o f  
things. I  intellectualised and analysed and rationalised all the time, 
without realising that things were going at a very personal level too. 
Things that needed a deeper look, in a therapeutic situation — even 
though I  was aware that the personal is political.
Yes, that's it.
And I  began to realise at one stage, just how personal the political 
goes — just how deeply inside us, or inside me at any rate, the social 
is.
Yes, 1 think a lot of women of our generation — feminist women [3] — 
are beginning to come to that realisation now, to see things like that, in 
that way. And also things like Greenham Common, you know, where 
boys over a certain age wouldn't be allowed [4], That kind of separatist 
stuff. And seeing now that that was growing out of pain. But also 
seeing now that that wouldn't be an answer either. You know, that that 
would be just another violent and painful answer to what we have now
[5], What we have now is a very violent painful kind of society, the 
way — what's done to women and what's done to men. But that that 
wouldn't be an answer either. You know, there's healing for women and 
there's healing for men and there's some way for women and men to 
work together. I really disagree with that, as if just by going off on your 
own you can solve it. And even the therapeutic group I'm in is a mixed
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group and a few years ago, I would have said, 'No, I don't want to be in 
a group with men'. And I don't see things like that at all now. I believe 
that I can't look at my issues without men, and they can't without 
women either [6], You know — so that would have really changed for 
me [7], And I suppose it's about a more holistic look at society and 
looking at the whole thing of — that male is bad [8], And I don't accept 
that at all, now, I really don't. And I think we put out all our own 
badness, all the things we didn't like onto men [9],
Projected it —
Yes. And I just wouldn't, I just couldn't go along with that at all now. I 
think it does me an injustice as well. That by virtue of being a woman, 
I'm a saint. And I think that that's what was done to women anyway, 
you know, the virgin or the whore [10], And I think in some ways, 
feminism did that again [11], You know, the Greenham Common stuff 
and all that, that women have no violence in them. And that's not true, 
we have violence in us as well [12], But how we deal with it is the 
thing. I think we often do it against ourselves, rather than out there. 
But that's no better.
Yes, and it doesn't move us on.
Yeah, it isn’t progressive or growthful, or [long silence].
Comments
1. Effects of the ‘real feminist’ discourse lingers in her present life.
2. Acknowledgement of multiplicity.
3. Reflects Kristeva’s notion of the ‘generations’ of feminism, especially of 
having arrived at a third generation, having gone through the other two stages.
4. Recognises the effects of an essentialist and separatist discourse on practice.
5. Awareness of essentialism, its rejection as inadequate, but also 
acknowledging its origins and necessity in certain situations.
203
6. The ‘issues’ of gender difference are read here as relational.
7. Effects of discourse on practice.
8. Recognises the harm essentialism does to men also.
9. Projection of what is repressed in the ‘feminine’ onto the male is seen as an 
effect of essentialist discourses, in this instance.
10. Recognition of dualism in patriarchy.
11. Recognition that essentialist feminist discourses reproduce definitions of 
women which are the same as those produced under patriarchy.
12. Confronting personal identity as it is constructed for her / us in essentialist 
discourses.
6.6 Commentary on the three discourses and the regimes of truth they 
provide about gender difference
Feminism signifies differently in all three discourses. In Discourse One, which 
relies on a notion of essential femininity or female culture, difference is 
understood as mutually exclusive opposites. Wholeness, where it is pursued as 
an aim, involves incorporating male and female into one, but not on 
deconstructing the dualism inherent in the terms. In Discourse Two, difference 
is understood as an effect of socialisation on a basically androgynous person. 
Gender is not seen as based on difference, but on socially imposed roles, which 
are internalised. Discourse Three facilitates awareness of multiple 
significations. This is explicit where P5 states: ‘I don’t feel as black or white or 
as straightforwardly as I used to’. The rest of that account makes it clear that 
this is not an expression of confusion, but an awareness of multiplicity.
Discourses One and Two have a certain social and explanatory power, because
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they are derived from dominant humanist discourses about the human person. 
Nevertheless, Discourse Two does not have the certaintities of Discourse One, 
because it is not premised so heavily on the idea of an essential femininity. Nor 
does Discourse Two have the benefit of the radical doubt which is encouraged 
by using Discourse Three as an explanatory framework.
In Discourse Two, multiplicity is not something which explicitly structures 
feminism. Nevertheless, the account which I chose as representative of 
Discourse Two recognises multiplicity. That is, where Discourse Two reaches 
an explanatory limit, the account has to reach outside the discourse for an 
explanation. For example, P2 refers to the ‘contradictions’ which prevent 
other people from becoming active in feminist initiatives. Her own explicit 
account uses Discourse Two (socialisation) to explain difference for herself, 
but acknowledges that it is not enough to explain investment in gender 
difference for other people: ‘But with other people, I can understand that the 
contradictions are too much and they don’t become active’ (P2: Section
3.1 above). The experience of contradiction or conflicting explanations and 
feelings has been recognised as a signifier of multiplicity (Hollway, 1982, 1989, 
Mama, 1995).
The account which I have chosen as representative of Discourse One also has 
to reach outside the discourse’s central proposition. It recognises gender 
difference as relational, that is, constructed in social relations in the present: ‘if 
they allowed priests to marry, that might change their thinking, because they 
would have to think about a few other things, apart from themselves’ (P4: 
Section 2.1 above). P4 is acknowledging here that subjectivity is produced in 
relations between people. In the next chapter (Chapter Seven), I explore this 
relational aspect of subjectivity further by taking a closer look at P4’s account 
of her own feminist subjectivity in a specific relational context. Nevertheless, 
Discourse One’s construction of difference encourages separatism as a feminist 
strategy and therefore doesn’t come up against its explanatory limits as often as 
Discourse Two does.
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In theoretical terms, what I have tried to do here is to demonstrate that the 
model of the unitary rational subject on which Discourses One and Two rely is 
inadequate for advancing feminist theory and an understanding of feminist 
subjectivities. Instead, a model that acknowledges multiplicity, dynamism and 
contradiction is more useful.
None of the participants operates in just one discourse. Operating in Discourse 
Three necessitates as a prerequisite awareness of the other two and a 
willingness to draw on them strategically. Operating in this discourse means 
frequently incorporating the other two as political strategies, while 
simultaneously asserting the absence of essential female or male natures. 
However, Discourse Three is that which emerges least in participants’ 
accounts. Discourse Three is more complex and much more difficult to operate 
in, since so few people recognise it. It is subaltern both in patriarchy and in the 
practice of feminism. Those who operate in Discourse Three seem to have a 
high degree of self-awareness and the ability to examine their own complicity 
or investment in domination and oppression (see Hardt, 1993 on the necessity 
of this). In contrast, Discourses One and Two encourage a high degree of 
focus on factors outside oneself, as oppressive, without acknowledgement of 
personal investment in oppressive structures. This is not to suggest that those 
operating in Discourse Three are unaware of structural factors in oppression. 
What it does suggest is that their models of change are distinct from those of 
participants operating in Discourses One and Two.
6.7 Discourse Four: the ‘real feminist’ discourse
As B. Ryan (1992: 156) points out, being a ‘real’ feminist is equated with being 
radical, and this is connected to the degree of activism one is seen to be 
engaged in. A primary concern for some feminists is ‘the grading of people’s 
feminist activism along a continuum of conservative to radical, which equated 
with definitions of good and bad, or, as it turned out, as high or low-caste
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feminism’ (ibid). Some accounts show that participants position or feel 
themselves positioned by a standard relating to the amount of change they were 
creating and by a persistent insecurity about what ‘being a feminist’ (a 
politicised identity) actually is. This discourse takes change as visible, public 
change. It is to some extent in conflict with the discourse of ‘the personal is 
political’, central to all feminist thought, because so much personal change is 
invisible to other people. When the direction of change goes from the personal 
to the political, the conflict is not very severe. Then, changes in attitude or in 
behaviour are more obvious. But when the personal is political discourse goes 
in the direction political to personal, in other words when people are engaged 
in finding out just how personal the political really is, when they are engaged in 
some of the process work that arises when it is recognised just how deeply 
ingrained the political structures around us are in our psyche, then the two 
discourses are in conflict. As P5 put it (already cited in Section 4.1 above):
And I think, then, that for years I was using the political to work out 
the personal. And it's only now I'm working out the personal side of it.
And that can be very confusing then, because there were times when I 
would ask myself, 'am I still a feminist?’ I'm beginning to see things 
very differently [laughter].
6.7.1 Achieving feminism
People also positioned themselves in the real feminist discourse through ideas 
of what were ‘correct’ feminist ways to be.
P9. We used to have debates in college [in the 1970s] about whether you 
should shave your legs or wear make-up [1]. I remember despising 
people who did. I had also spent some time in France and saw that a 
lot of French women didn’t remove body hair. I felt very comfortable 
with it and just couldn’t see why people felt the need to do it. Mind 
you, I wasn’t trying to attract what you — what I thought of as 
ordinary men. I hung around with a group of people who mostly felt 
like I did and I also had a boyfriend among them, who was 
conventionally very attractive. So I didn’t have to worry about my 
hairy armpits putting men off, because I already had one and he 
wasn’t someone that you could call a reject, he was actually
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somebody a lot of other women would have liked to go out with. I 
still don’t do it. But I have talked about this to people and I have 
realised that I ’m lucky — my hair is very fair, not dark. I get a deep 
tan and it gets even lighter in the summer. Some people have very 
dark hair and it just gets to them, the look of it, or the way people 
comment [2], or look, or whatever. Anyway, that was all twenty 
years ago, I’m much more tolerant now, it doesn’t bother me whether 
people shave their legs or not. Well, it bothers me if they become 
obsessed with it [3], But I can understand why people do it.
P12. I spent most of the time you were at college doing your thing 
fighting my own battle against poverty [4], Of course, I see now that 
many of the issues I was concerned with are women’s issues, but the 
idea that I was a feminist only came to me really in the last ten years 
or so.
Comments
1. Recognition that practices are about other things, that removing body hair 
can construct a woman as feminine, so the opposite, not removing it, can 
position one as feminist.
2. Recognition of how people can be interactively positioned in a discourse of 
femininity and made feel uncomfortable (that is, positioned by other people, not 
necessarily all of whom are feminists).
3. Obsession with the practice of removing body hair would mean that a person 
wasn’t a feminist. This is a change in position from the way she felt in the 
1970s, when any removal was a sign of not being a real feminist.
4. A suggestion that agonizing over whether one is a real feminist is something 
of a luxury.
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6.7.2 Being positioned by other people
P2 feels herself interactively positioned in a discourse of real feminism. She 
also draws on this discourse to position women who don’t give themselves the 
label feminist:
P2. What strikes me is that a lot of people who are into equality — whether 
it’s that you are low paid or you have to do the housework or worry 
about the baby or whatever — and that some women, even though they 
want to have all those things will still say, ‘well, I’m not a feminist’.
And because in some way we still want to — I don’t feel that we have 
resolved this idea that I am entitled to look well as a woman and 
whether I choose to put on mascara and lipstick, it really hasn’t a lot 
got to do with whether you’re a feminist or not — the sense you take of 
looking your best. A lot of women feel that if they like to dress up and 
like to be feminine, well then they can’t be feminists. [1]
I remember [a colleague] attacking me one day. She said, ‘Well, I’ve 
often seen you using your femininity to get attention from men. I asked 
who, and she mentioned some names. Now I know that I would have a 
habit of touching people — I don’t mean sexually — or I would go over 
and smile. And the message I was giving people was that when it suited 
me to wear the equality hat, I wore it and yet I was contradicting 
myself because I was pleasant to some men in the way I would ask for 
something or it was interpreted as sexual, even. I was really floored, 
couldn’t believe it. It made me acutely aware that people often expect 
feminists to be masculine and tough and not to wear nice clothes, and 
not to have a sense of — I like my hair up, or down, or something like 
that [2], Or not to have a sense that it is okay to flash a smile, that I 
might equally flash a smile at a woman, but it wouldn’t be construed as 
sexual if I was talking to a woman. If I was talking to a man it would 
be flirting. So I felt that those contradictions were there for me [3], that 
they expect the women who are into feminism to be very cold, and 
assertive alright, and big into arguments and big into politics and 
political parties [4], They don’t expect someone who teaches home 
economics and who dresses really nice sometimes to — there are 
contradictions, in that people have come back at me [5], And that does 
affect the way you think about yourself then, you start asking ‘what am 
I really like?’ [6], It took me some time to resolve being friendly with 
those men, especially when she was present. Not that I held it against 
her, but it floored me. And I appreciate that she would be big into 
equality too, but she would go the other route, that if women aren’t in 
there, it’s their own fault and you get up and you do it.
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Comments
1. The idea that equality and feminism don’t necessarily go together. Feminism 
is seen as a way of being, as opposed to simply wanting equality. P2 positions 
women who don’t call themselves feminist by referring to popular perceptions 
of what real feminists are like.
2. 4. A unitary model of the human subject is apparent in the real feminist 
discourse. Real feminists are all the same.
3. In experiencing contradictions, P2 recognises her multiple subjectivity and 
the inadequacy of unitary models of either femininity or feminism. She has 
investments in both of them.
5. She is aware of being positioned by other people in the real feminist 
discourse (interactive positioning).
6. The positioning affects the construction of her subjectivity.
Commentary
A discursive analysis of the account in Section 7.1 above points to the way that 
radical feminisms condemn altering the body in ways that conform to 
stereotypes of female beauty. A psychodynamic analysis is also required, to 
complement the discursive one. I introduce this idea here, but do not develop it 
until the end of Chapter Seven, and in Chapter Eight. The psychodynamic 
explanation of these expressions (cf Mama, 1995:137) of a real feminist 
discourse, when it comes from women who wonder whether they are real 
feminists or not, suggests that many women are not as sure of their feminist 
identity as they would like to be. Daily life involves a continuous confrontation 
with the reality of women’s oppression and the lack of power of feminist 
discourses in the face of hegemonic discourses of essential female sexuality,
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male sexual drive and other manifestations of patriarchy. As well as that, then- 
own multiplicity means that feminists do not simply take up a once and for all 
position in feminist discourse and thereby take on a new identity, leaving 
behind older identities. This is probably true of any identity adopted in 
adulthood, as Mama, (ibid) points out.
A related point, as P2’s account in Section 7.2 above shows, is that subjectivity 
is not only constructed out of our own self-perception, or our own reflexive 
positioning of ourselves, but out of how others treat us, the ways that they 
interactively position us. So if we feel effective as feminists, if we are active 
and achieving feminist aims, as well as seeing ourselves as feminist, we may 
also feel that others see us as feminist, making our feminist subjectivity more 
‘real’. This point is developed in Chapter Seven, which examines how 
subjectivity is constructed in relations with other people.
The ‘real feminist’ discourse is analysed in Section 7.3 below as an effect of 
women’s positioning in discourses of femininity. I identify it as a non-feminist 
discourse, which, as shown above, nevertheless forms some of the content of 
feminist subjectivity, as do other discourses of femininity. In this form it has 
passed into much media anti-feminism, where feminism is portrayed as unitary 
and negative and women are urged not to be associated with it.
6.7.3 Femininity having an effect on feminism
That many women feel constantly observed, or subject to the male gaze, was 
an observation made by Berger (1972). Foucault (1979) provides a model for 
understanding how subjects become self-regulating. The Panopticon is an 
architectural model (designed by Jeremy Bentham) for a prison, which consists 
of a central watchtower surrounded by a circular building divided into cells. It 
is designed so that each cell and its occupant is visible from the central tower 
but the tower is not visible from the cells. This arrangement ensures ‘that the
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surveillance is permanent in its effects’ (ibid: 201), without having to be 
continuous in its action (that is, the supervisor does not always need to be 
present in the tower). In this model, power is both visible and unverifiable. The 
inmates are constantly aware that they could be under observation, but they 
never know from one minute to the next if they are actually being observed. 
Thus, the Panopticon induces ‘a state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power’ (ibid, cited in Gavey, 1993: 96).
Bartky has made the following feminist Foucauldian analysis of femininity and 
has argued:
The woman who checks her make up half a dozen times a day to see 
if her foundation has caked or her mascara has run, who worries that 
the wind or the rain may spoil her hairdo, who looks frequently to see 
if her stockings have bagged at the ankle or who, feeling fat, monitors 
everything she eats, has become, just as surely as the inmate o f the 
Panopticon, a self-policing subject, a self committed to a relentless 
self-surveillance. This self-surveillance is a form of obedience to 
patriarchy. It is also the reflection in the woman’s consciousness of 
the fact that she is under surveillance in ways that he is not, that 
whatever else she may become, she is importantly a body designed to 
please or excite. There has been induced in many women, then, in 
Foucault’s words, a ‘state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power’. (Bartky, 1988: 81, cited 
in Gavey, 1993: 96, original emphasis)
Bartky analyses how some women exercise vigilance over their feminine 
appearance and connects it with the suggestion that ‘a panoptical male 
connoisseur resides within the consciousness of most women’ (Bartky, 1988: 
72, cited in Gavey, 1993: 96). If we take that analysis along with B. Ryan’s 
(1992) exposition of a grading of feminist activism, then the existence of the 
real feminist discourse for some women suggests the existence of a 
connoisseurship of feminism, a cohort who know what the right ways to be 
feminist are. Gallop (1988: 116) suggests that while this is often held up as an 
example of feminist ideology, it is in fact part of dominant patriarchal ideology. 
It is not feminist, but a residue of patriarchal ideology which some feminists 
continue to hold unanalysed. How many politicised males operate in that state
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of conscious and permanent visibility?
The ‘real feminist’ discourse relies on the feeling of being observed. Its central 
proposition, emanating from both anti-feminism and from some who position 
themselves as feminist, is that there is one correct way to be feminist, relying 
in turn on the notion of a unitary rational individual who adopts a political 
identity, from which all other aspects of living take their direction, without 
contradiction. This could well be connected with the dominant view that there 
exists a political correctness among feminists. It refuses to acknowledge that 
feminism is multiple and diverse.
How does this discourse function? Whose interests are served? What are its 
effects? In some cases, it paralyses people and makes them avoid collectives of 
feminists. In other cases, it skews recognition of what counts as feminist 
activity and feminist change. In some cases, people take up positions, or are 
positioned in discourses of real feminism at the same time as they recognise 
that the personal is political. This causes feelings of contradiction. The interests 
served are not those of feminism, or of disrupting gender relations, or of 
creating better awareness of gender issues.
Movement out of this real feminist discourse, or to a different position within 
it, seems to follow changes in awareness, combined with changing attitudes to 
oneself, such as developing self-esteem, a strong sense of self-worth and 
developing awareness of emotions in self and others. These could be referred 
to as therapeutic processes (cf Cain, 1993; Connell, 1995), but not just with 
individual effects. They are connected with political effectiveness and feminist 
agency. Following Mama (1995), I use the term psychodynamic processes to 
describe them. They are dealt with in greater detail towards the end of Chapter 
Seven and in Chapter Eight.
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6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have illustrated how three discourses of feminism and one 
non-feminist discourse carry some of the content of feminist subjectivity. The 
chapter is by no means a comprehensive list of discourses of feminism. I have 
tried to show how discourse is multiple and open to modification and how 
different discourses can compete and overlap in the same account. I have also 
indicated that a discursive analysis alone is inadequate; relational and 
psychodynamic analyses are also required.
As well as carrying the content of subjectivity, discourses transmit power 
relations. They exist within and transmit networks of power, with dominant 
discourses exercising their hegemony by resonating with and echoing the 
institutionalised and formal knowledges, assumptions and ideologies of a given 
social and political order. Feminist discourses are implicated in 
power-knowledge relations the same as other discourses. But the power of 
feminist discourse to define practice is limited to a small domain (Hollway, 
1989: 54), with the power decreasing from Discourse One through to Three.
Within feminism as portrayed in this chapter, Discourse One, the discourse of 
an oppressed feminine, appears to dominate and to have the greatest 
explanatory power, because of its resonance with patriarchal forms of 
knowledge about women. Discourse Two has less explanatory power and 
breaks down more often, due to its dependence on socialisation theory, which 
is unable to account for the complex and contradictory ways that people 
constitute and reconstitute themselves in the social worlds in which they 
participate. Yet it continues to have appeal, because of its relation to the 
dominant humanist model of the subject which has a core identity which is 
unchanging, but overlaid with social layers.
On the other hand, subaltern discourses also exist in contradiction to 
hegemonic ones, which subvert the dominant symbolic order and empower 
oppressed groups through their resonance with alternative ideologies and
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cultural practices (ibid). Discourse One operates in this way also. This 
illustrates the multiplicity of discourses. What is the dominant discourse within 
feminism is a subaltern discourse in patriarchal relations. The subaltern 
discourse within feminism is that of feminism as a rejection of male / female 
dualism (Discourse Three). It finds itself in contradiction to both patriarchal 
and other feminist discourses. Yet for those who draw on it and operate in it, it 
has emancipating effects. In addition, its awareness of the existence and value 
of first two discourses, in specific contexts, gives it, in my view, a greater 
political refinement and sustainable potential. This is a point which I develop in 
subsequent chapters.
Discourse analysis as I have used it in this chapter is an interpretative 
technique. It identifies subject positions which people take up and identifies 
also the collective assumptions and shared meanings and values that have been 
cumulatively built up through the collective experience of a group (cf Mama, 
1995). Individual subject positions are thus simultaneously social moments, in 
which the individual takes up particular social positions (Hollway, 1989: 54). 
Individuals have many discourses and discursive positions available to them, 
and the positions they take up are momentary, changing with the different 
social contexts and relations they find themselves in (cf Davies 1989; 1990a, 
1990c). Not only do people reflexively take up positions, but they are also 
interactively positioned by other people, in discourses they do not like, ‘against 
their will’, so to speak.
Using the concept of positionality to analyse subjectivity allows for the person 
to be conceptualised as a historical subject, changing over time and in different 
contexts. It also facilitates the development of the idea that people have 
multiple subjectivities. Since various subject positions are available to a given 
individual at any given moment, she or he may adopt different positions 
simultaneously, and display contradictions as a result of this. Or she or he may 
be positioned by somebody else against their will, in a discourse which they 
resist, and this may also cause contradiction and conflict. ‘Subjectivity is
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therefore taken to be a process of movement through various discursive 
positions, as something which is constantly being produced out of social and 
historical knowledge and experience’ (Mama, 1995: 99). This idea of 
movement in subjectivity is taken up in the next chapter (Chapter Seven), in the 
discussion of how subjectivity is produced in relations in the present.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUBJECTIVITY AS A PROCESS OF RELATIONS
7.0 Introduction
Discourses are always being reproduced and modified, therefore no list of them 
is complete. The discourses discussed in the last chapter do not form a 
comprehensive description of feminism. They clarify some of the content of 
feminist subjectivities. The concept of discourse is based on the assumption 
that a unitary feminism does not exist. Each discourse is brought to life 
through action (speech or other practices) and the ways that this happens in 
different situations reflect the positioning (either reflexive or interactive) of the 
people involved.
Certain discourses have more explanatory power than others and they affect 
the actions and assumptions of a majority of people. Foucault’s work takes this 
into consideration in his emphasis on the link between knowledge and power. 
For example, feminist discourses in general have minimal power to challenge 
gendered power relations in mainstream politics. Within feminism, however, 
certain discourses, such as the oppressed feminine and the socialisation 
discourses (Discourses One and Two), have more power than others to filter 
and explain people’s experiences for them. These are the discourses which 
most closely resemble humanist discourses and which take a unitary subject for 
granted. It is clear then that the knowledges and discourses constructed by 
feminists have their own power relations also.
Following Hollway (1982: 290), Faith (1994: 56) and Kenway et al (1994: 
190), when I refer to this phenomenon whereby some discourses have more 
explanatory power than others, I use the terms dominance or hegemony for the 
more powerful discourses and subaltern or muted for the less powerful ones. 
The term hegemony also carries the theoretical implications of Gramsci’s
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(1971) analysis of the power of dominant ideology (Kenway et al 1994: 190 ). 
It is consistent with the assertion made throughout this thesis that knowledge 
production is political and that, therefore, the sites of knowledge production 
need to be scrutinised.
Just as no list of discourses is ever complete, discourses do not determine the 
types of subjects produced. They ‘texture subjectivity’ (Mama, 1995: 111), 
along with other hegemonic and subaltern discourses, which include discourses 
of femininity, class, race, ethnicity, age, ability and sexual orientation. 
Feminism is only one of the many dimensions of subjectivity. Each discourse is 
responded to in ways that are unique to each individual (Hollway, 1989, 1995). 
This means that discourses are not constant, monolithic forces acting on 
passive victims. Instead, they are responded to collectively by the creation of 
new discourses and by individual movement between discourses (ibid).
7.1 Feminism as a stimulus for individual development
Mama (1995) examines how black women in racist Britain respond to their 
situations. Drawing on Mama’s work, I examine the feminist responses of 
women living in sexist Ireland to their situations. For those who take up 
positions in feminist discourses and reject the sexist discourses of the 
mainstream, the experience of rejecting the dominant can provoke an 
examination of their identities.
P2. I remember as far back as when I was about twelve, having vicious 
rows at home, that the boys shouldn’t be having their shirts ironed and 
the girls — but in reality it would have been in my early twenties, in 
college, before I would have made the connection that there was some 
link there between being a feminist and that kind of thinking. So the 
issue would have hit me much earlier than I equated it with feminism.
So until I was in second or third year in college, I wouldn’t even have 
thought of calling what I was thinking equality issues or that being 
related to feminism. I would have thought more in terms of the 
unfairness of it, but wouldn’t have been able to transfer that into any 
other kind of language for looking at that type of thing. I remember
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having ferocious rows at home about who cooked the dinner and who 
didn’t cook it and I loved cooking, so there were contradictions there 
for me because I actually loved the work that was supposed to be 
women’s work and yet I had these issues going on as a teenager. Why 
were the boys prioritised for the dinner, because they were out in the 
fields? And why was it that when they came in, they could turn on the 
football match and I had to turn off the radio.
Here, P2 poses an explicit challenge to the discourses that position her as 
essentially domestic. These are social discourses which she experiences in the 
relatively private sphere of the family. But she has also a multiple and 
contradictory identity, because she loves the work that is traditionally 
associated with women. Building her feminist identity is given impetus by being 
positioned by other people in sexist discourses. Throughout her entire 
interview, she emphasises the problems that her talent at traditional women’s 
work has posed for her in terms of the interactive positioning of her as feminist 
by other feminists and by non-feminists. She contests the dualistic world order 
which make being feminist and being interested in the domestic sphere 
mutually exclusive.
P4’s feminism was given impetus by more public sexism.
P4. I was really glad to come to Dublin [from Northern Ireland] because it 
was sort of peaceful — and then I realised, oh, oh, this is a funny kind 
of a place. First of all, I discovered, I just missed the marriage bar by a 
year. I was horrified to discover that people had to resign on marriage, 
from their jobs, you know, when they were just twenty two or twenty 
three — the other thing is of course that contraception was illegal. So 
you had to bring bags of pills and potions from the north. The other 
thing was that there were other things happening here, you know, the 
beginnings of the women’s movement and stuff. I was interested in all 
that, although I wasn’t involved in it actively — I had my daughter and 
then I tried to go and do a Master’s degree. I didn’t realise that you 
couldn’t do these things and raise babies at the same time. Well, there 
was no such thing as a creche.
P4 emphasises here her response to public forms of knowledge about women, 
in the context of a civil rights awareness, which she mentioned earlier in the 
interview and also in the context of the women’s movement as a social
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movement, which she refers to in the extract above.
P20 had considered herself a feminist for many years before the birth of her 
children, and describes as important in the construction of her feminist identity 
the marriage bar, the lack of contraception and the sexual double standard. She 
also emphasises her responses to childcare and other labour expectations in the 
less public sphere of the home as a crucial part of a process of constructing a 
feminist subjectivity. With the birth of her children, she had what she considers 
further radical insights into feminist discourses and the need for feminism and 
she was impelled to become publicly active as a feminist, in addition to making 
feminist changes in her home life.
P20. But I think when I had the kids, well, before I had them, there was a 
bit of a gendered division of labour at home. But after I had them, I 
was so angry and cross and everything like that at the amount of work 
that I had to do in order to keep going. It’s impossible to strike, to 
hold out and not do it, because things would be so bad if it wasn’t 
done, with the children. So I felt — I became very depressed at that 
time.
How did you cope with that, I  don 7 mean with the depression so much as 
with the labour?
I felt really and truly helpless and I suppose that was when I took a strong 
position as regards feminism. I felt that this is really what feminists are 
talking about. Any experience I had until then, like the threat of sexual 
violence, being undermined at work or getting shitty jobs, that nothing I 
experienced up until then was what feminism was really and truly about.
Labour in the home.
Yes, it was incredibly strong. You know, I can still feel how frustrated and 
angry I felt.
(This account is quoted more fully later in the chapter and given a more 
detailed analysis.)
P10 talks about her first enounter with a discourse of human rights, in a 
personal development course, as the first impetus in the process of developing
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her feminist subjectivity.
P10. I remember the day we did the human rights. I could hardly take it all 
in. [The facilitator] gave us a lot of time to read and think about each 
one. We had to pick out one that was special. I found that hard, 
because they were all so new and so important. Anyway, I picked the 
first one: ‘I have the right to be treated with respect as an intelligent, 
capable human being’. My hand was shaking. I had never thought of 
anything like that before [1], I could feel my hand shaking and my 
voice trembling when I read it out as my special one. I thought I was 
going to start crying [2], Before we went home, [the facilitator] asked 
each person what the morning was like for them, and I remember 
saying it was so little to ask— [long pause]
To ask?
To ask — to be treated with respect as an intelligent, capable human 
being.
Before that day, before you read the human rights, how did you think 
about yourself?
I don’t really know, I didn’t really think about myself at all. That day 
was a beginning [3], I ’m not saying that made everything easy lfom 
there on, but that was the start of a change [4],
Comments
1. Introduction to a new discourse (of equality and rights).
2. Illustrates the power and emotional resonance of a discourse of equality 
which was heretofore unknown to her. Knowledge has an emotional
component.
3. P10 begins an awareness of her own subjectivity, through exposure to a new 
discourse.
4. Awareness of movement, in this case taking up a position in a particular 
discourse for the first time.
For P I3, falling in love with a woman provided the stimulus to call herself
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feminist.
P13. When I fell in love with [her partner], I knew I wanted this to 
continue. Admitting to myself that I was a lesbian was hard in a lot of 
ways, but in other ways, it felt very right to be in this relationship. I 
knew it was the right thing, I felt that I had finally discovered my true 
self, my real identity. But I needed help — more help than friends could 
give, even feminist friends — I needed to work through the emotional 
upheaval that was going on inside me. It took me a while to find a 
therapist I was happy with. But I knew I really wanted the relationship 
to work, so I persevered, I knew there was a lot of personal stuff to be 
dealt with in order to be able to give and take with [her partner].
What sort o f therapist were you looking for?
Someone with a feminist consciousness. Up to then, I never called 
myself a feminist or got involved with groups or stuff like that. I always 
though I was one, but that other feminists wouldn’t think I was. But I 
felt I was really up against it now, that this issue of being lesbian was a 
feminist issue as much as anything else and that I needed a feminist 
therapist, or at least one with feminist sympathies, feminist awareness. 
It’s funny, like, I never considered it important before to do anything 
public, or identifiably feminist. Now, it seemed important — not just 
important, relevant, I suppose you could say.
Did the therapy relate — I  mean, was it relevant — to your feminism?
Oh God, yes, absolutely, it was — all sorts of things happened for me. 
It was only after that that I got the self-confidence to call myself a 
feminist. That was the first time I ever used that label for myself. A lot 
of things were involved, but mainly I think it was the self-confidence to 
name what — what I had always believed, and also the way I had 
always lived, as feminist. You know, I had always lived as a strong 
independent women who cared about other women’s lives. And I 
suppose I just didn’t name it publicly as feminist.
Commentary
In the accounts cited above, feminist identity is stimulated and constructed, at 
least partly, by becoming aware of oppression in the family arena, by being 
introduced to the concept of human rights, by a general awareness of living in a 
sexist society, by a consideration of sexuality and relationships. For the women 
whose accounts are cited, feminist discourses were available to mediate their
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experiences of discrimination and oppression. Discursive movement and 
changes in position were experienced as empowering by them. In theoretical 
terms, the relationship between their particular situations and the available 
discourses helped them to construct feminist identities for themselves. Feminist 
subjectivities were constructed in processes over time. The subjectivities are 
not fixed. They are not the same now as they were at the time of the 
interviews.
Hollway (1982: 385) points out that the particular positions in specific 
discourses which a person takes up and how they signify to themselves (that is, 
how their subjectivity is constituted) as feminist at any particular moment, 
depends on the point at which the diachronic and synchronic axes of meaning 
intersect. Feminist identity, then, can be seen as the point where a person’s 
position and history in feminist discourse (the diachronic axis) intersects with 
relations in the present (the synchronic axis). ‘The diachronic axis provides the 
history of recursive positioning in discourses. The synchronic axis provides the 
specific relation in whch significations are negotiated, as a function of positions 
in discourse’ (ibid). The signifier feminist thus achieves its meaning in a 
relational context, at the particular points where the axes intersect. These 
points are different for every person and they also vary within the same person 
(ibid).
7.2 The relational production of subjectivity
The fact that subjectivity is relational is due to power differentials (Hollway, 
1989: 60). People take up positions which will give them enough power to 
protect their vulnerable selves in difficult situations. In the next extract, P4 
describes a situation where her positioning in Discourse One left her vulnerable 
and she had to position herself in a different discourse to gain power. In doing 
this, not only did she want to protect herself, but she also wanted to protect a 
women’s network and the principle of women’s culture. Earlier in the
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interview from which the account is taken, it became clear that the dominant 
discourse within which P4 situates her feminism is the discourse of an 
oppressed female culture (Discourse One). However, in the meetings which 
she describes below, if she had continued to allow that discourse to dictate her 
positioning, she would have been marginalised and powerless. She says, ‘It was 
a sort of a battle of strengths, in a sense. I knew that if there was any chink in 
the armour at all, that the whole thing was gone’ (full quote below).
P4. Actually, it was interesting, there was a huge kind of backlash thing 
against the local groups and we went through a very difficult period 
where I had to organise and chair meetings. And there were guys in 
there who — you know, I ’m talking about politicians, local councillors 
— who use all this legal stuff to try and really shaft you and I thought,
‘No, I am not going to allow them to do this’. But what I had to do 
was I had to use tactics that they employed, which didn’t, which I 
don’t care to use myself. But I thought, ‘No, in this situation, you’re 
going to have to. ’ [ 1 ].
What did you have to do?
Shaft the bastards [laughter], I won’t really tell you all the things I had 
to do. There were a couple of guys there who decided, who tried to 
take out the local groups. They tried everything. Legally, they tried to 
talk you down in the chair, they tried everything you could think of.
And I just thought, ‘I ’m not going to allow this to happen, I am not 
going to allow it to happen’. And I didn’t. I had a support group 
around me, but at the end of the day, it was a sort of battle of 
strengths, in a sense [2], I knew that if there was any chink in the 
armour at all, the whole thing was gone down the tubes. I really knew 
that. It took an awful lot of energy, it was very stressful, but, in time, it 
worked. Now it’s funny really, because as I say, I didn’t feel 
comfortable using those tactics, they’re sort of bullying tactics, if that’s 
what you’d like to call them, or they’re very aggressive ones. But 
sometimes that’s the way you have to operate, you know, to survive 
[3], So that, actually, I decided to do that, to be very pragmatic about 
it. I haven’t had to do it again, but I would do it again if I had to. I 
would have no difficulty doing it again if I had to. I think that wouldn’t 
happen to a guy in the chair, you know.
You think they saw you as a soft target?
Initially yes. But they very quickly realised that that wasn’t the case, 
yes. It took about two meetings, that’s all. And in fact, that challenge
came at almost the first meeting I conducted. It’s interesting now that I
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think back on it. I think they thought it would be easy [4],
It wasn’t just a challenge to you, it was a challenge to the way the 
local groups were organised. In other words, it was a whole culture 
they were fighting.
Oh, absolutely, that’s right. And I think when you’re working in a 
group like that, you personify it in some way, or you’re seen to be 
leading it [5], So I think those were the sorts of things that, in the 
educational shpere, the reason I wanted to hang on in there and still 
would, is that I have a basic belief in adult education anyway, I believe 
in the development of the women’s sector. I really do. I think it’s just a 
lot of untapped potential. But I think it’s very difficult to organise and 
when we encourage women to come up from the ground, it takes a 
long time to get into positions where you can really use your power
[6], It really does, it’s very difficult.
Comments
1. Recognition that the discourse of feminism as an expression of women’s 
culture is subaltern in comparison with dominant discourses in mainstream 
culture. It has outsider status in this situation and cannot influence the ‘ball 
game’ in insider culture. Continuing to operate within it in these circumstances 
will marginalise it even further. There is also recognition of the importance of 
circumstances in the present moment, in deciding how to act.
2. Enactment of personal authority in her conduct of the meetings, by drawing 
on a different discourse and positioning herself in it, in order to be agentic and 
affect the ‘ball game’.
3. Recognition of the power relations involved. Recognition of the necessity of 
taking up a position which will give her enough power to protect the women’s 
networks, even if this is at odds with the culture of the networks themselves.
4. Recognition that her opponents at the meetings also make a similar reading 
of the power differentials between the two discourses. They thought it would 
be easy to defeat her, because they assumed that P4 would continue to operate
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within the subaltern discourse.
5. Drawing on the dominant discourse gives a more powerful status to the 
women’s networks, and possibly to the subaltern discourse of feminism (in 
relation to the mainstream), on which they draw for explanations.
6. Recognition of the power differentials between the discourses again, along 
with recognition of the slowness and difficulties of change.
Commentary
By positioning herself in a dominant discourse, outside feminist discourse 
altogether, P4 is able to play her opponants at their own game and win. 
Capable of acting in many discourses in their various manifestations, what 
decides the particular discourse she draws on from moment to moment at the 
meetings she talks about, is present circumstances, specific relations in which 
significations and agency are negotiated. Nevertheless, although she takes up a 
position in a dominant discourse for the strategic purpose of gaining power, 
that dominant discourse is modified by her reflexive positioning in feminist 
Discourse One. Once she has got what she wants, she does not continue to 
position herself in the dominant discourse.
7.2.1 A collective strategy
P I6. We were involved in this project [a specially funded project for 
children at risk of early school leaving] in school and because of the 
special funding that this project had, we were able to have regular 
meetings of the staff involved, with an outside facilitator, and one of 
the issues that began to come up was the gender balance in the class 
involved in the project and then, later, in all the classes in the school. 
There was a lot of sexually abusive language going on between the two 
girls and the twelve boys in the group concerned. In the beginning, they 
were seen as just horrible people [1], PI 7 and I talked a lot about it to 
each other and we thought very similarly on it, that it was a gender
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issue [2] and that something needed to be done about the gender 
balance in groups in the future. Eventually, the other staff on the 
project began to see it from that point of view and as a group we made 
a recommendation to the management that there should be something 
about gender balance. P I7, do you want to talk about it?
P I7. Um, yeah. It seemed to me that we had to be really careful about it 
[3], We knew from experience that going in with all guns blazing on a 
gender issue didn’t work [4], But we didn’t want to go along — but if 
we started talking about it in those technical terms, and about the need 
to examine school structures, if we started that straight away, we 
would have alienated the rest of them from the start [5],
PI 6 .1 mean, some of the time, I thought I would go crazy, bringing it up at 
every meeting and being restrained about my own opinions, just stating 
the problem over and over and saying, ‘This is a problem for everyone 
in the class, what can we do?’, or words to that effect [6], Mind you, 
we had a great facilitator for the meetings. I know he’s aware of gender 
issues, because of things he has written and said in other arenas. I think 
he knew what was going on. How many meetings did we have before it 
got taken seriously? Eight, ten?
P17. About that, yeah. We were able to let off steam to each other though. 
That was important. I’m not sure if I could have done it on my own [7],
P I6. Me neither. Through talking to you about it, I began to see how some 
of the men were threatened by us, by our ideas— and by our anger, I 
suppose, when we let them see it [8], There was one time near the start 
of the project that I had a huge row with one of them, over the same 
kind of thing, though not specifically about gender, but about working 
out of a deficit model of the kids. Of course, that wasn’t the language I 
used. I really lost my cool over it and so did he, in front of the group. 
After that, P I7 and I talked a lot about it and we really decided to keep 
it cool and play a game to get what we wanted. And it wasn’t just to 
get what we wanted, but what we believed in [9],
What happened in the long run?
PI 7. We began to develop a good relationship with one of the older men , 
an A post holder, very influential, but involved in the project just as an 
ordinary subject teacher. We sort of cultivated his good will towards us 
and towards our ideas [10], I mean, after meetings, we used to say to 
each other ‘he’s beginning to move, he’s coming over to our 
side’.That’s how it felt, I think you’d agree, would you, PI 6?
P16. Oh yeah, that’s exactly how we used to talk about it. When he began 
to see it in terms of gender, he carried the others with him. They were 
all men, some of them teaching here thirty years, really set in their
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opinions, probably couldn’t care less what happened to the girls. [The 
A post holder] suggested making some kind of recommendation about 
gender balance in classes to the management, from the group as a 
whole. That was a great day [11], They listened to him. We were so 
pleased. It wasn’t just a recommendation coming from us, the well 
known feminists on the staff, who were dismissed as extreme [12] most 
of the time, but it was coming from all these men who normally didn’t 
get involved in issues like that. And it was supported strongly by this 
influential person in the group.
Yes -
P I7. We managed to make a mainstream challenge out of something that 
was earlier just a marginal challenge [13] from two women teachers 
who were seen as a bit awkward, feminist, and, like P I7 says, extreme. 
And that was a feminist success for me [14], We plugged away at for 
maybe six weeks and it was really difficult not to be angry and 
screaming at them to do something. Looking back on that, I see it as a 
success, in that we got a group of men teachers who had been there 
thirty years and were mostly very complacent about issues like that to 
actually go to the management and ask for a change [15],
P I6. I think it also shows you how we felt as feminists within the school, 
that we felt it would be better, have a better chance of succeeding 
coming from them than from just the two of us [16], But we did 
manage to make them think about it. I look on that as an educational 
success, the fact that they thought about the issue and moved on it, not 
just passively followed whatever was happening. Them thinking about 
it was just as important for me as any direct consequences for the girls 
in the group [17], I think they learned something. I look on that as 
more of a success than a lot of other things I ’ve done in my time. But 
we almost had to do it by stealth.
P17. We knew from experience that we couldn’t be open about it and get 
anywhere [18], We had to be devious about it.
You weren’t really being devious about it, you could call it being 
strategic, along with being assertive in not letting it drop.
P I7. Yes, strategic, I suppose, but that meant we had to really hold back. 
We couldn’t show our emotions about it. We did have to work at it 
strategically, you’re right, we had to say, ‘When is the right time to 
bring this up, when is the right time to push, when is the right time to 
lay off?’ It was really difficult [19],
P I6. It relates back to what we were talking about earlier, about how, 
when you push, a person becomes defensive. So it’s like a long-term 
strategy — that you hold off at the time. And I don’t think we were —
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that they didn’t consent to it all [20],
P I7. By the end, I suppose, they kind of owned it. And in fact, I would 
never have been able to do that, in that situation at school, if I hadn’t 
worked out how to make changes at home. I really would never have 
been able to make those connections. I suppose it’s very much like 
learning how to take people where they are at, you know [21],
Comments
1. The dominant model of the girls in the school is a deficit one: they are 
deficient in relation to the school norms.
2. A gender perspective constitutes an explicit challenge to the dominant 
model.
3. 5. Playing down the political viewpoint is necessary for strategic reasons.
4. Recognition of the vulnerability of a feminist perspective.
6. Drawing on a child-centered discourse, which does not pose such a threat to 
the dominant model, as a feminist or gender analysis.
7. 9. Emphasis on the importance of a collective approach from the feminists in 
the group.
8. The two women recognise other people’s emotional investments in the 
positions they occupy. This includes their own investment in a feminist 
position.
10. They try to find common ground, as a strategic measure.
11. It is important that they do more than analyse the situation from a feminist 
perspective, they want to be able to effect change also, that is, to be agentic.
12. Feminism is mostly seen as extreme, but now a feminist initiative is coming
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from within the mainstream, even if it is not explicitly named as feminist.
13, 14. Again, it is important for the women to be agentic.
15, 17. The effects on non-feminists, that is, the girls and the other staff, are 
important and are part of the process of being agentic. There is also a 
pedagogical dimension to the way they want to relate to the other staff.
16, 18. Recognition of feminism’s vulnerability and susceptability to 
marginalisation.
19, 20, 21. Explicit recognition of the use of strategy to achieve feminist 
agency and to produce certain ways of thinking (knowledge) in their 
colleagues.
Commentary
There is a pedagogical focus in this case, in that the women wanted their 
colleagues to learn something and to own that learning. Again, this case 
illustrates that subjectivity in its relational aspects is connected to power. In 
this case, the power relation is twofold. The women want to protect 
themselves from vulnerable and being ‘defeated’ in their efforts to get gender 
balance seriously considered at the meeting. They also want to see the other 
staff members change their position to something nearer a feminist position, 
even if the others do not name it as such. Hence, they take up a position in a 
child-centered, humanist discourse vis a vis the other staff members, 
recognising their colleagues’ emotional involvement in the anti-feminist 
discourses and the threat to them if they shift positions. They also take up a 
tactical position of not pressurising them. In a strategic move, they avoid 
acting recognisably in a feminist discourse, which would allow their colleagues 
to position them as extremists and thereby dismiss them. Importantly, in this 
case, the two women mount their challenge in a collectively worked strategy.
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They convince each other that what they are doing is worthwhile, and they 
support each other in their frustration and anger, because the end result will 
have feminist effects for the girls in the class and on their colleagues.
7.3 The difficulties of acting strategically, in order to produce feminist
agency
In the sections above, I have conceptualised both pedagogy and subjectivity in 
terms of recursive relationships between discourse and situation in the present 
moment. This conceptualisation has meant analysing the effects and limitations 
of various feminist discourses in the everyday world. Where feminist discourse 
of whatever hue has minimal capacity to challenge the mainstream dominant 
discourses, feminists can resort to strategically drawing on the dominant 
discourses in order to ultimately gain power for the feminist discourses. As 
Harre (1979: 405) puts it: ‘The task of the reconstruction of society can be 
taken up by anyone at any time in any face-to-face encounter’. But the trick is 
to have others recognise and accept the discourse through which the 
reconstruction is taking place (Davies, 1990c: 137).
The combination of discourse and situation draws attention to the 
contradictions that exist for feminist women when acting in the interests of 
feminism in situations where not all of the actors are feminists: they have to 
operate outside of their preferred explanatory framework. This draws attention 
to the collective nature of feminism and feminist agency, as it is not enough for 
a feminist woman herself to identify as feminist. She wants to have feminist 
effects on other people, for her politics to have a collective or a social effect.
B. Ryan (1992) points out that achieving social change is different from being 
successful in winning specific goals. The question of what constitutes success 
has to be considered in the present social movement environment of media 
manipulation and professionalism of movement organisers. Drawing in money
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and numbers of demonstrators may well be more related to professional 
organisers’ responses than to citizens’ responses (ibid: 175). One of the 
unifying features of feminism is that it aims to affect the lives of all women, not 
just those who sign up as feminists, or accept the label. It is not just about 
saying, ‘Yes, I support the ideal’. It is about having practical effects on daily 
life. To this end, all women and men, feminist and non-feminist, are an 
important component in the achievement of feminist goals. The nature of the 
target group is thus so diverse that the meaning of the term radical varies 
greatly, and important changes which people make may not always be easily 
visible to observers. As Irigaray puts it:
I think the most important thing to do is to expose the exploitation 
common to all women and to find the struggles that are appropriate for 
each woman, right where she is, depending upon her nationality, her 
job, her social class, her sexual experience, that is upon the form of 
oppression that is for her the most immediately unbearable (cited in 
Bono and Kemp, 1991: 13).
For P 16 and P I7, being recognised as feminist in the situation they describe in 
Section 7.2.1 is less important than achieving change within the social world of 
their school. The men in the staff group are as important in the achievement of 
their goals as the young women who were the subject of their concern to start 
off with. Building a feminist identity in this case is given impetus by the desire 
to achieve feminist change, even if this means not asserting themselves openly 
as feminists at the meetings. Their identity is consolidated for them in the 
success of their strategy. Every day that goes by ‘successfully’ for a feminist 
woman adds to the production and reproduction of her feminist identity 
(Hollway, 1982: 425).
In identifying the intersection of discourses and situation as important, I am 
continuing with the project of trying to find out what organises somebody’s 
words and practices, that is, of how meaning is created. A person’s words and 
practices are only half the person’s. They are brought to completion by the 
group (cf McDermott and Tylbor, 1987: 160). The analysis of the language 
and practices used in a group or by a group can lead us back to social structure
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and the institutionalisation of certain practices. It can be seen as necessary to 
collude with these practices, in order to modify them and cause them to signify 
differently from the dominant significations. Collusion literally means a playing 
together (from the Latin col-ludere). Less literally, it refers to how members of 
any social order must constantly interact with each other to posit a particular 
state of affairs (ibid: 154). In examining the ways that P4, P16 and P17 collude 
with the dominant structures of the groups they find themselves part of, then 
we get an idea of the institutional constraints on feminist discourses. The 
feminists in question have to align themselves to a certain exent with the 
dominant discourses, in order to make links with feminist discourses and to 
achieve change. The boundaries between discourses are seen to be fluid.
This kind of analysis not only gives us an account of social structure, but an 
account of the tools that people use to build social structure (ibid: 164) or 
change existing structures. Along with language, issues like choice, collusion 
and strategy become significant. Although they do not alway show up in a 
conversational transcript of the situations where they took place, we can point 
them out in an an analysis which draws on our real-world knowledge about 
settings and possible responses afforded us through participants’ accounts. The 
participants cited here had analysed their own actions to the extent that they 
were clear that they were acting strategically and engaging with dominant 
discourses.
The situations described provide practical fields of deployment for the different 
discourses, constituting the relations-in-the-present, or the situational 
dimension of subjectivity. This dimension of subjectivity is at least half 
constituted by positioning in discourse and half constituted by the attributions 
of others (ibid). The collusion and choice referred to arise out of feminists’ 
concerns with feminist effectiveness and agency. A sense of agency is 
important for a feminist subjectivity to sustain itself and to continue to 
construct itself as feminist.
Reviewing situation and discourse to see how they intersect to produce
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feminist significations can give insight into the ways that they contribute to the 
construction of ideology, identity and subjectivity. Social categories such as 
feminist are constituted in discourses and these can vary in relation to the 
ideological purpose for which the discourse is employed and the strategic 
choices which are made. The concepts of movement, positionality, agency, 
choice, strategy and collusion can illustrate the variable, inconsistent and highly 
negotiable content of social identity. The next section (Section 4) examines 
these issues in the domain of heterosexual couple relations, as distinct from the 
work relations analysed in Section 2.
7.4 Feminist agency in the heterosexual dynamic
P20. But I think when I had the kids, well, before I had them, there was a 
bit of a gendered division of labour at home. But after I had them, I 
was so angry and cross [1] and everything like that at the amount of 
work that I had to do in order to keep going. It’s impossible to strike, 
to hold out and not do it, because things would be so bad if it wasn’t 
done, with the children [2], So I felt — I became very depressed at that 
time.
How did you cope with that, I  don’t mean with the depression so much 
as with the labour?
I felt really and truly helpless [3] and I suppose that was when I took a 
strong position as regards feminism. I felt that this is really what 
feminists are talking about. Any experience I had until then, like the 
threat of sexual violence, being undermined at work or getting shitty 
jobs, that nothing I experienced up until then was what feminism was 
really and truly about [4],
Labour in the home.
Yes, it was incredibly strong. You know, I can still feel how frustrated 
and angry I felt. Really fucking raging I was about it. Really so helpless 
[5], I remember, one time, there was a row about who cleaned the 
toilet in your house. Can you remember that?
I ’m sure there was, cos there have been so many rows about it.
Yes. And it just hit home to me so much, how universal it all was. How 
much men look as if they’re doing their bit and you still have women
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cleaning the toilets. So it was really around that time that my thinking 
just crystallised and I was really thinking, I was reading, my mind was 
going all the time.
But how did you work it out at home?
Well, it was eight years later really that it started getting worked out. 
And it’s the problem that Simone de Beauvoir mentioned, that the 
problem is that the enemy is someone that you’re living with. Someone 
that you probably love [6], And how can you bring around some kind 
of way of working things out if one person is so stubborn.
I f  the other person has no motivation to change, how do you make 
them change, or how do you change what is going on?
That’s right. And when you think of some of the psychology that says 
that the only person you can change is yourself, that’s a really 
dangerous thing. Well, obviously, in your day-to-day life, the only 
person you can change is yourself. But it cannot stop you from 
generating awareness of what actually is going on. The other person 
might refuse to change, but it’s not because you’re not showing that 
this is grossly unjust [7], And it really comes down to that: injustice. 
Would you have felt the gendered division of labour in the house?
Oh god, yes. But I  also fe lt a bit that I  took it all on, because I  wanted 
to be — perfect. In a way, there was a bit o f  the victim mentality about 
me. And i t ’s only in the last couple o f years I ’ve learned to do 
something about it [8], the kind o f power that came to me with the 
victim status [9J. I  think I ’ve learned, at least I ’ve learned to 
recognise it and in a lot o f cases, let it go. I  mean, I  used to do things 
like doing [my husband’s] laundry. I  don’t know why, well, I  do know 
why. I  thought I  had left behind the things I  had been brought up with 
[10], but I  still used to think, well, I ’m putting my clothes in the wash, 
so I ’ll put his in as well. But he never reciprocated. Now I  ju st don't 
do it. I  don’t care i f  he hasn ’t got — I  used to fee l sorry fo r  him i f  he 
didn ’t have clothes [11]. So it was only when I  learned to let go o f that 
stuff in myself that I  was able to make changes. So in a way I  kind o f  
agree that you can only change yourself, but that can certainly change 
the pattern. That’s why I  liked the Dance of Anger. That really helped 
me to look at things, the patterns [12], and to work out strategies. But 
that was one o f the reasons I  thought I  could never have a child, that 
that pattern, the division o f labour would be crystallised. And there 
was no way I  was going to get stuck in that. I  thought, maybe some day 
I  will learn to change it, but i f  I  have a child, I  won’t, it will be too 
late. That’s why I  really admire someone who manages to make 
changes after they have children, because I  think it must be exteremly 
difficult, because o f the emotional tie with your children. You ’re not
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What I think happened was something like you were saying about 
doing the laundry, that is that I never resented in any way doing things 
for the kids. But I resented having to clear our mutual space. Some of 
the mess was made by [her husband].
You don ’t mind clearing up after yourself.
Or your children, but after another adult I really hate. And what was 
really clear to me was that I fell into a pattern of looking after [her 
husband]. And when we had the children, it was established [14], And 
it was really so sick. And the solution, like not doing something — I 
mean, now I have absolutely no problem about not doing his side of the 
room or anything like that, but when I started that, I saw myself as this 
petty [15] person, who had drawn a line down at the end of the bed, 
and over that line wasn’t mine, whereas [her husband], he was too 
broadminded. It was petty of me, whereas he, he would never be 
caught up in these petty things. And if he was doing it, then he would 
do the whole lot. But of course, he never did it. So I was sort of 
seduced by this idea that what I was doing was being petty [16], he had 
of right, this sort of broad vision of us all being in this together. And 
yet I ended up doing the housework.
And did you try talking about this to him?
I ’d say that I tried everything. I tried talking, I tried sulking [17], I 
became really depressed. I used to fantasise about writing to his 
mother, saying ‘why didn’t you do this, why didn’t you do that?’ 
[laughter], making it out to be another woman’s fault.
And what marked the turning point, the turnaround?
No strategy that I came up with worked, that is, talking, sulking, 
fighting, crying, depression [18], I heard on a TV programme once that 
you have to fight for what you want, so I started fighting. But all it 
showed was how I powerless I was, it was just useless. So really what 
changed everything was my withdrawal from the family [19], It was, it 
was just so painful [20], And with that came a change. I was still doing 
work, but I was emotionally separated. And then I began to be 
physically more away from the house. With that, then, [her husband] 
made changes, cooking, he took more responsibility for housework. He 
started reflecting on his behaviour and things like that. That’s what 
changed it really [21],
He had no choice, i f  he wanted things done, he had to do them himself.
He had no choice with regards to the work. If he wanted a dinner, he
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going to neglect your children or see them neglected [13].
had to cook it. But the reflection part was of crucial importance [22], 
He really has changed. So while he was adamant about not changing, or 
about not seeing any flaws in himself, it was unbearably painful for me. 
But once he started changing, things became much easier [23], What 
was interesting about the dynamic that was keeping him unchanged, 
and that was my pressure. Do you know what 1 mean, that made him 
take up a defensive position [24], And I won’t draw any broader 
applications from that at all, but it certainly showed that I had to stop 
applying pressure, for him to change.
Well, I  have found something similar. That i f  I  apply pressure to [my 
husband], okay, he might do something different fo r  a short period. 
But i t ’s not a long-term change. But i f  I  withdraw a certain service, 
like the laundry service or something, not only does it make him wash 
his own clothes, but it does make him reflect a bit about, you know — /  
think it makes him realise how much time goes into it. Ihe very acts o f  
picking stuff o ff the floor and putting them in the machine and taking 
them out and hanging them up [25]
That’s right, because it looks like a trivial job, doesn’t it really?
Yeah. Shaking, folding, putting them into drawers when they ’re dry. 
When you could be sitting reading the paper or doing the crossword.
Yes. And then the mental space it takes up is crucial. I mean, that is the 
biggest difference I would see in [her husband] is that he never thought 
about what was going to be for dinner. Never, never. Now he has to 
say in the morning, what will we have for dinner this evening. And go 
to the shop, or whatever.
Comments
1, 3, 5. Strong feelings indicate contradictory positioning in feminist and 
feminine discourses. P20 positions herself as feminist, yet this is having no 
effect on relations. She is denied feminist agency and is positioned by her 
husband in a sexist discourse, as well as positioning herself in a sexist discourse 
with practical consequences, because she continues to do the housework.
2. The discourse of motherhood is inseparable from discourses o f ‘woman’ and 
she is positioned in this motherhood discourse also. These provide the 
positions which are most available, or ‘easiest’ to take up, in spite of her
237
simultaneous self-positioning as feminist, which she has done for many years.
4. A new situation helps her to see more about feminism. Yet, acting on the
terms of her new vision is not easy (cf Lewis, 1993: 183).
6. Statement of a central problem for heterosexual feminists.
7. Indicates the limitations of reasoning, argument, persuasion when striving 
for feminist agency.
8. Learning to act is equated with repositioning oneself with agency
9 .1 had already carried out some self-analysis in this regard.
10. Assumption that becoming a feminist meant that I had jettisoned sexist and 
‘feminine’ discourses.
11. But feeling sorry for my husband is in contradiction to the feminist 
discourses I had adopted.
12. Identification of what was previously repressed, or denied.
13. Recognition that discourses of motherhood are powerful and inseparable 
from discourses o f woman.
14. The dominant discourses of woman were what decided the pattern of her 
domestic work, although she had identified herself as feminist for many years.
15. Contradictions are experienced again. In feminist terms, not tidying after 
her husband is a success, but her use of the word ‘petty’ to describe herself 
indicates ambivalance, guilt, about not doing something which she decided on 
as a result of her feminism.
16. In reading herself as ‘petty’, she is reading herself through sexist 
discourses. These are the dominant discourses and they are part of the relations 
of power which affect the production of meaning or signification. The reading
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of herself which she makes through the more powerful or hegemonic discourse 
defines the situation and positions other subjects in relation to it. In this case, 
the positioning is in a discourse where mothers and wives are mature, 
broadminded, forgiving, generous and certainly not petty. This goes some way 
to explaining how Foucault’s power / knowledge couplet works.
17, 18. Again, the futility of reason and this time also, emotion, in effecting 
change.
19. The beginnings of changing a dynamic.
20. The emotional consequences of change. Her presentation of herself as 
somebody withdrawing is situated in contrast to her love for family. 
Discourses about women and / or feminists are never wholly free from the 
ideology of woman-as-mother, wives as generous and forgiving (see also note 
16). To act this way, by withdrawing, takes continuous struggle against 
dominant assumptions about who is responsible for the housework and family. 
And it still carries connotations of being unnatural.
21. 22. Although it is painful, there are gains: his work and his reflection.
23. A dynamic is changed, and it becomes possible to make different readings 
of the situation.
24. P20 has to change her discursive positioning through action, or, more 
accurately, through not acting. Neither reasoning, nor emotion (see comment 
17, 18) achieves this. By effecting change in her positioning in an agentic way, 
she interrupts her husband’s positioning in sexist discourses.
25. It must be clear by now to the reader that a lot of feminist signification 
within heterosexual relations for me is produced in the context of domestic 
laundry (my synchronic axis intersects here with feminist meaning along the 
diachronic axis).
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Commentary
Throughout the extract, P20 recognises the different forms that knowledge 
takes. Anger and frustration are forms of emotional knowledge which combine 
with feminist discourses. She recognises also that practices, in this case, 
heterosexual couple relationships, can be about other things, in this case, the 
maintenance of a patriarchal order.
P20’s new positioning, achieved through acting (in the form of stopping doing 
something, and withdrawal) is threatening an identity investment in the 
discourse of femininity and motherhood. Much dominant discourse says that 
women have to be either / or. If a woman is doing something feminist, then she 
cannot be ‘feminine’. Pain and feelings of contradiction, guilt or ambivalence 
arise because every woman’s discursive history (albeit in unique ways) has 
shown her that she can gain some power through being ‘feminine’. With power 
comes emotional investment. Therefore, consciously positioning oneself as 
feminist and therefore as ‘not feminine’ means leaving some of that power and 
divesting oneself of the related emotional investment. The dualism feminist / 
feminine does not exist solely ‘out there’ in discourses, but in women’s 
personal sense of themselves. People are never positioned in only a single 
discourse.
Being radical in a feminist context has long been connected to the degrees of 
activism one is seen to be engaged in (B. Ryan, 1992: 156 - 7). Activism or 
agency could be seen as doing things which achieve social relations that are 
radically different from in the past. It took P20 a long time, as she puts it. And 
this process of working on her individual development within this context has 
constructed her subjectivity in ways unique to her, out of an interactive 
relationship between her situation and feminist discourses. In addition, she 
recognises that politicised knowledge can be constructed in pedagogical 
relationships. They are sites for feminist activism.
P20. When [her first child] was about six months old, I wrote to [her local 
adult education organiser] and asked if I could do women’s studies. I
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wasn’t really clear about what women’s studies were, but I knew I 
could do it. And I knew that it came from that experience [of division 
of labour in the home]. And I suppose that was really my first 
translation into action.
That’s a direct connection between your situation in your home and 
wanting to be in education.
That’s right. Yes. And it was as clear as that. No doubt at all that one 
led to the other. And I felt really — that 1 was doing something as well.
And the fact that I could get paid for it as well was just wonderful. But 
I would actually have done it for nothing, I felt so strongly. It was a 
fantastic experience for me. I still couldn’t resolve lobbying, or — well,
I could lobby on a small scale and I could speak at meetings on a small 
scale. But this is really the way I am an activist.
i
7.5 Finely balanced strategies which depend on situations in the present 
moment
Even in the previous chapter (Chapter Six), where I discussed three feminist 
discourses separately, it was apparent in some of the analyses that the 
discourses broke down occasionally and did not have unitary explanatory 
power. This was due to the unique nature of each situation a feminist describes 
or finds herself in. In this chapter, I have used the concepts of movement, 
positionality, agency, choice, collusion and strategy, in order to discuss the 
weakening of the boundaries and the fluidity o f discourses in relational 
situations in the present. Through these concepts, meaning and signification are 
shown to be fluid also. How something signifies as feminist depends on both 
the discourse and the situation and the unique ways that these combine for 
feminists.
Achieving change in the arena of gender, in both personal and / or in social 
relations, is central to whether something signifies as feminist and to the 
construction and consolidation of the subjective sense of oneself as feminist.
Being proactive about feminism in certain situations can paradoxically mean
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the strategic playing down of feminist discourse. Behaviour or strategy like this 
could be described purely as contradictory. However, within the theoretical 
framework which I have adopted, acting thus is not just contradictory, but is 
evidence of the relational, dynamic and multi-layered nature of subjectivity. 
Nevertheless, the strategies are finely balanced. In playing down feminist 
discourses for strategic reasons, it is easy to become completely taken in by the 
dominant sexist discourses (cf Thompson, 1996: 12): We need to be vigilant, 
imaginative and courageous in order to make sure this does not happen (ibid).
P16. You have to be so careful. You want them to think you’re a decent 
human being, so that they will listen to you and your ideas and maybe 
change the ways they act. But if you’re too willing to listen, they 
assume you’re agreeing with them, and next thing, you’re being treated 
like one of them and it’s too late to pull back.
7.6 Multiple feminist subjectivities
I have demonstrated how different individuals draw on different resources in 
the course of their personal development as feminists. The process of 
construction of subjectivity is not a simple, linear process of evolution with a 
‘proper’ feminism as the teleological end of moving steadily and 
unidirectionally through successive positions. It is often debated whether 
Kristeva’s stages are to be seen as one better than the other, or as existing all 
at once (see Chapter Two, Section 3.5). The analyses which I have made in 
this work suggest that the stages are like various different options which are 
more or less continuously available to individual women and on which they 
draw in unique combinations, depending on relations in the present and then- 
own personal histories. Like Mama (1995: 117) in her study of black radical 
women, ‘What I wish to draw attention to here is the coexistence of subject 
positions and the movement of the individual between them in the present — in 
other words, the multiplicity of subjectivity’. In this section, I approach the 
point of entry to the multiplicity of subjectivity as the multiplicity of ways that 
acting in different relations in the present can signify as feminist.
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P4 shows awareness of multiple significations in the next extract. She contrasts 
a situation where she is with other feminists and where she does not feel 
vulnerable, to one where she has to interact with ‘men in suits’. Her feminist 
subjectivity takes a certain shape depending on the situation.
P4. I wouldn’t make any apologies for it, but I think it’s true, that you’re 
probably more comfortable with some groups than with others, 
especially if you are with groups of people that you know have similar 
ways of thinking. Some of my women friends who are involved at 
different levels within this organisation and in others would have -- you 
feel more comfortable and you feel easier and in fact, it’s funny, 
because we can also slag it off, which I would never dream of doing in 
another situation, make fun of ourselves. It’s very interesting. Also I 
feel much more comfortable when I’m doing work with the local 
voluntary groups and stuff like this, who are women, than I would, say, 
with statutory organisations, who are full of men in suits. I know I 
would not be less assertive, but I certainly would behave differently, 
because they would feel threatened by that. And I suppose you pick 
your circle of friends because they are kind of like you.
This extract illustrates P4’s recognition that feminist subjectivity is brought to 
completion by the group and is at least half constituted by the attributions of 
others. In her circle of women friends who are feminists, it is ordinary to be 
feminist. She has insider status. Having insider status creates a different 
dynamic from being on the outside. They can make fun of themselves, the 
situation is more relaxed. In situations like this, different kinds of feminist 
significations will emerge from those which will emerge where there is a 
dominant - subaltern dynamic. P4 would behave differently in such a situation, 
but would not consider herself less feminist.
Nevertheless, feminists in groups with other feminists create situations with 
their own power dynamics. If formal power relations are not present, then 
informal ones will operate. While a whole discourse and related practice has 
emerged in women’s groups, a discourse of inclusion and flattening out of 
hierarchy, this discourse is not unitary in its effects either. P6 speaks in the 
next extract about the difficulties that women as leaders can experience.
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P6. What I’m saying is that it gave a chance to look at what does — or can 
-- happen to women in leadership. All the feminist principles that we 
are all supposed to adhere to, go out the window. It can be very male, 
very hierarchical, let’s get the things done, and if you can’t take it, drop 
out.
There is no pure area where feminism could just get on with developing a 
feminist world without constraints from other discourses. In the social world, 
multiple discourses, including sexist ones, are competing, overlapping and 
co-existing. There is no clear-cut distinction between feminists and 
non-feminists. Feminism, whether among feminists or with non-feminists 
involved, has to interact with real-world sexist discourses and strive to be 
agentic, to have real-world consequences. P16 voiced this:
P16. Yes, of course it would be brilliant if you just had to work with other 
feminists all the time. I don’t just mean other women, because not all 
women are feminists, but with people who had a central concern with 
gender equality. I mean, I know that’s not enough on its own, but it 
means a lot, if people are feminist. And I’m not being naive either, I 
know that feminists disagree. I disagree with a lot of what people claim 
is feminist. I know that just us all being feminist wouldn’t be the answer 
to some of the things we face. But it would be just so nice to try it. I 
was listening to Hilary Mantel on the radio recently and she said, 
‘Feminism hasn’t failed, it hasn’t been tried’. I often think that it would 
be really nice to work with an organisation that had feminism built into 
its aims. And then I also think that, well, if I did that, there would be 
one fewer person rooting for feminist ideas and practices in schooling, 
schools would be more insulated from feminist and other egalitarian 
ideas if I wasn’t there. I just get on with it, really. My feminism takes 
on different shades depending on where I am and who I’m with and 
what I ’m trying to achieve. But it’s very important to get support from 
other feminists. And it’s important to me that other women would 
realise that it’s not always easy to be a right-on feminist in some of the 
situations we find ourselves in in schools. Now that P I7 and [another 
colleague] are here, things are so much better. There’s support and 
solidarity, even though we don’t always see things exactly the same.
Feminists juggle identities. None of the identities taken up is ‘false’. All are 
derived from the person’s experiences and knowledge of the various discourses 
and ways of being in the world (cf Mama, 1995: 121). Being multiple in this 
way would be characterised in traditional left political discourse as deserting 
principles. It would be pathologised in psychological discourse as not being
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authentic. But it can be retheorised as ‘normal’ or as politically acceptable once 
we view subjectivity as multiple and dynamic. The women cited in this chapter 
are describing their own movement between various subjectivities, displaying a 
skill that is developed and refined as they interact with all kinds of people, 
groups and situations. This kind of multiplicity is a feature of the complexity of 
contemporary political life. It is evidence of the subjectivity theorised by 
poststructuralism ‘... which is precarious, contradictory and in process, 
constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we speak’ (Weedon, 
1987: 33).
From a traditional left political point of view, this multiplicity would be seen as 
selling out or being incorporated into the dominant structures. Incorporation 
into the dominant structures is certainly recognised as a danger and I suggest 
that the keen political sense and commitment to feminism of the women cited is 
a factor which makes them aware of these dangers and helps them avoid such 
incorporation. The argument I wish to emphasise here, though, is that the 
dominant power structures are not monolithic and that feminist interactions 
with them can modify them and advance feminist discourses.
Social movements, including feminism, typically are treated in the media and in 
popular discourse as if their content is monolithic and non-contradictory (cf 
Holford, 1995: 103). Yet, in a relational, real-world context, these contents 
and discursive oppositions are less rigid, the dualism less apparent. The 
relational process can thus be seen as deconstructive in its practice. It 
deconstructs structures of power (in institutions, families, schools and 
businesses, for example). These constrain practice through providing a given 
form of social interaction (Connell, 1987: 92) However, as Hollway (1994: 
248) points out, ‘practice provides the dynamic of change’. ‘Practice, while 
presupposing structure ... is always responding to a situation. Practice is the 
transformation of that situation in a particular direction’ (Connell, 1987: 95, 
cited in Hollway, 1994: 248, original emphasis, already cited in Chapter One, 
Section 6). It is in the arena of pratice that new discourses may originate.
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The notion of collusion which I have used is consistent with the concept of 
multiplicity, in that it suggests we give up an emphasis on who has particular 
powers and instead move to questions of how specific situations or institutions 
offer access to various kinds of power (cf McDermott and Tylborg, 1987: 
167). Various situations in the present supply instructions to feminist 
participants about how to act effectively or with feminist consequences. ‘A 
topic does not become a topic just because somebody raises it; someone else 
must pick it up (Tannen, 1987: 8). Feminists raising feminist topics, that is, 
voicing feminist concerns and resistances, in a particular situation, need to get 
the other parties in the situation to collude with them. They need to get other 
people to interact with them on feminist terms. As Faith (1994: 39) puts it:
Resistance may take the explicit form of a counter-force doing political 
battle, a strategic play of forces ... Resistance may also be a 
choreographed demonstration of cooperation. The ‘willing victim’ may 
be operating from the vantage of strategic resistance, watching for 
openings and coalescing the fragmentary forms of resistance which, in 
combination, articulate a potential challenge to the status quo. The 
subject may know the experience of being in charge even as she is liable 
to the disciplines which claim her subjection. Foucault likens this 
process to the martial art of judo, proposing that sometimes ‘the best 
answer to an adversary maneuver is not to retreat, but to go along with 
it, turning it to one’s own advantage, as a resting point for the next 
phase’ (Baudrillard, 1987: 65).
In resisting, feminists draw on their knowledge of the multiple sources of 
feminism and where those sources overlap with the sources drawn on by the 
other members of the group. Boundaries can thus be seen as meeting points, 
rather than as battle lines (cf Kowalski, 1993: 180). The importance of the 
other has to be taken into account in any and every signification (Hollway, 
1982: 155). To communicate requires recognition of the other as both similar 
and different. Different situations provide opportunities for different subject 
positions. This facilitates both the social construction of the self, identity or 
subjectivity and also the reproduction and transformation of society (cf 
Stephenson et al, 1996: 184).
P16 and P17 draw on multiple sources of feminism when they draw on
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child-centered and human relations discourse (see Section 2.1). In the 
following extract, P6 acknowledges human relations in her approach to other 
people, but does not lose the challenge of feminist discourse.
P6. ... it doesn’t mean that you don’t challenge people. You might have to 
stop, and you have to respect where they are. I have learned to have 
much more respect for where people are at. And maybe when we stop 
at a certain place, they have things to say to me that I have forgotten 
about [1]. They can bring me back to that. So it’s very much that I 
have to learn myself all of the time [2], And both of us can do that. And 
of course, I’m still where I’m at too [3],
Comments
1. Recognition that subjectivity is multi-layered. She may have forgotten about 
aspects of her own learning about feminism, but they are still there.
2. Learning from ‘where other people are at’ is recognised as distinctly 
relational.
3. Where she is ‘at’ represents the discursive explanations and positions that 
she takes up and it exists in the same moment as her relations with other 
people who are differently positioned.
Commentary
For the feminists cited in this section, the relational aspect of feminist 
subjectivity exists simultaneously with their preferred discursive explanations 
and interpretations of feminism and feminist action. In taking up a relational 
position, one does not abandon the discursive positioning (Mama, 1995). They 
occur simultaneously, with movement between positions allowing one or the 
other to dominate at any particular moment. This is how I conceptualise 
multiplicity. It is based on contradictions, tensions and ambivalence. Some
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feminist women live more easily with multiplicity than others. Some feminists 
opt for more unitary views of women, of politics and of gender difference. As 
in Mama’s (ibid) study of radical black women’s identity, those who live most 
comfortably with ambiguity and multiplicity move in and out of various subject 
positions in the course of their social relationships and interactions with a 
diverse array of groups in their personal, political and working lives. They 
adopt a more or less conscious stance which arises out of a process of social 
and personal reflection. I posit, following Mama (ibid) and Hollway (1982; 
1989), that the self-reflection points to the simultaneous existence of 
psychodynamic processes within the individual.
7.7 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter has been suggested by a combination of my 
personal knowledge, my reading of theory and my readings of the data 
provided by the participants. In the next chapter, I combine this analysis with 
readings of psychodynamic processes, to give a further account of the 
construction of feminist subjectivities in the striving for feminist agency to 
disrupt the gender status quo. My theorisation of subjectivity implies that the 
discursive movements and relational processes observed in this present chapter 
are accompanied by psychodynamic processes within the individual and vice 
versa: psychodynamic processes have discursive (social and historical) 
relations-in the-present contents. In other words, ‘there is a constant resonance 
between psychodynamics and social experience in the construction and 
reproduction of the individual’s subjectivity’ (Mama, 1995: 133). I go into 
detail about some aspects of these processes in the next chapter, but want to 
point out their importance here. They are not separate from discursive 
movements, but for purposes of analysis, I have chosen to treat them in 
separate chapters.
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The key points established so far are:
• The signifier feminism achieves its meaning at points of intersection 
between discourses and relations in the present moment.
• The discourses occur along the diachronic (social and historical) axis of 
signification. The specific relation or situation in which significations are 
negotiated is referred to as practice. Practice occurs along the synchronic 
axis of signification (that is, the unique history of each person in discourse). 
This point is consistent with Hollway’s (1982) finding.
• The importance of the other (person or group) in the relation has to be 
taken into account in every situation where one wants to act in ways that 
signify as feminist.
• The multiplicity of discourses and situations and practices produces a 
multiplicity of feminist meanings and subjectivities.
• There are power differentials between discourses, both within feminism and 
between feminist and sexist discourses. These power differentials are 
reflected in situations in the present and they influence the choices, 
strategies and collusions which feminist women make, in pursuit of feminist 
agency and the transformation of practice.
• Different feminist discourses are drawn on, produced, or modified, 
depending on how they faciliitate feminist women to be agentic in the 
pursuit of feminist ends.
• Movement between or within discourses can take place as a result of a 
thought-out strategy, as a result of a formal pedagogical situation or as a 
less deliberate result of finding oneself positioned in a sexist discourse or in 
any kind of oppressive situation.
• Heterosexual couple relations are an important site for the transformation
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of the gender status quo. The disruption of structures of labour in the home 
is shown to be both relational and discursive, with accompanying 
psychodynamic processes.
• Choice, collusion, strategy, movement and positioning for feminist 
resistance and agency are important elements in the construction of 
feminist subjectivities.
• Any consideration of feminist subjectivities is incomplete without a 
consideration of collectivity.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
PSYCHODYNAMIC PROCESSES AND RADICAL 
SELF-REFLECTION
8.0 Introduction
Chapters Six and Seven have demonstrated that feminist subjectivity is both 
discursive and relational. This chapter examines how these dimensions of 
subjectivity exist in articulation with important psychodynamic components. In 
this way, the chapter examines how psychodynamic concepts can be used for 
the development of feminist poststructuralist discourses and the construction of 
feminist agency. This task is approached by analysing processes of 
self-reflection described by women positioned primarily in feminist Discourse 
Three, a discourse of multiplicity whose central tenet is the rejection of male / 
female dualism (See Chapter Six, Sections 5 and 6). The concept of 
psychodynamic processes provides an account of how an individual comes to 
be the particular person s/he is. It examines why a person habitually takes up 
some positions and not others and how and why a person comes to exhibit the 
characteristic reactions and behaviours that enable her to be known as an 
individual (see Mama, 1995: 130).
The chapter examines accounts of private and emotional change and the ways 
that such change is aifected by the discursive and relational contexts in which it 
takes place. The women cited use a process of radical self-reflection which 
further develops the explanatory power of a discourse of a multiple subject and 
undermines male / female dualism. The analysis of the self-reflection also shows 
how psychic life is relational and social, as opposed to being a purely 
intrapsychic and individual phenomenon. The psychodynamic dimension to 
meaning is seen to have effect at the two axes of subjectivity — synchronic and
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diachronic — which have already been discussed in Chapter Seven (Section 1) 
as the intersection of situation and discourse. In that way, the analysis draws on 
and develops the analyses of discourse and relations in the present, already 
begun in chapters Six and Seven. The chapter continues to use the concepts of 
positioning, movement and agency as analytical tools.
The self-reflection portrays ‘difficult emotional work’ (Lewis, 1993: 155) 
which is analysed by drawing on psychodynamic concepts of repression, 
splitting and projection. A recursive relationship between discourses and
psychodynamic processes is illustrated and the signification in the psyche of a
feminist discourse of multiplicity is theorised, adding to the theorisation of the 
signification of multiplicity in relations put forward in the previous chapter. 
Material which is repressed in the psyche is seen to be reproduced in discourse. 
For example, femininity which is repressed in feminist discursive positionings is 
seen to be reproduced in feminist practices. The chapter applies a
deconstructive approach to the analysis (See Chapter Two, Section 3.5) in 
examining how femininity and feminism are not dualistically opposed.
A feminist discourse of multiplicity emerges as complex and sometimes 
apparently contradictory. It is subaltern in both patriarchy and dominant 
feminist discourses. It requires and entails, in addition to awareness of different 
feminist discourses, awareness of the social and constructed nature of feelings 
and desires in oneself and others. This runs contrary to the dominant model of 
feelings in liberal humanist discourse, which sees feelings as an expression of an 
unsocialised part of the self. It also runs contrary to the essentialist discourses 
of woman which are the dominant discourses within feminism.
The women whose accounts are analysed in detail in this chapter identify most 
strongly with Discourse Three, characterised in Chapter Six as being
constructed on an awareness of multiplicity and an opposition to male-female 
dualism. They had both read drafts of Chapters Six and Seven, and my paper A 
Voyage Round M y Feminism (Ryan, 1995), before taking part in the 
discussions for this research. The textual reading of their accounts is more
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personal than the readings in the previous chapters and is part of an emerging 
tradition in feminist poststructuralist theorising. It looks at the intimate and 
immediate operations of power, but without divorcing it from its social 
context.
The accounts which are analysed in this chapter illustrate multiplicity being 
achieved through the participants’ recognition of their own simultaneous 
positioning in both feminine and feminist discourses. They illustrate the effects 
which these had on the practice of feminism within heterosexual couple 
relations, as well as on the practice of feminism with regard to other women 
and the effects on their own feminist identities. In both cases, investment in 
femininity was repressed initially, as a result of taking up positions in 
discourses of feminism. The expression and acknowledgement of their 
simultaneous positionings in discourses of femininity are interpreted by the 
women as revealing the multiplicity of their subjectivities and identities. This is 
seen to help them to produce knowledge about themselves and their 
relationships with other people which is mediated by feminist poststructuralist 
discourse. That is, they pushed forward the development of feminist Discourse 
Three (anti-dualism).
8.1 The need for an emotional dimension to feminism and change
PI 1 .1 mean, you can change all the structures in society, but if you haven't 
got people changed, to be able to cope with the changed structures and 
to be able to live with them, then they're going to go nowhere. [1] So 
it's like the women I was talking about earlier, — like, if they didn't 
learn the capacity to live with the changes in their structure [2], then 
they could have done the course and they could have gone home. But 
because they were able to learn how to deal with their feelings [3] and 
the changes, and to go home [4] and deal with the impact, they have 
stayed changed. But I just think that's really important. It's like — we 
can't go leaping over there. You have to have it in here, that people 
have the capacity to change [pointing to two angles of a triangle, the 
third of which is herself] and then go over there. It's like, I think that 
there's a step over there that needs to get done, in order to get 
straightforward. And personal development isn't just about going
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straight on there like that [5], I think, you know, career and economics 
and housing structure and family is — a really important part of -- you 
know, community change. But the internal organisation has to change 
as well. So I do think that we all need a time over here [pointing to the 
angle which is over to one side, indicating the internal content of 
change] — in really learning about ourselves and what our values are, 
what our beliefs are, and so on. So that then we can go back in there 
and be more effective [6], And that's why I get really critical o f people 
who run down personal development or therapy or, — you know, 
growth work, as if that's taking away from the revolution. I think so 
much of the revolution is just going to be reinventing the wheel, if we 
don't do some of that.
I f  you don't do that personal work, you —
You can’t sustain it. You just can’t sustain it. And I think, I mean, I did 
three years of psychoanalysis and I think that’s why I would be sort of 
— calmer — do you know what I mean?. Like earlier you were asking 
me — and I don’t wast my time knocking my head off a brick wall. And 
I think that’s because I did that. I mean, I would have been always 
doing it, but you know the way you just do it with friends or colleagues 
or reading psychology books or what ever. But then I said no, no, I 
have to go away and do something here. There's a whole load of things 
that need to get unbound [8],
Comments
1. Implies that not doing personal work has consequences for political change.
2. These women she is referring to have already made changes in their lives 
relating to working outside the home, childcare, labour in the home. P4 now 
draws attention to the need for parallel changes in the emotional construction 
of their home relationships.
3. Recognition of how emotional life is connected to change, that is, 
recognition of the intersection of discursive and psychodynamic processes. 
Also a recognition of how structures of labour and of cathexis (see Chapter 
One, Section 6) are connected in recursive ways.
4. Recognition of the impact of the taking up of positions in new discourses on
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home life in particular,
5. Recognition of the multiple nature of subjectivity and of its social and 
individual aspects.
6. Equates recognition of personal emotional investments with increased 
effectiveness, or, to use the theoretical term of this work, agency.
7. Implications of not doing personal work.
8. Implication that unbinding one’s emotional entanglements, or investments, 
allows for greater political agency. It is also implied that not doing it can result 
in withdrawal from the political arena.
8.2 Feminist emotional work within the heterosexual dynamic
This section takes up in more detail the dynamic within heterosexual couple 
relations, already referred to in the analysis of P20’s account in Chapter Seven 
(Section 4).
Before the following extract from her account, the research participant, P3, has 
been talking about her relationship with her husband. They are both formally 
well educated and have jobs in third-level education. They share a political 
outlook which is egalitarian and have both been involved in left-wing politics. 
P3 is particularly interested in the work of Julia Kristeva and we have discussed 
the three tiers of feminism (see Chapter Two, Section 4.5), earlier in our 
meeting. As part of her account, P3 discusses what she sees as her earlier 
failure to create the degree of egalitarianism she would have liked within her 
relationship with her husband, even though they were both committed to 
feminism and were economic equals. She describes the process by which she 
learned to make what she considers feminist changes in the relationship.
P3. I was just so depressed; I thought that I was the cause of all my own
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problems. In spite of all my feminist knowledge about the messages 
given to women and girls, and so on, I failed to see that I was buying 
into all of that [1], I was accepting my failure as a feminist as a 
personal failure, a personality deficiency, if you like, that the 
relationship could not be made more equal. That deep socialisation was 
there and I didn't recognise it for ages. Actually, on the surface, when I 
spoke to him, I was blaming him for all the problems in the relationship, 
but now when I look at it, I think that deep down I was really angry 
with myself, that I really blamed myself for not being able to cope with 
it [2], Here was this feminist [3], supposedly knowing about equality 
and all that, who still couldn't make her own relationship work. I mean, 
he would say to me: 'what do you want me to do? You're the one who 
wants changes, tell me what I should do?1 And I did take on all the old 
shit about being responsible for the relationship, managing, caring, all 
that, I took it on deeply [4], Any good feminist would have left, I 
thought, but I didn't want to [5],
So what happened?
Well, things were so bad in the end that we did separate. I wanted him 
to come to counselling with me, but he wouldn’t, so 1 went by myself. I 
felt like a complete mess.
What were the outcomes?
I learned a lot about myself [laughs] — God, I learned so much [6], I 
can't go into the whole thing, but one of the things I learned was about 
my own manipulation of [her husband], I always felt that he 
manipulated me, that he pushed my buttons, to use that phrase. I felt 
that he had all the power emotionally in our relationship, because he 
was able to walk away, while I ranted and raved and got all upset over 
his lack of participation in the housework and the emotional and caring 
work. Slowly it dawned on me that I was also manipulating him. I was 
getting what I wanted out of those situations too, because after every 
row, we eventually made up, and he apologised for walking out, and 
told me he loved me [7], The counselling helped me see [8] all the 
patterns that I was trapped in. For a good while, I blamed myself 
totally, which was wrong too, but then I learned to tell the difference 
between taking responsibility for my part in the destructive patterns and 
blaming myself [9], The next step I suppose was to see how to change 
the patterns. I realised that I was getting a lot of power out of those 
patterns, that it is very hard to disagree, for an educated man like him 
to disagree with the idea that he should share the housework [10], So 
that gave me power, I mean, he agreed with feminism, that was one of 
the reasons he got to know me in the first place, was because I was — 
we were politically very much in tune about a lot of things [11],
Of course, I knew that women tended to do the emotional work in
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relationships and that I tended to do it in our relationship, but I didn’t 
see for ages that I was getting something out of it, a payoff, if you like, 
from continuing to do this, this emotional work. I could claim victim
[12] status, I could say to him, ‘I have to do it, because emotional work 
needs to be done, it’s really important, and you won’t do it’. I was able 
to make him feel both inadequate and a lazy sod at the same time, 
because we both knew that it was good to be able to do emotional 
work, to be able to express feelings and that sort of thing [13], So — so 
that meant he was inadequate and by his laziness in not even trying, he 
was dumping more work onto me, so he was also being oppressive. 
Because of his own politics, he knew that I had a point, so he felt guilty
[14], But he didn’t make any changes, I mean, that’s what really got 
me. Talking to him about this, at the times when we tried to talk 
rationally and calmly about it, he said that he felt I had all the power
[15]. And I felt that he had all the power. It was a complete mess, as 
far as I could see. Of course, talking about it didn’t solve it, I needed to 
do [16] something. He didn’t make changes because he wasn’t really 
motivated to make them, and I continued to act the same old ways, 
which meant he was allowed to act the same old ways as well. In fact, 
it wasn’t really that I needed to do something, as much as that what I 
needed to do was to stop [17] doing something, doing certain things. I 
would agree with your analysis of yourself that you had double power 
in a way, in your relationship, because you were both the feminist and 
the caring, feminine one. In a relationship with a man interested in 
equality — that seemed very familiar to me [18],
How did you make the changes you talked about, when you said you 
had to stop doing things?
The counsellor asked me to look at how [19] we had reached this 
division of labour, not what the division of labour was, because I knew 
that already, God, did I know it, I knew exactly how much I did and he 
didn't do. But what she got me to do was to look at the ways that this 
had happened, been allowed to become the pattern [20], It was very 
painful, very, very difficult for me, because I realised just how much a 
part I played in it [21]. She helped me to see what I had been getting 
out of the situation, the payoffs [22], as we learned to call them. I 
blamed myself totally for a while, saw myself as a complete failure as a 
feminist [23], But then, I learned to make small changes, I read Dance 
o f Anger [Lemer, 1985], it was very helpful.
I found it much easier to give out to him for not doing his share, but to 
continue doing his share myself, than I found — well, it was much easier 
and familiar for me to do that [24], than to actually stop doing his 
share, or doing things for him [25], I kept complaining to the 
counsellor about how he wouldn't do things in the house. She would 
say to me things like, 'why are you doing them for him?' and I would 
reply that somebody had to do it. But of course, then I could take the
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moral high ground. I mean, I knew that he, as somebody who professed 
a commitment to equality, would feel guilty at not doing his share. So I 
was always in the right [26], In the end, I realised that this was giving 
me power, but it wasn't the sort of power that was helping me get the 
changes I wanted [27], I had a very strong sense of myself as a political 
person, in the outside world, but in my home life, I felt that there were 
no boundaries [28], I couldn't get any of the things I wanted, like — like 
the sort of equality I wanted in this relationship, but I knew that a lot of 
people — that the relationship looked good from the outside [29], I 
didn't know what emotions I was experiencing most of the time. Rage, 
anger, they were the dominant ones. But I didn't know what to do with 
them. When I got angry, he said things like, 'you're perfectly right', but 
he wouldn't talk about it, he just withdrew, either by walking out, or by 
refusing to talk about it [30], Jesus, I've talked so much, it's supposed 
to be the three of us —
PI. No, go o n , it's okay.
M m n...
I didn't know how to recognise, let alone manage, all the raging 
emotions I was feeling [31], Sometimes, he accused me of being 
completely over the top, impossible to reason with [32], But on the 
other hand, my emotionality and my feeling side were things he said he 
liked in me: I mean, this was when we talked rationally about things, 
the ways that I cared for people and had so many friends — all that 
[33].
What I realise now is that I had a lot of power through being the feeling 
one, that's like you, Anne, talked about in your paper [34], But also my 
feminist, analyses gave me a lot of power. I was able to analyse our 
relationship from a feminist perspective. That gave me power. But I 
wasn't able, hadn't a clue how to work [35] on a relationship from a 
feminist point of view. Really, I suppose, that’s what I got out of the 
counselling — the work I did with the counsellor — I learned how to 
actually get what I wanted, make changes, not just to analyse and 
blame all the time [36], And blaming could be sometimes myself, 
sometimes other people, especially [her husband].
Comments
1. ‘Buying into’ the ‘messages’ can be analysed as accepting the positions 
made available through a discourse of femininity, which is the classic story for
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women.
2. Acceptance at the time of giving her account that she once positioned herself 
in a discourse of femininity, but repressed this for a time.
3. Reflexive and interactive positioning in a feminist discourse by herself and 
others. In such positioning, feminists know the answers, they know what is 
wrong, so they should know how to ‘fix’ the situation. A discourse of the 
rational unitary subject facilitates this perception.
4. Simultaneously (that is, at the same time as the positioning in discourses of 
feminism), she is positioned in a discourse of femininity. In such a discourse, 
the woman is supposed to take care of relationships and emotions and to be 
good at it ‘naturally’. This is supposed to be a trait of the unitary female 
subject. Nevertheless, P3’s experience is contradictory.
5. Evidence of her reflexive positioning in a discourse of ‘real feminism’. It is 
also evidence of her refusal of the unitary subject of this discourse. In spite of 
the contradictions she is experiencing, she wants to continue in the relationship, 
rather than withdraw. By continuing in the relationship, she is going against a 
certain feminist orthodoxy, but is increasing her chances of constructing 
something outside this orthodoxy.
6. The process is recognised as pedagogical in nature.
7. Projection of the undesirable act of manipulation onto the other (in this case, 
the male) and simultaneous repression of manipulation in oneself.
8. Recognition of own previous projections and repressions.
9. Failure to recognise repressed material resulted in blame being placed on her 
from two discursive sources: feminist and feminine.
10. 11. He positions himself and is positioned by her in feminist discourse, 
which says that men should do housework. This gives her a feminist power to
259
make him feel guilty, because he accepts the feminist arguments, but does not 
act on them.
12. Separatist feminist discourse can be interpreted as positioning women as 
victims, which could facilitate this view of the woman in a heterosexual couple 
relationship. Again, the notion of woman as victim is based on a unitary view 
of the subject.
13. They are both positioned also in a human relations discourse which 
emphasises the importance of emotional literacy. He is guilty of failing to 
become literate, within the terms of this influential discourse.
14. In the terms of the feminist discourse which constructs their relationship, he 
is also guilty.
15. Both make completely different readings of the situation. He recognises the 
power conferred on her by her positioning in and taking up of positions in a 
socially dominant discourse of femininity. He does not say this outright, at least 
according to this account, possibly because he knows that in the feminist 
discourse that they share, this is not acceptable. Yet he recognises her power. 
Because something is not articulated or recognised, this does not mean that it 
has no effects. At the point that she is describing here, she has not recognised 
this positioning in femininity and the power it can confer on her in heterosexual 
relations. At this point, none of the discourses that either of them is positioned 
in is capable of moving forward the situation.
16. Recognition of the situational and relational nature of the situation and the 
need to act.
17. Recognition that she is maintaining the situation unchanged.
18. Recognition that I have helped to construct this account, through my 
relationship with the research participant.
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19, 20. Points to the need to deconstruct the situation, to examine the 
processes that brought her here.
21. Evidence of her investment in the outcomes of the processes. They are very 
much part of her subjectivity, even though she has repressed them, because of 
her desire to be feminist.
22. Recognition of her power through her positioning in feminine discourse.
23. Effects of positioning in real feminist discourse again.
24. Positioning as feminine is socially approved, it is easy, it is like ‘second 
nature’ for many women.
25. Feminist positioning exists simultaneously with feminine positioning.
26. Feminist discourse positioning her powerfully.
27. Explicit recognition of the power she achieved through taking up feminine 
positions. But also a recognition that for a feminist, there is little movement 
available through take-up of such positions.
28. Constant and rapid shifting of discursive positions, without recognising 
what is going on. That is, while still denying or repressing the existence of one 
of the discourses and one’s take-up of positions in it, such shifting leads here to 
a feeling of oneself as a decentered subject. Because of the dominance of the 
unitary rational model of the subject, this is how people most often interpret 
experiences of contradiction.
29. Recognition that power is more than economic and material issues.
30. Connection with having your topic picked up, as discussed in Chapter 
Seven (Section 6). Movement and creation of new positions are relational 
processes. As well as having a new idea or concept existing at an intellectual
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level, they need interaction with others in order to have practical effects.
31. Pointing to the necessity of dealing with the emotions as social phenomena.
32. Effect of positioning in a dominant liberal humanist discourse, which 
includes liberal feminism. Such positioning can facilitate a reading of excess 
emotionality as irrational and therefore as weak.
33. Simultaneously with her positioning as weak [32 above], she is positioned 
as strong This is an effect of both discourses of femininity and of difference 
feminism, which read emotionality as women’s special domain and strength.
34. Reading her own situation retrospectively, giving it meaning in time: a 
meaning different from what it had at the time it was happening.
35. 36. Distinction between rational analysis of an emotional situation and 
actually doing emotional work in a given situation. Indication of a need to 
move towards praxis.
Commentary
At first I do not win these fights, because of love. Or so I say to myself. If I 
were to win them, the order of the world would be changed, and I am not 
ready for that. So instead I lose the fights, and master different arts. I 
shrug, tighten my mouth in silent rebuke, turn my back in bed, leave 
questions unanswered. I say, ‘Do it however you like’, provoking sullen 
fory from Jon. (Atwood, 1988, cited in Goodrich, 1991b: 9)
Even within an egalitarian relationship (cf Hochschild, 1990a), femininity can 
confer power on women. Feminist women are still positioned interactively in 
discourses of femininity, which gives them a certain power which they may be 
reluctant to recognise. But even if not recognised, the positioning continues to 
have effects on relations and on subjectivity. Repressing the knowledge of this 
and the of take-up of positions within femininity serves to reproduce the 
discourse unchanged (Hollway, 1982). Recognising it, on the other hand, can
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have major effects in terms of movement, a sense of agency and discursive 
interventions. The discourse of femininity is not abandoned, but can be 
reproduced in different ways, mediated or filtered through a feminist awareness 
of the multiplicity of the subject. Identifying a repressed attachment to or 
investment in femininity can lead to the pushing forward of psychic 
development and the parallel construction of a discourse of multiplicity, in 
which one’s construction as both feminine and feminist can be made use of. 
Analysing events through feminist discourses which rely on a model of the 
subject as unitary (whether unitary female or unitary male) cannot explain 
feelings of deep attachment to certain positions in feminine discourses.
P3’s account shows her identifying repressed elements of a situation that arose 
as a result of her own politics. So the emotional work and the identification of 
emotional investments which she did as a result of her work in counselling is 
not just therapeutic at an individual level. It is therapeutic at a political level 
and is a politicised practice of therapy and emotional work. She also identifies 
the process as pedagogical. The comments highlight an earlier confused 
switching of positioning and take-up of positions between several discourses of 
feminism and a discourse of femininity and, before the counselling work, a 
denial or repression of positioning in feminine discourses, with attendant 
feelings of contradiction and confusion. Her recognition of the tensions 
between the different positionings has allowed movement to take place. Her 
refusal to adhere to one single explanation based on one discourse has had the 
effect of disrupting the model of the unitary subject.
P3 has read her situation retrospectively, giving it meaning in time which is 
different from what it had been at the time the of events she describes. A 
radical and politicised reflection on the situation, facilitated by the counselling 
process, has allowed her to construct a different meaning, and to construct 
herself as an agent capable of making a discursive intervention. This discursive 
intervention moves both her and her husband beyond all the discourses they 
have been seen to be positioned in throughout the account. These are not
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jettisoned, they remain part of their identities, but, through the identification of 
the repressed, the reproduction of femininity and emotionality in the same old 
traditional ways is stopped. In the space that is thus cleared, new discourses 
can emerge. These may exist at a practice level at first, as Hollway (1995) 
suggests.
Practice is not the same as full discourse, in that it does not provide 
recognisable discursive positions which people can take up. But it is a 
forerunner of discourse in that it is produced in language. Practice which does 
not reflect either dominant culture or dominant feminist discourses will be hard 
to maintain. This is acknowledged by P3 in her comments on my analysis, in 
Section 2.1 below, The social is seen to be implicated in reflection on 
experience (Stephenson et al, 1996: 184) and the new is always constrained by 
pre-existing discourses, structures and practices.
8.2.1 P3’s comments on the analysis of her account
After making the analysis above of her account, I sent it to P3 and asked if she 
would like to comment.
P3. Like PI said during our discussions, I can admit this only to other 
feminist women, and not just to any feminists, but to people who have 
made some of the same realisations as I have. Before we talked, we had 
both read your paper and I had seen in you some of the things that I 
have found important for myself.
I was able to say 'no' in lots of areas, but not at home. A very important 
lesson for me was to learn not to do things, not to say something, not 
to fix things up, which would maintain the situation, as you put it, and 
to let him deal with the consequences. Having separated was good, 
because when we came back together, I had different habits, we both 
expected things to be different.
Earlier, I agree, I had double power: I was feminist and feminine. Being 
feminine made me powerful to him (even though it also made me 
powerless at the same time, because it proved to both him and to me 
that feminism was not successful, that I was either a failure or a
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hypocrite.). He experienced me as always having power, if I wasn't 
being assertive and feminist, then I was being feminine, baking, fixing, 
maintaining friendships, expecting him to be grateful to me. He always 
said, when I complained, 'I never asked you to do it'. That was certainly 
true and I disempowered him by doing everything for him in that line. 
Learning not to do that sort of thing was very hard. But it was really 
worthwhile.
I was manipulative. If you're repressing femininity, you are denying 
your manipulativeness, you're claiming that you've left femininity 
behind, with all that that implies, but maybe you haven't. I know I 
hadn't. I probably still haven't left it behind. I have to acknowledge that 
it is always going to be a part of me and I have to learn to accept that 
and not hate myself for it, and accept the contradiction and confusion 
that that can bring to me as a feminist. It is deeply ingrained, and it was 
deeply ingrained in me, this way of getting my partner to like me, to do 
something like bake or make the house nice, or do the emotional work. 
And although I denied it, it was there. When I recognised it, I could 
deal with it as a feminist. But before I recognised it, I simply did not 
know how to deal with it.
The Dance o f  Anger has a lot of stuff about 'change back' messages 
that you get from the people around you when you make changes. But 
I didn't experience this. I really think that's because [her husband] had a 
commitment to equality. He didn't really know how to change, and I 
suppose he didn't feel uncomfortable enough to try to find ways to 
change, but once I made the changes in my patterns, he changed in 
response.
8.2.2 Emotionally charged relations and cathectic structures
Heterosexual relations provide a fertile site for the production of new feminist 
discourses of emotionality concerning gender identity. In addition, heterosexual 
couple relations provide the sites where feminism is hardest pressed. I contend 
that this is due to the social construction of cathexis, underpinned as it is by 
emotional investments (Hollway 1994), and its implications in power relations. 
This leads me to an attempt to deconstruct the power / emotion binary, where 
power is seen as social and cultural and emotions and feelings are seen as 
unmediated expressions of a core individual. This attempt reflects the 
poststructuralist concern with deconstructing the individual / society dualism.
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Strong emotions have already been used in this work (Chapter Seven, Section 
4) as evidence of contradictory positioning in different discourses.
Most feminist discourses recognise heterosexual relations as a key site for both 
the maintenance and the disruption of patriarchal relations. But the responses 
of difference feminisms tend to be either separatism or an inversion of the old 
binary whereby the feminine is extolled. The accounts analysed here show 
engagements where power is shifted radically, rather than inverted. Separatism 
and inversion can exist together where women try to have nothing to do with 
‘maleness’, < and avoid heterosexual relations and extol female virtues. Or 
feminists can try to bring the inversion into heterosexual relations, and extol the 
superiority of femaleness there. Neither of these responses is capable of 
subverting power and of challenging the gender status quo in ways that are 
truly radical.
Anxiety and discomfort with traditional feminine roles in domestic and personal 
heterosexual relations can lead women to take up positions in feminist 
discourses, but because of the multi-layered nature of subjectivity, traditional 
feminine identity is not discarded, but continues to be present and to produce 
significations for each individual. In examining the emotional dimension of 
subjectivity, then, I am examining in detail the emotional consequences of 
positioning oneself in feminist discourses, especially in the discourse which 
embraces multiplicity (Discourse Three), with accompanying anxieties and 
contradictions. These anxieties and contradictions are pronounced in 
heterosexual couple relationships. Particularly in egalitarian couple 
relationships, power is seen to be more than an effect of material or economic 
issues. At the same time, I take into account the emotional consequences of 
being positioned in sexist discourses, which is an experience common to all 
women, including feminist women.
Analysing heterosexual couple relationships carries with it the danger of a 
focus on individuals which ignores power relations. This is the major critique of 
therapy and counselling interventions which exist within liberal humanist
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metadiscourses (see Kitzinger, 1987: 197, 8; Goodrich, 1991a). In this chapter, 
I am looking at relationships and the emotions involved in them, but within a 
specific power analysis. I am doing this with a view to investigating how the 
focus on relationships within women’s personal development courses can also 
be done with a social power analysis, while still meeting women’s stated needs 
for attention to the personal.
The next section (Section 3) summarises the feminist moves made possible by 
politicised self-reflection, such as that analysed so far in this chapter. The 
following section (Section 4) demonstrates that such analysis is not confined to 
heterosexual relations, but can also be applied to feminist women’s relations 
with other women.
8.3 New positions: moves suggested by a psychodynamic analysis
Following Mama (1995), I use the term ‘moves’ to suggest how 
psychodynamic analysis can enable one to take up new positions. These moves 
are:
• the identification of repressed material through radical reflection outside 
dominant humanist discourse, on feelings of contradiction or conflict, 
symptomatised by being ‘stuck’ in one’s feminism and often accompanied 
by depression and extreme expressions of anger
• the identification of investments in femininity and thus of sources of power 
which may have been unacknowledged, which were keeping a dynamic 
unchanged
consciously divesting oneself of the types of power conferred on women 
through sexist discourses (this power exists, even if it is repressed in sexist 
discourses), in order to further feminist agency and with the effect of
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pushing forward feminist anti-dualist discourses.
These processes seem to be ongoing (cf Mama 1995: 134). P3 discusses her 
experiences of them in the context of a heterosexual dynamic. In the section 
that follows, I use material gathered from P 1 in the same discussion, about her 
relationships with and attitudes to other women, particularly non-feminist 
women. I use the account to further demonstrate the existence of repressed 
material about femininity and investments in feminine positions and the way 
that acknowledgement of these phenomena may result in transformatory 
experiences.
The analysis develops the two points which I have begun to explore: first, that 
every situation has psychodynamic aspects which are related to the discursive 
and relational aspects. Second, that no discourse, including feminist discourses, 
is without power relations, but that the self-conscious divestment of the power 
which can be an (albeit unconscious) outcome of the take-up of feminine 
positionings, can result in an increased ‘power to’, or agency. That involves a 
recognition that the knowledge and discourses constructed by feminists are not 
devoid of their own power relations any more than mainstream discourses (cf 
Hollway, 1982: 290). But awareness of psychodynamic processes within a 
discursive context which recognises multiplicity can assist a critical relationship 
with these power relations.
8.4 P i’s account: femininity and feminism
PI. You asked us in your letter to think about where we had been stuck 
and where things had been — become unbound. I suppose I thought — 
used to think -- that what should happen was that I should challenge 
other women, challenge their internalised oppression, the awful things 
they believed about themselves, get them to be more assertive, get 
away from that awful passive, door-mat stuff that women did. I thought 
they should just say no, as it were. I suppose, really, I thought I could 
get them to be more like me. I pitied them for being blind to their own 
oppression. I thought — if they would only look at themselves in a 
politicised way. I thought that would be very radical and that that was
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how my activism should take shape. But that’s where I got stuck, that 
wasn’t happening, and I was getting more and more frustrated. But you 
know something? What I needed to do — and this was the most radical 
thing I could have done in the circumstances [1] — was to, I needed to 
look at my own internalised oppressions and work out how they were 
leading me to be stuck.
The most important thing I learned was that I am not so different from 
them, you know, I’m not so different [2] from those poor, weak 
women that I pitied and despised at the same time. Exploring the ways 
that I was like them was exceptionally liberating [3], I realised that I 
was very like a lot of so-called traditional women [4]. I hadn’t managed 
to get rid of all that stuff that I saw other women doing — the caring, 
the working too hard, taking on too much responsibility, always being 
available to help out, or to get someone out of trouble [5]. I saw other 
women doing it in relation to their families. I saw girls and young 
women doing it — trying to please. But I didn’t see it in myself for a 
long time [6], because, well, I had, you know, a different lifestyle. I 
wasn’t in a relationship with a man, I was single, financially 
independent, all that. But I was doing those things in my own circle of 
friends and colleagues anyway. I always had to be giving, caring, 
sorting things out, available for people, lending them money. I wasn’t 
much of a listener, though, I can see that now, looking back. I actually 
realised that my self-esteem was very low. In some ways, I cringe when 
I say it, because I know how some people slag all that as trendy liberal 
jargon [7] — but it was — that’s how it was for me. I read the Gloria 
Steinem book [Steinem, 1993] and, I suppose I just recognised a lot of 
myself in it. I was really all caught up in meeting my ‘obligations’ — 
you know, what I felt were obligations [8],
How did it change?
At my lowest, when I was really depressed and fed up, I was invited to 
lunch with some friends and I met a women I liked a lot. She talked 
very openly about herself. She was clearly feminist and very politicised 
and of course that made me pay attention to her from the start. She also 
talked a lot about her emotions in relation to a project she was involved 
in, but it was very different from the kind of talk about emotions I was 
used to. It wasn’t the sort of analysis I was used to, but it wasn’t 
counselling jargon or pop psychology individualist shit either [9], She 
just talked about what she had experienced in a work situation and how 
she had dealt with it. I was really struck by her capacity to — to 
understand why she acted in certain ways and, also, not just to 
understand, but to do something about it, something that made her 
change the situation, or, you know, to get things moving. Later, I said 
to her that I ’d love to be able to understand myself so well. She 
recommended the Steinem book and The Dance o f  Anger [Lemer, 
1985], I’d heard of the Steinem book, but of course, not being tuned
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into that kind of thing, I hadn’t really paid any attention to it.
Reading Steinem, and doing some of the relaxation and visualisation 
and reflection that she talks about, I developed a self-awareness that 
has made me feel much more whole as a feminist. I used to get angry 
about being taken-for-granted. I did the ‘poor me’ thing a lot. I blamed 
other people for asking too much of me. And at the same time, you 
know, like I said, I was really pitying traditional women for doing the 
same things in their family and with their partners [10.] I really couldn’t 
let go of the idea that I had to be the great — the great — I don’t know 
— the fixer, the earth mother, the all knowing, all — [11]. You know, 
I ’d have done anything for people, I ’d take classes for colleagues, help 
them out, give people money. I never said no. And I was doing all this 
in the name of feminism. I mean, that’s not something I shouted about, 
but to myself, that’s what I thought. I suppose I was a bit smug, really. 
I saw myself as superior [12], I simply couldn’t say no to people who 
asked me to do things or get involved in something. And not only that, 
but, you know, I volunteered to do things, I constantly took on too 
many responsibiities, and then I would end up exhausted and resentful 
And eventually, I began to feel that this was an oppressive situation
[13], Eventually, I had to look at my own impulses towards this way of 
being — this way of being all things to everybody and at the same time 
being, well, feeling so superior and so elite, but at the same time so 
put-upon. You know, I considered myself to be more aware than other 
people, I thought that non-feminist women suffered from false 
consciousness. I was really quite socialist in my feminism, I didn’t like 
the Mary Daly stuff and I didn’t like the Carol Gilligan stuff either. To 
me, that was just too much like the stuff I was trying to leave behind
[14]. And in spite of all that, here I was, doing all the really feminine 
things, just like they were [15],
But I suppose what was the hardest thing for me to come to terms with 
was that I had created the situation for myself [16] — no, actually, I 
think the worst thing was that I began to understand that I hadn’t really 
always liked other women, especially so-called traditional women. They 
were too weak [17], they needed me to sort them out, to tell them how 
oppressed they were, but even when I did, they couldn’t see what I was 
talking about [18], And I made a point of not needing anyone. I was 
able to fix my own car, do my own household repairs, I was fit and 
strong, it was very important to me to be different from other women in 
that way, to be able to do anything that other women relied on a man to 
do [19].
But of course, I can see now, that wasn’t enough — really, I was a bit 
of a mess, too, by the time I began to learn something about my 
emotions. Funny, isn’t it, how you are interviewing us with so much in 
common.?
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Well, you know, what I'm  most interested in is women who have fe lt 
stuck, or in a mess, and how they managed to get past that feeling o f  
being stuck and still remained — retained— a political sense and a —a 
commitment.
I know, I just think it’s interesting. Well, anyway, — Jesus, up to that, I 
hadn’t a clue abut my emotions — no understanding of them at all. And 
I would do anything for other people, but I wouldn’t listen to them, 
and if I was talking to them, it was always in a very analytic way, very 
rational, rationalising everything. I thought I was really good at talking 
about feelings, but I was just good at analysing them, not at doing 
anything about them. I’d never really worked on my emotions, I had 
never been in a situation where I opened up about anything apart from 
my anger. I didn’t really trust other women, or anyone, enough to do 
that. I didn’t want to identify with other women, because — why? I’m 
not sure, well, I have a good idea — really, I know this sounds a bit 
confused, but I didn’t want to identify with feminine things, with 
femininity [20], Yet, I was doing feminine things, in the ways I was 
acting. And I suppose those ways were giving me a power [21] because 
I was always the caring, good one. I didn’t accept the label feminine 
about myself, but I did things traditionally associated with femininity, 
all the same [22], And when I realised a lot of this stuff, I went through 
a time when I really hated myself even more, I was very low, I blamed 
myself for being so stupid. I questioned whether feminism was possible 
at all [23],
I had to learn to be nice to myself, good to myself, stop driving myself 
so hard. I had to stop blaming myself. When I read your paper, I felt 
that I could talk meaningfully to you about all of this [24], I learned to 
accept parts of myself. In a way, that seems like the exact opposite of 
what I — what a feminist needs to do. But it wasn’t a matter of 
accepting them and things staying the same. Through some kind of 
acceptance of myself, of the feminine parts of my being, through me no 
longer fighting them, things began to change. I accepted that, yes, I 
was like many other women, in a lot of respects. I feel sometimes like I 
became a nicer person and that by becoming nicer, that created some 
sort of space for change to happen [25],
How do you mean — what sort o f  change?
I felt so blocked, I felt that my feminist aspirations were getting 
nowhere [26], I just got angry all the time about injustice and about the 
lack of progress on feminist issues. And my anger was futile, it got me 
no results. I was very depressed at that time, because I could see no 
way out. I felt completely and totally hopeless. Just — focusing on 
myself, becoming nicer to myself and becoming a nicer person,
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accepting myself more, I became more accepting of other people. 
Wanner, better able to relate. I think I understood more about my own 
emotions, so I could understand other people’s emotions too — not 
understand them, exactly, but understand the strength of them, how 
they can hold you back, or keep you in a certain place [27], I seemed to 
mellow — and I don’t want this to be taken as becoming more tolerant
— but I just — in mellowing, I got a much better view of other people, 
and that included that there didn’t have to be just one right way for 
feminist change to happen [28], I didn’t feel the need to be in control of 
situations all the time. I learned to relax and to listen to other people 
and being much more sure of my own feelings and emotions, I became 
much more assertive, instead of being aggressive. I mean, I — there 
was a real feeling of before and after. I ’m just sorry sometimes that I 
didn’t learn all this sooner, but, anyway, I didn’t. So — I suppose, 
though, if I had got into the personal stuff earlier, I mightn’t have had 
the political resources to help me have this kind of outcome, I might 
have got much more into myself and left politics behind [29],
I did get very into myself for a while. I suppose I was making up for 
lost time. I learned to relax and to feel more creative. I did some 
courses in group personal development and in — that’s what got me 
started in personal development work, facilitation. I learned to be more 
open about my emotions in groups. I loved The Dance o f Anger. I 
loved that because it stayed political and gave hope for the future — the 
other books in the series as well, The Dance o f Intimacy and The 
Dance o f  Deception. I knew I didn’t want to be side-tracked into navel 
gazing or all that personal growth stuff, without a feminist and political 
perspective [30], But I really needed this, I devoured it, it was really — 
I felt like I had finally acquired the last piece in the jigsaw of myself. 
And what was really exciting was that I could do that stuff, the 
personal stuff, without having to leave my politics behind, just like you 
were saying earlier. I mean, the way that Lerner talks about the patterns
— it was just like a revelation to me.
And I didn’t lose my anger — you have to hang onto anger, but now I 
had a different way of hanging onto it and dealing with it. Because I 
couldn’t cope with my anger before, I often felt I was like a child, not 
fully mature, or it was easy to dismiss me because I was immature or 
over the top, an irrational female [31], I ’d try to control it, keep it in 
[32], but then it would get too much for me and I ’d explode or get 
depressed [33]. But -- yes, that was it, really — starting with The Dance 
o f Anger, I learned how to use my anger, how to state my case and 
then how to do something constructive [34], I can deal with it now in
— in ways that aren’t just aggressive, or passive, losing the head or 
getting withdrawn and depressed and blaming other people. I ’ve done 
some work in family therapy with a woman therapist that I like. But 
I ’m sure that if I hadn’t been a feminist to start off with, my personal 
work would not have been like this, I mean, it wouldn’t have had these
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results [35], I ’ve come such a long way — my feminism is more 
productive now [36], I can connect with other people, instead of doing 
things for them all the time. Fm not saying it’s perfect, but I don’t 
expect that any more [37],
Comments
1. Equation of being radical with being agentic and able to make changes.
2. Recognition of the source of the aspiration towards feminism as arising from 
solidarity with other women.
3. Deconstruction of the feminism / femininity dualism experienced as 
liberating.
4. Possibility of a new reading of herself through doing emotional work.
5. Recognition of the take-up of positions in discourses of femininity by others, 
but not by herself (projection).
6. Projection of femininity onto other women.
7. Awareness of the ideology of liberal humanism and also the general disdain 
of politicised people for individualistic interpretations of social conditions.
8. Realisation that she has investments in the pattern she thought was imposed.
9. Juxtaposition of political analysis of emotional issues with liberal individual 
analysis and indication that there is a different, more politically productive way 
than either of them.
10. Positioning of other women through discourses of femininity or sexist 
discourses. Using those discourses to read other women.
11. Recognition of the power attached to these positions and drawing on them, 
while rationally denying their power, or denying that she might be taking up
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positions in sexist discourses herself.
12. Opposition of feminism (herself) to femininity (other women), but also a 
demonstration that she has reached awareness of how such dualism is 
implicated in power relations and hierarchy.
13. She both positions herself (reflexive positioning) and is positioned by other 
people (interactive positioning) as responsible. Because of the lack of variety in 
her positioning, becomes oppressive.
14. Explicit rejection of essentialist feminism at an intellectual level.
15. Recognition of contradictions again. In spite of rejecting the unitary female 
model of women posed by essentialist feminism, she is still positioned in a 
unitary discourse of the human subject.
16. Further recognition that the pattern she thought was imposed is one in 
which she had emotional investments.
17. Projection of the aspects of herself which she repressed psychodynamically 
and also the aspects of women which she rejected intellectually, onto other 
women
18. Recognition that her route into feminism owed more to feelings of 
alienation from other women, rather than solidarity with them.
19. Feminism taking the shape o f ‘being like men’, or being as good as men.
20. Feminism equated with being different from women. It is opposed to the 
sort of feminism she has explicitly rejected, which extols an essential femininity. 
Yet, her feminism based on identification with men is at the same time reaching 
its explanatory limits and her own unique combination of politics and 
experience is on the verge of pointing her into a third, deconstructive way of 
approaching feminism.
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21. A power associated with women, even if suppressed in sexist discourses.
22. Contradictions again.
23. Experience of lack of agency or ability to influence events.
24. Recognition that we (she and I) share a particular feminist discourse.
25. Production of knowledge about herself: that which is repressed is 
reproduced unchanged, what is acknowledged can be produced in different 
ways (cf Hollway, 1982).
26. Experience of a lack of agency again.
27. Stress on her experience that a lack of attention to emotional processes has 
an impact on agency.
28. Leaving behind the filtering of experience through a discourse of prediction 
and control and moving into a more poststructuralist discursive mode of 
understanding human action.
29. Recognition of the constructed nature of experience and the self and an 
implicit recognition and simultaneous rejection of the liberal humanist belief 
that the politicised individual represents the penultimate step on the way to 
maturity (cfKitzinger, 1987).
30. Implicit recognition of the self as a production, not as a discovery.
31. Within liberal humanism, anger represents immaturity, a ‘phase’ which has 
to be gone through on the way to the well-adjusted mature personality (see 
comment 29 above).
32. Perception of a ‘choice’ between rationality or emotionality.
33. Contradictions between the expression of anger and the ‘manly’ feminist
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she tried to be.
34. Capacity to act has grown out of a deconstructive approach to the choices 
between rationality and emotionality.
35. Recognition of the constructed nature of experience and the self. The self is 
a production, not a discovery (cf comment 30 above).
36. Experience of agency.
37. Awareness of the need to keep a political perspective alive, even if a 
feminist ‘end point’ is not reached.
Commentary
PI has come to see herself as a construction. Her feminist desire to be agentic 
is at least partly responsible for this reading of herself. Earlier in her feminism, 
she learned to read femininity as negative and this resulted in her wanting to be 
like men. Her unease with femininity and her negative evaluation of other 
women were produced through sexist discourses. This characterises early 
second-wave feminism, where not just men, but some feminist women also, 
read women through sexist discourses. PI managed that contradiction by 
distancing herself and marking the difference between herself and other 
women. In effect, of course, as Hollway (1982) points out in relation to a 
similar case, this was impossible, because she was positioned by others as a 
woman. Nevertheless, in this way, she was able to draw on the ‘double power’ 
of being like men, but of also having the power of the feminine, caring, 
maternal woman. But this became oppressive eventually, because if people are 
always positioned as responsible, strong, having obligations, the lack of variety 
in the positioning becomes oppressive. The unitary rational subject which many 
aspire to is itself oppressive.
Ultimately, this version of her feminism was unsustainable for PI. She wanted
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very much to change her positioning. This is the point at which a person 
positioned in dominant discourses of the human person might succumb to the 
notion of a core femininity and conclude that femininsm can never work. But 
PI has already strongly rejected essentialism at an intellectual level. She has an 
identity investment in being feminist, but outside essentialist discourses. This, I 
believe, is one important reason why she was able to see herself as a 
construction. Feminist desire for change is the ‘raw material’ (Hollway, 1982: 
469) through which significations of the self are filtered for the feminst women, 
in many situations. Thus, the particular discourses which make up the content 
of a person’s feminism will have an effect on the way the feeling self, 
contradictions and emotions are interpreted. I believe that the availability of 
positions in Discourse Three (anti-dualism) is most likely to produce 
interpretation of feelings and emotions as socially constructed and therefore to 
facilitate change in cathectic structures.
8.5 Doing politicised self-reflection: a commentary on the accounts of PI 
and P3
Practices of therapy and self-reflection are frequently and accurately seen by 
people on the left as reclaiming people for liberalism and individualism. But P3 
describes entering a counselling situation already positioned in political and 
feminist discourses, including poststructuralism. Similarly, PI came to 
self-reflection already positioned in radical and socialist feminist discourses, as 
well as liberal feminist ones. Thus, when they came to attend to their 
psychodynamic processes, the grid of intersections between discourses, 
situations and psychodynamics was very different from the grid of intersections 
of a person positioned mostly in dominant liberal-humanist discourses. Most 
people are positioned in the dominant discourses of the human subject and 
access to ways of theorising the self outside of these discourses is rare. Yet, 
everybody is a social theorist, and a theorist of her / himself whether implicitly 
or explicitly. The ways that people theorise about themselves is affected by the
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discourses and knowledge available to them. The outcomes of many 
counselling situations are similar, in that people interpret their experiences as 
the discovery of a ‘real’ self, because most people are drawing on the same, 
limited theoretical discourses about the world to interpret their experiences.
P3, however, is interested in Kristeva, especially the idea of the three tiers of 
feminism. She has an intellectual awareness of the need to deconstruct male / 
female dualism. PI is opposed to the idea of an essential human nature. Their 
difficulty for some time was that their intellectual stances did not translate 
directly into political practice and the feminist agency they had experienced as 
younger women was no longer forthcoming. The spark for renewed agency 
was attention to psychodynamic processes. The new element for both of them 
was the self-reflection they engaged in. They achieved profoundly radical 
effects when they filtered their reflection on their psychodynamic processes 
through the feminist discourses in which they had positioned themselves. These 
discourses included Discourse Three, with its rejection of male / female dualism 
and essentialist definitions of women and men. It is to be expected that 
available discourses will affect the ways that any situation is interpreted.
Because of their theoretical and political convictions and refutation of 
essentialism and an essential feminine nature, neither woman interpreted her 
identification of reflexive positioning in a discourse of femininity as evidence of 
getting in touch with a ‘real’ feminine self. They recognised it as the taking up 
of positions in socially approved discourses which almost every woman 
experiences. Each woman discovered a sense of herself beyond her own 
previous image of herself, but did not interpret the repressed part as in any way 
less social. P3’s description of herself in her time of confusion, as lacking 
boundaries, is reminiscent of what Gramsci calls a disjointed and episodic 
conception of the world (cited in Grimshaw, 1986: 137). The more coherent 
(but not unitary) and critical conception (ibid) which she reached allows her to 
acknowledge her multisubjectivity, and to incorporate contradiction and 
confusion in politically productive ways.
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The awareness which the women constructed of their psychodynamic processes 
helped them to become more critically aware of things which had deposited in 
them the ‘traces’ of which Gramsci wrote. These traces include an attachment 
to a traditionally defined femininity and, in P3’s case, ‘feminine’ forms of 
emotionality, which gave rise to some of the contradictions they had been 
feeling. This femininity was a part of their identity which, in their desire to be 
feminist, they had been repressing. (As already noted, there is a dualism implicit 
in the opposition of feminist and feminine.) Dominant liberal humanist 
discourse characterises such identifications as the discovery of a real self, but it 
is better ‘represented as an achievement rather than a discovery of something 
that was already there. It can be represented as the possibility of transcending, 
in certain circumstances, what had been “second nature”’ (ibid).
These assertions go some way to answering a Foucault-inspired question like 
‘what circumstances allowed or facilitated the development of this discourse or 
way of filtering experience?’, or ‘what conditions facilitate the acceptance and 
negotiation of multisubjectivity, rather than the dominance of the unitary 
rational subject?’ One of the conditions which I have identified from the case 
material is the viewing of feelings, emotions and contradictions as social 
products, albeit in ways that are unique to each individual, rather than as 
indicators of a pre-social or real self.
8.6 Conclusion
In Chapter Seven, we saw feminist women reflecting on how they consciously 
draw on different options (discourses), either feminist or humanist, depending 
on the situation, to achieve agency. In this chapter, we have seen women 
reflecting on the differences within themselves and using this knowledge of 
their own internal differences to achieve agency and move forward their 
feminist effectiveness. The intersections of situations and relations in the 
present moment with discourses were again seen to be important. In Chapter
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Seven, the point of entry to the multiplicity of subjectivity is seen to be the 
multiplicity of ways that acting in different relations in the present can signify 
as feminist. In this chapter, the acknowledgement of investments in femininity 
emerges as another point of entry to the multiplicity of feminist subjectivities.
Feelings and the contradictions they represent during the process of change are 
treated here as social products. The acknowledgement of contradictions allows 
space for consideration of multiplicity and has the effect of lessening the 
explanatory power of discourses of a unitary gendered subject. This, I believe, 
is what makes contradictions a suitable pedagogical tool for politicised 
personal development education. Through coming to terms with emotional 
investments, within a political framework, it is possible to disrupt structures of 
cathexis.
P3. When I'm angry, I mean, the way that I've moved is, that when I'm 
angry, I ’m able to tell myself — I'm angry because there's something 
political going on and I ask myself what I ’m going to make of this? I 
think they say, 'how can I get past this to my real self?'. And that's what 
keeps me radical. On the surface, I might look very conventional, a 
husband, two children — outwardly maintaining the status quo and the 
nuclear family.
Acknowledging contradictions and repressed material in the psyche is a way for 
feminists to develop a sense of self as active subject, rather than as object o f a 
male gaze or as the object of a discourse of ‘real feminism’ or as a victim. This 
is therapeutic activity with more than just individual effects, in that it 
demonstrates where investments in femininity have material force in the ways 
they maintain a femininity / feminism dualism and thus also maintain male / 
female dualism. Such investments reduce the actual diversity of behaviour to a 
dualistic model and uphold the gender status quo.
Multiplicity in the psyche can be acknowledged, although not without 
difficulty, due to the dominance of the unitary rational subject as a discursive 
position. Such acknowledgement in turn helps to push forward the subversion 
of male-female dualism and the production of a discourse of a multiple human
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subject. Davies (1990c: 136) asks:
How are we to move beyond male-female dualism? The simple answer is 
that all we have to do is to stop doing the work that maintains the 
difference. That, of course, is more easily said than done (emphasis 
added).
I assert that one of the types of work that maintains the differences is the use of 
power conferred on women by sexist discourses and which is often not 
acknowledged by feminist women who have attained power in the social 
spheres of work or egalitarian relationships. Yet, even quite powerful women 
such as these can find themselves hesitating in their assertion of power, turning 
it into domestic, ‘female’ or feminine ways of action. Even where feminists 
rationally and intellectually resist typically feminine positionings, they 
nonetheless have also learned the patterns of power and feelings through which 
male-female social relations are organised (Braidotti, 1989: 86). All women are 
positioned in discourses of femininity, which read women as powerful mothers 
and carers (even if this power is repressed). Thus, recursive positioning 
(interactive and reflexive) in any discourse through which a woman can be read 
as powerful will produce an identity investment which can co-exist with the 
politicised identity investments (as feminists, in this case) adopted in adulthood. 
Women often misrecognise this power of femininity, in the absence of a 
discourse which makes it explicit in feminist ways. They misrecognise it as the 
power of their sexuality, reading it through sexist discourse (Hollway, 1982): 
Almost any Hollywood film reads it thus (ibid), as does most advertising aimed 
at young women..
However, feminist women who also have access to resources such as income 
and education, as the participants in this research have, are unlikely to misread 
it as the power of their sexuality. They are likely to be positioned in discourses 
where they compete with men, or try to be as good as men. They are more 
likely to suppress the power of their femininity altogether. Acknowledging their 
construction in discourses of femininity and the ways they take up feminine 
positions was transformational for P2 and P3, in terms of producing feminist
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agency. Their experience of this and my analysis of the phenomenon goes some 
way towards developing a discourse of feminist multiplicity, where femininity is 
not jettisoned, but is acknowledged and re-produced1 in ways which have 
potential for a poststructuralist feminist praxis. There is a need to express, in 
feminist poststructuralist terms, the power of femininity, not to suppress it, as 
happens in sexist discourses and in the earlier feminist positions that these two 
women took up. This is not, however, the same as lauding an essential feminine 
as better than an essential masculine, as ‘difference’ feminisms do. It is a 
deconstructive move which promotes a discourse of multiplicity, in which 
women do not have to be ‘either / or’, but can experiment with different ways 
to be both feminist and feminine.
Accepting oneself as partially constructed in femininity can help feminists to 
accept the diversity of other women’s experiences and resistance and to 
understand other women’s actions. It also helps feminist women to find more 
points of intersection with women who do not accept the label feminist. Instead 
of differences between feminism and femininity being seen as uncrossable 
boundaries or as battle lines, they can be seen as meeting points. Understanding 
the ways that one’s own subjectivity is gendered and the social nature of one’s 
own and others’ feelings can allow feminist activists to connect more 
empathically with other women and to interact with them (collude with them, 
in the terms of Chapter Seven) in ways that may alter gendered practice. An 
exploration of one’s own psychodynamic processes, outside dominant liberal 
humanist models of the human subject, seems crucial to such projects. Neither 
a discourse of the rational unitary subject or of a unitary female feeling subject 
provides the conditions for these moves.
A liberal humanist analysis might have led PI and P3 to conclude that they
1 Following Hollway (1984a: 227), my use of the hyphen is intended to signify that every 
practice is a production. ‘Hence, recurrent everyday practices and the meanings through 
which they acquire their effectivity may contribute to the maintenance of gender difference 
(reproduction without the hyphen) or to its modification (the production of modified
meanings of gender leading to changed practices)’.
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were after all determined by an essential and pre-given femininity and that they 
might as well give up their feminist aspirations (cf Coward, 1993). Instead, 
because both of them were aware of discourses other than essentialist ones, 
they interpreted their emotional experiences in ways which facilitated feminist 
agency and a recognition of their own multiplicity. That is, they were able to 
recognise femininity as part of their subjectivities, but not as an essence.
It is clear that their rational intellectual take-up of positions in Discourse Three 
(anti-essentialist and anti-dualist) is implicated in the very construction of their 
psychodynamic processes and in the radical outcomes of their reflection on 
those processes. Thus, the personal is seen to be not only political, but also 
theoretical (cf Braidotti, 1989: 95), insofar as an exposure to the broad range 
of feminist theories provided anti-essentialist discursive positions through 
which the women could filter their experiences. The chapter has illustrated the 
‘extreme proximity of the thinking process to existential reality and lived 
experience’ (ibid: 94), which characterises feminist theory in general. It has 
also provided some answers to Braidotti’s questions: ‘how does the 
“woman-in-me” relate to the “feminist-in-me”? What are the links and the 
possible tensions between my “being-a-feminist” and “being-a-woman?”’ (ibid).
The profound complexity of the third tier is knowing oneself as a woman 
and in that knowing breaking the bonds of words and images and 
metaphors that have held oneself inside the male / female dualism, that have 
made one a woman in phallogocentric terms. (Davies, 1990b: 514)
8.6.1 Theoretical conclusions
Feminist subjectivity is theorised further in this chapter, through the addition of 
a theory of feelings and emotions as socially constructed, albeit in ways specific 
to each individual, and through the development of the theorisation of power, 
using the psychodynamic concept of investment. While gender is acknowledged 
as a social product, this does not mean that it will change in direct response to 
changing material inequalities (Hollway, 1982). The social nature of feelings
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and emotions is a factor which must always be taken into account in any theory 
of how change will take place. The ways we read the world, our relationships 
and ourselves have practical consequences for change which might be slight at 
first, but build up in such a way as to transform our subjectivity, through 
transforming our positions and relations. Each instance of a change in 
positioning changes the way the signifiers ‘woman’ and ‘feminist’ are 
produced. And if the signifier ‘woman’ is changed, the signifier man must 
change also (Connell, 1995; Hollway, 1982; Segal, 1990).
Power is analysed as a two-way phenomenon, through the use of the concepts 
of discourse and discursive positioning. In addition to being a way to protect 
vulnerable selves through the take-up of powerful positions within any one 
discourse (which was illustrated in Chapter Seven), power emerges as the 
energy which invests identity though the benefits of taking up certain positions, 
whereby one can meet one’s own needs (cf Hollway, 1982). Because different 
positions in different discourses are being taken up from moment to moment, it 
is no longer adequate to theorise people as always victims or as always 
oppressors. In traditional terms, power is the exclusive property of dominant 
groups. The analysis made here demonstrates that the person who would be 
traditionally characterised as victim has power to move or to change 
positioning, or to take up new positions. The emphasis is on the relationality of 
power, that it is a two-way production.
This is not the same as equating men’s and women’s power in social relations. 
Men’s power (and the power of members of any privileged group) is backed by 
resources and reproduced through dominant discursive power. ‘This discursive 
power is the kind that produces oppression, backed up as it is by material 
resources’ (Hollway, 1982: 464). The analysis provides a means to explore the 
possibilities for action towards change, by examination of contradictions, such 
as women’s positioning in sexist discourses and what is suppressed (women’s 
power) in these discourses. This was sketched in the chapter on relations 
(Chapter Seven), but has been further developed in this chapter’s analysis of
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emotional investments in certain discursive positions which may confer power, 
but whose acknowledgement may remain repressed or misread.
Such a theorisation allows a focus on where feminist women are aiming to go 
and how they can get there, rather than remaining fixed on where women have 
come from (cf L. Connolly, 1996: 62), or how they are held in place by 
imbalances in material or economic resources between women and men. A 
materialist analysis is not to be discounted, but needs to be enhanced by the 
addition of a theory of power which takes into account its dynamic and 
constantly shifting nature. Thus, the use of Foucauldian theory is seen to be 
particularly useful for analysing the production of gender and the means of 
re-producing the signifiers ‘woman’ and ‘feminist’ in changed ways Without 
an analysis of power which sees it as capable of being exercised by the 
oppressed (cf Hollway, 1982), it is not possible to explain feminist women’s 
investment in positions of femininity, nor is it possible to see the possibility of 
disruption of the gender status quo in cathectic relationships.
Through the use of the concept of repression, the ‘victim’ is seen to be not 
without power. What is repressed in discourse nevertheless has effects in the 
take-up of discursive positions (ibid) and the self-conscious divesting of oneself 
of certain kinds of power, such as the power conferred through either reflexive 
or interactive positioning in sexist discourses, is illustrated as a 
transformational and liberating process, given certain discursive resources, such 
as PI and P3 had. It also appears to be an adult process, since it is the result of 
feminist identities adopted in adulthood and honed in adult social relations.
8.6.2 Pedagogical implications
Femininity may confer a certain power, but it is ultimately a power which is 
constraining. If women prioritise the power of motherhood and domesticity 
and caring as essential feminine characteristics, this will ultimately be to their
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detriment. And moreover, it will facilitate their interactive positioning by other 
people as essentially maternal and domestic. This is not productive of agency. 
Women need to look after their own needs if they are not to become neurotic 
and guilt-ridden (Coward, 1993). Both Baker Miller (1986) and Lemer (1985) 
assert that the more developed women are, the more they can liberate other 
people. ‘The greater the development of each individual, the more able, more 
effective and less needy of limiting or restricting others she will be’ (Baker 
Miller 1986: 11). I take this further to assert that people who do not have 
access to radical discourses of the human subject will not use psychodynamic 
concepts with politically radical effect. This is the connection with the next 
chapter, where I try to take up the challenge for the feminist poststructuralist 
educator of making those discourses available in the context of women’s 
personal development education.
The essence of a liberal humanist approach to contemporary femininity is to 
make inequalities appear as equalities (Hare-Mustin, 1991: 82). In drawing 
attention to the ways that positioning in discourses of femininity can provide 
positions of power for women, as I have done, there is a danger that such 
power may be regarded as equal to men’s power. This kind of analysis is 
something I would have attempted to do only with feminist women who have 
thought in fairly radical feminist terms about themselves. Expecting women in 
personal development courses, for whom the courses are often a first step 
outside their immediate circles and into adult education, to engage in this kind 
of analysis would have the effect of reinforcing the status quo. Such an analysis 
of women’s investments in femininity is radical only insofar as it is mediated 
through discourses which challenge liberal humanism, as was the case for both 
PI and P3. This is an appeal to readers not to misread the analysis in this 
chapter. In some ways, it is for ‘advanced feminists only’. ‘When I read your 
paper, I felt that I could talk meaningfully to you about all of this’ (PI).
Feminists who are on the verge of new discourses, through engaging in new 
practices, could find this useful. I suspect that many women try to develop
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altered practice (the forerunner of new discourses) without having a language 
which would advance the practice to the status of discourse. This is one place 
where education can play a role.
For women who have a history in feminist discourse, our achievements in the 
public arena, or our acts of agency as younger feminists are not always enough 
to sustain us. Politicisation is not the same as agency. What I think is useful for 
the practice of personal development education is the way that attention to 
contradictions can be a starting point for altering practice. It is on 
contradictions that the radical self-analysis of PI and P3 hinges. The challenge 
is to share feminist poststructuralist discourses in ways that can articulate or 
collude with the positioning of each woman who comes to a course. In Chapter 
Nine, I discuss how I attempt to respond to this challenge.
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CHAPTER NINE
USING A THEORY OF MULTIPLE SUBJECTIVITY IN WOMEN’S 
PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION
9.0 Introduction
In this chapter I discuss the ways that my epistemological stance and my 
theorising of politicised feminist subjectivities undertaken in Chapters Six, 
Seven and Eight, influence my pedagogical practice. It is where I expose for 
scrutiny myself as a personal development facilitator trying to work from a 
feminist poststructuralist perspective in a field dominated by overlapping and 
complementary liberal humanist and feminist discourses of a unitary self and an 
essential femininity. I am not trying to present a formula for this kind of work, 
since each course and each situation is different and my analysis so far is highly 
contextualised. I discuss what I have found to be important issues in the 
practice of Stage One personal development education (see Chapter One, 
Section 9 for an outline of the content of such courses). Any generalisations I 
make are careful and revisable. Yet I go as far as asserting the importance of 
discourse, relations and psychodynamics in any educational practice which 
concerns itself with the production of politicised subjectivities and feminist 
agency.
This chapter represents research on myself and on my practice of adult 
education, which draws on my experience in personal development courses 
over a period of five years, both as participant, as co-facilitator and as 
facilitator. While I facilitated a personal development course specifically for the 
purposes of this research (see Chapter Five, Section 2.3 for details), and any 
quoted material is taken from participants of that course, I am drawing on 
much more than that one course to write this chapter. This is educational 
research, distinctive in its own right, as an educator researching her own
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attempts at praxis (cf Lomax, 1994: 11). It is not research on education from a 
purely psychological or a sociological viewpoint. I think that this is a timely 
development for feminist pedagogy, since so much of feminist research into 
education up to now has relied on exposing and mapping oppression as I did in 
previous work (A. Ryan, 1992), or calling for completely new systems to be 
put into place, as do Belenky et al (1986). The biggest challenge is to 
‘transcend the gap between principled scholarship and practical strategies’ 
(Acker, 1988: 307). 1 want to make feminist poststructuralist discourse into 
useful feminist knowledge for people apart from myself. I contend that this is 
possible in the practice of women’s personal development education and need 
not be confined to the academic world.
As Chapter One (Section 9) indicated, in Ireland hundreds of women take the 
first step into community based adult education via personal development 
courses, which are being colonised by supposedly neutral liberal humanist 
practices. We need politicised facilitators (Clancy, 1995) who are aware of the 
capacity of liberal humanism to mask power relations and to depoliticise 
educational practice. In Chapters Six, Seven and Eight of this work, we have 
seen self-defined feminist women trying to transcend the gap between their 
feminist theories and their practical strategies. Now is the time when I have to 
expose for scrutiny how I try to do this in the personal development classroom.
Just as the problem of experience is at the core of my approach to 
methodology (see Chapter Five, Section 3), I also problematise experience in 
my practice of facilitating personal development education. I believe that 
experience is interpreted according to the discourses available to mediate it. I 
do not come to these courses as if I was a neutral facilitator. I have a theory 
(feminist poststructuralism) which is based on a subaltern discourse of 
feminism and I want to make it available in a way that is meaningful to the 
women I work with. But I also have to find a balance between my desire to 
predict and control the outcomes and the women’s rights to take my theory 
and engage with it in their own ways, and to modify it.
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9.1 Locating resistance and constructing agency
Patriarchal relations and interactional processes (which include discourses of 
femininity) exist, in which all women, to a greater or lesser extent, are 
positioned. Feminist responses to them are multiple, collective and sometimes 
internally contradictory. We have to choose, as educators, where to intervene. 
For women coming to Stage One personal development classes, the family, 
power in the family, and heterosexual relations, are often the place to do that, 
when we are responding to their questions such as ‘how can we be different, 
now?’ (cf Games, 1991, cited in Kerfoot and Knights, 1994: 78) These sites are 
bearers of the gender status quo and a site of the production of gender 
differences. They are where patriarchal relations are at their most naturalised 
and normalised. We live in a formally egalitarian liberal democracy, where it is 
acceptable for women to take on roles outside their homes, in paid work, sport, 
party politics and many other arenas. Yet, through discourses which position 
them as essentially domestic, maternal and caring, women are still widely 
constructed as the only sex properly suited to primary childcare. Issues of 
domesticity and maternity surface time and again in the personal development 
courses I facilitate. Dealing with these issues is a major challenge to 
contemporary feminism (Coward, 1993; Hochschild, 1990a, b).
A ‘radical’ or separatist feminist approach would be to dismiss the family and 
heterosexual relations completely. But the problem with this perspective is that 
it fails to deal with the large numbers of people who live in families and in 
heterosexual relationships of one kind or another. Another way of approaching 
the issue of family and heterosexuality is to ask how we can re-shape families 
and heterosexual relations for feminist ends, that is, to disrupt the gender status 
quo. These structures, as we know them now, are generally self-contradictory 
in any feminist terms. But family and heterosexual relationships which are 
arenas for a radical démocratisation of the emotions (cf Giddens, 1994a), may 
be very important images for the future of feminism. What is more, they allow
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the women I have met in personal development courses to have the things they 
say they want, namely intimate relationships with men and children, as well as 
the changes they desire. Such a vision of radically changed families is inclusive 
of women who choose to live without men. It is also recognition of the fact 
that masculinities are constructed and can change (see, for example, Connell, 
1995; Segal, 1990).
I must emphasise here that women coming to Stage One are invariably 
nervous, often losing sleep the night before the first class. It may be their first 
experience of an educational setting since leaving school, which may itself have 
been a painful experience for them. The need for a facilitator to be gentle, while 
at the same time challenging women, cannot be overemphasised. Some may 
have difficulties with reading and writing, while others are highly literate and 
enjoy reading. For many, speaking in a group is terrifying at first. At the same 
time, it would be wrong to assume that they are not politicised. All have 
experience of power and resistance, as well as of conformity, although they 
may not use these terms to describe their experiences. Some have highly 
politicised consciousnesses and vocabularies. In their resistances, they have 
devised strategies, some of which may have been successful, some not. Every 
moment of resistance devises its own strategy, as the analysis so far in this 
work has illustrated. Yet, the ways that they / we resist can produce agency, or 
not. I am concerned with facilitating them to examine the ways their resistance 
can be agentic.
The challenge for me as a personal development facilitator is to find a 
pedagogical method which is adequate to my analysis of feminist subjectivities. 
I believe that the content of a standard personal development course can be 
used to position women in a feminist discourse of multiplicity, just as much as 
it can position them in esssentialist discourses. I use the course structure and 
content which I have outlined in Chapter One (Section 9), but I approach 
courses as educational and learning events, not as therapy. To encourage 
women to read themselves as multiple feminist subjects, I filter the content
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through the following pedagogical tools:
• The productive and positive nature of the experiences of contradictions, 
and how they create possibilities for movement.
• Kristeva’s three tiers and other feminist analyses of women’s situations, 
which I regard as discursive content.
• Lerner’s (1985) idea that relationships are like a dance. People need to stop 
doing certain work, to unlearn patterns that maintain dynamics of power 
and of male / female dualism. I see this as a pedagogical tool which 
corresponds to the relational elements of subjectivity, as developed in 
Chapters Seven and Eight of this work. .
• A focus on one’s own needs, ‘treats’ and bodily relaxation, as a means to 
producing self-awareness. By mediating this self-awareness through 
discourses of multiplicity and discussions of power, I aim to facilitate 
acknowledgement of unconscious investments in certain ‘feminine’ 
positions and recognition of repression and projection in intimate 
relationships. ‘For a woman to change her relation to power, she must 
become the centre of her own life’ (Goodrich, 1991b: 25).
9.2 Personal development as a political process
Any exploration of agency in personal development must begin with a 
recognition of the power dynamics embedded in the personal development 
process itself. Feminist practice of personal development is not a neutral 
endeavour (cf Hollway, 1991a: 95). There is a hierarchical relationship between 
a facilitator who is paid for her expert knowledge and skills, and the group 
members who are seeking the benefit of that expertise. The facilitator is in a 
more powerful position than the group members by virtue of her expertise, 
qualifications, status, position, and the fact that the women are probably paying
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for the course, even if it is a nominal sum (cf Hart, 1990). Consequently, the 
facilitator’s words, directions, questions, beliefs and interpretations are 
weighted by the group as possessing more power than their own. Only by 
recognising that power and privilege in teaching / facilitating relationships can I 
use this power in ways that facilitate agency.
I try to produce conditions in the personal development classroom which will 
facilitate self-understandings of the participants which are not confined to 
liberal humanist discursive interpretations. I do this particularly by naming 
power and by emphasising the social nature of feelings, emotions, desires and 
contradictions. If I do not name power in the personal development classroom, 
then I mask it and its relations and I individualise women’s experiences of 
contradictions and desires for change. At the same time, I want to promote 
feminist poststructuralist ideas about power and multiplicity, not essentialist 
ones. Yet I must let go of my own desires to predict and control the ways that 
the women will engage with these ideas.
I wish to be an empathie listener and encourage the women to be the same for 
each other, but I also want to take a critical role in examining the stories that 
they tell, such as life-maps, check-in stories at the start of each class, and 
stories about relationships and feelings which arise throughout the sessions 
together. As with the practice of memory work (Stephenson et al, 1996), these 
stories are recounted because they are formative. I believe that they can be loci 
for change, if I can engage radically with the women to facilitate more social 
and multiple readings of them. Some of the stories may be expressed in terms 
of regulatory discourses and how I respond to them can have the effect of 
disrupting these discourses, or not.
The power of the facilitator is considerable. By virtue of my position, I have 
credibility and clout and my comments and information carry weight. I know 
this from experience of how people act in relation to me as a facilitator. My 
way of being can produce ways of being in other people. That is, I can attempt,
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by my method of relating to them and by the content and information 
(discourses) that I introduce to the course, to interactively position them in 
ways that assist them to recognise and negotiate their own multiplicity, rather 
than bury it.
I know also that there are limits to personal development. So one of the things 
I need to do is to be active outside the class and to share that with the women 
and encourage them to become active also, in their own ways. In changing 
beliefs, it is important to work on an action level as well as a conceptual level. 
But if action tasks are encouraged too early (either outside the family arena or 
within it), results may be superficial. Agency needs to be collective as well as 
individual, in order to have maximum social impact. But I must not replicate 
the agency / structure or individual / society dualism, by implying to the women 
that public action is superior to private actions.
In my practice of personal development facilitation, I find that such exercise of 
power involves walking a fine line of deliberately reducing hierarchy by using 
self-disclosure and by putting as much information and control as possible into 
the group’s hands, while at the same time not denying or undermining my own 
authority and competence. I try to be as aware as possible of the values I 
express, either directly or indirectly, and to be open about what I believe. 
Folowing Avis (1991), I clarify for the group what I believe: for example, ‘I 
believe we need to examine power in our lives’, or ‘I believe that relationships 
work best when people have equal power’. I also make it clear that each 
person should reveal about herself only what she wants to reveal and feels 
comfortable about revealing, and that it is fine to decide not to continue with 
the course. I also tell the group that the course is not counselling or therapy. I 
explain that it is an adult learning programme, but one which is not like the 
schooling they may have experienced.
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9.3 The facilitator’s relationship with the group and relationships within 
the group
Women’s experiences of schooling have generally demanded that they embrace 
socially acceptable forms of femininity (Lewis, 1993: 155, 185, 6; Ryan, 1997; 
Spender and Sarah, 1980/88). Many of the stories I have heard in previous 
courses have illustrated women’s bad experiences as children at school, a great 
deal of them related to their social class positioning and poverty. Many of the 
women learned to cope with this as children by trying to please the teacher and 
to develop a special relationship with her and this may continue to happen in 
the adult learning situation of the personal development course. It is important 
to remember that this is a relationship with a group and that the members can 
provide support for each other when I am gone, and in between class meetings, 
since I don’t usually live in the areas where I teach.
Because of positioning in discourses of femininity, frequent patterns for some 
women are to ‘rescue’ others in the group and to avoid looking at themselves. 
When caught in this pattern, we (both myself and the other women) may make 
the error of giving advice, telling a women what she should do, or encouraging 
her to take a particular direction such as leaving an abusive relationship. 
Women also often attempt to be the all-powerful, nurturing, and wise mother in 
relation to others in the group. This is disempowering for the woman who is 
the focus of it (Avis, 1991). I find that by talking about these things on the first 
day, when we are setting ground rules for the group, we can avoid it, although 
I need to continually watch out for it. Bringing up the issue in this way on the 
first week also has the effect of sometimes making women reflect on it in 
relation to their behaviour as mothers in their own families, so the seeds are 
sown for discussing such patterns when we come to examine relationships.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily indicative of a lack of politicisation if a 
woman focuses on the situations of other women in the group. This may be 
part of her process of consciousness raising. Although I believe that each 
person needs to look at how the personal and political are implicated in each
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other, not everybody does this in the same sequence. It is important, however, 
that women do not get into the role of advice-givers for other women in the 
group. I usually deal with the possibility of this by reminding the group about 
the ground rule of not giving advice, but of sharing what may have worked for 
oneself.
As facilitator I need to continually work on myself in these issues also (cf ibid). 
As Chapter Eight in this work shows, it is an issue of both politics and power 
to avoid focusing on one’s own internalised oppressions and focus only on 
other people’s. A facilitator’s politicisation needs to be sustained and 
developed by a continual radical self-reflection on the ways one is interacting 
with the group members.
9.4 Facilitating skills
The facilitator needs a thorough understanding of the economic, political, 
social, cultural and biological constraints that shape women’s lives and 
behaviour. This includes a knowledge of the variety of feminist discourses and 
analyses, as well as understanding issues of poverty, violence, sexual abuse, 
gender construction, guilt and ambivalence about change. Even if we consider 
ourselves feminist, we must examine ourselves for any anti-women biases we 
may have absorbed from dominant discourses (ibid).
A facilitator must evaluate women positively, which includes recognising and 
acknowledging the strengths of the women before they come to personal 
development, while simultaneously acknowledging their desires for changes. 
When I feel irritated because women don’t seem to be making changes, I need 
to understand their behaviour in the larger context of the oppression of women, 
and not to draw on liberal humanist discourses which psychologise them as 
inadequate or not wanting to change. Emotional investments in power and in 
femininity and embeddedness in patriarchal social relations mean that the 
process of becoming agentic is simultaneously threat and desire (Lewis, 1993:
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154, 5). The dynamics of agency do involve contestation of the status quo, 
however small or slow these changes may be. These dynamics are born of 
knowledge which, once acquired, changes the way a person views the world. 
Challenging the status quo can result in women getting ‘change back’ (Lemer, 
1985) messages from men and children, who also have emotional investments 
in power and their identities. These identities are threatened when women 
change their relationships to power (cf Hollway, 1994: 268),
9.4.1 Naming power
I use the word ‘power’ in the courses as early as I can. This can be difficult, 
because it can put women off and it is important to keep them attending from 
week to week. It is rare that people coming to courses articulate power 
differentials as a reason for their desire for changes or for some of the 
difficulties they experience in making changes in their lives. The maintenance of 
men’s power in the family is arguably the most diverse in its forms. In 
marriages, there is often not outright oppression, but the unacknowledged 
pre-eminence of men’s desires and the subordination of women’s desires (Avis, 
1991). The patterns of desire, desirability and object choice moulded within the 
family extend beyond that institution to permeate the wider world of labour and 
authority (Segal 1990: 99, 100). The challenge for me is to get the women to 
see relational patterns as political patterns, or patterns of political institutions, 
with all the power implications of that view, as well as simply relationships, 
which is how they would be portrayed in a liberal humanist personal 
development framework.
I describe power initially as an ability to have control over one’s life and to be 
able to influence other people and the decisions that affect one’s life. I explain 
that women often have difficulty using the word power. A gentle way to 
introduce it is to use some elements from Jeffers’ (1987) ‘pain to power’ chart:
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PAIN
I can’t .................................
I should.............................
If only.................................
I have to be perfect...........
I have to please others.....
I have to always be strong
I should try harder............
Hurry up............................
POWER 
.1 won’t 
..I could 
.Next time
I’m a fine person, just as I am 
.1 want to look after myself 
It’s alright to have needs 
.I’m doing the best that 1 can 
I can take my time
I tell women that it is often difficult for women to think of themselves as 
powerful. We are taught that powerlessness is appealing, submission is erotic 
and helplessness is feminine. Yet they all know how much they do in their own 
families, how they are far from helpless in many different ways. I ask them to 
think of a story where they were not helpless, and to talk to another person in 
the group about it. I do not ask to hear the stories, but afterwards I ask how 
they felt. Feeling powerful is not the same as having power, or being agentic, 
but it is a necessary step. Understanding different ways that power can work 
and how a change in positioning can change those workings is part of a 
production of agency
PD1. My mother-in-law visits every Sunday and stays for tea. I always 
used to cook a full fry, set the table, all that. And this was one thing I 
wanted to change. It was putting too much onto me every Sunday. I 
thought of changing ‘I should cook a fry’ to ‘I could cook a fry, but I 
don’t want to and I don’t have to’. The Sunday after that, I just had 
sausage rolls and apple tart, and we ate off our knees, by the fire. 
Nobody said anything, but I felt much better. It really made me think 
about the way to change things, small things, and how they make you 
feel much more in control.
In talking about communication and assertiveness, 1 also focus attention on 
situations where the other party has the power to refuse a woman’s request for 
change. It is not always the case that if a woman communicates clearly what 
she wants, that a reasonable other will facilitate her. It is necessary to know 
what one wants and needs, but getting it may be much more a matter of 
strategy and power than simply asking for it. Nevertheless, it is important to 
know what one wants. Discussion based on these issues can be a good lead-in 
to the social nature of feelings, especially feelings of anger and depression at
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powerlessness. In naming power, I am articulating a collective feminism which 
gives people terms outside of individualist discourses in which they can 
interpret their experiences.
9.5 Challenge and empowerment
In personal development education, challenge and empowerment are each part 
of the other. I cannot facilitate women’s empowerment or the construction of 
agency if I do not challenge their beliefs, their expectations of themselves and 
others and their learned behaviours, thus making them conscious of how their 
lives are structured. To do this, I draw on Avis (1991: 189) and strive to:
1. provide a context in which the processes of politicisation and becoming 
agentic can occur;
2. communicate my own politicised views, along with my beliefs in the 
value of women and every woman’s potential to be agentic;
3. provide social analysis which gently challenges internalised belief systems 
which may keep women from moving in the direction of agency. This 
includes overtly challenging sexist or demeaning or essentialist views of 
women which may be discussed in the group and which often arise from 
discussions of current news stories and media representations of women;
4. help women to take actions in their own lives, however small, according 
to what they identify as necessary and as best for themselves.
Avis’ (ibid) work on women and power in family therapy has provided these 
four headings. The rest of this section examines their use and potential for 
personal development education and continues to draw extensively on her 
work. Importantly, however, I situate the work in the arena of feminist 
pedagogy, as distinct from a one-to-one therapeutic relationship. The collective
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nature of an educational setting is important for the process of politicisation in 
the context of critical adult education. The list is not exhaustive, but represents 
my beliefs in the potential of personal development education for feminist ends. 
The beliefs are not distinct from each other. They overlap and complement 
each other in relation to the course content.
9.5.1. Personal development education: providing a context within which 
the process of becoming politicised and agentic can begin and develop.
Women coming to a women-only group are taking time for themselves and 
beginning a process of individuation. Individuation is a political act and 
statement for women who are often constructed in an ideology of women’s 
relatedness and connectedness. Traditional femininity is not geared towards the 
individuation of women. In the very act of individuation, ‘the subject becomes 
an active agent, a point of intelligibility, a self that constitutes itself in relation 
to history’ (Poster, 1989: 61, cited in Faith, 1994: 42). Emphasising 
individuation is not to deny the connectedness which so many of the women 
value, nor the importance of relationships to them, but it is often the first time 
in a long time that they have had a space in which to think of themselves as 
distinct. It is a process which is distinct from individualism and it is often 
immensely liberating for women.
This space allows women to reflect on and discuss their needs, without 
worrying about protecting family members, partners and friends. It also allows 
new relationships and / or friendships to develop within the group, fostering 
collectivity as well as individuation. Working on one’s individuation in a group 
context can counteract the individualisation of women’s problems. It also 
breaks down the isolation and shame which women often feel.
The presence of other women allows women to build up personal authority 
through the telling of and listening to their stories and they may re-view them
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through the use of key questions from the facilitator. These key questions often 
concentrate on how and why certain situations have come about, rather than 
on the telling of what the facts are. For instance, by using ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions, PD5, a women in her sixties who had been ‘churched’ after the 
births of her four children was able to connect this to the oppression of women 
within the church and to connect her feelings of hurt with anger at social 
injustice.
With regard to relationships, I emphasise to women that the reason for paying 
attention to them in the course is so that women will stop assuming the burdens 
for them, not because they are responsible for the relationships. PD2, a woman 
whose three grown-up children were deaf used this piece of information as the 
starting point for ceasing to constantly worry about them. Such an emphasis 
allows me to communicate a view of women as separate individuals from their 
relationship systems and allows the women to develop this view of themselves. 
I point out that motherhood, for example, is on the one hand a relationship, but 
also a political institution, as are all relationships (Avis, 1991). I talk about 
culture and beliefs about motherhood, as a way to make such theory accessible. 
Forming friendships with other women is an important resource for women in 
discussing and taking on board such theory.
Life-stories and narratives: Women can ‘share the stories of their lives and 
their hopes and their unacceptable fantasies’ (Heilbrun, 1989: 44). Identifying 
with other women can help a woman understand her position in oppressive 
social relations and how she has been shaped by them.
One studies stories not because they are true or even because they are 
false, but for the same reason that people tell and listen to them, in 
order to learn about the terms on which others make sense of their 
lives; what they take into account and what they do not; what they 
consider worth contemplating and what they do not; what they are and 
are not willing to raise and discuss as problematic and unresolved in life 
(Brodkey, 1987: 47, cited in Brookes, 1992: 33).
I have to listen very carefully to people’s stories, in order to discern the
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women’s current understandings of power and control in their lives. Maybe I 
can create a shift, by the way I ask a question, and thereby emphasise a 
different aspect of the story or of her character from what she has emphasised. 
This is part of the creation of belief, a very complicated task and more 
complicated than the sharing of facts and details (Avis, 1991). I may be able to 
lead to the creation of multiple interpretations of the same event, which may 
contradict each other. The same set of events can inspire a story in which great 
personal authority is demonstrated, as well as stories emphasising passivity, 
weakness, or deprivation. In this way, I emphasise the multiplicity of each 
person.
Through attention to their stories, the women can reclaim aspects of the past 
and present not readily apparent to me. Much of this reclamation, as Brookes 
(1992) suggests and as I have suggested already, is dependent upon the quality 
of questions which the teacher asks. There is a relationship between good 
questions and radical self-reflection. This situation is different from Haug’s 
(1987) and Stephenson et al’s (1996) process of collaborative memory-work 
within groups, but can draw on it. It is different because here, I am a teacher, 
set apart from the group, by virtue of my status. But I do not have to set 
myself apart completely, in that I share my story with them, and encourage 
them to ask questions of me. The way that I share my story is also important, 
in giving information about me and about feminism. In this way, I can try to 
keep a check on power imbalances which might occur between me and them.
A lot of the story-telling process is not so much telling new stories, or new 
things, but saying the same basic things again and again. Brookes (1992: 156): 
cites Williamson (1981), suggesting that it makes little difference what we 
teach, as long as it leads to questioning of the assumptions which inform our 
social practices. Consciousness raising through autobiography and storytelling 
are practices which can be taken up immediately, in any classroom, with both 
women and men, without devising a separate curriculum (Brookes, 1992: 156). 
Groups can discover their collectivity, as well as affirming each member’s
302
personal authority to ‘tell’ their lives. This is in contrast to Belenky et al’s 
(1986) suggestion that we need to devise a whole new curriculum for women. 
This is one way of integrating a feminist perspective into women’s 
interpretation of their everyday experiences.
9.5.2 Communicating a belief that women can be agentic
I try to communicate to the women that they are all competent and capable of 
agency and that they know what is best for themselves, each one in her own 
situation. This is in line with my belief that every moment of power and 
resistance devises its own strategy. In order for them to gain access to their 
own competence, they may also need information, in the shape of discourses of 
feminism and social analysis (see Section 5.3).
Many women who come to personal development are out of touch with then- 
own needs and are accustomed to meeting and responding to others’ needs. 
One of my first goals as a facilitator is to help them develop relationships with 
themselves and to listen to, validate, articulate and meet their own needs (cf 
Avis, 1991). Ways of tuning in to the self and one’s needs are listening to the 
body’s symptoms and what they can tell us about our situations. Headaches, 
fatigue, overeating and depression can all be listened to as messages from the 
self denoting fear, anger, lack of agency, inequality. I emphasise listening to 
themselves, as well as listening to other people in the group. I advise daily 
relaxation and / or visualisation to help them make contact with their own 
needs. I devote nearly half an hour of each class period to meditation, 
relaxation or guided visualisation.
Writing, drawing and collage-making can also be tools for women to develop 
relationships with themselves. In the process of these activities, they often 
discover new and powerful self-awareness and self-appreciation, making 
conclusions and generating knowledge they were not aware of before and 
which they may not even articulate during the course. Resistances can be
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produced which I am not necessarily aware of. That is, they may not be shared 
with the group, or articulated verbally, but this does not mean that they are not 
happening.
I try to affirm each woman’s reality and feelings, ideas and experiences, 
accepting them as unique to each person, yet emphasising that they are social in 
origin and are often shared by other women in the group. It is usually a relief 
for women to find that other women share their feelings of anger, guilt at 
feeling anger, resentment, being burdened and powerless (ibid). ‘The discourse 
of silence is one salient feature of our engagement of the social world’ (Lewis, 
1993: 105). Yet in overcoming silence and learning to talk to each other, 
women need to be presented with discourses which position them with agency, 
rather than with discourses which simply map their oppressions. Women often 
bond around the experience and the telling of abuse and oppression (Bart, 
1993: 248), but they need to develop the resources to go beyond simply 
describing them, to identifying where they already resist and where they can 
resist further and make changes. I try to assist this development by pointing to 
the strength and resilience that they have shown in the past, when dealing with 
oppressive situations (cf Avis, 1991). However, I need to be careful not to 
situate women’s strength within a discourse of essential feminine qualities, 
rather to show it as constructed out of social relations.
Because of my own positioning in discourses of femininity and caring, I have to 
work hard at avoiding over helping (ibid). I have to communicate my belief in 
their competence, by not giving too much help. I can give information and 
encourage people to meet and support each other outside the group. As a 
facilitator, I must not be over protective towards the women, if I feel that they 
are depressed about their situations. This can increase women’s feelings of 
inadequacy and prevent them from becoming agents of their own lives. I can 
lead the women by making suggestions or giving advice, and encouraging them 
to meet each other for mutual support outside the classroom. This active stance 
on my part will provide a model for the women of being assertive, as well as
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caring (ibid). I must offer gender-sensitive and feminist perspectives, which 
may differ from some of the values held by some of the women. I have to do 
this in ways that challenge the women without alienating them from me and 
from the course.
Often, halfway through a course, women say that they feel strangely depressed, 
in contrast to the first few weeks of a course, when they often feel excited at 
the newness and the prospect of changes which they envisage. I emphasise the 
importance of going slowly and of paying attention to the parts of themselves 
that are being cautious. I affirm the importance of waiting until they are ready 
to make changes and of making small changes to start off with. At the same 
time, I can affirm that change will take place, using terms such as ‘when’, 
rather than ‘if  (ibid). One can also reassess as strengths what might otherwise 
be regarded as deficits or illness. Thus, depression can be seen as a healthy 
normal reaction to difficult circumstances and can be examined for what it tells 
women. Normality can be redefined to highlight women’s strengths, rather than 
their deficiencies.
9.5.3 Providing information which may be contrary to the discourses 
through which women interpret their experiences
This component of personal development is indispensable to both the 
politicisation and the becoming agentic of women. It includes feminist analyses, 
discourses and social analysis. It is one way of introducing the feminist 
discourse of multiple subjectivities, as a framework for interpreting everything 
else that happens on the course. It is where connections are made between the 
personal and the political. It is partly rational, intellectual and theoretical. It is 
where I, as an intellectual, try to make feminist poststructuralist theories 
available to women.
There is a dilemma for feminist pedagogy in deciding what practical
forms of pedagogy to adopt. One response to this has been to argue
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that all feminist education should be student-centred, in the sense that 
pedagogy should always be seen as arising out of and as providing a 
response to the immediate experiences and needs of students. Yet if 
knowledge can be seen not merely in terms of ‘power over’ but also of 
‘empowering’, then sometimes a failure to provide and make accessible 
more structured forms of knowledge might itself be seen as failing to 
provide resources for empowerment which some have and others do 
not. (Grimshaw, 1993: 61)
Theoretical, rational and cognitive elements: Many women coming to Stage 
One personal development education often believe that their problems are of 
their own making and that they are inadequate, stupid, ignorant or inept. When 
they tell their various stories, to each other in pairs, or to the group, I draw 
again on Avis (ibid) and ask questions, or provide them with questions to ask 
each other, such as:
• where did you learn that you are responsible for making other people 
happy?
• who told you that you shouldn’t ask directly for what you want?
• where does this belief come from?
• does this still make sense to you?
• how were you taught to look after children?
• how were you taught to look after men?
• what would happen if you said no?
• what would happen if you stopped doing something?
• what do you need?
• how did things get to be the way they are?
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Providing information: Since information is one form of power, it is important 
to find as many ways as possible to put this power in women’s hands (ibid). 
When people first tell their stories, and I have had a chance to identify some of 
their beliefs from these stories, I provide information which challenges these 
beliefs and supports alternative constructions of reality. I do so in several ways:
1. I discuss and elaborate the process of gender socialisation, which helps 
women to understand that their beliefs have been taught to them, that they 
are not absolutes. I keep it simple, but not reductionist, with sentences like 
‘women are taught from birth that other people’s needs are more important 
than theirs’; ‘women are taught that it’s not respectable to want sex’; ‘I ’m 
not surprised that you feel guilty about not making the beds for the whole 
family — most women feel guilty when they make changes, because they are 
taught to put everybody else first before themselves’. These are simple 
statements, but I have learned that, when a course is going well and women 
are enjoying it, they hang onto every word that the facilitator says. I have 
met some women months or even years after a course ended who are able 
to repeat things I said during the course.
2. New information can also be provided in the form of statements which 
challenge women’s beliefs about themselves and other women, such as 
‘women need to take care of themselves in order to be able to really care 
for others’; ‘by caring for yourself and meeting your own needs, you are 
teaching your children how to respect and care for themselves’. It can be 
also useful to report on research findings about issues like sexual abuse, 
housework, or depression (ibid). This research adds weight to my message, 
while at the same time giving the women more information.
I try to introduce the idea of mutiplicity in this way also, making statements 
like ‘we can be different people at different times, depending on the 
situation’. I use games, especially remembered childhood games to 
illustrate that we do not jettison parts of ourselves that we may have 
thought were in the past. The use of games and laughter also gives a
307
pleasurable dimension to the course which is crucial in forming feminist 
subjectivities (cf Kenway et al, 1994).
3. I give information through reading material, in the form of handouts 
which I produce myself and in the form of recommending books. I can use 
cartoons, poems, newspaper and magazine articles, as well as books. It is 
important however to be aware of literacy difficulties that may exist within 
the group and not to disempower women by giving them material to read 
that is too difficult, too academic or too long. For women who do enjoy 
reading, I lend books and articles and recommend that they buy some of 
their own. I have found Lerner’s (1985) The Dance o f Anger a very useful 
book to share with women.
‘We ’ statements: I have found that this type of statement is a simple and 
powerful way to connect the personal and the political, to decrease hierarchy 
between me and the group and to encourage a collectivity with other women 
and in particular with the other group members. Again, Avis (1991) provides
suggestions:
• As women we have been taught th a t... (we should not get angiy)
• Many women feel... (depressed, angry, guilty)
• Most of us have learned ... (to blame ourselves when things go wrong)
• A lot of the groups I work with ... (have had similar experiences about 
this issue)
• As women, many of us have experienced ... (harassment, intimidation, 
violence)
• As women, we are often ... (badly paid)
‘We’ statements are also ways to examine Kristeva’s three tiers. I explain about 
different ‘stages’ of feminism, showing that they can exist together. If we talk
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about women’s need for access to jobs, education and economic independence, 
then we are articulating a liberal feminist perspective. If we talk about women 
as a group and their ways of doing things, or if we laugh about how hopeless 
men are at certain tasks, then we are articulating radical feminism which values 
female ways of doing things, but without necessarily being essentialist (Davies, 
1990b). This can be one way to discuss projection and how we may project the 
parts of ourselves that we do not like onto other groups or individuals. This 
can again lead into discussion of multiplicity and the idea of Kristeva’s third 
tier, where gender identity is not fixed. The challenge is to be able to ‘know’ 
where a group is ‘at’ and to give them the next piece of information that will 
lead them to a different way of looking at themselves, at other women and at 
men.
Making connections: I use Dolphin’s (1994) spiral model of social analysis to 
help women examine and analyse the workings and the power relationships 
operating in their lives. I use a big poster of the spiral, designed to show how 
each level — personal, social, cultural, political and economic — interacts, 
interlocks and influences the others. Becoming aware of these levels enables an 
understanding of the roots of oppression and inequalities. I generally introduce 
the spiral in the same session where I introduce human rights. I ask women to 
reflect on the following questions:
• Personal: how do I experience things?
• Social: how do people relate to each other?
Cultural: what are the dominant beliefs and values and how are they passed
on?
• Political: how are decisions, policies and laws made and who makes them, 
at all levels of society — homes, workplaces, parishes, communities, the 
state?
• Economic: who controls and owns resources of money, raw materials, land,
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equipment and technology
PD3 worked as a cleaner in a hospital. On the first day of the course, she talked 
about how she felt invisible and ‘nothing’ when medical staff walked by her 
without a greeting or acknowledgement, ‘as if I wasn’t there’. In an interview 
after the course, she commented:
PD3. I came to the course because I felt so down in myself. I thought that 
it would help me feel better. The most important thing for me was the 
day you showed us the spiral. I took it home and stuck it on the fridge.
I talked about it to my husband. I brought it to work and showed it to 
my friend. I was raging, really raging I was. 1 decided to do something 
about it.You remember I asked you to photocopy the human rights for 
me? Well, I gave them to her and we decided to stick them up in the 
kitchen at work. I often saw people reading them. That was really 
important.
9.5.4 Helping women to take action in their lives
Clarity regarding responsibility. Many women come to Stage One feeling and 
believing that they are responsible for every aspect of their family life and 
intimate relationships. I find it helpful to clarify the things for which women are 
and are not responsible (cf ibid). I use the concept of human rights to do this, 
emphasising that other people have rights and responsibilities also. This is often 
a first step in helping women to understand that there are power differentials at 
work when they experience difficulties in making changes. The second step is 
to help the women to see what they are able to change and where emotional 
investments may be blocking change. Women may not always be able to make 
changes in their relationships with their husbands or partners as fast as they 
would like, but they often are able to make changes in their relationships with 
their children and with friends
I find that a trigger for these changes is often the ‘treat’ for themselves that 
they have to do for ‘homework’. Taking time for themselves apart from course 
time often triggers a release of the excessive responsibility which some of them
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feel for their children. Success or agency in changing relationships with children 
can lead to a consideration of patterns of power and control. I find that women 
reflect a great deal between the weekly classes. Reflection on successful 
changes, that is, where they have been agentic, is important in learning to make 
further changes in heterosexual relations. Often, at check-in at the beginning of 
a class, they talk about their engagements with the previous week’s material 
and how they acted, or not, in relation to it.
PD4. My friend wanted me to go guarantor for her at the Credit Union. It 
was for a big sum of money. And anyway, I didn’t want to go 
guarantor, even if it was a small sum. She just took it for granted I’d do 
it, gave my name without asking me and told me on her way home. I 
thought about what we had learned about saying ‘no’. I didn’t want to 
do this for her, I went round to her house and said it straight out. It 
took an awful lot out of me. I said I didn’t want to break up our 
friendship, but that I didn’t want to be her guarantor. I asked her to go 
back to the Credit Union and tell them. She did. She’s not speaking to 
me yet, but I ’m just glad I did it.
I often use the metaphor of martial arts to examine power, emphasising that 
not doing things can be as important as doing things. This is useful in helping 
women think from a power perspective about situations they want to change 
and understand that head-on resistance is not always the best strategy for 
agency . This requires self-awareness. It has also led some women to take up 
martial arts, or self-defence classes based on martial arts.
Anger. Helping women to acknowledge and to express their anger and to use it 
to make changes is potentially one of the most politicising, resistance-focused 
and agency-producing actions that personal development education can do. It 
is also potentially the most depoliticising action, depending on the discursive 
framework of the course. Politicisation is often represented by liberal 
humanism as a passing if necessary stage in identity formation: anger represents 
this phase (Kitzinger, 1987: 56). Radical political identity is seen as a 
penultimate step in achieving maturity: the liberal humanist well-adjusted and 
non-politicised identity is the final one (ibid). But maturity is a concept that is 
socially constructed and therefore reflects the values and interests of the
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hegemonic culture (Clark and Wilson, 1991). Writing about the construction of 
lesbianism, Kitzinger (1987: 56) asserts: ‘In directing the lesbian’s attention 
away from the outer world of oppression and offering a satisfying inner world 
as a substitute, psychology offers salvation through individual change rather 
than system change'. If the facilitator does not recognise the necessity of 
politicisation, as well as attention to individual needs, personal development 
education will have the same effects that Kitizinger discusses: it will encourage 
women to ‘deal with’ their anger within the gender status quo, rather than use 
anger to disrupt it.
When we discuss feelings and relationships in courses, anger is always brought 
up. I tell the women that anger is a vital part of becoming more conscious and 
of making changes and I deliberately try to mobilise anger by predicting it and 
affirming it as a highly positive emotion for women, as recommended by Avis 
(1991).
I use social analysis to point out how women have been robbed of anger and 
taught to be docile and therefore out of touch with power and strength. 
Women’s relationships with others are affected by the necessity to deny and 
disguise the anger that arises from a lack of power. The only acceptable voice 
for women in a male world is a voice that does not directly express anger. 
Caring, represented as a fundamental female quality, can be better understood 
as a way of negotiating from a position of low power. Patriarchy is 
represented, not by outright oppression, but by the unacknowledged 
preeminence of men’s desires and the subordination of their own. If a women 
wants to exercise authority it must be indirect or manipulative, or else in the 
service of others. The same is true if she wants to show anger (ibid).
I explain how, because of these social conditions, we may project anger onto 
others and not acknowledge it in ourselves. This facilitates a view of the person 
as multiple and is able to accommodate both anger and caring in the one 
person, thus undermining male / female dualism. I share some of my own 
experiences of anger with groups. This always catches their attention, because
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they are surprised that somebody whose manner is as mild as mine appears 
could feel anger as strongly as I describe. I talk about the cost of anger to 
women, whether it is directed at ourselves in the form of depression or illness, 
or directed at other people, where it affects relationships with bitterness and 
resentment. All the time, I emphasise the social nature of anger.
I often use the metaphor of a cleansing white light to describe the benefits of 
anger, pointing out that it is a clear and strong emotion which has the potential 
to energise and focus energy onto the areas where change is needed (ibid). I 
make it clear that the experience of anger in situations of oppression is to be 
expected. I explain how anger can affect the body and I encourage physical 
release by pounding pillows or screaming into them. I encourage women to see 
where their anger is coming from and to make plans in the group for dealing 
with certain anger-causing situations where they can make changes. Again, I 
find Lemer’s (1985) book about anger an invaluable tool to share with women.
Saying ‘no stopping certain practices; unlearning: I ask the group where in 
their lives they want to say ‘no’, but have difficulty. I ask them to role play 
situations where they practise saying no directly. I encourage them to examine 
how they could stop doing an activity that they no longer want to do. We 
discuss the guilt that women can feel when they say ‘no’ to demands or 
expectations from partners, children, friends or colleagues. I emphasise again 
that each situation demands its own strategy and its own ways of resisting. The 
more agentic women become in their families and in other close relationships, 
the more changed will be the emotional and logistical patterns that have shaped 
experiences and dynamics in those relationships. We discuss how it can be 
difficult for us to learn to tolerate not being seen as healing and helpful.
We discuss how relationships can be reorganised to support women’s new 
interests and activities. By being different, they are creating different situations 
which they need to learn to deal with. They may get strong ‘change back’ 
messages from family and friends (ibid) and it is essential that I warn women 
about them. The family can be threatened, because of the ways that traditional
313
families revolve so completely around women, so that even small changes in 
the woman’s role may mean that work and emotional patterns are disrupted. I 
explain that everybody is capable of the emotional work that the mother or 
wife traditionally did, but that women sometimes find it difficult to let other 
people do their own emotional work, because it is one of women’s few 
traditional sources of power.
In the meantime, it may be enough for women to learn to say ‘no’, in small 
things, perhaps not even to say no directly, but to take time for themselves. I 
explain that this is not just to feel good, although that is one of the effects of 
taking time for treats, but also to get rid of some of the burdens they are under, 
including housework and emotional labour.
9.6 Personal development education: the beginnings of a pedagogy of the 
body
We are embodied subjects. Feminist resistances of the 1960s began with the 
body and a woman’s right to choose how it is or is not used. For both women 
and men, the body is one medium through which the world is experienced. On 
the other hand, women are objectified bodies. ‘Under constant critical 
surveillance by others, women begin to experience their own bodies at a 
distance. They view themselves as the objects of the intentions and 
manipulations of others’ (Davis, 1996: 115).
I tell the women of my belief that our oppressions and our emotional 
investments are not only felt rationally and at a level of feeling, but also at the 
level of the body. The body has a role in self-regulation, in that the gut 
responds not only to food but also ‘digests’ stress and the emotions. The body 
needs to be relaxed to establish or re-establish a free flow of energy. Again, the 
martial arts metaphor is often one that women find easy to relate to, in thinking 
about energy flowing.
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Insofar as the emotions are social and are ways of knowing our world and our 
relation to it (Hochschild, 1990b), they trace how social factors influence what 
we expect and thus what feelings actually ‘signify’. Emotions are embodied 
experiences which radiate through the body as a structure of ongoing lived 
experience. For individuals to understand their own lived emotions, they must 
experience them socially and reflectively (Denzin, 1989). Attending to the body 
is another pedagogical tool which I consider vital to a politicised practice of 
personal development.
At Stage One, this is primarily approached in the form of the relaxation and 
visualisation exercises already mentioned. It is also dealt with when we discuss 
feelings and relationships. I give people a blank drawing of a body and ask 
them where they experience various feelings. Relaxation helps to restore 
‘sensual authority’, without which we can become muscularly rigid and 
perceptually dulled (Taylor, 1991: 62). The body is a meeting point between 
private and public. For women, particularly, patriarchal power can dictate how 
the body is constructed and social (Davies, 1990b). I ask women to talk to 
each other about what they learned about their bodies as children and as 
adolescents. They often focus on commands such as ‘keep your legs together 
while sitting’ which held the secret to becoming respectable (cf Haug, 1987; 
Stephenson et al, 1996).
Attending to the body can contribute to a growing awareness of the structuring 
of subjectivity through the embodiment of dominant ideologies (Taylor, 1991: 
72). Yet, to move beyond unconscious challenges or emotional defiance, there 
has to be a critical connection able to thread together the fragments of the 
contradictions, accommodations and resistances. Resistance without a 
grounding in political critique is limited in its effects on everyday practices and 
existences (ibid). In the sharing of stories and narratives, a common experience 
of resistance and oppression is recognised, in relation to the body as well as 
other aspects of women’s lives. Paying attention to the body in this collective 
setting is capable of beginning a process of a critical pedagogy of the body,
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although such a pedagogy is one that is ongoing. Stage One personal 
development education is just a first step.
9.7 Personal development education: part of a feminist project
My discursive analysis in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight of this work has 
shown that a person is never totally powerful, or totally powerless. I posit, 
then, that if, in my courses, I can get women to focus on contradictions, that is, 
the reasons why they want changes in their lives and came to the course in the 
first place, and where these desires show up the cracks in the social façade then 
there is the possibility of politicisation. If I can facilitate women to see where 
they are powerful and resisting, as well as seeing how constraining power 
relations work in their lives, this can help them make changes and be agentic. 
We can look at intimate and immediate manifestations and operations of power 
in this way. Nevertheless, the discursive analysis does not deal with questions 
of authority and the powerful social status of experts to produce ‘truth’ (see, 
for example, Fraser, 1989: 173,4). This is an aspect of power which I refer to 
and try to make explicit through the use of the spiral analysis.
The personal extending which personal development education can bring about 
is necessary, then, but not everything. It is necessary to acknowledge the limits 
of personal development, both to myself and to the groups I work with. 
Sometimes, recognising limits can be comforting, by allowing us to say, ‘I ’ve 
done all 1 can do here’ (Avis, 1991). Part of my feminist project is to 
encourage them to move into other groups which will continue to develop their 
politicisation.
The possibility of reorganising families as a result of personal development 
education is limited by the gender relations sanctioned by the larger society. 
The options open to the facilitator are limited too, by the dominant discourses 
in the larger social system of which women and their relationships are part.
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Nevertheless, by opening up the possibility of alternatives to the dominant 
discourses in personal development education, we can begin to transform 
practice in the existing social order. Foucault identifies liberation with 
resistance rather than revolution, the acting out of refusal at multiple points of 
power relations (Faith, 1994: 53). The task is to change the regimes which 
produce truths about people. In changing family and relationship dynamics, 
women can begin to change one of those regimes of truth.
Feminisms produce a mosaic of resistances which address the family, 
language, courts, churches, media, welfare, educational and health 
institutions, violence against women, political economy, heterosexism, 
colonization, racism, imperialism and all other impositions of 
patriarchal truths. The targets of feminist wrath and appeal are vast, 
deep, intricate and constantly shifting. Whereas individual feminist 
voices may convey a dogmatic certitude of analysis, as a broad and 
internally diverse social movement feminism moves beyond the model 
that would simply replace one regime of truth with another. Feminisms 
are local in their expressions and global in their collective, potential 
force, (ibid)
Resistances can occur beyond that which is articulated, observable or 
conventionally politicised. As a facilitator, I need to be aware of this. It is not 
always possible to measure learning outcomes, as Brookfield (1986) reminds 
us. I must not make assumptions about what course participants have or have 
not learned. Too many women make personal development education their first 
or only contact with adult education for us to leave it untheorised and to 
neglect its politicised practice.
There is a problem for the feminist poststructuralist facilitator, regarding the 
content of such courses. She is constantly in competition with dominant 
discourses (feminist and non-feminist, both drawing on liberal humanism) of 
what it means to be a woman, while simultaneously using human relations 
processes, such as empathy, participative techniques and drawing on personal 
experience. She also needs to be aware that it is not enough to ground her 
practice in simplistic notions of false consciousness and to see feminist personal 
development teaching as mediation or, worse, as a charitable act (Lewis, 1993:
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177). Experiences in the feminist personal development classroom can be a 
deeply emotional for many women, offering the opportunity to claim relevance 
for the lives they live as the source of legitimate knowledge (cf ibid). Women 
don’t need to be taught what we already know: that we are marginalised in a 
mainstream culture for which our productive and reproductive labour is 
essential. We need opportunities to reflect on our situations outside dominant 
discourses of the personal. From that viewpoint, a personal development 
course can construct for women ail island, or a ‘holding environment’ (Avis, 
1991), in which they recognise, understand and change their role in inequitable 
power relationships and cathectic relationships. This may include deciding to 
leave those relationships.
I want courses to end with ‘woman’ signifying differently for the women than it 
did at the beginning, that is, with interpretations available to them which are 
not mediated by the dominant discourses of woman. In this way, the signifier 
‘man’ can also begin to be changed (cf Connell, 1995; Hollway, 1982). Any 
changes that women make also interrupt men’s positionings.
Concern for this basic struggle should motivate feminist thinkers to talk 
and write more about how we relate to men and how we change and 
transform relationships with men characterized by domination, (hooks, 
1989: 130)
This is feminist work that focuses on strategies women can use to speak to men 
about domination, oppression and change. It is the sort of work that is not 
readily available (ibid). Yet, many women have a deep longing to share their 
desires for change and their feminist consciousness with people to whom they 
are close. They want their feminism to reach into their relationships, in order to 
transform them. How we understand ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ affects how 
we see our options for doing such transformative work and our choices for the 
future. It is crucial that personal development facilitation practices do not 
actually produce women in liberal humanist terms and then claim to ‘discover’ 
what they have produced. It is essential that the facilitator has a keen political
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awareness of the conditions of her own production.
Naming power and the multiplicity of power and the social nature of feelings 
and contradictions are concepts central to my assertion that personal 
development practice can be politicised and can produce feminist agency. 
Personal development education deals primarily with intimate relationships 
(structures of cathexis), underpinned by emotional investments. Being involved 
in intimate relationships, including marriage, can be a source of agency and 
power, as well as constraint (Hollway, 1995). Through personal development, 
women can learn not to do the emotional work for others in their relationships 
and thereby affect structures of labour and power as well.
In discontinuing both emotional and practical work for others (including 
projection of certain qualities or feelings onto men as individuals and as a 
group, see Coward 1993 and Hollway 1994: 260), they often need to learn to 
deal with guilt and ambivalence which arise because they are leaving behind 
traditional positions of power for women, with their associated emotional 
investments in those positions. My analysis in Chapters Seven and Eight shows 
that women who can deal with uncertainty, contradiction and feelings of 
ambivalence are likely to be agentic in pursuit of feminist goals in a multiple 
and complex social world. Learning to deal with these feelings of ambivalence 
requires a strong sense of what one’s own needs are (Coward, 1993), which 
many women are lacking, when they first come to personal development 
education. Chapter Eight has shown that what is unacknowledged is often 
reproduced unchanged. Constructing self-awareness in feminist 
poststructuralist discourses can lead to the abandonment of such reproduction 
and the re-production of women and men in modified ways.
Feminist personal development done outside liberal humanist discourses of the 
self can thus play an important part in the construction of new selves. Deleuze 
(1988: 115, cited in Faith, 1994: 42) suggests that social change, such as shifts 
in capitalism, ‘find an unexpected “encounter” in the emergence of a new Self 
as a centre of resistance’. This is what poststructuralist feminisms are doing,
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although not in the individualising way that Deleuze intends. This is also 
consistent with Giddens’ (1991) assertion that, in late modernity, the creation 
of self-identity is a political project. ‘Women who want more than family life 
make the personal political with every step they take away from the home’ 
(Sichterman, B. 1986: 2, cited in Giddens, 1991: 216).
9.8 Conclusion
This chapter has put forward a way of facilitating politicised personal 
development education, based on my own practical experience and on my 
theorising earlier in this work. While my practice may be flawed, if I have no 
practice, then there is only empty theorising. Yet, if we do not theorise in order 
to inform our practice, then our work is open for colonisation by the dominant 
discourses of the self. These liberal humanist discourses depoliticise our 
feelings, desires for change and experiences of contradictions, and reduce them 
to effects of our individual psychologies and / or pathologies. Where Chapters 
Six, Seven and Eight address the first of my research questions about the 
nature of feminist subjectivity, this present chapter has tried to examine the 
second question: under what conditions can we do politicised personal 
development education?
A politicised practice of personal development education has the potential to be 
a successor to earlier feminist practices of consciousness raising, incorporating 
its strengths, while avoiding the weakness of a lack of a nurturing dimension 
and support for women in working on feelings of guilt, ambiguity, and 
ambivalence. In this, it is capable of living up to consciousness raising’s 
theoretical goal of examining lives with all senses, including an equal emphasis 
on feelings. Drawing on feminist poststructuralist theory, it is capable of 
challenging the gender status quo by demonstrating that gender differences are 
produced and thus available for modification.
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CHAPTER TEN
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER WORK
10.0 Introduction
This chapter summarises my empirical findings, examines the theoretical, 
political and pedagogical implications of the work and makes suggestions for 
further work. Stimulated by an intense personal engagement with feminism and 
issues of agency, I have aimed in this study to research and theorise feminist 
subjectivities and to examine both their similarities to and differences from my 
own. Subjectivity has been treated as a process by which a person discursively, 
relationally and psychodynamically constructs a sense of self, or of identity. I 
have undertaken the study in order to deepen our knowledge about how 
feminism ‘works’ for feminist women and how they produce knowledge about 
feminism and about themselves as feminists. I have drawn on the pictures 
presented of feminist subjectivities, to suggest a practice of women’s personal 
development education which is capable of producing politicised and agentic 
subjects. The work has drawn on two primary theoretical frameworks, namely, 
Foucauldian discourse analysis and psychodynamic accounts o f the relationship 
between signification and emotional life, including the unconscious, as 
developed by feminist poststructuralists, particularly Hollway and Mama.
Theory and practice must meet and engage with each other and I have 
approached this engagement at one meeting point which is constituted by 
feminist subjectivities, including my own. I have attempted to take this further 
and see how these subjectivities can provide sources and themes for another 
meeting point between theory and practice: that constituted by feminist 
personal development education. This attempt at linking theory with classroom 
practice gives the work its pedagogical focus.
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10.1 Summary of findings
10.1.1 Discourses of feminism
Three major discourses of feminism were evident in participants’ accounts, 
along with another discourse concerned with a ‘real feminism’, which I 
interpreted as anti-feminist in its effects. These were analysed in Chapter Six. 
Central to my use of the term discourse was the understanding that there were 
different meanings about feminism held by the research participants and that 
people are positioned in relation to these meanings. Discourses, as analysed in 
this work, were found to position individuals in relation to one another socially, 
politically and culturally, as similar to or different from; as ‘one of us’ or as 
‘Other’. In this way, different positions and powers were made available to 
people. The signifier feminist achieved its meaning for feminist women in this 
discursive context. I treated discourses as the content of feminist subjectivity. I 
also kept in mind the conditions of existence of discourses and their practical 
fields of deployment.
The discourses which I selected from the participants’ data were:
Discourse One: feminism as an expression of a natural femininity which is 
oppressed under patriarchy;
Discourse Two: feminism as a rejection of women’s and men’s socialisation 
into different roles;
Discourse Three: feminism as a move away from male / female dualism; 
Discourse Four: a ‘real feminist’ discourse.
The first three discourses reflected Kristeva’s three stages, or tiers of feminism, 
although they were not identical to them. Discourse One, the discourse of a 
female culture or an essential female nature repressed under patriarchy, 
appeared to be the dominant discourse and to have the greatest explanatory
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power, because of its resonance with patriarchal forms of knowledge about 
women. However, even while meshing with dominant patriarchal discourses of 
women, this discourse challenged them, by also subverting the dominant 
symbolic order and empowering women through its resonance with alternative 
ideologies and cultural practices. What was analysed as the dominant discourse 
within feminism was simultaneously analysed as a subaltern discourse in 
patriarchal relations. This characteristic of Discourse One was one of the first 
illustrations in the thesis of the multiplicity of discourse. It was also used 
subsequently to illustrate the multiplicity of subjectivity.
Discourse Two treated feminism as a rejection of women’s and men’s 
socialisation into different roles. It had less explanatory power and broke 
down more often in participants’ accounts, due to its dependence on 
socialisation theory, which is unable to account for the complex and 
contradictory ways that people constitute and reconstitute themselves in the 
social worlds in which they participate. Yet this discourse continued to have 
appeal, because of its relation to the dominant humanist model of the subject as 
having a core identity which is unchanging, but overlaid with social layers.
Discourse Three was that of feminism as a rejection of male / female dualism. It 
contradicted both patriarchal and other feminist discourses and was the 
subaltern discourse within feminism, as well as within mainstream discourses. 
Yet for those who drew on it and operated in it, it had agentic and empowering 
feminist effects. In addition, its awareness of the existence and value of first 
two discourses, in specific contexts, gave it, in my view, a greater political 
refinement and sustainable potential.
With Discourse Four, the discourse of ‘real feminism’, some participants 
positioned or felt themselves positioned by a standard relating to the amount of 
change they were creating and by a persistent insecurity about what ‘being a 
feminist’ (a politicised identity) actually was. This discourse took change as 
visible, public change. It was to some extent in conflict with the discourse of 
‘the personal is political’, central to all feminist thought, because so much
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personal change is invisible to other people.
I used a psychodynamic explanation of expressions of a real feminist discourse, 
suggesting that many women were not as sure of their feminist identity as they 
would have liked. I suggested that this was a result of continuous confrontation 
with the reality of women’s oppression and the lack of power of feminist 
discourses in the face of hegemonic discourses of essential female sexuality, 
male sexual drive and other manifestations of patriarchy. As well as that, 
feminist women’s own multiplicity meant that one simply did not take up a 
once-and-for-all position in feminist discourse and thereby take on a new 
identity, shedding older positions and related emotional investments without a 
trace. This, I asserted is probably true of any identity adopted in adulthood, 
especially politicised identities.
10.1.2 The relational construction of feminist identity
The discourses analysed in Chapter Six did not form a comprehensive list of the 
content of feminism. They clarified some of the content of feminist 
subjectivities. It became apparent from respondents’ accounts that individuals 
have many discourses and discursive positions available to them, and that the 
positions they take up are momentary, changing with the different social 
contexts and relations in which they find themselves. Not only do people take 
up positions (reflexive positioning), but they are also positioned by other 
people (interactive positioning), in discourses they do not like, ‘against their 
will’, so to speak.
Analysing subjectivity as positions in discourse allows for the person to be 
conceptualised historically, as changing over time and in different contexts. It 
also advances the idea of people having multiple subjectivities. Each discourse 
is responded to in ways that are unique to each individual. This means that 
discourses are not an omnipresent monolithic force acting on passive victims.
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Instead, they are also responded to collectively by the creation of new 
discourses and by individual movement between discourses as well as 
individually through psychodynamic processes.
In Chapter Seven, a relational aspect of feminist subjectivity was thus seen to 
exist simultaneously with participants’ preferred discursive explanations and 
interpretations of feminism and feminist action. In taking up a relational 
position, participants did not abandon the discursive positioning. Relational and 
discursive positioning occurred simultaneously, with movement between 
positions allowing one or the other to dominate at any particular moment. In 
this way I further conceptualised multiplicity. It was seen to be based on 
contradictions and ambiguity, with some feminist women living more easily 
with multiplicity than others.
The signifier feminism was seen to achieve its meaning within a framework of 
intersections between discourses and relations in the present moment. Choice, 
collusion, strategy, movement and positioning for feminist resistance and 
agency were important elements in the construction of feminist subjectivities 
and the production of feminist agency. The specific relation or situation in 
which significations were negotiated was referred to throughout the analysis as 
practice. The data suggested that changes in practice could have structural 
effects. For participants, movement between or within discourses took place as 
a result of a thought-out strategy, as a result of a formal pedagogical situation 
or as a less deliberate result of finding oneself positioned in a sexist discourse 
or in any kind of oppressive situation.
In making strategic choices for agency, feminists found themselves also 
treading a fine line between operating in feminist discourses and drawing on 
more dominant discourses, in order to open lines of communication with other 
people. Work relations in organisations and heterosexual couple relations 
featured as important sites for the transformation of practices concerning the 
gender status quo. The disruption of structures of labour in the home was also 
shown to be both relational and discursive. In addition, their disruption was
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capable of stimulating feelings of guilt and ambiguity which pointed to the 
existence of related psychodynamic processes.
Different feminist discourses were expressed, repressed or modified, as a 
consequence of their effects on the subjective experience of power and feminist 
agency. Some feminists opted for more singular routes and more unitary views 
of women, of politics and of gender difference. Those who lived most 
comfortably with ambiguity and multiplicity moved in and out of various 
subject positions in the course of their social relationships and interactions with 
a diverse array of groups in their personal, political and working lives. I 
interpreted this as a more or less conscious stance arising out of a process of 
social and personal reflection. The self-reflection also laid bare the character of 
some of the psychodynamic processes of individual women.
10.1.3 Psychodynamic processes at work in the construction of feminism 
and feminist identity
In Chapter Eight, I examined how psychodynamic concepts can be used for the 
development of feminist poststructuralist discourses, drawing on concepts of 
repression, splitting and projection. In the psychodynamic analysis, a feminist 
discourse of multiplicity (Discourse Three) emerged again as complex and 
sometimes apparently contradictory. I analysed participants’ accounts of 
private and emotional change and the ways that such change was affected by 
the discursive contexts in which it took place. The signifiers ‘feminist’ and 
‘feminine’ were seen to depend on each other for meaning, rather than being 
mutually exclusive opposites. The accounts cited illustrated discursive 
interventions into the ways that the signifiers ‘woman’ and ‘feminist’ were 
produced. A process of radical self-reflection pushed forward the explanatory 
power of a feminist discourse of a multiple subject. The analysis of the 
self-reflection showed it to be situational and constantly in process and also to 
have feminist and other discursive content which was outside dominant
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liberal-humanist discourses of the subject, although not uninfluenced by them. 
It showed how psychic life is relational and social, as opposed to being a purely 
intrapsychic and individual phenomenon.
This analysis led me to an account of the constructed nature of desires and 
contradictions in the feminist subjects participating in the research. A recursive 
relationship between discourses and psychodynamic processes was illustrated 
and the signification in the psyche of a feminist discourse of multiplicity was 
theorised, adding to the theorisation of multiplicity in relations, already put 
forward in Chapter Seven. Material which was repressed in the psyche was 
seen to be reproduced in discourse. For example, femininity which was 
repressed in feminist discursive positionings was seen to be reproduced in 
feminist practices. The analysis took a deconstructive approach to examining 
how femininity and feminism are not dualistically opposed. The signification of 
feminism in the psyche was also seen to be achieved in a discursive context.
Power was analysed as a two-way phenomenon, through adding the concept of 
investment to the concepts of discourse and discursive positioning. Power had 
already been theorised in the relational analysis of Chapter Seven as a way to 
protect vulnerable selves through the take-up of powerful positions within any 
one discourse. In the psychodynamic analysis of Chapter Eight it emerged as 
the energy which invests identity though the benefits of taking up certain 
positions, whereby one can meet one’s own needs. The meeting of needs 
produced psychological investments for the women whose accounts were 
involved in this analysis.
Because different positions in different discourses were being taken up from 
moment to moment, I asserted that it is no longer adequate to theorise women 
as always victims or as always oppressors. In traditional terms, power is the 
exclusive property of dominant groups. The analysis made here demonstrates 
that the person who would be traditionally characterised as victim has power to 
move or to change positioning, or to take up new positions. The emphasis in 
the analysis was on the relational nature of power, that it is a two-way
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production. It was emphasised that this is not the same as equating men’s and 
women’s power in social relations. Men’s power (and the power of members of 
any privileged group) is backed by resources and reproduced through dominant 
discursive power. This discursive power is the kind that produces oppression, 
backed up as it is by material resources.
10.1.4 Applications to women’s personal development education
Drawing on the findings outlined, I turned my attention in Chapter Nine to 
their application to women’s personal development education. I asserted that 
women need to look after their own needs and that the more developed they 
are in this respect, the more they can work towards their own and other 
people’s emancipation, provided they also have access to political discourses 
which facilitate this. I asserted that such political discourses must include 
discourses of the human subject which do not assume a unitary subject, either 
female or male. What people can report, and how that is made sense of in an 
educational context, is affected by what discourses are available. If the only 
discourses available are those which assume a unitary subject, women and men 
will not be able to use psychodynamic concepts with politically radical effect.
Personal development education in particular is an arena where feminist women 
versed in discourses such as those provided by feminist poststructuralism need 
to get involved in facilitation and I described my attempts at practice. 
Furthermore, I asserted that my findings on the subjectivities of feminist 
women indicate that politicisation is not the same as agency. In fact, they are 
recursively positioned with regard to each other, so it is essential to have a 
theory of agency as well as of politicisation.
While the analysis of feminist subjectivities undertaken in Chapters Six, Seven 
and Eight, was complex and highly theoretical, I asserted that such a 
theoretical grounding is necessary for a politicised practice of personal
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development education. This is particularly so where it attends to 
contradictions and the ways that they can provide starting points for altering 
practice in the gender regime and thus constructing feminist agency. Without a 
theory of the person which deals with contradiction, the way is open for 
dominant discourses of a unitary subject to hold sway.
I thus also attempted in Chapter Nine to show the relevance of the concepts of 
multiplicity and multiple subjectivities to a feminist practice of personal 
development and how it deals with the experience of contradiction. It is not 
enough to say that people are multiple, they also prioritise certain positions in 
the construction of their lives. An important motivational feature in taking up 
positions in social relations was to achieve power, as the analysis of the 
feminist women’s subjectivities in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight had shown. 
For this reason, I asserted that the introduction of power as a topic in personal 
development is essential and I attempted to show how I use the concept in my 
own practice. I also emphasised the distinction between liberal humanist 
individualism, which I considered inimical to politicisation, and individuation, 
which is an important part of resistance and agency experiences for many 
women who take personal development courses. A central assertion of the 
discussion was that the facilitator is not neutral and that she must be aware of 
her own politics and stance regarding the human subject.
10.2 Theoretical conclusions
The theoretical implications of this research for both feminism and adult 
education stem from the development of a theory of subjectivity which can 
cope with identities taken on in adulthood. The multi-layered nature of identity 
and subjectivity must be taken into account in efforts to politicise people or to 
develop critical thinking. Adult education and feminism both need to ask what 
psychologies and social theories are adequate to this. Otherwise, dominant 
discourses of the human subject will be taken for granted as ‘common sense’,
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with all the ideological implications of such an adoption. There is no practice 
without a theory. We need to be aware of what our theories are.
The theoretical resources of feminist poststructuralism as I read it in this work 
are capable of mobilising counter hegemonic feminist definitions and 
interpretations o f women and of gender differences. Meanings can be changed 
through inter-discursive work, that is, through the articulation of concepts in 
new and different ways which may stand in stark contrast to other feminist 
theoretical traditions, but which nevertheless have concerns about women’s 
oppression which have much in common with these other traditions (cf 
Kenway etal, 1994: 190).
Subjectivity, ideology, discourse and power are contested issues within the 
diverse body of feminist thought. The feminist poststructuralist attention which 
I have brought to them here provides a complex understanding of different 
forms of oppression, resistance, agency and signification experienced by both 
feminist and non-feminist women, of the ways patriarchal relations operate and 
the conditions of re-production and resistance. Below, I review the usefulness 
of some of the theoretical tools provided by the feminist poststructuralist 
framework which I used for the analysis in this work.
10.2.1 Discourse
The production of discourses and knowldege can have political effects. The 
creation of new feminist discourses and their implication in the construction of 
politicised subjectivities and pedagogies are pivotal to this thesis. For that, we 
need a theory of discourse which is both sophisticated and practical. The 
concept is centrally concerned with content and allows us to magnify for 
examination a set of assumptions which cohere around a common logic and 
which confer particular meanings on the experiences and practices of people in 
a particular sphere (Hollway, 1984b).
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The concept of discourse also allows us to see individuals using different 
mechanisms to interpret their experience almost simultaneously, or in the 
course of one conversation or situation. In this way, it facilitates examination 
of the ideological work which produces femininity and feminism as a set of 
relations arising in local historical settings, without segregating ideology from 
the economic and social relations in which it is embedded and which it both 
organises and by which it is determined (Smith, 1988). It also challenges 
monolithic and totalising notions of causality and determination and allows the 
deconstruction of signifier / signified relationships which are commonly viewed 
as natural and normal.
By refusing certain discursive practices or elements of those practices, and by 
searching for new ways to position themselves, individuals can be seen to 
construct new and different forms of discourse and thus of material practice. 
They are seen at the same time to be constrained by existing discourses, 
structures and practices. These are not simply external constraints, but are also 
responsible for the psychic patterns through which individuals position 
themselves as feminist or feminine and through which they privately and 
emotionally experience themselves in relation to the social world (Davies, 
1990c: 13).
The concept of positioning in discourse has proved valuable, allowing us to see 
that people can be positioned simultaneously in different discourses, prompting 
contradictions to manifest themselves. This concept is more dynamic than a 
static definition of roles and is able to focus on how self-signification is 
achieved in encounters between people in social situations. As Hollway’s 
(1982, 1989) work shows, and as this work also demonstrates, people are 
positioned in discourses in ways such that they are motivated to reproduce 
certain positions in discourse and therefore certain significations. Because 
people are never positioned in only a single discourse, contradictions occur and 
subjectivity is not determined. Change is possible through the contradictions 
between discourses and how people experience themselves as positioned
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through more than one discourse. Because these discourses are a recursive 
product of a domain of material and cultural changes, the reproduction of 
gender is not determined (ibid).
If we accept that people are not rigidly fixed in a single identity, then we can 
study the ways in which they are able to change, to resist and oppose dominant 
discourse, either by taking up positions outside these discourses, or by 
developing alternative ones, or both. When we look at the processes by which 
women living in a sexist and anti-feminist environment constitute themselves as 
feminists and take up positions in feminist discourses, we are examining how 
politicised subjectivities are constituted in oppressive environments and in 
environments of resistance.
As Mama (1995) points out, discourse in the general sense is something which 
is not separate from the individuals who make it up. It is not just a conceptual 
process. Theorised in this way, feminism becomes both a contradictory and 
multiple collective experience that women respond to in the process of 
constructing themselves as subjects. Existing feminist discourses are therefore 
both a vehicle for individual development and a generative factor in the 
production of new feminist discourses.
There remain theoretical problems with the concept of discourse. These 
problems concern where one discourse ends and another begins, the relation of 
discourse to the material world and its precise relation to ‘practices’ as I have 
used the term in this work (for example, are practices always discursive 
practices?). And although positioning in discourse improves on the notion of 
the individual as a set of roles, it is easy to slip into discourse determinism, as 
Foucauldian discourse theory does, and as radical feminist theory tends to do, 
because they do not account for each person’s unique relation to discourse. 
This is where the theorisation of emotion and investment is valuable.
The idea of emotions as discursively constructed connects discourse, the 
unconscious and subjectivity and allows for different individual reactions and
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responses to discourses. It also challenges the notion that desire, emotions or 
feelings are an expression of the real or true essence of an individual. People 
can be controlled by perceptions of what is true or real about them. Perceptions 
of women’s true nature, illustrated by the expression of their ‘real’ desires, 
have been shown to be open to challenge, to demonstration of their 
constructed nature.
Challenging perceptions of what women are really like from a radical feminist 
or liberal feminist perspective alone is not enough (although it may sometimes 
be necessary), because these feminisms rely on a model of the human subject 
which allows that there is such a thing as a real and true femininity. They thus 
lend themselves to universalisms regarding women, which feminist 
poststructuralism considers to be inimical to emancipatory moves. The bases of 
the other feminisms in essentialist models of the subject make their approach to 
change reliant on rationality and voluntarism. These may be useful tools, 
depending on the situation, but they are not sufficient to deal with people’s 
investments in certain discursive positions and their resistance to 
transformation.
10.2.2 Theorising the person, the personal and human agency
Because of the focus of my research and my pedagogical interests in the 
personal, there is a danger that this work could be dismissed by those interested 
in political and social change as an idealist analysis of change at the level of the 
individual (cf Hollway, 1982: 491). My focus is intentional, however, derived 
from my conviction that the political includes the personal and that the personal 
must not be left untheorised in any consideration of politics. Otherwise the 
personal will be subject to either liberal humanist idealist, or to social 
constructionist interpretations.
A critical adult education which is effective in its efforts to produce political
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and social change needs a sophisticated theory of the subject, just as all social 
theory does (Giddens, 1993: 5). In my emphasis on recursiveness between 
discourse, relations and psychodynamics, what Giddens (ibid: 2 - 8 )  refers to as 
‘duality of structure’, I believe it is possible to avoid the reductionism about the 
human subject to which both humanism and structuralism are prone. By taking 
this approach I add to theories of the person produced by other critical 
theorists (for example, Hollway, 1989; Mama, 1995) which give an account of 
the social and the psychic as dynamic mutual productions open to change.
As developed in the work of Hollway (1982, 1984a, 1989), signification as a 
starting point for examining the self, the person, or subjectivity does not 
already privilege either side of the individual / society dualism which I have 
identified as problematic and as characteristic o f the opposition between liberal 
humanism and social constructionism. Situations and events signify differently 
and uniquely for each person but this must not be taken to mean that the 
process of signification is not social. Emotions must be articulated through the 
content of discourses. There is no other way to articulate them (Hollway, 
1982: 493). Signification is produced in discourses and is therefore expressed 
in relation to discourses which pre-exist a person.
Drawing on Foucauldian concepts of power and Hollway’s assertion that 
power is linked to emotional investments allows us to recognise that power 
operates differentially depending on the social relations involved in a situation, 
the discourses people recognise and the positions they take up in different 
discourses. By accounting for power and discourse in each case, an analysis 
based on signification privileges neither individual nor structure.
Since discourses do not exist ‘out there’, the duality of structure also refers to 
the circulation of signification (and thereby of discourses) between people, 
rather than between a person and a discourse (Hollway, 1982; Mama, 1995). 
People participate actively — even if sometimes unwittingly —in the production 
and reproduction of discourses, and therefore of change. The plethora of small 
everyday significations which we take for granted must be taken into account
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in the search for a useful theory of change.
A theory of the person that relates contradictions, desires and emotions to 
discourses which position us as women and as feminists and which also 
provides alternative positions for us to take up is a good basis on which to 
challenge the kind of rationalism on which critical adult education — in its a 
desire for social and political change — is based. This rationality has had limited 
success. Signification and related concerns with the construction of meaning 
offer a way beyond rationalism and its dualistic opposite, ‘pure’ feeling. This 
area of theorising needs to be given continuing attention by critical adult 
education.
10.2.3 Political implications for feminism
Gender is a system of difference production which depends on labour, power 
and cathexis for its effects, as Connell (1987, 1995) and Hollway (1994) have 
argued. If signifiers of ‘woman’ remain the same, then ‘man’ will continue to 
signify the same. Moves that women make to change their positions thus have 
effects on men’s positioning. The difficulty with this is that change involves 
feminist women trying to change both themselves and men at the same time. It 
is nevertheless encouraging that any change interrupts men’s positioning in 
discourses as well as women’s. This is work that men can do also and into 
which they have been encouraged and sometimes precipitated by women’s 
feminism (cf Connell, 1995; Griffin, 1997). Another implication is that a focus 
on gender relations is required. Men and men’s subjectivities, especially as they 
engage with emancipatory discourses, including feminism, cannot simply be left 
out of the equation, as radical feminist theorising tends to do.
When people come to read themselves through different discourses, the 
structures of labour, power and cathexis and the system of gender difference 
production which they facilitate are challenged. Many women and men do not
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recognise that other discourses, practices and possibilities exist, apart from 
those based on an essentialist perception of what it is to be women or men. 
Their incorporation into femininity and masculinity comes about not only 
through divisions of labour and imbalances in material and economic power, 
but also through complex and less acknowledged emotional, psychic and sexual 
workings of desire and cathexis. Dominant sexist discourses encourage them to 
interpret these workings as evidence of their true ‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’ 
selves. In dominant feminist discourses, these are interpreted for them as 
evidence that attention to the personal will never achieve emancipation, or, 
alternatively, for women, that they need to leave the heterosexual relationships 
within which they experience these feelings (Hollway, 1995).
Feminist researchers and teachers must not underestimate the cathectic 
attachments which can exist to certain discursive practices and positions. It 
should also be understood that investments can seem like freely made choices, 
or can be portrayed as choices. Another implication is that feminist educators 
need to be aware of discourses which challenge liberal humanism’s and radical 
feminism’s dominant views of the human subject, and that they are able to 
develop the discourses in the collectives of which they are part, and to find 
ways of communicating and developing different discourses when working 
with women or men in any learning situation.
10.2.4 Power and agency for feminist change
Feminism has been preoccupied with power throughout its history and it is a 
current concern of Irish feminist activists. Critical adult education practice and 
theory aimed at social change also take power and empowerment — theorised 
in this work as agency — as central concerns. From a feminist poststructuralist 
point of view, 'it does not make sense to think of political change simply in 
terms of emancipation from oppression, as feminists conventionally have done. 
It does make sense to think of transforming political relations through the
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production of new discourses and so new forms of power and new forms of the 
self (Ramanazoglu, 1993a: 24). What has this work added to the theorisation 
of power and agency?
Power has been theorised throughout the study as an outcome of discursive 
practices and positionings which exist in recursive relationship with 
psychodynamic processes. It is acknowledged that there are other ways of 
theorising it (see Cockburn, 1983; Fraser, 1989: 32), but it is asserted that the 
discursive form of power is one of the least obvious manifestations, and one 
which needs to be acknowledged. In this way, power can also be seen in terms 
of an ongoing, relational production, open to change, instead of simple 
suppression.
I have attempted to integrate psychodynamic accounts with interpersonal 
relations, including family dynamics and unconscious motivations and with 
sociological structures, practices and relationships, as advocated by Segal 
(1990: 93). Segal considers such an integration rarely attempted, outside 
feminist writing on mothering, which tends to treat it as a timeless, ahistorical 
institution. To do this, I have used Connell’s (1987, 1995) theorisation of 
structures of labour, power and cathexis, with an emphasis on cathexis. I 
further assert that all three of these structures can be dealt with in a politicised 
practice of personal development education. Whatever about achieving a 
‘complex integration’ (Segal, 1990: 93), I have shown how structures of 
cathexis permeate labour and power structures. As Segal (ibid: 102) points out, 
power also permeates all aspects of the structures to an extent that it is 
probably inaccurate to treat them as analytically distinct. ‘The solution is 
perhaps to avoid any tripartite structural divisions for a more flexible naming of 
the central dynamics of gender hierarchy. Power, surely, is everywhere — in the 
economic, the political and the interpersonal; desire, and its opposites, fear and 
loathing, are similarly ubiquitous’ (ibid).
The analysis of power in this study has concentrated on emotional investments 
in certain positions and cathectic relations. It has shown that women are not
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without power, as women, or as feminists, when it comes to getting people to 
engage with feminist discourses and thereby have feminist effects. But I have 
emphasised also that this does not mean that women’s and men’s powers are 
equal, nor that the power of feminist discourses is equal to the power of 
dominant sexist discourses. Firstly, the power conferred by being the other 
(that is, the woman, or the feminist woman) in various relations in the present 
is not equal to that of men because it does not signify the same in dominant 
sexist discourses (Hollway, 1982). In addition, in practice, such power operates 
at the same time as many other powers, such as socially sanctioned authority 
and material resources. Such alternative sources of power and power relations 
also pertain in heterosexual couples and between adults and children, resulting 
in social sources of power within intimate relations (ibid: 484). This is where 
we need to include materialist and economic analyses:
The resources which usually have accrued to the men through other 
discourses and practices confer powers which are not usually left 
unexercised in the struggle to control the object of his desire for the 
other, (ibid)
The feminist women in this study are examples of women who have access to 
multiple sources of power because of their independent economic status. Some 
women have only one power to lose and when this is the case, they are less 
likely to challenge their position with ease (ibid). The importance of keeping in 
mind the material inequalities between women and men is thus emphasised. It 
needs to be kept in mind by any facilitator of women’s personal development 
education who is hoping to produce politicised and agentic subjectivities and 
who draws on such an analysis of power.
Socially critical understandings are not in themselves a guarantee of being able 
to make changes associated with being agentic as a feminist. This is where 
radical feminist theorising and earlier consciousness raising practices are 
lacking.
My analysis makes it clear that power and agency are not the same thing.
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Having power is not the same as being agentic, but to achieve agency, it is vital 
to understand politically the different ways that power works and how one is 
implicated and positioned in those workings. Every moment of power and 
resistance devises its own strategy. Some forms of resistance to the workings 
of power produce agency, others do not. The analysis of power as a two-way 
production indicates additional moves that women can make to achieve 
feminist agency. Such moves have not been analysed in liberal feminist and 
radical feminist theorising.
The concept of positionality was again useful for analysing patterns of power 
relationships and the construction of agency. I took it from the research arena 
into personal development education. It allows women to approach change 
when they are feeling ‘stuck’, through an examination of their own positionality 
and the ways they position other people. ‘Conscious choices, even when they 
are less than ideal, help us to transcend our sense of entrapment’ (Lipman 
Blumen, 1994: 128). Personal development education can help people to make 
some choices, from a positional perspective. But collective agency is necessary 
also: the limits of personal development education are recognised.
Another benefit of the concept of positionality is that it allows women to 
recognise that they simultaneously occupy a range of social and cultural 
positions and to incorporate the social into their reflection on experience. This 
was illustrated in this study as occupying simultaneously feminist and feminine 
positions, but does not have to be confined to such positionings (see, for 
example, Kenway et al, 1994: 199) Through using positioning and 
positionality, it is possible to come to see power as multiple. The implications 
for a theory of change and hence for a meaningful feminist politics are 
significant. It takes us beyond a view of women as either stuck in a system 
where they have no meaningful access to power, or, alternatively, as powerful 
in the maternal, domestic and sexual arenas only. It prevents feminism from 
falling into ‘psychobabble’ on the one hand, or a structural-based movement 
incapable of politicising the personal, on the other hand (Burman, 1995: 132).
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10.3 Pedagogical conclusions
Feminism is a massive pedagogical project (Faith, 1994: 61). Generating new 
theoretical perspectives from which the dominant can be criticised and new 
possibilities envisaged is especially important. It is one of the aims of this thesis 
to show the practical value of feminist poststructuralist theory. What gives this 
work its focus on pedagogy is my desire to share something of feminist 
poststructuralist discourses and to engage in the production of knowledge.
The concept of pedagogy draws attention to the process through which 
knowledge is produced. In this section, I treat feminism and critical adult 
education pedagogy as almost interchangeable terms. I think this is justifiable, 
since feminism is a politics usually adopted in adulthood. I also assert that adult 
educators need to know about the consequences of identities adopted in 
adulthood. Tennant and Pogson (1995: 117) claim that a transformative 
practice of adult education is a version of Foucault’s (1988) ‘technologies of 
the self (cfGiddens, 1991).
Lusted’s concept of pedagogy is appropriate for a feminist poststructuralist 
pedagogical project, because it recognises the relational nature of teaching, 
learning and the production of knowledge. ‘How one teaches is therefore of 
central interest but, through the prism of pedagogy, it becomes inseparable 
from what is being taught and, crucially, from what one learns’ (Lusted, 1986: 
3; see also McDonald, 1989). Feminism and pedagogy converge at the point of 
intersection between personal experience and commitment to transformative 
politics. As an instrument of social change, a truly transformative pedagogy 
requires the embodiment of a subjectivity conscious of her own subordination 
(Lewis, 1993: 54) and of her successful resistances. But if our understanding 
takes us only as far as pinpointing the construction of femininity and 
oppression, then it is inadequate for a transformative pedagogical practice. The 
social transformation of gender identities is an explicit concern of feminist 
pedagogy. Subjectivity and, specifically, feminist subjectivity and its production
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is therefore central to any feminist pedagogy.
One challenge for both feminism in Ireland and for critical adult education 
pedagogy (especially where they come together in women’s personal 
development education) is to find a praxis adequate to the accounts of feminist 
subjectivities presented in this thesis. I have asserted more than once in this 
work that any curriculum which places personal growth at its centre must 
negotiate some tricky ideological ground (Kenway and Willis, 1990). The 
requirement of the pedagogy is that it can provide a framework where people 
can go beyond rational accounts and can do this without slipping into mere 
feeling accounts (cf Hollway, 1989). In other words, it has to avoid dualism.
Much feminist exhortation and adult education practice in this country comes 
down on one side or other of the dualism. Reactions to rationalism tend to 
concentrate on the spiritual and emotional. Reactions to the personal call for 
more emphasis on the structural. Humanist practice is seen as a radical 
alternative to religious practice in personal development education, but when 
humanist practice is then found to be inadequate for forming politicised 
subjectivities, the call is made to leave the personal, or to move beyond it, and 
to concentrate on the structural. The call to ‘move beyond’ personal 
development (cf Mulvey, 1995) assumes a hierarchy of development from 
personal to political, from individual to structural.
My analysis and account of my own stance have made clear that I do not 
consider any of these responses adequate, and I advocate a politicised account 
of the personal and a recognition of how personal the political is, in order to 
move beyond the stalemate which exists, with people taking to one camp or the 
other. This, I believe, is what a poststructural input into theory and practice can 
do for feminist adult education.
When women arrive at radical feminist and social constructionist ways of 
seeing things for the first time, it is enormously exciting. This produces the 
‘aha!’ factor. But, even though these ways of interpreting the world provide
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very important insights, they are not the sole explanations for women’s 
condition. Unfortunately, because we are so attuned to the idea that 
fundamental truths exist, most people stop there. They look for reductionist 
explanations in all walks of life. So, pedagogically speaking, we need to go 
beyond the reductionism o f ‘aha!’, while acknowledging its importance. This is 
reminiscent of Kristeva’s project of operating in three stages of feminism — 
radical, liberal and deconstructed — all at once. If women consider that an 
essential femininity is the whole truth about them, this can operate to 
perpetuate the current power status quo. If they consider that the only way to 
emancipation is to tackle social structures, it can have the same effect, because 
the personal is left untheorised in a politicised manner and the assumptions of a 
liberal humanist perspective are taken for granted. Foucault shows truth, 
reason and goodness as ideas produced inside a mode of life in order to ratify it 
(cf Hollway, 1991a). He exposed distinctions operating between rational and 
irrational as operating for power’s sake (Cocks, 1989: 18). Distinctions 
between the personal and the structural can operate in the same way.
Feminist poststructuralism provides a radical framework for understanding the 
relation between people and the social world and for conceptualising social 
change (Davies, 1990c: xi). The structures and process of the social world are 
recognised as having a material force, a capacity to constrain, to shape, to 
coerce, as well as to make possible individual action. The processes whereby 
individuals take themselves up as persons are understood as ongoing processes. 
The individual is not so much social construction which results in some 
relatively fixed end product, but one who is constituted and reconstituted 
through a variety of discursive practices. It is the recognition of the ongoing 
nature of the constitution of self and the recognition of the non-unitary nature 
of self that makes poststructuralist theory different from social construction 
theory (ibid).
The solution, then, to the very real problems outlined in Mulvey’s (1995) 
report on women and power in Ireland, as discussed in Chapter One of this
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work, is not a straightforward turn to the structural conditions of life. It is not a 
move ‘on’ to awareness of structures. This implies that there is a hierarchy of 
moves which can lead to liberation, starting with the personal and moving on to 
higher forms of conscientization such as the structural. They all have to be 
tackled at the same time: not an easy task, but an essential one. For feminists 
and educators committed to social transformation, it is not enough to say that a 
course of action can emphasise one aspect only. This means that all choices for 
action have limits which must be recognised. Neither is the solution to abandon 
spiritual development or individuation, or the awareness which liberal 
humanism has created of individual human needs. However, if women remain 
preoccupied with introspection and healing, people with vested interests in 
retaining the status quo will get on with that task (cf Inglis, 1995: 4).
The concept of multiple and contradictory discourses, powers and subjectivities 
can act as a resource for women, and for men, who want to make changes. 
Radical self-reflection can create awareness of how all of these positions and 
discourses overlap in the same person, that is, how the person is multiply 
constructed. Awareness of this is profoundly liberatory in its potential, 
especially insofar as it has the effect of freeing people from guilt or 
ambivalence, or at least can give them the tools to free themselves.
But how does this differ from a human relations discourse, when people want 
to know ‘Who am I?’ It can be frustrating not to be able to settle on an idea of 
who one is, even while at the same time accepting the constructedness and 
multiplicity of human experience. Wetherell (1995: 135, 6) draws on Hall 
(1988a: 44) to address this issue. Hall argues that we do, indeed, answer the 
question and come to conclusions and settle on positions in various 
relationships (cf Davies and Harre, 1990) and often maintain these versions of 
ourselves for a considerable length of time (or find that others maintain them 
for us). Identity is thus about closure, as well as difference and multiplicity. It is 
about refusing all the possible versions and choosing one, for a time. So 
subjectivity, the sense of oneself, is often formed ‘at these points where we
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place a Hill stop’ (Wetherell, 1995: 136). This has implications for the 
sustainability of feminist politics and strategy. A feminism where the 
constructed nature of self is accepted but where choices for action are made 
nonetheless, based on a conviction that closures have to be made, however 
flawed, is eminently sustainable.
10 3.1 Implications for politicised adult education
The study of feminist subjectivities in this work has shown that so much of 
feminist life is the daily project of establishing a social identity. How can it 
work, then, if it is based on a deconstruction of the category ‘female’? Again 
drawing on Hall (1988a, 1988b), Wetherell (1995: 141) calls for a
politics of articulation ... that is, a politics which tries to combine two 
contradictory movements — opening and closing. Closing in the sense 
that effective political action involves putting, at some point, a stop to 
talking: in feminist terms it involves defining a community of women, 
and an identity from which to act. But also opening — in that this 
community of women must not be taken for granted; the way it is 
constructed must be continually open to question (see also Gallop, 
1982).
This might be one way to mobilise Kristevan theory and take it out of the 
marginal position it occupies.
Kristeva’s concern to dissolve identity ... is necessary if resistance is 
not to replace the domination it struggles against with an equally 
repressive structure of subjugation. As far as can be seen, however, her 
politics, although subversive, lack mobilization thus remaining marginal 
for want of collective agency. (Kerfoot and Knights, 1994: 85)
Wetherell (1995) advocates feminist psychology as a model of this new method 
of politics. A self-consciously feminist adult education praxis could also 
provide such a model. Within it, a feminist practice of personal development 
education could have a role in introducing the model at grassroots level, as well 
as in its reflexive development. Personal development education is, after all,
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where many women make the first contact with adult education and feminism. 
Such a model involves laying bare the power dynamics of different discourses 
of femininity and feminism, openly questioning the formulation of dominant 
discourses about women, pushing forward subordinated and barely formulated 
alternatives such as I have produced in this thesis, as well as others which I 
refer to in Section 5 of this chapter, on future research and pedagogical work.
The knowing subject of such a model of pedagogy will take on board the 
poststructural lesson par excellence, which is to be suspicious of authority and 
authoritative versions of who we are. It is important that feminist teachers can 
somehow make accessible to learners the various theoretical tools that are 
available for doing this, but it is equally important that such teaching does not 
take the form of an initiation into feminist theory as a disembodied form of 
knowledge. Feminist teaching projects must devise ways of teaching students 
about the various feminist perspectives in ways that focus them on students’ 
everyday personal, intellectual and political dilemmas (Middleton, 1993: 31) 
and provide positions from which to act effectively for political change.
The model of subjectivity put forward in this work has potential for practical 
application in personal development education.
Much of the unfamiliarity and strangeness of poststructuralism recedes 
when applied to everyday life. Work, relationships, beliefs, skills, and 
we ourselves are not identical from one day, or even one moment, to 
the next or from one place to another. There are always differences ... 
What we do in everyday life is negotiated, compromised, contingent, 
subject to miscalculation, and flawed. (Cherryholmes, 1988: 142)
While authoritative and foundational theories may promise redemption, they 
cannot help us deal with confusion and imperfection, mingled in with success, 
as well as poststructuralism can. Poststructuralism has room for both 
constructors and deconstructors. Construction is based on the realisation that 
what is built is temporal, fallible, limited, compromised, negotiated and 
incomplete or contradictory. Each construction will eventually be replaced. 
And deconstructive argument must be shaped so that construction will be
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encouraged and follow (ibid: 143).
Cain (1993: 83) claims that once a concept is discursively arrived at in feminist 
theory, women recognise it. The role of the intellectual in this is facilitative, 
clearing the roadblocks, from the standpoint or site of the group of people for 
whom you want to produce knowledge. If we fail to incorporate the practice of 
personal development education into our politicised and critical educational 
theory, then we leave open space for others to construct — either implicitly or 
explicitly — theories of the person and of experience which we may well find 
politically unacceptable.
It is important that intellectuals get involved in the ‘arenas of practice’ 
(Hollway, 1994: 268). Otherwise, dominant assumptions about women and 
men will be reproduced unchanged. For many intellectuals and deeply 
committed radical feminists, this entails a possibly difficult ‘reconciliation of 
radical political commitment with an appreciation of the shades of grey in the 
social world’ (Cocks 1989: publisher’s introduction). It also involves taking a 
close look at our own powers.
10.4 The contribution of this work to critical adult education and 
feminism
Empirical analysis on politicised, specifically feminist, adult subjectivities has 
not been done before in an Irish context, nor in an adult education context. 
Using procedures developed in Britain by Hollway (1982, 1984a, b, 1989) on 
adult relations and Mama (1995) on the development of radically politicised 
black identity in women, I have developed a contextualised picture of some of 
the content and processes of feminism for women in 1990s Ireland and have 
drawn implications for the practice of politicised personal development 
education for women. In its examination of politicised identities adopted in 
adulthood, the study moves beyond the dualism apparent in most published
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analyses of women, politicisation and power in Ireland, which emphasise either 
the personal or the structural and thus fail to overcome problems of either 
individualism or determinism.
Building on the work of other feminist theorists, this work claims that feminist 
women’s desires for change and their resulting behaviour do not arise solely 
from individual psychologies or preferences, nor from the rationally adopted 
feminist discourses which feminists use to interpret their experiences in 
adulthood. Social relations and situations in the present also shape their 
feminism. This means that, while the situations and relations which shape 
feminism vary greatly, the ways that feminist women interpret them are not 
accidental or fortuitous.
Regarding personal development education, the desire for change in their 
everyday lives motivates women to attend courses. In more general feminist 
day-to-day life, there exists a consciously articulated desire to disrupt the 
gender regime. No matter what discourse of feminism a woman draws on most 
readily to explain her experiences, a crucial factor in any relation where the 
gender regime is under scrutiny by her is the opportunities in the present 
provided by a particular setting or situation. This influences what discourses 
are drawn on, where the boundaries between discourses become blurred, the 
explanatory limits of discourses and how feminist women approach resistance 
and the transformation of society.
In developing this approach, I have drawn on critical psychologies and social 
theories and have developed in the process a theory which I consider distinctly 
educational, because a pedagogical context allows us to address subjectivity as 
discourse, relations in the present and as psychodynamics in a way which few 
other situations allow. I consider this attention to subjectivity to be radical and 
a distinguishing mark of my project. This is more than being simply 
cross-disciplinary. It is an effort to develop theory in which feminism and 
pedagogy come together to form a living educational tradition. As such, it 
offers to critical adult education a revised conceptual framework for thinking
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about the person and about gender. It builds on and pushes forward the 
development of consciousness raising and conscientization, in a manner which 
is context-specific. The emphasis on circumstances in the present gives the 
theory and practice its dynamic — and therefore living — quality.
Brookes (1992: 156) cites Williamson (1981), suggesting that it makes little 
difference what we teach, as long as it leads to questioning of the assumptions 
which inform our social practices. The production of emancipatory forms of 
subjectivity is a practice which can be taken up immediately, in any classroom, 
including the personal development classroom, with both women and men, 
without devising a whole new curriculum (Brookes, 1992: 156). This is in 
contrast to work which suggests that we need to devise a special curriculum 
for women.
The alternative which this study suggests is possible is to integrate a feminist 
perspective into students’ reflection on everyday experiences and dilemmas 
(ibid). In this way, it is possible to create a dynamic educational practice where 
different subject positions are available to people, backed by a theory which 
puts forward for consideration debates about the social construction of selves 
and the reproduction and transformation of society (cf Stephenson et al, 1996: 
184). The classroom itself can thus become an arena of practice.
In adult education, feminism has been addressed many times, but not from this 
starting point of feminist subjectivities. Personal development education has 
been addressed also, but from either social constructionist, empowerment or 
human relations perspectives, not from the feminist poststructuralist 
epistemological stance adopted here. This stance takes as given the necessity to 
have a politicised theory of the person and a personalised theory of the 
political, in order to make education dynamic and productive.
The stance taken builds on the work of Freire and Mezirow, discussed in 
Chapter Four. It addresses Freire’s concern with social justice and asserts the 
value of praxis, as Freire does, but without assuming that all people’s
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experiences of oppression are the same, that is, without lapsing into 
universalism. In examining acts of resistance and change, the work also 
recognises that we are multiple, contradictory, desiring and embodied subjects. 
It thus addresses the assumption in Mezirovian theory that we are primarily 
rational subjects and that there is a close and unproblematic relationship 
between rational knowledge and action for change.
10.5 Suggestions for further research and pedagogical work 
10.5.1 Subjectivity
Movements for social change need sophisticated theories of the person, the 
personal and human agency. Theoretical work on subjectivity provides an 
emancipatory discourse within which to position research (cf Hollway 1991a: 
133) and pedagogy. This is important for adult education theory and practice 
which wish to develop a distinct pedagogy with the production of social and 
political change at its core, while drawing on existing theoretical traditions 
which are useful.
Following Hollway (1989: 42), I assert that unless researchers and educators 
have developed a theory of subjectivity, old assumptions will govern practice. 
Such investigations and pedagogical projects need to take into account the 
increasing multiplicity of male subjectivities, especially as men respond to 
feminist discourses (cf Connell, 1995). They can also address the theorisation 
of femininity and masculinity in ways which are not deterministic, thus 
encompassing the project of the production and modification of gender 
differences, to which I refer in Section 5 .3 of this chapter.
I would like to see more research and pedagogical situations where women and 
men could analyse themselves as social subjects, as PI and P3 did in Chapter 
Fight, rather than having a researcher or teacher offer interpretations. For this 
reason, I think that a memory work approach to methodology (see, for
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example, Haug, 1987; Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault and Benton, 1992, and 
Stephenson et al, 1996) would be useful in further work of this kind.
At the time I began the fieldwork and analysis, I was not aware of the full 
potential of the memory work approach, although I later learned that many of 
my aims are similar, namely, the problematising of experience as authoritative 
and the accounting for the ways in which subjectivity is both discursively and 
relationally produced (ibid: 183, 184). I believe that memory work is capable of 
producing, in group situations, a dynamic analysis o f the self, which can help 
group members to theorise agency and change. I consider this crucial in any 
research which is going to be of use to radical pedagogies. I would like to see 
work like this done systematically on a large scale.
I have also made connections between methodologies used in emancipatory 
research and emancipatory pedagogies. They have the potential to be mutually 
enriching, by producing new knowledges which can help efforts for social 
change. The development of the memory work technique in particular is one 
which could provide a model for bringing together research and pedagogy 
which deal with subjectivity. The development of a group’s sense of collectivity 
and collaboration are factors which affect the quality of the memory work 
process (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 62).
In discussing research and pedagogy, we also need to be aware of the common 
dangers between the genderising of methodologies for research and the 
ghettoising of women’s education into ‘what women need’ in educational 
terms and ‘what women do best’ in terms of a research approach. Both of these 
views need to be deconstructed and shown to be social and historical. As 
Coward (1993) asserts, women need to talk, but they need to talk outside 
dominant discourses, otherwise these discourses can produce the very gender 
differences they claim to be describing, both in education and in research.
350
10.5.2 Power
The picture presented in this work of multiple subjectivities and experience 
calls into question any straightforward notion of power. Nevertheless, feminists 
and critical adult education practitioners need to continue to give consideration 
to it. This work shows it to be a productive force, present in relations of all 
kinds and capable of being exercised by the oppressed in a dynamic 
relationship, as well as by the oppressor. This is one sense in which it can 
produce knowledge (cf Hollway, 1991a: 11). Such a perspective on power 
needs to be incorporated into any work on oppression, resistance and change.
Many women earlier accepted the idea that power means having what men 
have, but this resulted in the second shift of housework added to work outside 
the home, as described by Hochschild (1990a). The inadequacy of this notion 
of power in turn has led to a flight into new age mysticism, with its accent on 
female spiritual power and its lack of engagement with material culture. A third 
way, currently popular, is to concentrate on female sexual power, where the 
Spice Girls, advertising agencies and the Machiavellian machinations of The 
Princessa (Rubin, 1997) come together. But female power is no threat to any 
gender regime if it is limited to sexual aggression based on ‘in your face’ 
essential sex differences and then marketed as titillation.
A ... methodological precaution ... [urges] that the analysis should not 
concern itself with power at the level of conscious intention or 
decision; that it should not attempt to consider power from its internal 
point of view and that it should refrain from posing the labyrinthine and 
unanswerable question; ‘who then has power and what has he in mind? 
What is the aim of someone who possesses power?’ Instead, it is a case 
of studying power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is 
completely invested in its real and effective practices. (Foucault, 1980:
97, cited in Cherryholmes, 1988:)
Real and effective practices include the words, statements, texts, discourses 
and experiences of participants in education and research. While power has 
always been a focus of feminist theorising, we need to constantly develop this, 
to produce ever more useful understandings of it, capable of dealing with the
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complexity and multiplicity of its late twentieth-century expressions. Old 
dichotomies led to clear explanations and impetus for action; the new 
complexities of power may have the opposite effect (Jones, 1993: 165), if we 
do not develop ways of using them in classrooms to spark militant oppositional 
efforts (cf Cocks, 1989: 6).
10.5.3 Treating gender differences as produced, rather than as given
Feminist pedagogy and research need to address the fact that feminism will 
never get beyond critique to creating social change if the production of gender 
differences is not analysed. Personal development education is one area where 
this can happen for adult educators. It is where feelings and relationships are 
central, so they are available for deconstruction, if the facilitator knows how to 
do this. Social analysis and struggles for social and economic equity do not, of 
themselves, modify the production of gender difference. They are essential 
elements for change but, alone, not sufficient. It is not just a question of adding 
process to content either (if content is seen as discourses and social analysis). 
Recognition of the emotional investments and the dynamics they set up with 
partners and children is crucial.
These cathectic dynamics are areas where gender differences are available for 
modification. They are spaces where we can learn to move from critique to 
reconstruction (Wilkinson, 1996: introduction), that is, to act with agency. 
There is no point in tiying to change structures of labour, culture, politics, 
economics and power, if it is not acknowledged that they exist in inextricable 
relationships with cathectic structures which must be addressed also. Cathectic 
relationships can undoubtedly be restraining, or a force for the maintenance of 
the gender status quo, but they can also be arenas of practice, where change 
can take place. Such relations are sites for the production of gender differences 
and therefore for their modification. This means that adult education needs to 
focus on gender relations as sites for the production of gender differences,
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rather than on supposedly essential gender differences. This is a policy matter 
for course designers and providers of professional training.
We need highly politicised feminist women to train as personal development 
facilitators. They must be politicised already, before they start the training and 
they need to hone this politicisation as part of their training and their ongoing 
educational and political development. Furthermore, they need to have a radical 
theory of the human person at their disposal. They need to know how to go 
beyond essentialist feminisms and psychologies, as well as beyond social 
constructionist interpretations of human nature.
Human relations psychology is widely drawn on in personal development 
courses, as it is in adult education as a whole, for its learner centred and 
participative processes. Process has its own content and therefore human 
relations processes bring content with them. Facilitators need a high degree of 
awareness of this danger and an accompanying theoretical sophistication which 
can counter essentialist ideologies of women, as well as human relations and 
other liberal humanist claims to ideological neutrality.
10.5.4 The production of feminist discourses of emancipatory relations 
between women and men
Feminism needs to get to grips with relations with men and with 
heterosexuality as sites for political change for at least two reasons. First, 
gender differences are produced and are thus available for modification. 
Second, as Hollway (1995) points out, the experiences of many heterosexual 
women who are also feminist are being largely ignored in mainstream 
theorising about women’s oppression. Nevertheless, there are interstices of 
practice where heterosexual feminists are engaged in relations with men which 
escape dominant forms of heterosexual relating. This space is social, in that it is 
related to practice born out of feminist discourses and it is also private and
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unique to each individual through the workings of psychodynamic processes 
(ibid). It is a space which this study demonstrates exists, bearing out Hollway’s 
work. Such practice is currently not a discourse, in the sense that it has 
collective resonance. There is an absence of any published debate about it in 
Ireland. The effects of not developing it may be the distancing of many 
heterosexual women from feminism, as in Britain (ibid), and / or a colonisation 
of matters concerning heterosexuality, marriage, sexuality, relationships and the 
family by forces with an interest in maintaining the status quo (cf O’Reilly, 
1993).
The production of such a discourse would resonate with many women’s 
experiences but requires more empirical work, informed by the theoretical 
stance of feminist poststructuralism. Hollway (1995: 100, 102) also calls for 
such work and suggests that she has been told informally by many feminists 
that they relate to these issues. She emphasises, as I wish to, that this is not a 
call for work which suppresses aspects of heterosex which contradict equality. 
Rather it is a call for discourse analytic work which has access to theoretical 
tools which can do justice to the full range of experience (ibid).
10.6 Concluding remarks
This work has highlighted the role that knowledge creation can play in the 
formation and evolution of the social movement that is feminism and the role 
that feminism, in turn, plays in the construction of knowledge and subjectivity. 
Social movements generate knowledge and typically form an identity in 
opposition to a constructed Other (Holford, 1995: 103). Feminism has done 
this, and in large measure has constructed itself as Other to a male culture. But 
the knowledge generated must be viewed critically, even by those who identify 
with the aims of the social movement and consider themselves part of it (ibid).
Poststructuralist theory is itself a discourse that we can take up, in order to 
critically view feminism. I have chosen to take it up here because it provides
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me with the conceptual tools to make sense of my data and allows me to 
formulate answers to the central question of the study: under what conditions 
can we do politically radical women’s personal development education? 
Equally importantly, I have also taken it up because it is a radical discourse 
which allows us to think beyond the male / female dualism as inevitable, to 
examine the processes through which we position ourselves as male or female 
and which we can change if we so choose. This is part of a pedagogical effort 
to produce new living subject positions which people can take up or enter.
Feminist poststructuralist theory has also been a part of my own efforts at 
shaping a feminist identy and feminist agency. It has enabled me to produce 
useful feminist knowledge in my own particular nexus of discourse, situation 
and psychodynamic processes.
Both Tong (1995: Chapter 8) and Richardson (1996b) place feminist 
poststructuralist theorising at the margins of feminism. It is certainly a subaltern 
discourse within feminism. Liberal feminism is dominant in schools (Ryan, 
1997) and either social constructionist radical feminism or essential differences 
feminism, or a mixture of the two, dominate the explanatory frameworks of 
women’s community movements and education. There is evidence that a small 
number of women are also beginning to engage in a class analysis of the 
community women’s movement (see Dorgan and McDonnell, 1977). The 
discourses on which these manifestations of feminism draw do not change 
meaning or challenge dominant cultural assumptions about what it is to be 
female or male. I am not suggesting that feminist poststructuralism provides the 
‘Final Solution’ but that it encourages feminist workers for change to see 
things somewhat differently and to ask some previously unasked questions, 
thereby refining and revitalising their work for change (cf Kenway et al, 1994: 
197).
The analysis provided in this work is a means to explore the possibilities for 
action towards change, by examination of contradictions, such as women’s 
positioning in both feminist and sexist discourses and what is often suppressed
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(women’s power) in these discourses. Such a theorisation allows a focus on 
where feminist women are aiming to go and how they can get there, rather than 
remaining fixed on where women have come from or how they are held in 
place by imbalances in material or economic resources between women and 
men. It moves beyond the dualism apparent in most published analyses of 
women and power in Ireland, which emphasise either the personal or the 
structural and thus remain trapped in either individualism or determinism.
A materialist analysis is not to be discounted, but needs to be enhanced by the 
addition of a theory of power which takes into account its dynamic and 
constantly shifting nature. Thus, the use of Foucauldian theory is useful for 
analysing the production of gender and the means of re-producing the signifiers 
‘woman’ and ‘feminist’ in changed ways. Without an analysis of power which 
sees it as capable of being exercised by the oppressed, it is not possible to 
explain feminist women’s investments in positions of femininity, nor is it 
possible to see the possibility of disruption of the gender status quo in cathectic 
relationships.
There is a need to reappraise the meaning and use of the term radical in 
feminist theorising. While present-day and earlier radical feminist theory is very 
important to feminist poststructuralism, it can no longer be considered the basis 
for a radical politics which encompasses a theory of how change happens. I 
believe that feminist poststructuralism is a discourse which is capable of 
producing women as active agents for feminism. It can be used to do this 
through personal development education, as well as in other arenas of feminist 
endeavour.
The use of feminist poststructuralist theory in this work has allowed me to 
produce knowledge which serves feminist interests of challenging the gender 
status quo. By extension, these interests are the same as those of a critical and 
politicised adult education. It has allowed me to demonstrate the explanatory 
limits of the ‘structures vs person’ debates about social change. It has also 
allowed me to contribute to the work of feminists who are developing a
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dynamic theory of the psychic and the social as mutually recursive productions. 
Such theory is capable of theorising change and facilitating human agency, 
while not purporting to be universal.
In the process of contributing to this theory, I have shown that reflection on the 
self does not have to be purely individually focused, or individualistic in its 
effects. I have also shown that feminism ‘comes together’ very differently for 
each person, depending on individual history, and in engagement with 
discourses which carry the social and historical content of subjectivity and 
which are in turn inserted into a cultural web of narratives available to each 
individual. In addition, each situation, or moment o f the process is important as 
an instance of production, circulation and consumption of feminism.
Politically agentic educators display a judgement capable of capturing the 
distinctive character of both an era and a specific situation. There is a way of 
understanding how people in a particular time and place think and act which 
also tells us what can be changed politically and what cannot. This is the ‘sense 
of reality’ (Miller, 1996) which distinguishes pedagogy, something quite 
different from knowledge of sociological and psychological Taws’. Knowledge, 
subjectivity and meaning are constructed by feminism, along with other social 
movements. Adult education has a role to play in this process, in that adult 
educators can act as movement intellectuals, not to initiate people into 
academic knowledge, but to take academic knowledge into the frontline of 
educational practice and to facilitate its development in an engagement with 
students. Through our research, our theorising and our classroom practices, we 
can produce with them new positions in emancipatory discourses which are 
available for take-up by all of us. In this way, we have a central role to play in 
the emergence of new knowledges and thus in social change itself. As Holford 
(1995: 107) puts it: ‘In no other area of their activity are adult educators 
offered so profound a role’.
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